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This dissertation explores the interaction between formal institutions and the
informal institution of corruption in Romania from 1997 until 2006. I argue that
corruption is an informal institution that creates incentives incompatible with the formal
rules, alters the effectiveness of formal institutions, undermines the rule of law, and
threatens democratic consolidation. Specifically, I test the capacity of formal institutions
to counteract the informal institution of corruption and thus to reduce corruption in four
sectors: the judiciary, customs, health care, and public procurement. The research project
investigates the methods to restructure incentives and increase the effectiveness of formal
institutions, the factors that influence the success or failure of anticorruption strategies,
and the capacity of anticorruption strategies to restructure incentives. An institutional
analysis of corruption contributes to our understanding of when and why anti-corruption
programs fail or succeed.
This study employs a mixed methodology. The predominant methodology is
qualitative, whereas quantitative analyses are integrated whenever appropriated (e.g.,
testing for statistically significance relationships between variables or estimating kappa
coefficient for multiple raters). The longitudinal analysis of the four sectors in Romania
uses the "most similar with different outcomes" research design.

The dissertation shows that, particularly after 2000, there were clear indications of
political will manifested through comprehensive diagnoses of corruption, the intermittent
inclusion of the main stakeholders in the policy-making process, the adoption of
anticorruption strategies, and the creation of more transparent monitoring systems at the
national and sectoral level. Moreover, one factor stood out in explaining the presence or
absence of political will, namely the external pressure exercised by the EU, which was a
constant factor in explaining the instances of political will and in supporting the anticorruption leaders if and when they appeared. The public opinion pressure was shown to
be insufficient by itself to stimulate political will and to lead to the adoption of
anticorruption reforms, particularly outside the election years. Overall, the largest
progress in combating corruption and increasing the effectiveness of formal institutions
was registered in the judiciary, followed by customs, and public procurement, whereas
the least progress was made in the health care sector.
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CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Introduction

This project explores the interaction between formal institutions and the informal
institution of corruption in Romania in the decade prior to the country's accession to the
European Union. I argue that corruption is an informal institution that creates incentives
incompatible with the formal rules, alters the effectiveness of formal institutions,
undermines the rule of law, and threatens democratic consolidation. Specifically, I test
the capacity of formal institutions to counteract the informal institution of corruption and
thus to reduce corruption in four sectors: the judiciary, customs, health care, and public
procurement. What are the methods to restructure incentives and increase the
effectiveness of formal institutions? What reforms or strategies are effective in fighting
corruption? Are anticorruption strategies capable in practice of restructuring behavioral
incentives? What are the factors that influence their success or failure? An institutional
analysis of corruption contributes to our analysis of when and why anti-corruption
programs fail or succeed.1
For the last sixteen years, Romania has been struggling with the process of
democratic consolidation, a process undermined in part by corruption. In October 2005,

1

Although informal politics are not the focus of this study, they are captured to the extent to which they
play a role in moderating the interaction of formal institutions with the informal institution of corruption.

1

Transparency International (2005a) ranked Romania as the eighty-fifth most corrupt
country in the world, along with the Dominican Republic and Mongolia. Thus, Romania
lagged behind all former communist countries in the region, except Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia. A year later and only a
couple of months before joining the European Union, Transparency International ranked
Romania as the eighty-fourth most corrupt country in the world. While the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) for Romania improved (from 3.0 to 3.1 ), Romania continued to
maintain its rank as the most corrupt former communist country in the region, except for
those mentioned above.4
In the Romanian post-communist context, corruption is an informal institution
inherited from the previous regime that further thrived under the favorable circumstances
created by the transition to democracy and the market. The complex transition process
resulted in a fluid formal institutional context conducive to the flourishing and
routinization of informal institutions. Specifically, corruption in transition settings has
been facilitated by the rewriting of an unprecedented number of laws, regulations, and
policies; the redistribution of wealth from the state to the private sector; the virtual
absence of institutions capable of checking the abuse of public office; a situation in which
the old rules do not function anymore but the new rules are not yet crystallized in
people's minds; and, particularly in the post-communist cases, state officials who have

2
For more details regarding the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), please see
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2005/cpi2005.sources.en.html
3
The score is measured on a scale from 1 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). For more details, please see
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006
4
See for example the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) at
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006

2

inherited a lot of license permission and discretionary powers (World Bank 2000a,
Hankis 2002, Krastev 2004).
Borrowing from several sources (Philp 2002, Helmke and Levitsky 2004, Huffer
2005), I define corruption as a set of unwritten and illegal norms and rules that regulate
interaction between public servants and the general public, are used for the public
servants' personal gain (although sometimes indirectly, e.g., family, friends, ethnic
group, political party), and are enforced through informal channels outside of the
officially sanctioned channels. Hence, corruption in the forms of bribery, influence
peddling, gratitude or informal payments, favoritism, nepotism, clientelism, and
misappropriation competes directly with the formal democratic institutions created or
reformed in Romania since 1990.
The prospect of European Union (EU) membership highlighted the conflict
between the formal institutions of democracy and the informal institution of corruption
by increasing the visibility of the latter and providing powerful pressure from the outside
to curb them. To fulfill EU requirements, Romania had to adapt its formal rules and
norms to the European standards that sometimes differed considerably from its informal
norms. The result was an increasingly conflictual relationship between the formal and
informal rules. Furthermore, the EU pressure for anticorruption strategies and results was
unevenly distributed; that is, the pressure to curb corruption in the judiciary and customs
was higher than for public procurement and health care sector (see Table 1, page 55).
This project draws on the literature on democratization, corruption, and informal
institutions and it brings three major contributions. First, it contributes to the study of
informal institutions by offering a better understanding of their interaction with formal

3

institutions and of the sources of informal institutional change in democratizing countries.
Second, it brings an empirical contribution to the policy debates by revealing the
effective ways of containing corruption and strengthening formal institutions. And third,
it contributes to a better understanding of the role played by external actors (such as the
EU, World Bank, UNDP) during democratization processes on reforming formal
institutions, fighting corruption, and, ultimately, on democratic consolidation. Hence, I
test the effectiveness of anticorruption strategies5 and provide an understanding of
anticorruption strategies from an institutionalist perspective. For the purpose of this
study, I use Helmke and Levitsky's (2006, 13) definition of effectiveness, according to
which an institution is effective if "rules and procedures [...] are enforced or complied
with in practice." If institutions are effective, actors believe that there is a high
probability that noncompliance with the rules will be sanctioned. If the opposite is true,
the actors expect low sanctions for noncompliance with the rules and norms prescribed
by the formal and/or informal institutions.
As an institutional analysis of corruption, this study relies on two approaches:
Historical Institutionalism (HI) and Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI). The former
approach stresses the importance of path dependency, according to which, institutions are
perceived as "relatively persistent features of the historical landscape" which influence
the actors' behavior and actions (Hall and Taylor 1996, 941). The creation of new
institutions usually entails "high fixed or start-up costs," significant "learning effects,
coordination effects, and adaptive expectations." Furthermore, once an institution is
established it will generate positive feedbacks that will reinforce its own stability and

5

1 am using this term to reflect the various programs, measures, mechanisms and tactics employed in the
fight against corruption.

4

development (North 1990, 95). Positive feedback in path dependence analysis simply
translates into "history is remembered" (Pierson 2000, 75). According to Thelen (1999),
there are two feedback mechanisms that reinforce the established institution or path
taken. One mechanism is functional and it relies on the incentive structure created by the
existing institution(s) and which induces "actors to adapt their strategies in ways that
reflect but also reinforce the 'logic' of the system" (Thelen 1990, 392). The other path
refers to the distributional effects of institutions and it claims that the institutional
arrangements introduce certain distributional biases that empower certain groups in
society and create policy feedback that over time will crystallize the existing institutions
and block other avenues for change (Thelen 1990, 394). Both mechanisms are highly
deterministic and suggest that institutional patterns set into motion in path dependence
processes are very difficult to change (Mahoney 2000).
Furthermore, both HI6 and RCI use a calculus approach in explaining actors'
behavior; that is, they see actors as utility maximizers who engage in extensive
calculations and behave strategically in order to attain their goals. Rational choice
institutionalists accept the important role played by "institutionally induced preferences"
(Katznelson and Weingast 2005, 12), that is, they agree that rules and social norms
constrain the actions and behavior of rational utility-maiximizers actors (Ostrom 1991).
Thus, institutions shape actors' preferences and influence their decisions and not only the
other way around. Additionally, HI and RCI recognize the important role that power and
asymmetrical relations of power play in analyses of institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996).
For HI, institutions are considered to be "distributive switchboards" populated by actors
6

Historical Institutionalism uses also the cultural approach in order to explain how actors' behavior is
influenced and constrained by institutions. For more details, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor,
"Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism," Political Studies (1996), pp. 936-957.

5

who have a wide range of assets and possibilities (Katznelson and Weingast 2005, 15).
While historical institutionalists emphasize the uneven distribution of power across social
groups, rational choice institutionalists highlight the role that power asymmetries play in
the creation, development and transformation of institutions. The balance between costs
and benefits for the relevant actors will determine how institutions will evolve, the
relevant actors having the advantageous position in the asymmetric balance of power.
Although, HI is less suited to explain rapid institutional change, change would not be
inconsistent with this theory if power (e.g., outside power) were a cause of that change.
However, RCI is somewhat less deterministic in nature than HI and, therefore, better
suited to explain institutional change.
The informal institution of corruption inherited from the communist regime fits
the path dependent explanation proposed by historical institutionalists. This informal
institution was reinforced through a functional mechanism that relies on an incentive
structure that induces actors to engage in corrupt activities. Nonetheless, according to
RCI, a positive change of the informal institution of corruption (i.e., decrease of its
effectiveness) rests heavily on the ability to change the incentive structure created by this
institution (i.e., by increasing the costs of complying with the informal rules and the
benefits for non-compliance with these rules). My argument is that path dependence is
helpful in explaining the endurance of the informal institution of corruption, but falls
short in understanding how these institutions can be changed and, therefore, how
corruption can be curbed. According to HI, a reduction in the effectiveness of the
informal institution of corruption is unlikely. By focusing on the incentive structure
created by the institutional arrangements and the factors that alter that structure, RCI is

6

better suited to help us understand how corruption can be contained and reduced. In this
study, I am employing propositions made by both approaches because HI helps explain
the persistence of the informal institution of corruption and the difficulties in changing it,
while RCI claims that a successful strategy to change informal institutions is to alter the
incentive structure created by those institutions.

2. Why Romania?

In December 1989, Romania was the last and only country in Central Eastern
Europe to violently overthrow its communist government. Since then, the country has
undergone a difficult process of transition to democracy and market economy, a process
undermined in part by the continuation and even thriving of informal institutions. The
informal institution of corruption was part of the communist legacies and all former
communist countries had to address them. Additionally, the nature of transition further
aggravated the situation, corruption being considered one of the main causes of
departures from the rule of law in the newly established democracies (Sandholtz and
Taagepera 2005, Rose 2001). Hence, corruption is not uncommon during transition
processes and all former communist countries in Central Eastern Europe struggled with
corruption after 1989.
Romania had faced especially difficult challenges during its dual transition due to
the communist legacies (as with all former communist countries), the endurance of
former nomenklatura and its control of power for the first six years after the transition,
the lack of an organized and strong opposition, and a weak civil society. Thus, for the
first six years after the revolution, Romania was constantly included in the category of

7

illiberal democracies, along with other post-communist countries such as Bulgaria and
Slovakia (Vachudova 2005). That might be explained in part by the fact that, despite the
violent break up with the previous regime, the old nomenklatura remained in power after
1989 revolution. The absence of a strong and cohesive opposition and the advantageous
position of the old communist cadres in the political and economic arenas delayed the
democratization process in Romania.
Romania was also considered to be a challenging case for the accession to the EU
(Vachudova 2005, Pridham 2007). Although it was considered from the early nineties to
be one of the serious candidates for EU membership, Romania constantly lagged behind
all other candidate countries to the EU (Phinnemore 2005). Furthermore, Romania had
been constantly ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the region and the most
corrupt EU candidate country by various international organizations. The persistence of
corruption might be explained by the fact that, in the Romanian post-communist context,
corruption is a matter of political culture and a constant and major concern for the general
public and politicians. Thus, the former are interested in curbing corruption and living
better lives, while the latter are using corruption as a campaign issue to further their
political careers (in the short run, at least). Corruption makes for a highly visible and
inflaming campaign issue and political parties cannot refrain from using it in order to get
in office. At the same time, the effect of using corruption as a campaign issue depends on
where the parties stand during the elections (i.e., governing coalition or opposition). The
last tree national elections (1996, 2000, and 2004) have shown that all major political
parties have used anticorruption rhetoric successfully when they were in opposition. The
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anticorruption rhetoric proved to be detrimental to the governing parties which became
vulnerable to the attacks of the opposition and lost the elections7.
Besides being a relevant case for post-communist transition to democracy and
market economy, Romania is also an interesting case because of its mixed political
system. Following the French model, the Romanian president is directly elected for a five
o

year mandate whereas the Parliament is elected for a four year mandate. The president
has the responsibility to choose the Prime Minister (PM) and appoint the government
based on the nominations made by the Parliament. In case of government reshuffle
(which had happened at least a couple of times during each four-year government
mandate) the president revokes and assigns, after discussions with the PM, the new
government. The relationship between the president and the government has proved to be
complicated and difficult to sustain for long periods of time even when the president and
the PM came from the same political party. The situation is even more complicated when
the president and the PM are from different political parties9 and they have to cooperate
to maintain the governing coalition formed by their parties and preserve the support of
their colleagues in the Parliament.
Furthermore, the hybrid political system creates the potential for more tensions in
the relationships between the executive (the presidency and the Government)10 and the
Parliament. According to the Romanian Constitution, Art. 109 (1), the Government is
7

This claim supports Ivan Krastev's (2004) argument regarding the use of anticorruption campaigns and
its negative consequences. See pages 19-20 for a more detailed discussion of his argument.
8
The five year mandate was introduced by the 2003 Constitution and the first five-year mandate started in
November 2004.
9
Although the Constitution stipulates that the president cannot be a member of a political party during
his/her mandate, it is common knowledge which party the president favors based on its pre-election
membership and the assignment of ministers to his former Party fellows.
10
According to Adrian Enache, from a doctrinaire point of view, both the government and the president
represent the executive. For more details, see Adrian Enache, Controlul Parlamentar [Parliamentary
control] (1996), Ia§i: Editura Polirom.
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politically accountable to the Parliament for its activity, but every president since 1990
has attempted to control the Government as much as possible. Thus, President Iliescu's
(1992-1996) direct involvement in the Government's activity led Jacques Rupnik (1997)
to the conclusion that the Romanian political system is a presidential one. While I
disagree with this claim, I share his estimation with regard to the president's attempt to
control the government. Additionally, Parliament-president cooperation is complicated by
the fact that both are directly elected and have the same legitimacy and responsibility to
the electorate. The hybrid system makes it easier to avoid blame and more difficult to
hold specific actors accountable for their actions or inactions. Furthermore, it makes it
easier for political actors to take credit for any success in establishing the rule of law and
curbing corruption. Hence, the mixture of the parliamentary-presidential system affects
the adoption and implementation of anticorruption strategies, and implicitly, the
relationship between formal institutions and the informal institution of corruption. The
impact of this political system is, therefore, captured in the analysis of the institutional
strategies adopted in the decade under study.
However, the political will to combat corruption and, implicitly, the success or
failure of anticorruption strategies are not likely to be the direct result of a specific
regime type. That is, the mixed Romanian political system is not expected to be more or
less successful in its anticorruption efforts then other countries that have parliamentary
systems (e.g., Bulgaria, Hungary) or presidential systems (e.g., Argentina, Brazil). The
anticorruption literature, as it will be shown in more detail later in this chapter,
emphasizes the importance of political will to combat corruption, regardless of a
country's regime type. Hence, to state with absolute certainty that a specific political
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system increases the chances of curbing corruption or vice versa would require additional
and extensive research which is beyond the scope of this study.
Thus, while sharing the general characteristics of post-communist countries and
their transition problems, Romania can be considered a difficult case. Nevertheless, being
a difficult case for the dual transition, the fight against corruption, and the accession to
the EU only makes Romania an even more interesting and important case to study.
Moreover, as a native Romanian, I am linguistically and culturally prepared to study the
relationship between formal institutions and the informal institution of corruption in this
country. However, the more important component of the research design, i.e., the
selection of sectors, is developed later in this chapter.

3. Literature Review

This section examines briefly the relevant literature on democratization, informal
institutions, and corruption. The first subsection focuses on the literature on democratic
consolidation and the significance of the rule of law. The second subsection reviews the
literature on informal institutions and the sources of informal institutional change. A
persuasive argument of corruption as an informal institution in Romania and the concept
of "blat" is also included in this subsection. The last part of this section evaluates the
literature on corruption emphasizing particularly the difficulties of defining corruption,
the consequences of corruption, and the anticorruption strategies recommended in the
literature. Additionally, this subsection includes a discussion of "political will" and the
difficulties of measuring it in practice.
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3.1. Democratic Consolidation and the Rule of Law

The democratization process comprises two phases: the breakdown with the
former regime and the consolidation of the democratic regime (Huntington 1991). The
latter is attained when democracy becomes the "only game in town" (Linz and Stepan
1996). The literature on democratic consolidation emphasizes the importance of creating
complex institutional arrangements compatible with the democratic norms and capable of
guaranteeing the rule of law (O'Donnell 1992, Mainwaring 1992, Valenzuela 1992).
Thus, democratic consolidation is claimed to entail the "elimination of formal and
informal institutions that are inimical to democracy" (Valenzuela 1992, 71). Although the
importance of eradicating the informal institutions incompatible with democratic
standards is mentioned, subsequent scholars have focused mainly on the design and
functioning of formal institutions.
The rule of law represents an essential element for the success of democratic
consolidation by establishing "a hierarchy of norms that make actions by, and upon, other
arenas legitimate and predictable" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 14). The legal system
represents one of the fundamental pillars of market economy and an independent
judiciary is essential for the implementation of public policy as well (World Bank 2000a).
A corrupt or politically dependent judiciary makes the implementation of public policy
more difficult, undermines reforms, overrides legal norms, facilitates high-level
corruption, and it undermines the democratic consolidation process as a whole (RoseAckerman 1999). Additionally, a corrupt judiciary cannot serve as a check on other
branches of government and cannot ensure an impartial and equitable implementation of
the rule of law (Dakolias and Thachuk 2000). The result is the creation of a private

system of justice based on informal rules, which in turn will reinforce the perception of a
failed legal system (Hay and Shleifer 1998). Furthermore, since one of its roles is to act
as the ultimate arbiter of anticorruption reforms, a corrupt judiciary will in fact
undermine the anticorruption efforts themselves (World Bank 2000a, 14).
When corruption competes with the formal rules that regulate the functioning of
the judiciary, customs, health care system, and public procurement sector, the negative
consequences go beyond their mere functioning and effectiveness. Not only is the rule of
law, people's welfare, and the privatization process undermined but also the very
legitimacy of public institutions is threatened. The success of democratization process
depends on the rule of law (Linz and Stepan 1996) and the legitimacy of the formal
institutions. The loss of legitimacy threatens the prospects of democratic consolidation
and corruption represents such a threat in Romania.

3.2. Informal Institutions

Although the mainstream comparative analysis has focused mainly on the study
of formal institutions such as constitutions, electoral systems, party systems, and market
systems, the wave of institutional change in post-communist and developing countries
has also stimulated the research of informal rules and institutions. Thus, students of Latin
America (Taylor 1992; O'Donnell 1994, 1996; Helmke 2002; Helmke and Levitsky
2004) and post-communist Eurasia (Mershon 1994, Dryzek 1996, Seleny 1999, Borocz
2000, Collins 2002) emphasize the importance of informal institutions and their
relationships with formal institutions in democratizing countries. These studies suggest
that by looking only at formal institutions, one cannot have a comprehensive
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understanding of the way the transition process works. Informal institutions also shape
political actors' behavior by creating incentives and constraints outside of the formal
arena. Institutions, both formal and informal, are important because they reduce
uncertainty and create constraints within which individuals make rational decisions
(Ostrom 1991, 240). Inattention to the informal rules and norms leads to an incomplete
representation of the way formal institutions work and of the factors that affect their
effectiveness, and implicitly the factors that influence the democratization process as a
whole.
In an attempt to develop a framework for integrating the study of informal
institutions within mainstream institutional research, Helmke and Levitsky (2004)
developed a typology of four models of formal and informal institutional interaction:
complementary, substitutive, competing (the most problematic), and accommodating.
The first two types of relations are characterized by convergent outcomes and the
informal institutions have the role of "filling in gaps," or supplementing ineffective
formal institutions. In contrast, competing and accommodating informal institutions seek
divergent outcomes from those of formal institutions. While the accommodating informal
institutions do not violate the letter of the formal rules, the incentives created by
"competing" informal institutions are incompatible with those of the formal rules.
Furthermore, accommodating informal institutions coexist with effective

formal

institutions, while competing informal institutions coexist with ineffective formal
institutions. This typology is especially useful when it comes to evaluating the impact of
corruption in democratizing countries. As an informal institution, corruption competes
with the formal democratic structures adopted during the transition to democracy,
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especially when the former are ineffective due in part to an unsystematic enforcement of
the formal rules. In Romania, corruption is an informal institution that competes with the
formal democratic institutions and undermines the latter functioning and effectiveness.
The literature on informal institutions identifies three main sources of informal
institutional change. The first source is the formal institutions themselves either by a
change in their design or a change in their effectiveness (i.e., strengthening formal
institutions) (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). A second source of informal institutional
change may be an alteration in the conditions that sustained the informal institution; that
is, a change in the external environment that results in a different distribution of power
and resources may lead to a change in the informal institutions affected by the new status
quo (Knight cited in Helmke and Levitsky 2006, 24). While a change in the external
conditions that sustain an informal institution may lead to their alteration, this type of
change is unpredictable and is less helpful in understanding how informal institutions can
be intentionally changed. An alteration in the actors' shared beliefs and experiences that
in turn will affect their shared expectations about the informal rules and norms represents
a third source of informal institutional change; while these type of changes are possible
and can sometimes have quick results (e.g., the case of foot binding in China), changes in
the societal values are generally slow and incremental (Helmke and Levitsky 2004,
2006).
Thus, where a change in the design of formal institutions has already taken place,
as is the case of Romania, the task then becomes to increase the effectiveness of formal
institutions. Specifically, a restructuring of incentives can lead to more effective formal
institutions, which in turn can reduce the effectiveness and prevalence of informal
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institutions. For the formal rules to be able to replace or change the informal ones the
formal rules have to be recognized and applied consistently; they have to be precise in
their language; and they have to be associated with a willingness to invoke sanctions
(Knight 1992, 185-186). If these conditions are not met, the attempt to change stable
informal expectations may actually exacerbate the pervasiveness and "stickiness" of
informal institutions.

3.2.1. Why Is Corruption an Informal Institution in Romania?

According to Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 733), three basic questions must be
answered in the attempt to identify an informal institution: 1) What are the actors' shared
expectations with regard to the actual constraints they face? 2) What is the community to
which the informal rules apply? And 3) How are informal rules enforced? Based on
actors' mutual understanding of the informal rules, one can differentiate between
informal behavior patterns and informal institutions and, thus, identify the actors' shared
expectations. Of course, that would require an intimate knowledge of the community to
which the informal rules apply. Related to the first question, the second one asks to
identify the community to which the rules apply, such as a village, an ethnic or religious
community or a nation. And finally, the third question refers to the existence of sanctions
for violating the informal rules. These sanctions may take different forms (ostracism,
social disapproval, extrajudicial violence), but they exist and actors are aware of their
existence and of the risks they would encounter by violating the informal rules. The
existence and enforcement of sanctions is essential for differentiating between informal
behavioral regularities and informal institutions.
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Using these questions as basic criteria for identifying an informal institution and
based on the intimate knowledge of the Romanian society, I argue that corruption is an
informal institution in Romania. It is common knowledge in Romania that, in order to
solve a problem (regardless of its nature), one has to engage in a corrupt activity either by
offering a bribe (money or gifts) or by using its connections (relatives, friends, clients).
The failure to follow the informal rules of corruption leads to consequences of various
natures for the persons involved, depending on the problem they attempted to solve. The
informal rules of corruption as well as the sanctions associated with them are known
nationwide in Romania and they influence and constrain actors' behavior. Hence,
corruption is comprised of a set of informal rules embedded in widely shared
expectations among both citizens and public officials and a refusal to comply with these
rules is going to be sanctioned.
The impact of informal rules is far-reaching in the Romanian society by shaping
actors' behavior. Thus, if one needs medical attention but fails to follow the informal
rules (e.g., bribe the medical personnel), he/she runs the risk of receiving poor health care
services that might endanger his/her life. Although there are no written rules regarding
the appropriate conduct of patients in their interaction with health professionals, everyone
finds out very fast the "price" of every service delivered in a medical facility. The means
through which patients find out about the appropriate prices are very simple: other
patients already have that information or, sometimes, the new patient asks directly the
nurses or other low-level personnel working in the hospital about the costs of services
provided by doctors. The informal rules of gratitude payments are so entrenched that
everyone obeys them unless they have no income and no possibility of obtaining the
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money necessary to cover the informal payments. In the latter situation, the risk is to
receive a lower quality of health care, the health professionals' services being diverted to
those who paid for the extra attention. However, since health is a good that people
cherish dearly, there is little resistance to the established informal rules of corruption in
this sector.
In 2004, a group of Romanian journalists of investigation decided to publish a
Bribery Manual (Manual de §paga) that presented a collection of real life stories of
everyday corruption in the country collected over a period of two and a half years. The
diversity of corruption accounts reflected the widespread practice of corruption and the
pervasiveness and influence of its informal rules. For example, the gratitude payments
that a patient made for a hip surgery, the result of a car accident, amounted to €600
($745 n ) . The total costs of the patient's stay in the hospital were broken down as follow:
€300 ($373) the main surgeon; €150 ($186) the second surgeon; €50 ($62) the
anesthesiologist; €60 ($74) the nurses; and about €30 ($37) the other lower level health
care staff. Moreover, the total cost did not include the drugs the patient bought with her
own money while in the hospital. (Popescu 2004, 16). The failure to make the informal
payments, as noted before, affect the quality of services received by the patients. In a
different case, a young patient who had her tonsils removed was complaining about pain
post-surgery. The nurse's reply was: "You should have thought about that before the
surgery and you should have 'greased' the wheels!" (Popescu 2004, 16).
The informal rules of corruption are not limited to the health care sector. For
example, in 2003, the television station Antena covered the story of a custom officer who
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The currency conversions to USD were made by using the average currency exchange rate for 2004 as
provided by the National Bank of Romania.

was fired because he refused to cover up an illicit activity in which his direct supervisors
were involved. The customs officer, along with another colleague, was sent to process a
customs control on a series of shipments with goods from Turkey which were transiting
Romania. The two customs officers noted a series of irregularities, including the false
paperwork that accompanied the shipment and the undervaluation of the goods being
transited. Shortly after beginning their processing, the two officers were told that they
have to stop their activity and report to their supervisor. What followed was a series of
events which highlight the entrenched informal rules of corruption in the customs sector.
The customs officer was asked to sign a paper stating that his colleague had conducted an
illegal customs control, and when he refused to do so he was dismissed. Believing that
they have done nothing wrong, the customs officer refused and was fired without a
possibility to work in the public sector for a minimum of seven years. Additionally, his
supervisors requested the Court of Accounts to initiate an investigation into the activity
of the dismissed customs officer for alleged past irregularities in his activity. To add even
more pressure, the customs officer began receiving death threats if he would ever go
public with his story, which he did only after his former boss managed to get him fired
from a private company where the customs officer was working as a customs consultant.
After years of humiliation and disappointment with the judicial system, the customs
officer left the country and started a new life in Western Europe. Shortly after the "Black
Box" show presented his story on Antena television, the show was cancelled in response
to "higher pressures" (Interview Journalist 2, June 6, 2007).
The case of corruption in the customs sector is illustrative of the widespread
tentacles of the informal rules of corruption that reach to the highest levels and have
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serious consequences for those who oppose them. Additionally, the everyday encounters
with the traffic police are conducted according to the informal rules of corruption. For
example, to ensure that the policeman who supervises one's driver's license road test will
not intentionally fail the test takers, an informal payment (i.e., bribe) is paid prior to the
test. In some cases, the driving instructors collect a fixed sum of money from each
student and pay the policeman in charge with supervising the road test.
The informal rules of corruption are not only permeating almost every aspect of
the Romanian society, but failure to comply with them sometimes results in very serious
consequences, as the case of the customs officer demonstrates. The sanctions for not
complying with the informal rules when dealing with the judiciary or public procurement
sector are of a different nature than those in health care or customs, but not necessarily
less costly. For example, the loss of a trial which may result in imprisonment and/or
significant financial losses or being placed on a black list for government contracts and
risking losing one's business due to a failure to follow the informal rules are
consequences that people have to consider almost every day. Hence, in studying
corruption is important to understand the rules and sanctions that comprise the very fabric
of this informal institution. Moreover, institutional designers or reformers must take into
consideration the incentive structure to engage in corruption when engineering new
formal institutions or reforming the existing ones. That is, the incentive structures to
comply with formal rules must aim at altering or, ideally, counteracting, the incentive
structure to engage in corruption. Failure to take into account the underlying mechanisms
of corruption when designing or reforming formal institutions is likely to result in
ineffective formal institutions and/or failed formal institutional reforms.
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3.2.2. Blat

The communist societies had been characterized by the existence of a special type
of informal rules known as blat, rules that although were a deviation from the formal
ones were condoned by the communist regimes. Blat is defined as "the use of personal
networks (kin, friends, and acquaintances) to obtain goods and services in the economy
of shortage" and "the informal exchange of 'favours of access' given at the expense of
institutional resources" (Ledeneva 2004, 123-4). In the context of the economy of
shortage that characterized communist societies, the line between friendship and the use
of friendship became blurred. Consequently, personal networks were very important for
getting access to goods in short supplies and to other institutional resources (Ledeneva
2004).
According to Helmke and Levitsky (2004), blat is an example of accommodating
informal institution created because although the actors did not like the outcomes of the
formal rules, they were unable to change or openly violate them. Heidenheimer (1989)
claims that blat is a form of "white" corruption and, therefore, an acceptable form of
corruption in the public's eyes, because of its non-monetary form and its role in
increasing social equality in communist societies. This acceptable form of corruption
"'allows' participants in blat transactions to mis-recognize their activities as 'help' and to
cover it in the 'rhetoric of friendship'" (Krastev 2004, 64). The process of transition to
democracy affected also the informal institution of blat which was reformed according to
market principles. According to Krastev (2004), blat changed from a non-monetary to a
monetary form and is now largely perceived as corruption. The informal networks
specific to blat have survived and even multiplied during the democratization processes,

but they are being perceived as means for introducing social inequality. This, in turn,
makes them less acceptable in the eyes of the general public (Krastev 2004). Nonetheless,
the informal networks specific to the system of blat and their survival in post-communist
societies may help us understand the endurance and pervasiveness of informal
institutions.
However, the differentiation between blat and corruption appears to rely mainly
on the monetary or non-monetary form that they take. Thus, according to Ledeneva
(2004) and Krastev (2004), the use of one's influence and authority position in order to
obtain benefits for him or for others (i.e., family, friends, clients) classifies as blat as long
as there is no direct monetary exchange involved. This differentiation suggests the use of
a narrow definition of corruption which, in turn, allows for the classification of certain
informal institution of corruption as blat. However, survey results show that people do
not consider corrupt activities only those involving the direct exchange or gain of money.
Favoritism, nepotism, and clientelism (i.e., the use of one's authority and influence for
his own non-monetary benefit or for the benefit of his family, friend, or client, such as to
secure a job position or get special treatment or favors from a public servant) are
considered to be corrupt practices (Gallup Romania 2002). Hence, my conceptualization
of corruption includes also corrupt activities that do not involve a direct exchange of
money or direct financial benefits. Regardless of its color or form, corruption is an
informal and illegal institution. Furthermore, the informal networks specific for
accommodating informal institutions such as blat can be and have been used to engage in
corrupt activities in post-communist countries. Hence, the distinction between blat and
corruption is meaningless in the post-communist context, where the same informal

22

networks that characterized the former are now employed for the benefit of the latter.
Besides, the relationship between formal and informal institutions has changed once the
communism collapsed. That is, the effective communist formal institutions have been
replaced by ineffective democratic structures that allow more room for the expansion of
informal institutions such as corruption. Additionally, while the existence of blat in
communist times found its justification in the special circumstances in which people
lived, corruption is non-justifiable in a society that aspires to be governed by democratic
rules and norms, a fact demonstrated by the growing attention devoted to corruption, as it
will be shown next.

3.3. Corruption and Anticorruption Strategies

The last decade has witnessed an increased interest on the part of various
international organizations such as the EU, International Monetary Fund (IMF),
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Transparency
International (TI), and the scholarly community (Eigen 1996, Klitgaard 1997, de Lozada
1999, Sedigh and Muganda 1999, Philp 2002, Davis 2004) in understanding corruption,
its causes, consequences and strategies to contain and reduce it. The increasing attention
accorded to corruption is stimulated by the growing amount of evidence that corruption
undermines good governance, the rule of law, economic development, and even moral
values (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank (WB), World
Trade Organization (WTO), Mauro 1995, Kaufmann 1997, Karklins 2005).
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3.3.1. Conceptual Problems

Scholars agree that any study of corruption should start by defining the term, an
endeavor which is both difficult and controversial. They also agree that the term
"corruption" has different meanings in various languages, a fact that might explain why a
unique and universal definition of corruption is difficult to find. Thus, corruption has
been defined in moral, legal, public office, public interest, and economic terms. Prior to
corruption becoming the subject of rigorous social science research, corruption was
defined primarily in moral terms as an act to be condemned. According to the moral
definition, "to corrupt means to pervert, degrade, ruin, and debase" (Williams 1999, 504).
However, the moral conceptualization of corruption has been "largely eschewed" by
contemporary scholars in part because of the religious connotations attached to the idea
of morality (Huffer 2005, 121).
The legal conceptualization of corruption attempts to define it "as something that
occurs outside of rules and laws" (Huffer 2005, 121). Such a parsimonious definition was
appealing to scholars, but the variation of legal codes across countries was soon
considered to be a serious problem that limited the general application of a legal
definition of corruption. Furthermore, although laws are considered to be "neutral,
objective, and non-political", they often represent the interest of the "most powerful who
can determine what conduct is declared improper" (Williams 1999, 505). This, in turn,
would further limit and eschew the conceptualization of corruption because it would
mean to sanction the interpretation of the powerful rather than the just (Williams 1999,
505). Moreover, laws regulating public life assume the existence of a clear delineation
between private and public spheres which, as it will be shown next, is not always the case

(Huffer 2005, 121). More importantly, though, by simply defining corruption as
something that occurs outside the legal norms and rules does not offer, from an analytical
point of view, a better conceptualization of corruption. Hence, the legal interpretations of
corruption have had a limited contribution to the study of corruption.
The public office and public interest definitions assume that the public and private
roles are clearly established and differentiated, while that might not always be the case.
According to these conceptualizations, corruption is behavior that deviates from the
public servant's duties in the interest of monetary or status gain for the individual, his
family, or friends, and which damages the public interest (Philp 2002, 45-46). During
communist governance, the distinction between public and private roles was blurred and
public servants used their positions in order to further their own interests as well as the
interests of their families, friends, acquaintances, or ethnic group. Additionally, these two
definitions, by emphasizing different aspects of the public (office and interest), leave
unclear which one of the two views of the character and scope of the public office or
public interest should be accepted nor is it clear what norms should one use to measure
the additional concepts included or implied in the definitions (Philp 2002).
The economist explanation portrays corruption as rent-seeking behavior that
occurs because governments have too much control over resources and markets
(Williams 1999). The underlying assumption is that individuals are selfish and seek to
maximize their short-term profits at the expense of other economic actors. As Philp
(2002) notices, these market-oriented definitions of corruption do not define better the
concept of corruption, but they are more likely to offer a model for understanding the
incidence of corruption.
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The lack of consensus in the literature with regard to a definition of corruption
along with my argument that corruption is an informal institution have led me to a
different conceptualization of corruption. This definition relies on the existing definitions
of corruption and on Helmke and Levitsky's (2004) description of informal institutions.
Hence, for the purpose of this project, corruption is defined as a set of unwritten, illegal
norms and rules that regulate the relationship between public servants and the general
public, are used for the former's personal gain (directly and/or indirectly), and are
enforced through informal channels outside of the officially sanctioned channels. As
such, corruption may take different forms such as bribery, influence peddling, informal
payments, nepotism, favoritism, clientelism, and misappropriation. This definition of
corruption as an informal institution emphasizes the expectations the actors have with
regard to the rules and norms that regulate corrupt informal behavior as well as the
sanctions for non-compliance. Thus, corruption creates an incentive structure to engage
in corrupt activities that competes with the incentive structure created by formal
institutions. Consequently, this conceptualization of corruption emphasizes the illegal
nature of corruption but, unlike the legal definitions of corruption, it has the advantage of
capturing the complex nature of corruption (i.e., informal rules and norms, enforcement,
and sanctions).
Clientelism is generally viewed as a network of social relations characterized by
"a particular mode of 'exchange' between electoral constituencies as principles and
politicians as agents" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 7). Studies of patron-client relations
focus particularly on Latin America, where clientelism is considered to be an informal
institution that sometimes competes with the formal institutions and directly violates the
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formal rules and norms while at times it substitutes for weak formal institutions (Helmke
and Levitsky 2006, 17). Hence, corruption and clientelism are considered to be two
distinct types of informal institutions. In post-communist countries, patron-client
relations are viewed as having their origins in the previous regimes where the communist
nomenklatura controlled the best jobs and appointments. After 1989, the communist
cadres became patrons "who received tribute from subservient units and subordinated
interests of their posts to personal and particular interests" (Karklins 2002, 28). While
clientelism and corruption are separate in Latin America, in post-communist countries
they merge and the result is what Andras Sajo (1998) calls "clientelist corruption." This
type of corruption is "a form of structural corruption, which should be distinguished from
discrete individual acts of corruption" (Sajo 1998, 2). The former nomenklatura had a
significant advantage at the beginning of the transition and it materialized that advantage
by establishing corrupt patronage networks that continue to self-perpetuate. Thus,
clientelism can be considered to be one of the forms corruption takes in post-communist
settings.

3.3.2. Consequences of Corruption

Numerous studies on corruption have shown its negative consequences. Thus,
corruption reduces economic growth and lowers the level of foreign direct investment; it
reduces the effectiveness of industrial policies and encourages businesses to function in
the unofficial sector in violation of tax and regulatory laws (Rose-Ackerman 1999); it
distorts public expenditures by encouraging unproductive public investments (projects
with higher corruption capital) and under-investments in human capital by spending less
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on education (Mauro 1995, Krastev 2004); it marginalizes citizens from the political
process; it puts an additional burden on the poor; and, very importantly, it fosters disdain
for and undermines trust in public institutions, democratic politics, and the rule of law,
thus, de-legitimizing the democratic governance (Klitgaard 1991, Delia Porta and
Vannucci 1999, Karklins 2005).
Revisionist scholars have challenged this view of corruption by claiming that
corruption is not necessarily incompatible with economic development (Huntington 1968,
Lui 1985). Corruption, whose meaning varies from culture to culture, may actually
advance economic development by introducing an element of competition into
monopolistic industries or by speeding up services (Leff cited in Kaufmann 1997, 114).
According to revisionist scholars, governments often pursue sub-optimal economic
policies due to either their incompetence or ideological bias. In these circumstances,
corruption plays a positive role by reducing the negative consequences of these suboptimal policies (Nye 2002). Additionally, corruption may improve the situation by
persuading the government to pursue policies more in line with social welfare if the
business groups can, through corruption, enhance their participation in policy formulation
and if they are more likely to promote growth (Leff 2002). According to the traditional
rent-seeking theories, corruption is viewed as a preferred form of seeking preferential
treatment in comparison to other more competitive and legal forms, such as lobbying,
because it reduces economic costs (Lambsdorff 2007, 116). However, the revisionist
scholars do not take into consideration the possibility of corruption leading to suboptimal policies nor the inefficiencies that are resulting from the allocation of contracts
and licenses through corruption (Kurer 1991). Nor do they take into consideration the
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very impact of corruption on rent-seeking, which is that "[CJorruption motivates
politicians and public servants to impose (or threaten to impose) market restrictions so as
to maximize the resulting rents and bribes paid in connection with them" (Lambsdorff
2007, 121). In other words, corruption tends to self-perpetuate and to further distort the
market competition and the distribution of benefits. Furthermore, this reductionist view
of corruption fails to recognize its broader negative impacts on society as a whole.
Although subtle forms of this perspective can still be identified, the dominant
view is that corruption is a plague that needs to be reduced, controlled, and prevented.
Additionally, as Rose-Ackerman (1999, 110) said:
"If behavior labeled "corrupt" by some observers is, nevertheless, viewed
as acceptable gift giving or tipping within a country, it should simply be
legalized and reported. If, however, these practices are imposing hidden or
indirect costs on the populace, analysts can clarify and document those
costs. Definitions of acceptable behavior may change once people are
informed of the costs of tolerating payoffs to politicians and civil
servants."

3.3.3. Corruption and Privatization

Privatization is considered to be an effective tool in combating corruption because
it reduces the state control over certain assets and transforms discretionary official actions
into market-driven actions (Rose-Ackerman 1999). By introducing market competition in
previously state controlled sectors, the incentives that actors face will be dictated by the
free market rules reducing the incentives to engage in corrupt activities. Hence, the
privatization process is considered to be a necessary step in reducing corruption.
However, studies show that the short term impact of privatization on containing
corruption is ambiguous. Privatization is a process that offers many opportunities for
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corruption and control over the information is one of them. That is, the information
regarding the big enterprises that are to be privatized or any other information pertinent to
the privatization of specific assets is still in the hands of the government or the
privatization authority controlled by the government. Corrupt officials may offer
incomplete or false information to the general public while selling pertinent information
and access to insiders who pay for that information (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 35-37).
Privatization is no guarantee that the newly created units will no longer be subservient to
politically motivated interests nor that they will be less likely to engage in corrupt
activities (Lamsbdorff 2007). Additionally, the many examples of corruption in the
course of privatization in post-communist countries prove the limits of privatization in
reducing corruption (at least in the short term).

,

Nonetheless, the type of privatization implemented is important because different
strategies create various opportunities for corrupt behavior. Kaufmann and Siegelbaum
(1997) differentiate among privatization strategies employed in post-communist countries
that generate more or less potential for corruption. In Romania, the MEBO (managementemployee buy-out) strategy had been largely employed (Kaufmman and Siegelbaum
1997, 427)12. Regardless of the chosen strategy, opportunities for rent-seeking may
increase during the privatization process if the level of administrative discretion is high,
the process lacks transparency, the privatization agency is not independent, and the
process is slow. Nevertheless, Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) claim that by modifying
and controlling the previously mentioned factors, privatization may create fewer
opportunities for corrupt behavior and lead to a reduction of corruption in the long run.

12

See Chapter II for a more detailed discussion of the various strategies of privatization and their potential
for corruption.
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The level of privatization and therefore market-competition in the four sectors
under study here is very limited due to features specific to each sector. The judiciary and
customs are two sectors vital for the survival of the democratic system and the national
security. Therefore, these two sectors have not been the object of the privatization
process in Romania. In the health care sector the privatization process, as part of the
reform process, began in late nineties and has continued at a very slow pace. As a result
the private sector is small and the competition is mainly among dentists, who own the
most private businesses. In September 2006, Otmar Kloiber, the general secretary of the
World Medical Association, declared that the Romanian health care system continues to
be "centralized, corrupt, and over-bureaucratized" (Evenimentul Zilei, September 21,
2006). The public procurement sector is a sector that began developing in 1990 and while
competition should be one of its main features, it is yet to demonstrate its role in reducing
the level of corruption. Hence, although privatization is considered to be an important
strategy in curbing corruption in the long term, for the moment its role in reducing
corruption in post-communist countries remains to be empirically demonstrated.
Additionally, it is not believed to be an effective anticorruption strategy in the four
sectors under study here.

3.3.4. Anticorruption Strategies

The literature on corruption suggests that the strategies to contain corruption
should be multi-pronged and include a variety of methods (World Bank 2000a, World
Bank 2000b, UNDP 2002, UNDP 2004, Karklins 2005, Kaufmann 2005). Most analysts
of anti-corruption strategies focus on de-monopolizing decision making, limiting
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discretion, and strengthening accountability. Specifically, they advocate effective law
enforcement and willingness to invoke sanctions, the creation of oversight institutions
and anticorruption agencies, increase in transparency and freedom of information acts,
whistleblowers and witness protection, clear ethics codes, and a merit-based civil service.
Underpinning all of these, however, is the political will to fight corruption, singled out as
an indispensable factor in effectively implementing anticorruption strategies (World
Bank 2000b, UNDP 2002). In the absence of a political will to fight corruption, the
institutional strategies would remain desirable propositions that would be unlikely to
materialize or work in practice. Political will is thus a necessary condition in the fight
against corruption. International donors (e.g., EU, World Bank, UNDP) and public
opinion can influence the level of political commitment to curb corruption by pressuring
political officials to take action. In Central and Eastern Europe, the EU plays a significant
role and any scenario that fails to include this external actor provides an incomplete
picture of the interaction between formal and informal institutions in post-communist
countries, especially in the candidates to EU membership. Similarly, an inclusion of the
domestic public opinion provides new insights into the role of the public in the fight
against corruption (World Bank 2000b, UNDP 2002, UNDP 2004).
The anticorruption strategies advocated by anticorruption scholars and experts
and which focus on de-monopolizing decision making, limiting discretion, and
strengthening accountability are all institutional strategies. These strategies attempt to
change the incentive structure created by formal institutions and the competing informal
institutions by increasing the costs of engaging in corrupt behavior and the benefits of
complying with the formal rules. Since these two types of institutions are correlated and
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an increase in the effectiveness of one type of institution leads to a decrease in the
effectiveness of the other type, these institutional strategies are curbing corruption while
strengthening the formal institutions. Therefore, this study focuses on the institutional
strategies designed to curb corruption and on their ability to achieve the proposed goal.
The fight against corruption is not only difficult, but there is no guarantee that one
successful implementation of anticorruption policies will endure or that will be followed
by other successes in curbing corruption (Eigen 1996). According to Krastev (2004),
governments are more likely to succeed in their fight against corruption if they
implement anticorruption policies without using anticorruption rhetoric, that is, if they do
not employ anticorruption campaigns. An anticorruption campaign, in which corruption
is used for electoral purposes, increases the incentives of the opposition to attack the
government as being corrupt, accusations that the government is likely to fail to reject as
long as the public defines corruption as "the very nature of exercising power" (Krastev
2004, 110). Furthermore, an anticorruption campaign is also more likely to be
accompanied by kompromat, which can be expressed as "publicizing, with the intention
of compromising someone, data, evidence, circumstances, or documents (or the threat of
publicizing such data), using the traditional and reformed journalistic and political genres
of reporting, exposing, defaming, and recrimination" (Szilagy 2002, 208). The
publication of compromising material, even in the absence of any evidence (as was the
case of the executive director of Bulgartabak in 2002 (Krastev 2004)), may reinforce the
public's view that all governments are corrupt and there is no chance to effectively curb
corruption. The perception of a widespread corruption, in turn, may lower the costs of
corruption and increase the chances of individuals to engage in corrupt activities. Hence,
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in order to avoid kompromat and to increase the chances of successfully fighting
corruption, governments have to effectively implement anticorruption policies without
attempting to use anticorruption rhetoric.
However, corruption is an incendiary campaign issue and in societies plagued
with corruption, politicians perceive anticorruption rhetoric as a means to gain more
votes. That is, in their competition for winning the elections, political parties cannot resist
the temptation of using corruption as a political issue and Romania is no exception. Thus,
corruption became an integral part of any election campaign since 1996 and the success
of the Romanian Democratic Convention (RDC)13 and its presidential candidate, Emil
Constantinescu set an important precedent, namely, that corruption wins votes. The
following national elections were therefore dominated by an anticorruption rhetoric and it
was employed successfully by the main opposition parties, which managed every election
to win enough votes to rule the government and dominate the Parliament.14
As Krastev (2004) stated, the use of corruption as a campaign issue can easily
backfire with damaging consequences for the political parties that employed it. The fate
of CDNPP is perhaps an extreme example but a relevant one in showing also the negative
impact of anticorruption rhetoric divorced from designing and implementing effective
anticorruption strategies. Nine years after its electoral defeat, this political party has yet
to gain the trust of the electorate and enough votes to pass the electoral threshold. As the
other examples are showing corruption is a constant in the political context of postcommunist Romania. The last three national elections were profoundly marked by the use

13

RDC is a party alliance between Christian-Democratic National Peasant's Party (CDNPP), National
Liberal Party (NLP) and some other small parties. NLP left the coalition in 2000, few months before the
national elections.
14
A more detailed discussion of the use of anticorruption rhetoric is made in Chapter IV.

of corruption as a campaign issue which placed the fight against corruption mainly in the
realm of rhetoric with damaging consequences for political parties and implicitly for the
general public which continued to be afflicted by corruption. Hence, the use of
anticorruption campaign makes the fight against corruption more difficult because the
government becomes more vulnerable to attacks from the opposition

parties.

Additionally, the failure to fulfill the electoral promises and to demonstrate political will
to combat corruption may not only result in electoral defeat but in an increase cynicism
among the general public with regard to politics and democracy.

3.3.5. Political Will

As mentioned before, political will is the essential factor in the fight against
corruption on which heavily rests the effective design and implementation of
anticorruption strategies. Starting from previous definitions (Kpundeh 1998, Brinkerhoff
1999 and 2000), political will is defined as the demonstrated commitment of political
actors (elected or appointed leaders) to engage in and carry out a set of strategies (i.e.,
anticorruption strategies) and to sustain their costs over time. This definition includes, on
the one hand, the acknowledgement that a healthy system of governance is of national
interest and, on the other hand, the need for the effective cooperation of national key
leaders in the long-term fight against corruption.
Building political will and, moreover, maintaining it over time is not an easy task.
First, timing is a key issue and elections may offer good opportunities for politicians
eager to portray themselves as anti-corruption and pro-reforms. Thus, a good rhetoric
may help them get access to the governing power and resources. Of course, the real
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challenge comes after the election when the new-elected politicians must keep their
promises (Pope 2000). Second, building political will requires cooperation of the main
political actors and their determination to curb corruption. Additionally, the actors'
personal integrity and the integrity of their actions must be beyond reproach, otherwise
the fight against corruption risks being compromised by its own advocates and the
popular view that all politicians are corrupt reinforced. Third, the fight against corruption
may require political actors to cross the party lines both in the legislature and in the
government, a task that may be politically costly for those brave enough to do it (World
Bank 2000b). It is not uncommon for Romanian politicians to be expelled from their own
parties because they criticized the party policies, agenda, leadership, or have supported
the opposition on a specific policy. For example, in 2002, the president of the local
chapter of the SDP Bihor, Mihai Bar, was expelled from the party after he criticized the
dubious activities of a father and son, Aurel and Adrian Tarau,15 also members of the
SDP. Another member of the SDP, this time from the Suceava chapter, had the same fate
as Bar after he criticized the questioning activities of some of the high profile members of
that local chapter (Parliamentary debate, March 31 2003). Consequently, those
committed to combating corruption must be willing to accept sometimes serious political
and career costs.
According to Barbara Geddes (1994, 13) political actors are constrained in their
ability to initiate reforms (and anti-corruption strategies for that matter) by their desire to
succeed in their political roles and by their control of state resources. In other words,
political actors will initiate and support reforms if their own careers are not at stake.

15

Adrian Tarau was investigated at the time for his involvement in the smuggling of oil and gas in
Yugoslavia during the embargo.

However, reforms are collective goods and as such they pose the problem of the freerider. Everyone would be better off if they cooperate, but, in the short run, that is not the
rational choice for individuals to make. For politicians, the choice is between the political
benefits of supporting the reform, on the one hand, and the costs of using resources for
other than achieving political support (i.e., for implementing the reform), on the other
hand. If the benefits outweigh the costs, they will push for reform; otherwise, even the
most reformist politicians may choose to postpone the reform. After all, in order to make
a change one has to be in office. These constraints on political actors' ability to initiate
and support reforms influence the political will required for initiating and implementing
reforms and anticorruption strategies. If political actors as rational individuals do not
perceive it politically beneficial for them to initiate and support them, the chances of
building the required political will for an effective fight against corruption and for
reforms, in general, are slim.
Additionally, Geddes (1994) claims that not only elected politicians but also party
leaders play an important role in the struggle over reform. In proportional representation
systems with closed-lists, party leaders hold more power over the votes of politicians in
their parties who are concerned with the future (re)elections. Thus, if parties are
disciplined and party leaders have this power, the support for reforms rests with the
personal interests of the party leaders. Nevertheless, the successful initiation and
implementation of reforms is more difficult in a multiparty system: more players, higher
transaction and enforcement costs, and lower benefits.
However, building political will does not have to be an impossible task. Political
competition that allows for the alternation in governing power of political parties may
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help build the necessary political will to fight corruption. Through political competition,
demands and promises for reforms and policies addressing the problem of corruption per
se as well as the underlying problems that facilitate corruption may become the top issues
on government and opposition parties' political agendas (World Bank 2000).
At the same time, one must not overstate the importance of political parties in the
fight against corruption in Romania where the multiparty system continues to be fluid.
That is, new parties are created through the assimilation of smaller parties into bigger
ones, other political parties are still searching for the most appropriate name and doctrine,
and political alliances are created and dismantled after only several months with parties
moving from the opposition side to the governing side. For example, on June 16, 2001,
the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was created through the assimilation by the Social
Democratic Party of Romania (SDPR) of the Romanian Social Democratic Party (RSDP).
Since January 1990, the latter had cooperated with all major political parties regardless of
their ideological stances, altered its political doctrine according to the political stances of
the new-coming members, incorporated the Socialist Party in July 2000, only to be itself
assimilated (although they called it "fusion") by the SDPR (Alexandrescu & Stoica
2005). Another relevant example is that of the Conservative Party (CP), the single party
with a centrist doctrine in Romania, which changed its name four times in the last fifteen
years. In 2004 elections, CP formed an alliance with SDP, but immediately after the
elections CP broke the alliance and joined the new governing coalition formed by NLP,
DP, and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR). The decrease in
number of political parties registered at the Municipal Court in Bucharest from 150 in
1996 to 41 in 2006 suggests that the party system in Romania is undergoing positive
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transformations, but it has yet to stabilize. What all these changes illustrate is the limited
role political parties play in the fight against corruption; as long as their own existence is
being questioned and their doctrinal identity is not clearly defined, the fight against
corruption is more likely to remain in the realm of political rhetoric. Hence, formal
institutions play the crucial role in effectively addressing the problem of corruption,
which also explains the focus of this research on formal institutions and their role in
curbing corruption in Romania.

3.3.6. Problems with Identifying and Assessing Political Will

While political will has been recognized as a necessary element in the fight
against corruption, only two attempts have been made to identify the characteristics that
could be used to identify political will and to develop a framework for its analysis.16 The
first such attempt was made by Sahr J. Kpundeh at the international conference organized
by the OECD Development Centre and the UNDP Programme for Accountability and
Transparency (PACT) in October 1997 in Paris. The papers presented at the conference
were subsequently compiled in a book with a similar title, namely Corruption and
Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries, published in 1998. Kpundeh
(1998, 77-78) proposed a set of six indicators to identify and assess "genuine" political
will, namely (1) the degree of analytical rigor in understanding the context and causes of
corruption; (2) the use of a strategy that is participative (i.e. incorporating and mobilizing
the interests of many stakeholders); (3) the distinction between "demonstrative" and

16

Approximately 150 peer-reviewed articles from various fields (political science, economics, health
policy, education) that mentioned "political will" in their title or content were reviewed. However, only the
studies discussed in this section had actually developed a framework for assessing political will. In all other
instances, political will was only mentioned as a necessary factor that was either present or absent.
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"strategic" issues; (4) the prevalence of incentives and sanctions; (5) the creation of an
objective process that monitors the impact of reforms and incorporates those findings into
a strategy that ensures policy goals and objectives; and (6) the level of structured political
competition in both the economic and political spheres. These indicators are designed to
cover a large spectrum of manifestations of political will and to indicate instances of
"genuine" political will and its absence.
The first indicator, the analytical rigor in diagnosing corruption, evaluates the
major measures taken to assess the problem of corruption and to identify the steps
required to curb it. The second indicator assesses not only the crucial role of leadership
but also the involvement of non-governmental actors who are affected by the adoption
and implementation of anticorruption strategies. Thus, a strategy that is participative by
including and gathering the cooperation of many stakeholders is another indicator of
genuine political will. Kpundeh goes a step further and claims that genuine political will
depends on the commitment of actors outside the government to implement the
anticorruption reforms and they would do that only to the degree they perceive their
interests to be protected by the government. As in his definition, Kpundeh expands the
concept of political will to a whole arena of actors from various sectors, which makes it
more difficult to identify and analyze the intended concept, namely political will.
The third indicator is the distinction between "demonstrative" and "strategic"
issues. Kpundeh defines the former as "reforms that are desirable for their nominal
outcomes (e.g., cost reductions resulting from successful implementation of reforms)",
whereas the latter are explained as incorporating "the assessment of probable costs and
benefits of enacting a particular reform as measured against the costs and foregone
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benefits of choosing not to intervene" (1998, 86). However, the explanation of
"demonstrative" and "strategic" issues is not clear and instead of making the
identification of genuine political will easier, it complicates it even further. Moreover,
Kpundeh does not state that the presence of only "demonstrative" issues is an indication
of absent genuine political will. Instead, he claims that the choice of strategies that
accomplish their stated goals on a manageable basis is a more definitive indication of
genuine political will, which undermines the use of "demonstrative" issues in the design
of this indicator.
The prevalence of incentives and sanctions, Kpundeh's fourth indicator, would
evaluate the reformers' ability to adopt and implement effective strategies that would
"restructure the principle-agent relationship" by providing positive incentives for
compliance (e.g., rewards for honest behavior, publication of positive outcomes) and not
only sanctions (Kpundeh 1998, 78). While anticorruption experts and policy-makers
recognize the importance of preventing corruption, it is not clear from this indicator how
much emphasis should be put on positive incentives in order to conclude that there is an
instance of "genuine" political will. Moreover, as long as there are sanctions for corrupt
behavior and a willingness to invoke them, it is hard to argue that there is a lack of
"genuine" political will to fight corruption just because the sanctions are not
complemented by measures designed to reward honest behavior or other positive
incentives for compliance. It is also not clear what the ideal balance would be or, at least,
the balance that would indicate a "genuine" commitment of political leaders to fight
corruption.
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The fifth indicator of political will proposed is the creation of an objective
process that monitors the impact of reform and incorporates those findings

into a

strategy that ensures policy goals and objectives. This indicator appears to assess not
only the existence of political will but also its sustainability over time. Long-term
"genuine" political will is, thus, expected to include the assessment of the anticorruption
reforms implemented and the incorporation of those results into the new and refined
strategies.
The level of structured political competition in both the economic and political
spheres, Kpundeh's last indicator, is described as the existence of "meaningful
competition" and "institutionalized structures" capable to monitor and punish any
arbitrary abuse of power. While political competition is recognized in the literature on
corruption as being important in stimulating the formation of political will, it is not an
indicator of political will per se. Authoritarian leaders may have the political will to curb
corruption and the means to achieve their goals in a society tightly controlled by the state
including in the economic sphere, if they think that by showing real determination to
fight corruption would strengthen even more their position. Hence, the lack of political
competition in either political or economic spheres should not necessarily equate with the
presence of political will.
Kpundeh's attempt to conceptualize political will and indentify a set of
characteristics that would allow scholars and practitioners to identify and assess
"genuine" political will is an important starting point for analyzing political will.
However, his proposed set of indicators leaves room for improvements and it should be
seen as such for developing more comprehensive and clear measurement tools. The
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second attempt to develop a framework for identifying and assessing political will came
soon after Kpundeh's and it was made by Derrick W. Brinkerhoff (1999 and 2000).
Building on Kpundeh's model, Brinkerhoff took it a step further by developing a
framework that comprises the characteristics or indicators of political will, the
environmental factors that influence political will, and the relationship between them.17
While the environmental factors are important in assessing the changes in the degree of
political will, the goal here is to evaluate the characteristics that would help us identify it
and analyze its impact.
Brinkerhoff (1999 and 2000) defined political will as "the commitment of actors
to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives—in this case, anti-corruption policies
and programmes—arid to sustain the costs of those actions over time" (2000, 242). He
proposed a set of five indicators of political will, namely (1) locus of initiative; (2) degree
of analytical rigor; (3) mobilization of support; (4) application of credible sanctions; and
(5) continuity of effort. The titles of these indicators alone allow us to see the similarities
between his and Kpundeh's indicators. More specifically, the second, third and fourth
indicators resemble three of the indicators proposed by Kpundeh. Additionally,
Brinkerhoff proposes also the scales that should be used for each indicator and which
would allow the creation of a composite measure of political will. The aggregated
indicator of political will would include the scores from all five indicators, with
high/strong rankings delineating strong political will. Brinkerhoff cautions researchers to
take into consideration the scores of all indicators when assessing the degree of political

17

For a detailed description of his model, see Derrick W. Brinkerhoff, "Identifying and Assessing Political
Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts", Implementing Policy Change Project, USAID 1999, Working Paper No.
13 and Derrick W. Brinkerhoff, "Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts: An Analytical
Framework", Public Administration and Development 20( 2000): 239-252.
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will and that low scores on some indicators may not be an indicator of a complete lack of
political will.
According to Brinkerhoff, the first indicator of political will, the locus of
initiative, refers to the "home-grown" or "imported/imposed" characteristic of political
will. Home-grown political will is preferred because it increases the chances of success if
the domestic reformers realize the necessity for developing and implementing
comprehensive reforms, while imported or imposed political will may have unintended
consequences due to the creation of resentment feelings towards the external actors who
are trying to impose their own will on the country in question. The suggested scale for
this indicator would range on a continuum from high to low, with higher values
indicating stronger political will that lies with the domestic reformers. While the
distinction between home-grown and imposed political will appears to be important, the
impact of external actors is also considered to be an environmental factor that affects the
strength and sustainability of political will and rightfully so. If external pressure is a
political will moderator, it cannot be used to also identify it and assess its strength.
Furthermore, if there is no domestic political will, it is difficult to see how one can claim
that there is actually any political will to develop and implement difficult reforms, such
as anticorruption reforms.
The degree of analytical rigor, Brinkerhoff s second indicator, is similar with
Kpundeh's first indicator, which assesses the comprehensiveness and seriousness of
identifying the causes and manifestations of corruption, the sectors most vulnerable, and
the potential solutions. This indicator should also be measured on a high-low continuum
scale, with higher values indicating a stronger political will. The third indicator,
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mobilization of support, resembles Kpundeh's second indicator which refers to the
development of a strategy that is inclusive and mobilizes support from various
stakeholders and the long-term willingness of reformers to implement their strategies and
to ensure the transparency of their efforts. This indicator is, thus, a sum of multiple
indicators measured on different scales such as "many versus few efforts, strong versus
weak, and/or effective versus ineffective, with the former of each of these being
associated with stronger political will" (Brinkerhoff 2000, 243).
While Brinkerhoff s attempt is to develop a more comprehensive indicator, this
aggregation of indicators into a single one is problematic for at least a couple of reasons.
First, this indicator attempts to measure more than just the mobilization of support for the
anticorruption strategies, but also the degree of transparency in the implementation and
impact of those strategies and the degree to which the failures are being publicized.
Hence, this indicator requires a long period of time in order to measure what it intends to
and it would not necessarily reflect the reformers' intent and success in mustering support
for their efforts. Second, the different scales use to assess the indicators require further
clarifications. For example, how many efforts are enough to score the highest value on
the scale and how few are too few to have a weak political will? How would weak but
inclusive efforts be assessed to determine a low degree of political will? Furthermore, the
effective/ineffective scale needs further clarification and objective indicators in order to
ensure an analytical assessment of anticorruption strategies. A strategy may prove to be
ineffective despite the mobilization of high level of support. In the end, this indicator
attempts to capture more than it initially proposes and it loses sight of the intended goal,
namely the mobilization of support.
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The next indicator, the application of credible sanctions, resembles Kpundeh's
fourth indicator, and it refers to the implementation of punitive sanctions and the creation
of positive incentives that would change behavior. The scale used to measure this
indicator would range on a continuum from strong application of highly credible
sanctions to weak application of ineffective sanctions, with the former indicating a
stronger political will. Although Brinkerhoff developed this indicator by introducing the
scale to measure it, the balance between sanctions and positive incentives remains nonspecified. Hence, the scale fails to assess the creation of positive incentives that would
change people's behavior or to measure the positive incentives necessary to determine the
existence of strong political will.
Brinkerhoff s last indicator assesses the continuity of effort, that is, the reformers'
long-term commitment to implement anticorruption strategies in terms of necessary
financial and human resources and by establishing a process of monitoring the impact of
anticorruption strategies and incorporating those findings into the new strategies. The
latter part of this indicator is similar with Kpundeh's fifth indicator, but as in the case of
the previous four indicators, Brinkerhoff proposes the scale to be used in measuring this
indicator. Thus, "strong and sustained continuity of effort" would be a sign of more
political will and "weak, episodic, or one-shot efforts" would suggest less political will
(Brinkerhoff 2000, 243).
Although these two attempts represent progress in conceptualizing political will
and developing a framework to assess it, both have shortcomings that reveal the
complexities and difficulties that any such study entails. Nonetheless, the mere fact that
such a research would be complicated should not prevent scholars from attempting to
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untangle the black box of political will. One of the goals of this research is to identify and
assess the impact of political will and it does that by building on the previous studies and
developing an adapted analytical framework in the Romanian case.

4. Research Design

4.1. Hypotheses

The literature on corruption argues that external pressure and public opinion
pressure are important elements in fighting corruption, but that the political will is the
essential element. The same literature suggests that there is a series of institutional
strategies to curb corruption, including enforcement of anticorruption legislation and
sanctions, creation of oversight institutions and anticorruption agencies, increase in
transparency and freedom of information, whistleblowers and witnesses' protection,
ethics codes, and merit-based civil service. Furthermore, an overall, effective
anticorruption campaign should involve a multi-dimensional approach in which multiple
strategies are used together or in various combinations corresponding to the sectors
targeted and the specific levels of corruption (World Bank 2000b, UNDP 2004, Karklins
2005). The institutional literature proposes a relationship between the restructuring of
incentives, the increase in effectiveness of formal institutions, and the decrease in
effectiveness of informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 2006).
Based on the literature on corruption and institutions and as it is presented in the
theoretical model (see Figure 1 below), I am hypothesizing that:
HI: The more corruption became a salient issue for the EU, the higher was the
political will to fight corruption.
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This hypothesis is based on the literature on corruption which states that
international organizations, institutions, and/or donors play an important role in the fight
against corruption. More specifically, the international actors can condition their
assistance by asking the governments to show a real commitment to curb corruption. In
this case, the EU is in an advantageous position not only because of the financial
assistance given to the Romanian government but also because of the latter's desire to
achieve EU membership. Hence, an increase in the salience of corruption for the EU
should translate into more political will to curb corruption.

Figure 1
Theoretical Model

Feedback effect
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Union Pressure

Public Opinion
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In the first report monitoring the progress towards democracy made by Romania
as well as the problems that remain to be addressed before the accession (i.e., 1998
Regular Report), the European Commission (EC) mentioned corruption only a few times
and mostly as a problem specific to the judicial system. However, by 2005, corruption
48

was assigned a red flag in the Regular Report and it had become one of the most
important problems to be addressed before the accession. Furthermore, the report
mentioned the effective fight against corruption as a condition for becoming an EU
member at January 1st, 2007. At the same time, one has to take into consideration the
possibility that the EU pressure was motivated by political reasons and less by the
existing level of corruption in Romania. It might be the case that EU politicians, in
response to their own constituents' pressure to postpone the enlargement, used
corruption, a highly visible and inflaming issue, as a means to justify their political
decisions with regard to Romania. Regardless of the real motivations behind the EU
pressure, it is expected to see an increase in the salience of corruption for the EU
associated with an increase in the political will to fight corruption.
H2: The more corruption became a salient issue for the public, the higher was the
political will to fight corruption.
The logic behind this hypothesis is also based on the literature on corruption,
according to which an effective fight against corruption is not possible without the
public's support and active participation. Given the secrecy that surrounds corruption,
people have to become aware of its existence, negative effects, and, most importantly, of
the means to fight it. Media and civil society organizations play an important role in
raising awareness and pressuring the government to initiate and implement anticorruption
strategies. Public opinion surveys are effective tools to monitor the importance that
people assign to the problem of corruption and the necessity to fight it. In turn, these
survey results may signal not only the significance that the public assigns to corruption as
a major problem, but they can also serve as means to add more pressure to the
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government and the political elites to effectively commit to the fight against corruption.
In its endeavor to push for anticorruption reforms, the public has one effective means to
achieve its goals: elections. Every four years, local and national elections are held during
which the public has the opportunity to reward or punish the politicians according to their
performances in office and, especially, to how well they kept their electoral promises. As
previously mentioned, beginning with 1996 elections, political parties have been
regularly sanctioned by the electorate with sometimes highly damaging consequences
(see the case of CDNPP). Under these circumstances and as long as politicians keep
using anticorruption rhetoric, ignoring the public opinion is not a politically viable
option. Furthermore, given the difficulties inherent in the fight against corruption, public
opinion can influence not only the building of the political will necessary to carry out this
task, but also the maintenance of a high political commitment over time (Pope 2000).
Therefore, the expectation is that an increase in people's perception of corruption as
being the most or among the most important problems they face leads to a higher political
will to curb corruption.
The impact of these two variables, EU pressure and public opinion pressure to
fight corruption, on the political will is likely to be difficult to differentiate. However,
given the fact that corruption appears to be more salient for the EU in the case of
judiciary and customs, an increase of the EU pressure to fight corruption in these two
sectors should materialize in a higher commitment (i.e., political will) and, therefore, an
increased implementation of anticorruption strategies in the judiciary and customs (see
Table 1, page 55). As an international actor, the role played by the EU in the fight against
corruption may be a unique case that cannot be replicated by other international
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organizations or institutions in other contexts. The EU has an advantageous position
compared to, for example, the World Bank, because of the financial and non-financial
"tools" it has at its disposal to exert necessary pressure on governments that want to
become EU members as well as the promise of the future benefits after the accession. It
may be the case that the EU will play a less significant role in the fight against corruption
after the accession, but it is highly unlikely that a complete reversal of the anticorruption
policies will take place. Moreover, due to the direct impact of health care corruption on
people's lives, it is highly probable that public opinion will exercise more pressure for the
adoption and implementation of anticorruption strategies in this sector than in the other
sectors.
At the same time, as the theoretical model shows, a feedback effect may occur;
that is, a decrease in the level of corruption and an increase in the effectiveness of formal
institutions should in turn affect the level of EU pressure and public opinion pressure
(i.e., decrease). A change in the two main dependent variables (i.e., increase in the
effectiveness of formal institutions and decrease in corruption) may lead to a relaxation in
the pressure exercised by the public opinion and EU. That, in turn, may affect the level of
political will and consequently the implementation of institutional strategies. However,
such a feedback effect would require a longer time to be monitored than the ten year
period that this study is focusing on, given the fact that in some sectors (e.g., health care,
public procurement) Romania is at the early stages of developing and implementing the
necessary institutional strategies. Hence, the primary focus of this study is on the impact
of the public opinion pressure and EU pressure on the level of corruption and the
effectiveness of formal institutions and not vice-versa.
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If the first two hypotheses are confirmed and an increase in political will is being
observed, the next step is to differentiate between political rhetoric to fight corruption and
demonstrated political will to curb it. Given the negative consequences of corruption, it is
to be expected that an increase in the salience of corruption for both the public and the
EU would result in an increase in the declared (or rhetorical) political commitment to
effectively fight it. That is, corruption is very likely to be used as a campaign issue during
national election years although perhaps less likely to be fought against once the elections
are over. Thus, there might be a gap between the political rhetoric and the demonstrated
political will to fight corruption represented by a failure to adopt anticorruption measures
or policies that would curb corruption. For example, in the 2006 National Anticorruption
Report, TI Romania notes that, despite the Romanian President's declared commitment to
effectively fight corruption, the parliamentary parties showed a decreased level of support
with regard to anticorruption policies. Deputies and senators representing both the
opposition and the governing coalition parties have constantly opposed or made it
difficult to adopt bills addressing specifically the fight against corruption. Hence, the
demonstrated component of political will is identified and, assuming that it is present, the
study continues with the testing of the next two hypotheses.
H3: The more anticorruption strategies were adopted, the greater the decrease of
corruption.
Corruption is an informal institution which through its own rules and sanctions
seeks divergent outcomes to those intended by the formal institutions. Additionally,
corruption has the advantage of time because the informal rules have been established
and enforced well before the fall of communism. The literature on informal institutions
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states that competing informal institutions, such as corruption, coexist with ineffective
formal ones. Hence, in the absence of a coherent package of anticorruption strategies and
effective formal institutions capable of changing and replacing the competing informal
institutions, corruption continues to thrive. The chances of successfully fighting
corruption depend on the ability of the anticorruption strategies employed in changing the
incentive structure created by the coexistence of formal and informal institutions. That is,
the implementation of anticorruption strategies should lead to a decrease of incentives to
engage in corrupt activities and an increase of incentives to comply with the formal rules.
Since institutions are composed of rules and sanctions for violating them, the application
of anticorruption strategies may result in a change in the costs of complying with the
formal (i.e., decrease) and/or informal rules (i.e., increase). Thus, a decrease in the level
of corruption should translate into an increase in the effectiveness of formal institutions
since the two variables are correlated and changes in one type of institutions results in
changes in the other type.
H4: The more anticorruption strategies employed simultaneously

(multi-

dimensional approach), the greater the decrease of corruption.
The success in the fight against corruption depends not only on the type of
anticorruption strategies employed, but also on how they are employed (i.e., multidimensional versus one-dimensional approach). The increasing literature on corruption
agrees that the simultaneous implementation of a variety of anticorruption strategies is
needed in order to increase the chances of successfully curbing it. Thus, the goal is not
only to pass anticorruption legislation but also to implement and enforce it, to increase
transparency and accountability, as well as to ensure the public's support by offering
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effective protection for those who decide to come forward and denounce corrupt acts or
testify against corrupt individuals. A multi-dimensional approach in the fight against
corruption is expected to lead to a decrease of corruption and an increase in the
effectiveness of formal institutions. That is, an effective package of anticorruption
strategies contains measures designed not only to target corrupt behavior and activities,
but also to reform the formal institutions plagued with corruption (e.g., oversight
institutions, strategies to increase transparency, ethics codes).
However, one may also expect sector by sector variation in the impact of various
anticorruption strategies employed as well as in the specific selection of strategies
employed in each sector (for example, the specific package of anticorruption strategies
implemented in the judiciary may be different than that employed in public procurement
sector). Moreover, it is also reasonable to take into consideration a time lag between the
implementation of specific strategies and the results of those strategies. Generally,
anticorruption strategies have specific time tables attached to them, which also mention
the distance in time from the implementation until the first, second, and so on evaluation
of their implementations and with what results. Based on the specific anticorruption
strategies employed and the time lags attached to them, the impact of the multidimensional approach may lead to results that will vary from sector to sector. Still, the
simultaneous implementation of different anticorruption strategies is expected to result in
changes in the level of corruption (i.e., decrease) and the effectiveness of formal
institutions (i.e., increase).
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The variation in Salience of Corruption for the EU (Table 1 ,"more" and "less"18)
is evaluated according to the likelihood of corruption in each sector to obstruct
Romania's accession to the EU. The 2005 EU Regular Report on Romania mentioned not
only that corruption was the main problem that has to be addressed, but it also
emphasized the importance of making real progress before January 1st 2007 or the
process of accession would be postponed at least one year. The judiciary and customs
were singled out as the main sectors in which anticorruption efforts must be aggressively
applied and progress made in order for the process of accession to continue as scheduled.

Table 1
Variation in the Salience of Corruption: the Public vs. the EU
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The EU Regular Report issued in May 2006 noticed the progress Romania made
in the fight against corruption. However, the Report also mentioned the need for
maintaining the pace of reforms and the implementation of anticorruption strategies,

18

1 chose to use the categorizations "more" and "less" because they capture more accurately the differences
in priorities for the EU and the public with regard to the fight against corruption and allow for more degrees
of differentiation among the four sectors with regard to anticorruption strategies and their effectiveness.

55

particularly in the judiciary and customs. Additionally, the Report stressed the
importance of obtaining concrete results in the fight against corruption, i.e., indictments,
prosecutions, trials, and convictions. Public procurement was also mentioned as a sector
in which corruption needs to be addressed, while the health care sector was presented as a
sector in which petty corruption was a "concern." Nonetheless, the most emphasis was
once again put on reforming and cleaning-up the judiciary and customs.
The variation in Salience of Corruption for the Public is conceptualized based on
the impact and importance of corruption in each sector for the general public. Hence,
corruption in the judiciary has led to "a generalized perception that Romania is governed
by vested interests and not the rule of law" (Open Society Institute 2002, 493). At an
individual level, a corrupt judiciary negatively impacts people's lives through the
arbitrary interpretation and application of the law leading to the creation of a general state
of uncertainty governed by informal rules that contravene the formal rules. Corruption in
the health care system also has a very direct impact on people's lives because health is a
good that people go to great lengths to obtain and maintain. Furthermore, this sector is
one in which people report personally experiencing corruption more often than in the
other sectors (Karklins 2005). According to the World Bank's Diagnostic Survey (2001,
14) one of the worst effects of corruption in this sector is the fact that poor households
are twice as likely as rich households to say that they do not seek medical assistance even
though they need it. Corruption in customs is less salient for the public because of the
less direct negative impact on people's lives. Public procurement is a sector that is not
only new in Romania but it is also less visible to the general public, which justifies the
"less" salient designation.

56

4.2. Case Selection

I conducted a qualitative case study of four sectors in Romania by using the "most
similar with different outcomes" research design. This approach assumes that differences
in outcomes among the cases19 compared are explained by their differences rather than by
their similarities (Przeworski and Teune 1970). The sectors were chosen because of their
importance for democratic consolidation, the different salience corruption has for the EU
and the public in each sector, and the varying strategies employed to fight it. I have also
taken into account the fact that corruption is secret by its nature and studying it is
somewhat illusive, especially when the interests at stake are high and the attempt is to
maintain them hidden from the public. Therefore, I chose methods of data collection such
as public official records, press publications, and interviews with anti-corruption experts,
public officials, representatives of NGOs and professional organizations, and journalists
that allowed me to gather reliable data. In addition, I used surveys of perception of
corruption20 conducted by various national and international organizations, such as
Transparency International Romania, Open Society Foundation Romania, the Center for
Health Policy and Services, the Center for Institutional Analysis and Development, and
World Bank.
Judicial System. An independent judiciary capable of enforcing rights, the
constitution, and other democratic institutions is still lacking in Romania (Anderson et al.
2005). After the 1989 revolution, the judicial system underwent significant reforms. The
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For the purpose of this research, the four sectors are treated as individual cases.
Unbiased, hard data on corruption continues to be difficult to obtain and usually raises the question of
validity. Surveys on perceptions of corruption remain the most reliable means of assessing the levels of
corruption. (Transparency International 2005,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2005/dnld/methodology.pdf).
20

57

main changes regard the recognition of the rule of law, the independence of judiciary, the
judicial code, and organization of the judicial system. However, in 2001, the World Bank
found that more than half of the citizens believe that judiciary is the second most corrupt
sector (after customs). The report states that one in five citizens reported paying a bribe
either to get a certain judge assigned to the case or to speed up the trial. There were also
instances in which a judge bribed another judge from a superior court in order to
influence the latter's decision (Open Society Institute 2002, 497). The 2005 EU Regular
Report on Romania underscored corruption in the judiciary as one of the major
impediments in the way to the EU accession. Consequently, the judiciary is the sector
where the EU exercised more pressure for institutional reform and reduction of
corruption. Moreover, this sector is expected to differentiate itself from the other three
sectors with regard to the demonstrated political will and, implicitly, the impact of the
institutional strategies implemented.
Customs. Since 1990, the customs authority has also been significantly reorganized. New legislation regulating the functioning of customs administration and the
modernization of customs methods has been adopted and adapted to EU standards
(GRECO

2002). In late 1992, Romania began close cooperation with the EU in the
99

context of the PHARE

program, targeting an increase in the efficiency and

effectiveness of customs. In a report published in 2001, the World Bank found that the
customs authority was perceived as the most corrupt institution in Romania and that
21

GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption), called the monitor, is a mechanism designed to improve
its members' capacity to fight corruption and operates under the supervision of the Council of Europe. For
more details, please visit http://www.greco.coe.int/Default.htm.
22
PHARE (Poland and Hungary Aid for Reconstruction and Economy) is the European Union's grant
assistance to the Central and East European countries in their process of economic transformation and
democratic consolidation. For more details, please visit http://www.gmunccd.org/FIELD/Multi/EU/FR_Phare.htm
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enterprise managers reported frequent encounters with bribery when dealing with
customs. Additionally, Romania has a geographically strategic importance in the context
of customs transit and in the fight against drug and human trafficking from the East
(PHARE 1998), translating into more pressure from the EU to reduce corruption in
customs. The difference between customs and judiciary may be less significant with
regard to the EU pressure, but corruption in customs is a less salient issue for the public
than health care or judiciary. Therefore, variation between customs and judiciary is
expected with regard to the pressure of public opinion (higher in the case of the
judiciary), political will and the effect of institutional strategies adopted and
implemented.
Public Procurement System. The first legislation regulating public procurement
was adopted in 1991. Since then, the legislation has been changed and complemented
with laws concerning the functioning of the procurement process and in an attempt to
align with the EU rules and norms regulating public procurement.
Still, SIGMA

(2003)

found a huge discrepancy between tender notices (about 6000) and contract award notices
(about 2000) published in the Official Journal of Romania (Monitorul

Oficial).

Corruption distorts the way public contracts are assigned and subverts the economic
transition. The EU started exercising increased pressure to reform and combat corruption
in this sector in 2005. Additionally, the public procurement sector is very complex and
relatively new for the general public to exercise direct pressure to be reformed and
cleaned up of corruption. Consequently, variation between these sector and the other
three
sectors is expected with regard to both EU and public opinion pressure. Moreover,
23
SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management) is a joint program of the OECD and
EU designed to support partner states to improve their public governance systems. For more details, please
visit http://www.sigmaweb.Org/pages/0,2987, en_33638100_33638151_l_l_l_l_l,00.html
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an increase in the EU pressure starting with 2005 is expected to translate into an
increased demonstrated political will to reform this sector just prior to accession. Hence,
differences are expected also with regard to the institutional strategies adopted and their
impact, which is expected to be less visible given the novelty of institutional strategies.
Health Care System. The health care system in Romania has been reformed at a
slower pace than other sectors. Prior to 1989, the health care sector was based on the
principles of universal coverage, state financing, central planning, and free access to
health care (Bara et al. 2002, 446). The most important change took place in 1997 when a
German insurance model based on compulsory contributions was developed, but the
private sector continues to remain under-developed. The insurance model has reduced the
chances of elders, those who live in rural areas (40% of the population), and unemployed,
who cannot make the monthly insurance payments, to have access to health care services
(Bara et al. 2002, 450). Additionally, in 2001 the public perceived the health care system
as the fifth most corrupt sector in Romania and more than half of the citizens reported
paying atentie (under-the-table) while using health care services (World Bank 2001/ The
likelihood of fighting corruption in this sector may be less than in the judiciary or
customs because EU pressure is less significant. Nonetheless, corruption in health care is
felt by a wide swath of the population directly, unlike customs or procurement.
Therefore, public opinion pressure is expected to be higher in this sector and to result in
an increased political commitment to reform and combat corruption in the health care
system.
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4.3. Methodology and Measurement

The project employed a mixed methodology. The predominant methodology was
qualitative and quantitative analyses were integrated whenever appropriate (e.g., testing
for statistically significance relationships between variables or statistically significant
differences between trends). Corruption is by its nature hidden and difficult to prove;
therefore, the best approach is to incorporate multiple perspectives and methodological
tools. Each tool has its own specific strengths and weaknesses but they complement each
other and taken together offer a more complete image of the phenomena under study (Yin
2003). I conducted an annualized longitudinal analysis that started in 1997 and ended in
2006. In July 1997, the European Commission issued its Opinion regarding Romania's
application for EU membership. The Opinion presented a detailed assessment of the
progress made by Romania towards democratization and market economy and it
recommended problems to be addressed during the pre-accession process. That year also
marked the official starting point of the annual evaluations made by the EU to all
candidate countries, evaluations that took the form of annual Country Monitoring
Reports, simply called Regular Reports that monitored the progress made by the
candidates in meeting the EU requirements. Additionally, from 1997, every new
government in Romania publicly announced its commitment to fight corruption, but both
the EU and the Romanian public were impatient for concrete results (Transparency
International Romania 2005). With January 1st, 2007 as the deadline for the EU
accession, the pressure for progress and result in the fight against corruption increased in
2006. Nonetheless, the efforts appeared to have been concentrated on reforming and
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curbing corruption in the judiciary and customs, and less in the public procurement and
health care sectors.
Although I made a basic designation of each of the four sectors as more or less
salient for the public and the EU, I further measure each. I measured the salience of
corruption for the public by evaluating 1) public polling results (specifically, the
Barometers of Public Opinion (BOP) from 1998 until 2006, inclusive) and 2) the cases of
corruption publicized in the newspapers (under the assumption that publicity has
demonstration value and keeping in mind the fact that it is more likely that it may be the
case that only the major cases of corruption are covered in the written media). In order to
measure the salience of corruption for the EU, I assessed 1) EU monitoring reports of the
progress in reforming the four sectors and fighting corruption, 2) the presentation in the
written media of corruption in association with EU integration, 3) statements made by EU
officials regarding the level of corruption, and 4) statements made by EU officials
regarding the postponement of EU integration in the absence of a decrease of corruption.
Political will was measured by a set of six indicators, which were borrowed and
adapted from Kpundeh (1998) and Brinkerhoff (1999 and 2000) to capture the
demonstrated and rhetorical political will in the Romanian case. The first indicator, the
analytical rigor in diagnosing corruption, evaluates the major measures taken to assess
the problem of corruption and to identify the steps required to curb it. The second
indicator, the inclusion and cooperation of main stakeholders,

refers here to the

collaboration between government, political parties, and civil society organizations in
drafting and adopting anticorruption legislation and strategies. The third indicator,
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adoption of anticorruption reforms,24 assesses the development and implementation of
anticorruption reforms. The process of adopting a particular anticorruption strategy is
measured by assessing the a) consensus or compromise, b) duration of reaching an
acceptable agreement for all parties involved in the decision process, and c) political
coalitions formed during the negotiation and decision process based on the minutes of the
legislative debates and data from interviews. The parliamentary minutes were used to
analyze the legislative debates regarding the adoption of specific anticorruption reforms;
the legislative debates revealed not only the changes introduced to the initial legislative
proposals, but also the changes that failed to be adopted, the reasons for which they were
not adopted, as well as the dynamics between the political parties and between the
government and the legislature, which will reveal the level of compromise in adopting
anticorruption measures and will help differentiate between demonstrated and rhetorical
political will. The fourth and last indicator assesses the creation of a monitoring system
that is transparent and that includes its findings in refining anticorruption strategies. The
indicators are qualitatively evaluated and while specific scores are not attributed to each
individual indicator (as Brinkerhoff suggested) the degree of political will is based on the
aggregated evaluations of the individual indicators.
I also evaluate the statements made by political parties and political elites
regarding the fight against corruption publicized in the major newspapers, and the use of
corruption as a campaign issue during national elections (2000 and 2004 national
elections) to determine the degree of rhetorical political will. Additionally, I analyze
public statements made by three high officials, namely President Emil Constantinescu

24

"Reforms" and "strategies" are used interchangeably in this study.

(1997-2000), Prime Minister (PM) Adrian Nastase (2001-2004),25 and President Traian
Basescu (2004-2006). Although not exhaustive, these statements are illustrative of the
rhetorical political will expressed throughout the decade under study.
I measured the enforcement of legislation and sanctions by assessing 1) the
incidence of corruption indictments, prosecutions and convictions (judicial records
obtained from the Ministry of Justice, the General Prosecutor's Office, and the National
Anticorruption Directorate). The application of other anticorruption strategies such as
oversight institutions and anticorruption agencies was measured by 1) identifying them
(i.e., ombudsman, audit institutions), 2) their formal authority (i.e., evaluation of
statutes), 3) the resources allocated for their operation (i.e., funds and staff), and 4) their
activity based on the Activity Reports made public by these institutions.
The increase in transparency was measured by evaluating 1) the openness of
procedures (i.e., publication of tenders and the information needed to participate, the
advanced time of their publication, publication of bids and contract awards in public
procurement); 2) publication of legislation; 3) publication of regulations (customs); and
4) publication of fees (i.e., for health care services, customs). The efficacy of freedom of
information was measured by assessing the existing legislation based on 1) its quality
(e.g., identify the specific types of information that fall under this legislation) and 2) its
effectiveness (e.g. attempts made by the media and people to access information under
the Act on Free Access to Public Information and their success in doing it). In order to
measure the protection of whistleblowers and witnesses, I evaluated 1) the quality of the
25

PM Nastase was chosen due to his high visibility during 2001-2004 SDP governance, period in which he
was the forefront political actor representing the new administration in the fight against corruption. That
strategy is explained by the fact that Nastase was preparing his 2004 presidential campaign and therefore,
he made a conscientious decision to build an image of corruption-fighter, image that would increase his
chances of success in the upcoming presidential elections.
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legislation (what specific protection offers) and 2) the implementation of the legislation
(number of cases registered since the implementation of the legislation).
Ethics codes are also important strategies in the fight against corruption and to
measure their impact on the level of corruption I evaluated 1) the quality of the rules; 2)
sanctions for violating them; and 3) cases of violations of ethics codes publicized in the
written media and/or publicized by the organism responsible for monitoring the
implementation of ethics codes in each sector (e.g., the Superior Council of Magistracy
publicizes the cases of ethics codes violations in the judicial system). I measured the
degree to which the civil service is merit-based by assessing 1) the rules and procedures
for recruitment (e.g., merit-based versus appointments), 2) the rules of promotion (e.g.,
rewards for performance and honest work versus seniority rule), and 3) professional
training courses.
The dependent variables, change in the level of corruption and increase in the
effectiveness of formal institutions, are correlated; by measuring the decrease in the level
of corruption, I indirectly measured an increase in the effectiveness of formal institutions.
The change in the level of corruption was assessed by utilizing 1) existing national and
international surveys assessing the public's perception and experiences with corruption in
each sector, 2) interviews with anticorruption experts and public employees and 3)
qualitative evaluation of the institutional strategies and their reported impact.
The surveys that evaluate the views of firms, public officials and households with
regard to corruption are the main measure of evaluating the existence and diffusion of
corruption and the only available data source that allow the monitoring of corruption over
time and across countries (Kaufmann et al. 2006, 1). Perceptions are important because
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if, for example, people believe the courts to be corrupt, they will not want to use their
services regardless of the objective reality. Furthermore, perceptions about corruption can
be used to monitor the success of anticorruption strategies the same way that polling data
is used by governments around the world in setting policy priorities and evaluating their
progress (Kaufmann et al. 2006). Perceptions of corruption also affect people's trust in
public institutions, the rule of law, and democracy. Hence, a high level of perceived
corruption indicates that corruption is a serious problem that cannot be ignored and, if
anticorruption strategies are developed and implemented, it suggests a low level of their
efficiency. Moreover, increasingly more surveys measure not only the perceptions of
Oft
corruption but also the actual experiences with corruption (e.g., World Bank's BEEPS ).
Thus, people are asked to assess the perceived level of corruption and to report their own
experiences with corruption. At the same time, one should not overstate the difference
between perceptions of corruption and actual experiences with corruption because, given
the secret nature of corruption, people might not be completely forthright with their own
experiences of corruption.
There are two major criticisms made of corruption data: measurement error and
imprecision. Thus, one should be aware of these weaknesses and the fact that specific
measures of corruption at the sector level are not perfectly related to the overall level of
corruption (Kaufmann et al. 2006). In order to address these weaknesses, I used surveys
of corruption that were comparable (that is, they were either centralized or
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The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) is a national survey of business
firms that assesses corruption and other probl
ems firms have to face, and it is also one of the best indicators of corruption in public procurement. For
more information, please visit http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/beeps.htm.
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decentralized ) and that also provide detailed information with regard to the definitions
and methods used to collect data, so the level of uncertainty was reduced (Knack 2006).
Additionally, I chose corruption indicators that used rather fixed and explicit criteria that
allowed me to measure change over time (e.g., indicators included in the Barometers of
Public Opinion), as opposed to indicators that used criteria which have been greatly
revised from one year to another. While different indicators of corruption may use
various definitions, for the purpose of this study, I do not need to identify corruption
indicators that match exactly my definition of corruption. While it would be interesting to
distinguish between the changes in the level of various forms of corruption, that is
beyond the scope of this study.
An analysis of informal institutional change requires extensive fieldwork and a
significant knowledge of the community or society within which they are embedded
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Additionally, extensive fieldwork of corruption is in itself a
complex and difficult phenomenon to research. To that end, I spent eleven months (from
September 1st 2006 until July 31st 2007) conducting field research in Romania. I collected
a significant amount of data from newspapers, public official documents, corruption
reports and studies, and from interviews with public officials, anticorruption experts, civil
society representatives, journalists, and professional experts (i.e., judicial experts, health
care experts, and public procurement experts). A total of 31 interviews were conducted
between January 2007 and July 2007, which included 10 public officials, 9 civil society
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"Centralized" means that the corruption sources are represented by a network of people with country
specific expertise but that the final rating is being determined by a small number of people; "decentralized"
means that the views on corruption are solicited from experts only for countries in which they have direct
expertise. For more details, see Stephen Knack, "Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central
Asia: a Critique of the Cross-Country Indicators," World Bank Working Paper 3968, July 2006,
particularly pp. 8-9.
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representatives, 1 representative of magistrates' professional organization, 3 journalists, 4
professional experts, 2 anticorruption experts, and 2 physicians. With the exception of
public officials, the identities of the interviewees are confidential and in accordance with
the Human Science Institutional Review Protocol no. 06-03-13. The three newspapers
surveyed, i.e., Evenimentul Zilei, (The Daily Event), Jurnalul National (The National
Journal), and Romania Libera (The Free Romania), were selected based on the data from
the Romanian Audit Bureau of Circulation and consultations with representatives from
the Romanian Academic Society.

5. The Organization of the Study

The second chapter provides a historical setting for the discussion of corruption as
an informal institution. Corruption is shown to be part of the communist legacy, a legacy
that expanded during the transition to democracy and continued to undermine the process
of democratic consolidation and the establishment of the rule of law. The endurance and
pervasiveness of informal power relations is also discussed along with their impact on
democratization and marketization.
The third chapter focuses on the EU strategy of democracy promotion, Romania's
road towards accession, the EU pressure on the Romanian Government, and the impact
on the political will. The main emphasis is on the analysis of EU pressure on the
Romanian government to transpose the acquis communautaire and fight corruption in
each of the four sectors under study and on the assessment of the EU impact on the
domestic political will. Additionally, the evolution of the EU pressure in the major
newspapers is investigated.
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The fourth chapter is devoted to the analysis of the public opinion pressure on the
political will. Thus, the chapter assesses the salience the public assigns to corruption by
analyzing public polls data and it examines the role played by the media in uncovering
cases of corruption and presenting rhetorical political will. The relationship between the
public opinion pressure and political will measured by the newspaper articles is then
statistically tested. The chapter also discusses the impact of public opinion in the four
sectors analyzed in this study.
In the subsequent four chapters the institutional strategies adopted and
implemented in the decade under study are being evaluated for each sector in the
following order: judiciary, customs, public procurement, and health care. Each
institutional strategy is analyzed and its impact on corruption is being assessed.
Additionally, the presence of demonstrated or merely rhetorical political will is assessed
in the discussion of institutional strategies. Each chapter concludes with a summary of
results, an evaluation of the overall impact of the institutional strategies in achieving the
intended goals, and the remaining problems.
The concluding chapter summarizes the findings, discusses their implications,
explains the limitations of this study, and presents avenues for further research.
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CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. Introduction

The informal institution of corruption is not a new development in the postcommunist Romania. Corruption was inherited from the communist regime and thrived
under the favorable circumstances created by the dual transition to democracy and market
economy. In this chapter, I show that the particular characteristics of the communist
regime were not only conducive to corruption, but that the very existence of corruption
was necessary for the functioning of the state command economy. Hence, corruption was
accepted and tolerated to a certain degree in all communist regimes, Romania included. I
also demonstrate that corruption is part of the communist legacy in post-communist
Romania, a legacy that undermines the process of democratization and the establishment
of the rule of law. First, I briefly discuss the formal institutional changes that took place
at the beginning of the transition period, including the issue of formal institutional tabula
rasa that created additional space for the flourishing of corruption. Next, I address the
issue of informal relations and their impact on the process of democratization and
marketization. The chapter concludes with a brief assessment of the pervasiveness and
endurance of corruption and informal power relations in the post-communist Romania.
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2. Corruption under Communist Regime

In autumn 1944, when the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) came to power it
was largely unknown among Romanians. From its creation in 1924 until August 1944,
RCP had avery small party membership and it was formed mainly of ethnic minorities
(Hungarians, Jews, Bulgarians, Russian, Moldavians), who, although adopted Romanian
names in an attempt to increase the Party's membership, were not very successful in
recruiting Romanians (Deletant 1999). Thus, the communist regime in Romania was
imposed by the Soviet Union and it lacked the popular support needed to legitimize it.
The very process of gaining power without popular approval and the use of terror in order
to impose the communist rule might explain why some individuals would see corruption
as a form of rebellion against "an illegitimate system" (Holmes 1993, 160).
Regardless of the way in which communists came to power, the very
characteristics of the communist systems were conducive to corruption. Those regimes
were characterized by a significant institutional blurring, to use Leslie Holmes'
terminology (1993, 183), and the most important one regarded the delineation between
the state and the party. In communist regimes the locus of power was the party-state; that
monopoly of political decisions led to a situation in which "events do not occur, decisions
are not made, and facts are often not recognized as facts until they are allowed to occur or
to be recognized" (Jowitt 1992, 72, emphasis added). The party-state's impractical
demand for individuals to identify with the public interest rather than their private
interests resulted in a lower identification with the public institutions, a blurring of the
public and official realms, and a deeper divide between the public and private spheres.
According to Jowitt (1992), the Romanian communist regime strengthened certain
71

traditional political attitudes that emphasized the social differences based on status which
existed prior to 1945. The difference now was no longer between boier (nobleman) and
subject, but between party-cadre (the elite) and citizen (the non-elite). Party cadres had a
privileged status in all communist regimes, not only in Romania, and those interested in
making a "good living" knew that advancing in the communist party was the fastest and
safest way to reach that goal. It was common for people during communist era to stimula
atentie, to gain the attention of the elite (e.g., doctors, bureaucrats, managers) and for
many individuals with such a high status to regularly require mica atentie, a little
attention (i.e., a bribe in the form of money or goods) before the performance of a public
service (Jowitt 1992, 65).
The failure of the communist regimes to institute a rational-legal bureaucratic
system led to the establishment of a system permeated by networks of personal relations
among its members, relations based on mutual obligations as opposed to the impersonal
and rational legal rules and norms that exist in a system based on the rule of law (Cole
1981, 84-85). The extensive use of pile, relations, nepotism, clientelism, and favoritism
was so widespread in communist Romania, that the acronym PCR (Romanian
Communist Party, in Romanian) was said to actually mean Pile, Cuno§tine, Relatii, that
is, connections, acquaintances, and relations (Cole 1981, Holmes 1993). Nepotism, which
was generally perceived by Romanians as being a form of corruption also in the
communist era (Holmes 1993, 69), was common at all levels of the Romanian society.
Ceau§escu's attempt to create a Romanian-style communist society led to the creation of
what became known as "socialism in one family", a highly nepotistic system in which the
top positions in the RCP and government were filled with family members, distant
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relatives or people from his own village, Scornice§ti. Thus, at the beginning of 1980s,
Elena Ceau§escu, the leader's wife, became the RCP's second-in-command and the
person in charge with the Central Committee Commission for cadres and the party's
personnel policy; the couple's youngest son, Nicu Ceau§escu, was being groomed to
become their heir; two of Nicolae Ceau§escu's brothers were in charge of the military and
the security police, and other close and distant relatives were assigned influential
positions in various sectors, such as the military and

Securitate, the secret police

(Tismaneanu 1989 and 2003).
Another important feature of the communist regimes which was highly conducive
to corruption was the state command economy. Jo wit (1992a) described the relationship
between the Party and the economy as charismatic and the fascination of the communist
regimes with building heavy industry as a heroic activity, worthy of the noble cadres
(129). In Romania, Ceau§escu became directly involved in the economy, making regular
"vizite de lucru," working visits to factories and giving "indicafii prefioase," valuable
advices, that managers had to incorporate into their working plans (Deletant 1999, 125).
His obsession with heavy industry and the dependence on central planning, along with
the regime of austerity measures for the Romanians resulted in a disastrous economic
situation and a sharp decrease of the living standards by mid 1980s.
The state command economy emphasized production goals paying less attention
to the means necessary to achieve them. In a society in which, as Stalin put it, "Victors of
production are not judged!" (Schwartz 1979, 430), adopting informal means for
achieving production goals was not only acceptable but it was also rewarded.
Additionally, the significant changes resulted from the rapid modernization process
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(industrialization and collectivization) that took place in the first decades of the
communist rule were considered responsible for the appearance of a certain degree of
corruption. A lower level of corruption was regarded as beneficial for the society because
it would help "grease the wheels" and lead to economic growth (Huntington 1968). To a
certain degree at least, that might have been the rationale of the communist parties and it
might explain their tolerance of corruption in the economic sphere. Corruption might
have also been accepted as a substitute for other political, economic, and social reforms.
The combination of informal, personal network of bureaucratic relations with the
strictly hierarchical order of the communist party and the special status of privileges for
the party nomenklatura made for a highly favorable environment for the flourishing of
corruption (Staats 1972, Schwartz 1979). Although corruption was considered to have
played a functional role in the communist society because it sustained its economic
functioning (Kramer 1977, Schwartz 1979, Holmes 2006), its pervasiveness further
increased the gap between society and the party-state. Under those circumstances in
which individual initiative and responsibility were restricted and discouraged; where state
production plans were not only a priority but also a patriotic obligation for every sector of
the economy to achieve; where decision-making processes were highly secretive; where
raw materials and products were in short supplies; and where the penalties for not
achieving the goals were real and severe, corruption became an important informal means
for achieving the required economic goals (Jowitt 1992, Holmes 1993 and 2006, Rose
2001). Hence, corruption became an integral part of the second economy which
developed in all communist countries and which helped compensate for the consumer
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shortages and political frustrations created by the communist political-economic system
(Sampson 1987).
However, one of the major problems with functional corruption is how easily it
can become dysfunctional (Schwartz 1979). If initially corruption was accepted as a
substitute for institutional reforms and as an informal means for achieving economic
goals, very fast it spread to all areas of society. Nepotism, clientelism, favoritism, bribery
became the rule rather than the exception in communist societies. While instances of
corruption were very common, the official reporting of corrupt acts was less frequent
and, as expected, there are only few studies and reports of official disclosure of corrupt
activities. There are even less instances of cases of convictions for corrupt activities,
which is not surprising given the privileged status of the party cadre, who considered
themselves to be above the law, and the widespread use of pile in solving any kind of
problems.
Nonetheless, the few examples of corruption are illustrative of its pervasiveness in
all sectors of the communist Romanian society. At the beginning of 1980s there were
several official reports of bribes taken from failed applicants as a basis for admission to
the law school and of the redirection by farm managers of labor and/or material from
public to private use; there were also stories about the sale of an entire shipment of stylish
shoes before the store opened because they were all bought by the store's employees for
their families, friends, or in order to use them for establishing or maintaining important
connections; and the "truism of rural life that no country doctor need[ed] ever spend one
Leu28 on food because of the in-kind gifts of his patients" (Cole 1981, 86). During the
same period, there were also few official reports regarding high officials who have been
28

Leu is the Romanian currency.
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replaced due to inefficient management and allegations of corruption (QER 1982, 7). In
her study, Holmes (1993, 105) recounted a corrupt act that she witnessed at the Otopeni
International Airport, in Bucharest, Romania in 1986, when a passport control officer
took $30.00 and a cartoon of Kent (what she called "an invaluable currency when visiting
Romania") from three young men from the Middle East, in order to allow them to enter
the country. Western cigarettes, particularly Kent, were a highly appreciated and
influential currency in the corrupt exchanges that took place under communism. "Like
money, Kents are anonymous, divisible, and relatively long lasting. They can even be
counterfeited by stuffing empty packs of Romanian cigarettes!" (Sampson 1987, 131).
Besides money and cigarettes, anything else that was in short supply made
for a very
9
good currency (e.g., cognac, chocolate, meat, books, shoes, electronics, etc.).
Corruption was so widespread in communist societies that Wojciech Markiewicz
(1985, 195) claimed that "we start greasing other people's palms even before we are born
(or strictly speaking, our parents do it, when they take the trouble to try and arrange
tolerable conditions for our arrival into this world).... [and] right up to the grave."
Moreover, the specific communist structure made corruption so common that the very
words bribery and corruption were not used anymore. Instead, people began using
euphemisms and new expressions such as "a presentation of some tokens of our
gratitude" (Markiewicz 1985, 195) were incorporated in the people's everyday
vocabulary. The word corruption re-entered the vocabulary after 1989 when the corrupt
activities became less personal and money become the main currency for corrupt
exchanges (Ditchev 2002).
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3. Cultural Explanations of Corruption

One of the often used explanations for the existence and persistence of corruption
in Romania is cultural. Corruption is said to be part of the Romanian pre-communist
culture which dates back to the Ottoman times when the Danubian Principalities,
Wallachia and Moldavia, were ruled by Phanariotes, Greek princes, who used to buy their
positions from the sultans (Bacon 1984, Mungiu-Pippidi 1997). That situation created a
vicious circle in which money had to be extracted from the Phanariotes' inferiors (i.e.,
Romanian subjects) in order to pay or compensate for the payment made to get the
position. Corruption is also claimed to be part of the "Balkan mentality" (Moore 1984,
189) and, therefore, something to be expected in the Romanian society, a society that
historically lacked "any faith in the state" (Sampson 1987, 132) and it was familiar with a
rule of patronage and corruption. Another often used explanation of corruption in
Romania is religion and, more specifically, the Orthodox Church, which is claimed to be
an excessively accommodating church. Since Phanariotes' times, the Orthodox Church
had collaborated with the exploitative leaders and failed to protect its followers
(Gallagher 2005). The cooperation with the communist regime further tainted the image
of the Romanian Orthodox Church and it demonstrated its continuous dependence on the
exploitative state.
However, one of the main features of communist regimes was their commitment
to completely change their societies, to revolutionize them. Every aspect of the
communist societies was attempted to be controlled by the party-state through a myriad
of state-sponsored, or more appropriately state-controlled, organizations destined to
create the "new socialist man" appropriate for the communist society. While communism
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reinforced certain "traditional political attitudes and behavior" (Jowitt 1992, 63), it also
created a new "culture of expectations" (Holmes 1993, 161) which developed regardless
of the pre-communist culture and which emphasized the perquisites that came with higher
positions in the nomenklatura. Additionally, the communist regime regularly told people
that they own the wealth in society and many of them began believing it, or at least
believing it when it fitted their purposes (Holmes 1993). It was created a paradoxical
situation in which the public property belonged to everyone, but no one (at least among
the non-elites) felt responsible for protecting it. That situation might explain the lower
respect people had for state property, which in turn allowed them to justify pilfering,
embezzlement, and corruption in general, when the public property was the object of
their actions.
Communist regimes affected the cultures and values of their societies and
corruption became part of the informal rules and norms that shaped the everyday human
interaction (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005, 116). As any informal or formal institution
for that matter, corruption was influenced by the cultural context in which it appeared and
developed. The problem with the cultural explanations of corruption is that they tend to
be fatalistic and limited; that is, corruption is considered to be part of one's traditions,
customs, and history and, therefore, it is little if anything that can be done to change that.
In the Romanian case, the emphasis on the Ottoman inheritance regularly omits the fact
that Transylvania was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and therefore the
Phanariotes' mentality did not develop there. To claim that the Romanian society is prone
to corruption because of its inherited culture of corruption from the period of Ottoman
servitude requires one to give too much credit to those traditions and to their power to
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spread and thrive in new territories (i.e. Transylvania). Even if admittedly those traditions
and customs became common to all Romanians, not everyone in society looks back at the
very same traditions; various segments of society may look at different traditions in the
past in order to justify their present actions (Holmes 1993, 158). Assuming that everyone
in society shares exactly the same views with regard to cultural values and traditions is
highly reductionist. Additionally, culture is not fixed and although traditions and customs
change slower, they do change over time and are influenced by formal institutional
constraints. At the same time, learning advances and people re-socialize and re-educate
themselves constantly in order to adapt to new political and social environments (Rose et
al. 1998).
According to the cultural explanation of corruption, culture determines a society's
propensity to corruption and explains the variation in the levels of corruption among
different countries. For example, Daniel Treisman found that the British colonial heritage
and Protestantism are correlated with lower levels of corruption (Treisman 2000).
However, later studies that used larger samples and additional controls found that there
was no significant relationship between Protestantism and corruption or between British
colonial heritage and corruption (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, Sandholtz and Gray 2003).
In a different study, Seymour M. Lipset and Gabriel S. Lenz (2000) attempted to
demonstrate quantitatively the link between culture and corruption. First, they referred to
Robert Merton's theory that corruption was a behavior motivated by social pressure to
achieve certain goals (e.g., high income) by engaging in violations of norms when the
access to the approved means was restricted. They also pointed to Edward Banfield's
explanation of "amoral familism" characteristic for societies with cultural values that
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emphasize family ties at the expense of communitarian values. Building on Banfield and
Merton's propositions and using data from the 1990 World Value Survey, the two authors
concluded that both familism and achievement orientation are significantly correlated
with corruption levels (Lipset and Lenz 2000, 117-120).
However, in a different study, Martin Paldam found that corruption varies
significantly among countries within the same cultural areas and that there was "little
basis for the belief that corruption is so deeply embedded in the culture of a society as to
be unchangeable" (Paldam 2002, 238). Furthermore, William L. Miller and his
collaborators' analysis concluded that the widespread corruption in post-communist
countries cannot be explained by "any kind of culture", and that the "bargaining power of
officials vis-a-vis their clients" offers a better explanation for the higher levels of
corruption in those countries (Miller et al. 2001, 277).
Hence, cultural explanations of corruption are appealing to politicians who can
blame the high levels of corruption and the low levels of success in curbing it on the
historical endurance of certain cultural traits favorable to corruption. These types of
explanations are also convenient for the people because it might justify their poor
electoral choices and their low level of active participation in fighting against corruption
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003). Culture is the opportune explanation of corruption and of
everything else that goes wrong in society, without really providing an answer to the
questions regarding the existence of those problems and the appropriate solutions for
addressing them. Hence, the cultural argument of corruption is tautological and not
helpful in finding the most effective and efficient solutions to tackle this problem. Any
understanding of corruption and of the means to curb it must look to other explanations,
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such as structural constraints imposed by the specific features of the communist regime,
the endurance of informal institutions in post-communist societies and the relationship
between formal and informal institutions during democratization and marketization.

4. Institutional Flux, Tabula Rasa?

By 1989, the communist countries in Central Eastern Europe were pervaded by
corruption; there was corruption at higher levels, benefiting those in the party
nomenklatura

and the government, and there was corruption at the lower levels,

encouraging disrespect for the formal institutions and the rule of law (Rose et al. 1998).
According to Elster and his collaborators (1998), the breakdown of the communist
regimes left behind an institutional tabula rasa. The formal institutions of the old regime
were completely discredited; the Communist Party and its leading role were removed
from the political scene; and the main question became "Is there anyone who might be
able to do anything—including defining what needs to be done?" (Elster et al. 1998, 25).
Therefore, the immediate challenge that post-communist regimes had to address was the
designing of new formal institutions that would ensure the transition to democracy and
market economy and that would take the place left void by the dismantling of old
institutions.
However, the demise of the communist regimes left behind a more complex
situation than the tabula rasa argument suggests. While some formal institutions were
dismantled leaving behind an institutional vacuum in which the new institutions had to be
created, others were replaced, reformed or continued to function largely unchanged (see
Table 2 below). The brief discussion of the main institutional changes that took place in
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Romania in the immediate period after the collapse of the communist regime will
illustrate the intricacies of the dual transition in Romania.

Table 2
Formal Institutional Changes in Early 1990s
Dismantled

Newly Created

Replaced/
Reformed
Constitution

Largely
Unchanged
Police

Grand National
Assembly

Political Parties and
Electoral System

Romanian
Communist Party

Public Procurement*

Judiciary*

Bureaucratic
Apparatus

Securitate

Parliament

Customs*

Health Care*

Military

4.1. Dismantled and Newly Created Formal Institutions

The most important formal institutions that were removed from the political life
were the Grand National Assembly (GNA), the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), and
the Securitate, the infamous Romanian secret police. Their disappearance from the
political arena left behind a situation similar to an institutional tabula rasa, a situation in
which new institutions had to be created to fill the void left behind by the disappearance
of the old institutions and in response to the requirements imposed by the
democratization process. Hence, there had to be created a new Parliament, new electoral
rules, and new political parties. Securitate was an exceptional case because its
disappearance was not only considered as a necessary step in breaking with the
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communist past, but it did not generate the need to fill the space left behind with another
similar institution.

4.1.1. The Legislature

Following the Soviet model, the 1948 Constitution of the People's Republic
established the Grand National Assembly, a unicameral legislative body which was
considered the highest organ of state authority. When GNA was not in session, which
happened quite often, a Presidium formed of a president, a secretary, and seventeen other
members acted on its behalf. Of course, GNA was composed of loyal members of the
Communist Party and acted under the latter control and supervision (Deletant 1999, 60).
GNA was dissolved in December 1989 and the interim role of the legislative body was
held by the Council of the National Salvation Front (CNSF). After heated debates, CNSF
opted for a bicameral Parliament, which was to be formed based on the results of the first
elections, scheduled for May 1990 (Birsch et al. 2002). The new bicameral Parliament
was created in May 1990, following the elections. Originally, the Chamber of Deputies
had 396 members, but after the first elections its size was reduced, and currently there are
333 Deputies, 18 of them representing small minority groups that cannot win enough
votes to pass the electoral threshold. The higher chamber, the Senate initially had 119
members, but after the 1990 elections, the number of Senators was increased to 143
(Hollis 1999). Currently, the number of senators was reduced to 137, each senator
representing 160,000 voters.
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4.1.2. The Electoral System and Political Parties

In January 1990, RCP was declared to be part of the communist past and banned
from the political life. According to Elster et al. (1998, 131), the post-communist
transition differed from other democratization processes in the sense that it had a "unique
starting point". In Central Eastern Europe there were no pre-communist party structures
which could be easily recreated or any external agencies ready to create new political
parties on the basis of some sophisticated political ideology and program. Therefore, the
new democratic political parties were transitional and transitory; that is, they were
brought into existence by the transition process and faded quickly or undergone
significant changes because their original position on the political map was in response to
the problems created by the transition (Elster et al. 1998). The specific starting point
suggests that the new political parties were created in "something like an institutional
vacuum" (Lijphart and Weisman 1996, 246).
In addition to the decision regarding the structure of the Parliament, the
provisional legislative body had to opt for a new political system, to choose new electoral
rules, and to decide the timing of the first free elections. CNSF opted for a proportional
representation (PR) electoral system, with no electoral threshold and closed lists, and,
following the French model, a semi-presidential system. The combination of PR, closed
party lists, and no electoral threshold led to the creation of a significant number of
political parties. Thus, in the first free elections that took place in May 1990, seventy one
political parties entered the competition for the new Parliament. Following the 1990
elections and in an attempt to reduce the high degree of party fragmentation, it was
introduced a 3 percent electoral threshold for political parties, which was increased to 5

percent in 2000. Additionally, an 8-10 percent electoral threshold was introduced for
political alliances

(Birsch et al. 2002). The changes made to the electoral rules affected

the number of political parties, some of them disappearing completely and others being
assimilated into other political parties, proving thus their transitory and transitional
character. By 2004, the number of political parties was reduced to fifty-four, and the
number of effective parties (i.e., political parties who won more than 1 seat in the
Parliament) decreased to six (Alexandrescu and Stoica 2006).
The largest political party that managed to easily win the first free elections was
the National Salvation Front (NSF), which was formed in December 1989. The rise to
power of NSF was explained by several factors: first, the leader of the party, Ion Iliescu,
became the most visible and popular political figure in the confused days of the
Revolution; second, there was no viable or organized opposition (Hollis 1999); third, a
high number of ex-party cadres joined the newly formed political party, the NSF; and
fourth, the informal power relations made the transition almost unchanged (see below). In
1992, following internal struggle, NSF split and two new political parties were created:
the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PSDR) and the Democratic Party (DP)
(Alexandrescu and Stoica 2006). Given the compulsory membership to RCP, it was not
surprising that almost all members of NSF and its successor parties were former members
of the RCP. What distinguished this party from the other political parties created in 1990s
was the predominance of former communist nomenklatura and Securitate among the NSF
members, who continued to dominate the most important political and economic
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The threshold for alliances is calculated as follows: 5 percent for the first party, 3 percent for the second
party, and 1 percent for each additional party up to 10 percent.
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positions. This in turn explains the domination of the political arena by the NSF and then
the PSDR for the first six years of the transition.

4.1.3. The Securitate

The communist secret police service was perhaps the most hatred institution in
Romania. The Securitate, the main instrument of control and terror, was also one of the
principle actors in the repression of revolutionaries in December 1989. It is not surprising
that one of the first decrees of the new leadership was to transfer the control of the
Department of State Security from the control of the Ministry of the Interior to the
Ministry of Defense. A following decree, adopted on 30 December, dismantled the
Securitate and placed its directorate chiefs under house arrest or in the reserve. From the
disbandment of the Securitate were created no less than nine new security and
intelligence services, attached to different institutions and lacking any form of centralized
controlled. Some coordination of their activities was provided by the Supreme Defense
Council, Consiliul Suprem de Aparare al Tarii, an organism responsible to the President,
but no Parliamentarian oversight or accountability was ensured (Deletant 2001).
Nonetheless, at least officially, the Securitate ceased to exist along with its supreme
leader, Nicolae Ceau§escu.

4.1.4. Public Procurement

The communist regime was characterized by state ownership and control over
economy and there was no obvious justification for a public procurement sector. Hence,
the tabula rasa argument can be reasonably applied to the creation of this formal
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institution. The first legislation regulating the activity in this was adopted in 1991 and the
new government opted for a central public procurement structure. However, the lack of
experience with drafting legislation and regulations specific for this sector, associated
with the lack of trained personnel capable to implement the new legislation made the
establishment of this new institution a very long and contentious process (Wiehen 2000).
The most important and major legislation and regulations were adopted and implemented
only after 2000 and mainly in response to the external pressure exercised by the EU.

4.2. Replaced and/or Reformed Formal Institutions

As previously mentioned, there was a partial institutional tabula rasa left behind
by the demise of the communist regime. Some institutions were not completely destroyed
or dismantled, but they undergone more or less radical changes. Four institutions that fall
into this category are briefly discussed in the next section: the Constitution, the judiciary,
customs, and the military.

4.2.1. The Constitution

Under communism, constitutions did not play a significant role. Although
constitutional texts existed and they were formally enforced, they were not design to
constrain and obligate the power elite. The idea of constitutionalism became important in
Central Eastern Europe after the demise of communism and it was perceived as the
quintessence of political freedom (Elster et al. 1998). In Romania, the democratic
Constitution was adopted in December 1991 and it established the defining elements of
the Romanian state, the citizens' rights and freedoms, and the fundamental rules by
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which legislation and government were to be conducted. The 1991 Constitution
replaced the old communist one and it marked the crucial change that took place in
Romania in December 1989.

4.2.2. The Judiciary

Under communism judiciary was just one instrument of control and coercion and
not even the most important one. Law was mainly used to support the communist
political system, to enhance its legitimacy in the front of the people, and to annihilate any
opposition (Herron and Randazzo 2003, 427). The jurisdiction of courts was
circumscribed mainly to issues of public law, administrative and criminal law, and any
judicial decision that would conflict with the state was solved in secrecy. Furthermore, it
was common for political decisions and administrative regulations to take precedence
over law at all levels of the political chain of command (Solomon and Foglesong 2000).
Since no separation of powers was considered necessary, there was no need for an
independent or active judiciary, but those features had to be changed in the new
democratic system.
The judicial system inherited from the communist regime was weak, subordinated
to the Communist Party, and it lacked public respect (Solomon and Foglesong 2000).
Additionally, a specific feature of the communist judicial systems was the Office of the
General Prosecutor or the Procuracy, Procuratura. This institution was established in
Romania in 1952, following the Soviet model established by the infamous chief
prosecutor during Stalin's time, Andrei Vyshinski (Gallagher 2005). The Procuracy was
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The 1991 Constitution was amended in 2003 to expand the rights of minorities and to align the domestic
legislation with the EU requirements.

endowed with extensive powers and it ensured that the communist legislation was
enforced and that the nomenklatura's interests were respected. Hence, the inherited legal
system was described as a "strong Procuracy and a weak judiciary" (Macovei 1999).
The establishment of the rule of law essential for a democratic system required
the creation of a strong and independent judiciary. However, the re-creation of a new
judicial system capable of upholding the rule of law impartially and independently was
set to be a very difficult task. Some of the most significant changes that took place
shortly after the regime change in December 1989 included the "reestablishment of the
courts of appeal, the development and extension of the court network, the
disestablishment of the military section of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, [...]
and last but not least the establishment of specialized panels of courts" (SoJust 2006, 77).
Many controversial features of the old judiciary were being reformed after 1989,
but the Procuracy was not one of them. The powers assigned to prosecutors had remained
intact for almost a decade after the beginning of the transition. Moreover, the 1991
Constitution failed to adhere firmly to the principle of separations of powers, which
might explain the reluctance of judges to declare their independence, particularly that the
political leadership was largely comprised of the same familiar figures as prior to 1989.
The Law on the Judiciary, adopted in 1992, placed prosecutors under the subordination of
the Ministry of Justice; but, unlike judges, there were no constitutional provisions that
required prosecutors to exercise their powers transparently. The 1997 amendments to the
law assigned exclusive judicial power to the courts, placing Procuracy inside the
executive branch and legalizing its de facto status (Macovei 1999). The power of
Procuracy had become increasingly important in the fight against corruption; the outcome
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of a corruption case often depended on which prosecutor took that case (Gallagher 2005).
It would require more than a decade for the powers of the prosecutors to be reduced and
for the judiciary to begin asserting its officially declared independence.

4.2.3. Customs

The first measures undertaken by the communists after they gained power was to
control the customs services, which was achieved by the replacement of "bourgeois"
customs employees with loyal members of the RCP. In 1973, it was created the General
Directorate of Customs (GDC), an institution with judicial independence that had the
purpose to control and ensure the unitary functioning and effectiveness of customs
policies and services in Romania. In order to guarantee the state's control over the
customs and the exact implementation and enforcement of state legislation, Securitate
was charged with maintaining a close surveillance on the functioning of customs (Ciupala
2007). Thus, in December 1989, the Customs Authority was completely under the control
of the communist regime and the country was almost completely isolated from the
outside world, including the communist neighboring countries.
The demise of communism requested some changes in the structure and
functioning of the customs sector. An important change was the removal of the control
exercised by the Securitate forces as part of the dismantlement of the secret police
service. Thus, the customs personnel had partially changed due to the replacement of the
Securitate officers and to the creation of new regional and local units which required new
personnel. The General Directorate of Customs and its subordinated regional units had
continued to function under the subordination of the Ministry of Finance, but new
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legislation was adopted as early as 1990. Nonetheless, some very important changes were
introduced only after 1997 and within the context of the EU integration.

4.2.4. The Military

The Romanian Ministry of Defense was also among the first institutions to be
reformed after the demise of the old regime. Beginning with mid 1970s, the regime
actively pursued the political subordination of the military. It became common for those
holding higher military positions to also be part of the top echelons in the Communist
Party and by late 1980s the military was under the complete control of the Communist
Party. However, Ceau§escu's reliance on the Securitate forces, associated with the
frequent use of military troops in agriculture, shipyards, and coal mines during 1980s,
and the obstruction of military promotions in 1989 might explain the army's reluctance to
follow his orders during the demonstrations of December 1989. Hence, the military was
one of the very few institutions that was trusted and respected in post-communist
Romania. Nonetheless, a reform process was also necessary and the transformation of the
Ministry of Defense was initiated in early 1990s. Initially, the measures aimed primarily
at the elimination of the communist political control in the military and the control
exercised by Romania's membership in the Warsaw Treaty. After 1995, the reform
process had continued with the restructuring of the Ministry of Defense and its
subordinated units and the preparation of the Romanian army for joining the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization31 (NATO) (Hentea et al. 2007).

31

Romania became a full NATO member in April 2004.

4.3. Mostly Unchanged Formal Institutions

Although reform and change were the dominant words in the early 1990s, they
fail to materialize in all cases. Thus, some institutions made their transition to the new
democratic system and continued to function mostly unchanged for almost a decade.
Three such institutions are discussed below: the police, the health care system, and the
bureaucratic apparatus.

4.3.1. The Police
In December 1989, the Ministry of the Interior32 (MI) was comprised of the
following structures: the Securitate, the Militia, the Troops of Security and Firefighters,
the Penitentiaries, and the State Archives. The first change that affected the structure of
the MI took place on December 1989 when the Securitate was dismantled and the old
Militia was assigned a new name, Police. The Border Police also became part of the MI
(transferred from the Ministry of Defense) and a new unit, Gendarmerie was recreated
(the Gendarmerie existed prior to the communist governance and it was part of the
Ministry of Interior during the interwar period) (MIAR 2007). Although the number of
the departments subordinated to the MI underwent a few changes, their composition
remained largely the same throughout 1990s. As a result of the Securitate dissolution, a
total of 2896 cadres were taken over by the Ministry of the Interior. The rest of them
were placed in the reserve or were transferred to other departments (Deletant 2001, 40).
The adoption of the title "police" was intended to clean the bad name the former
Militia had in Romania and to mark a complete break with the old regime. Although no
32

The literal translation of the Ministry of the Interior is the Ministry of the Domestic Affairs and, since
2003, the Ministry of Interior and Administration Reform.

institution was more hated and feared than Securitate, Militia ranked high among the
most detested institutions in communist Romania. The militiamen were despised and
disrespected in private, but treated as cordially as possible in public. They were endowed
with and enjoyed great discretionary powers not only in the implementation of laws,
regulations, and rules but also in their choice of methods to implement and enforce them.
It was common knowledge that their favorite method of interrogation was beating, which
was applied indiscriminately, regardless of the severity of the crime committed, or the
age and gender of the accused. It was also well known the fact that if stopped by Militia,
one could not get by unless he/she would pay them the requested bribe or unless he/she
would have connections at higher levels. The Militia made the transition carrying with it
the former personnel, corrupt mentalities and working style that gave the old institution
its bad reputation. The old European proverb, "the wolf changes his hair, but not his
habit" accurately describes the transformation or lack of it made by the Romanian Police
in the early years of transition.
Also part of the Ministry of the Interior was the Judiciary Police whose officers
were responsible for conducting various judicial investigations. The structure and
composition of that unit was submitted to the same incremental changes that affected the
other departments subordinated to the MI. In other words, the old judicial police officers
were also the new ones. The major change was with regard to the type of investigations
they

had

to

conduct.

The

democratization

and

marketization

processes

had

unintentionally generated new opportunities for criminal activity to flourish and the
investigation of corruption cases became an important part of the judicial officers'
activity. However, the lack of real reform meant that the same old judicial officers were
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also in charge of investigated the new corruption cases under the supervision and control
of public prosecutors, who themselves inherited large powers from the previous regime.

4.3.2. Health Care

The access to health care is considered to be a public right in European countries
and it was promoted as such a right by the communist regimes. One of the few positive
accomplishments of the old regime was the creation of a universal and free health care
system. The "socialized medicine", according to which every citizen was entitled to free
health care services, made for an important propagandists tool both nationally and
internationally. At home, the regime boasted its merits by comparing the national health
care system with those in the capitalist countries where poor people were left to die due
to the exorbitant prices and physicians' greed. Abroad, the communist health care system
signified the progressive nature of the regime in comparison to the reactionary nature of
the capitalist societies (Field 1999).
The health care system was designed as part of the governmental structure, and
the health department functioned under the supreme authority of the Minister of Health,
usually a physician (Field 1999). As part of the centralized feature of the old regime, all
health policies and regulations were decided at the higher level, remaining to be
implemented by the local administrative bodies. Although the health care was universal,
not everyone had access to the same quality services. The discrimination became more
obvious in 1980s due to the economic decline that affected all sectors and the living
standards of the population. The shortages in the health care system varied from medical
equipment and supplies, to medication, to funding for building repairs and medical
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personnel. By 1989, many hospitals were in very poor condition, some of them lacking
the most basic equipment for a medical facility (Field 1999). In addition, although the
official slogan was that health care services were free, the reality was very different.
Bribery, connections, and relations became very important and could make the difference
between a quality health service and a poor one or between a health service and no
service at all.
Despite the serious problems that characterized the health care system in 1989,
the same highly centralized structure was maintained almost unchanged until 1998, when
the Law on Social Health Insurance was implemented. Some small steps towards
reforming the system were taken, such as an attempt to decentralize the system by
transferring the responsibility of funding the local dispensaries to the district levels in
1991; the creation of a private health care beginning with 1993, which proved to be a
very slow process in most sectors, except dentistry and pharmacy; and new laws
regulating the medical professions (Bara et al. 2002). Although some changes were
attempted, the health care system inherited from the communist regime continued to
function in a similar way for another eight years after the demise of communism. The
transition to democracy has introduced new medical technology, equipment, and
medication, but, the perpetuation and increase of corruption made it more difficult for
many people to have access to them and even to the basic health care services.

4.3.3. The Bureaucratic Apparatus

One of the characteristics of the communist regimes was their vast bureaucratic
apparatus based on personal relations and a plethora of administrative regulations which
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provided additional incentives to engage in corrupt behavior. According to Linz and
Stepan (1996), one of the arenas that needed to be addressed during the transition was the
creation of a state bureaucratic apparatus capable of implementing the reform policies.
The state bureaucracy extends and overlaps to a certain degree with some of the formal
institutions discussed so far. Nonetheless, given the significance of this arena for the
democratization process, an additional discussion is considered necessary. The option for
creating a completely new state bureaucracy was not feasible for at least several reasons:
1) there were not enough trained people that could replace the compromised bureaucracy;
2) there were very good specialists among the public officials that were already working
in the bureaucracy and whose input was of great importance for the transition; 3) some of
the new policy-makers had their own interests to protect and the old bureaucracy was
better positioned to help them; 4) the bureaucracy itself was strongly connected and
influential enough to pressure for the maintenance of the old structure; and 5) reforming
the administrative apparatus was not a top priority for the new governments. Thus, the
old structure of the bureaucratic apparatus had continued to function almost unchanged.
Additionally, reforming the state bureaucracy was bound to be a complex and
difficult task to achieve. The bureaucratic apparatus is not a unitary body which can be
easily restructured and changed, but it functions on different levels, with each level
having more or less autonomy and interests in protecting their independence and status.
Even if there was made a decision to reform the administrative sector at the central level,
the implementation of the reform strategies would greatly depend on the lower levels.
The process became increasingly complicated under the circumstances created by the
previous informal power relations and informal institutions, which made the transition to
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the new system almost intact. Furthermore, the high degree of formal institutional flux
stimulated the development of informal institutions, and corruption was one of them.

5. The Legacy of Informal Power Relations

From an institutional perspective, the breakdown of communist regimes generated
a very complex situation. Some institutions disappeared; others were replaced or
reformed, while still other new institutions were created in an institutional void. All these
changes affected not only the institutions, but also the people working there. Hence,
important questions arise from these institutional changes: What happened to the
communist nomenklatura and the Securitate officers? Did they vanish from the political
scene along with their institutions? And where did they go? Although Elster et al. (1998)
overstate the tabula rasa argument they do acknowledge the lack of change in social
power relations during the transition period. The informal power relations and informal
institutions that existed under the communist regime have continued to function basically
unchanged. The individuals maintained their skills, positions, material resources
associated to those positions, and the formal and informal connections they had prior to
1989. All these power relations became extremely important during the transition period
and gave a significant advantage to the former party-cadres and Securitate officers,
especially during the privatization process.

5.1. Privatization—Strategies and Main Beneficiaries

The privatization process entailed the transfer of state assets into private hands.
Given its complexity, each country adopted a different strategy or set of strategies and
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chose to implement them at different paces. Moreover, the strategies chosen to privatize
state assets varied with regard to their potential for generating corruption. According to
Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997), the strategies with the lowest potential for corruption
are voucher-based mass privatization and liquidation. The former has low potential for
corruption during the implementation and post-privatization process because it does not
create long-term obligations for the state. The liquidation strategy is also perceived as
effective for reducing the long-term corruption because of the complete change in
ownership and control over the privatized assets. However, liquidation is also the least
popular strategy among officials due to its high electoral costs; as its name implies,
liquidation is often associated with the closure of the factory or enterprise that is being
privatized with resulting unemployment, social disaffection, and poverty. Hence, that
strategy has been used very little in all former communist countries.
The privatization strategies that are considered to have the highest potential for
corruption

are

the

management-employee

buy-out

(MEBO)

and

spontaneous

privatization. As the name suggests, MEBO involves the selling of the enterprise to new
owners, who are often the same managers of the state asset that is being privatized. As
such, the strategy gives a clear advantage to the old managers, who have access to
internal information regarding the state of the enterprise and the connections necessary to
ensure that the price is not too high. This in turn creates new opportunities for corruption
during the process. At least in theory, spontaneous privatization may lead to lower levels
of corruption because it implies a complete change in ownership. In practice, the old
partnerships and connections are being used to the advantage of some people, actually
increasing the potential for corruption. Additionally, it can create "corrupt monopolistic
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structures" (Kauffmann and Siegelbaum 1997, 445) by impeding fair competition in the
medium term.
In Romania, MEBO - the strategy with the highest potential of corruption - was
the dominant strategy used in the privatization process. Most of the forty-six foreign trade
enterprises that functioned in Romania in 1980s were privatized by using the MEBO
strategy with the prior management retaining the control of the enterprise. The main
appeal of the enterprises was considered to be the connections established with foreign
companies and other Romanian enterprises. For example, Viorel Catarama worked for an
enterprise that formerly exported furniture to Western Europe; he developed business
relationships in Belgium and the Netherlands and used those relations after 1989 to
expand his newly created business. Catarama also served as undersecretary of commerce
for a brief period, which also helped him develop his business (Brucan 1998, 86). Other
examples of newly successful businessmen who used their old positions and connections
include General Victor Atanasie Stanculescu, who was the chief of supply section in the
Ministry of Defense in charge of the business of import and export of armaments and
munitions and who set up a very lucrative insurance company specializing in shipping,
airlines, and related fields; Dan Voiculescu, who worked at two export-import enterprises
during Ceau§escu's rule, and who became the owner of a mechanical factory and a media
mogul, owning a daily newspaper, Jurnalul National, and a private television company,
Antena 1 (Brucan 1998); and the Paunescu brothers. George Constantin Paunescu started
his career as chief of the Commercial Agency of Romania in Italy in the early 1980s and
completed it in 1989 as the director of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Brucan 1998). His
brother Viorel worked in the restaurant business before 1989 and was able to gain
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significant wealth by taking advantage of the shortage economy. After 1989, the
Paunescu brothers soon became dollar multi-millionaires and the owners of the top hotels
in Romania, including the Intercontinental which brings them an annual profit of about
20 million dollars (Gallagher 2005, 118).
The magnitude and complexity of the privatization process, associated with high
administrative discretion and lack of transparency, clearly favored the former party
nomenklatura. In 1990, several strategically important sectors were transformed into regii
autonome, borrowing from the French Model. These regii autonome had a quasiautonomous status from the state, but they were used by the new leadership to ensure its
control over the most important and profitable assets in the economy, such as electricity,
gas, and oil. One such regie autonoma is RENEL, the largest company in the country that
has the monopoly of electricity. The PSDR used to reward its supporters with high
positions in RENEL and other well-paid sectors of the state economy (Gallagher 2005,
116). As previously mentioned, PSDR (the former NSF) was comprised primarily of
former nomenklatura and Securitate officers and it managed to dominate the political
scene and to govern almost undisturbed for the first six years after transition. The
combination of inherited power relations, new power positions, and the fluid institutional
and legal context gave them a significant advantage and allowed them to use every
opportunity to their benefit.
The importance and endurance of power relations was also demonstrated by
Stoica's analysis of the privatization process in post-communist countries (2004). He
concluded that the former party cadres were the main winners because they had the
advantage of managerial skills and experience accumulated prior to 1989. He also
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claimed that network resources were crucial in starting a business or in ensuring its
functioning. The importance of pile (connections or props) and relatii (relations) varied
from business to business with smaller businesses needing fewer pile or relatii at the
beginning than bigger businesses, but with all businesses requiring them for their
efficient functioning. Thus, according to one Romanian ex-cadre,
"To start a big business you have to be "somebody" [yourself]. You have
to know people, important people...otherwise no one will take you
seriously. If you know the right people, some damn functionaries or other
[political] hotshots, you have no problem, ab-so-lute-ly no problem in
starting your own business. How do you think I started? I had no money
whatsoever but I knew such people and they helped me out with loans and
contracts [from the government]" (Stoica 2004, 265).
Another former party cadre said that he found the entire discussion about
successful Romanian businessmen very amusing because "I read their names and it's like
reading the (communist) party list....It's the former Communist Youth Organization plus
other party secretaries. I know this for a fact! I was one of them" (Stoica 2004, 265).
Hence, every new entrepreneur devoted time, energy, and resources to develop networks
of pile and relatii that would ensure the success of his business. Through the use of mici
atentii (small gifts or bribes), new businessmen established connections with a variety of
individuals from different sectors and who can greatly influence the well-functioning of
their businesses, such as suppliers, local bureaucrats, beat cops, public officials from
other government agencies, health and safety inspectors, and officers of the Financial
Guard (the Romanian equivalent of the Internal Revenue Service) (Stoica 2004, 266).
Being a former communist cadre definitely constituted an advantage during the
transition to market economy and having the right connections could make someone a
millionaire in dollars almost overnight, even in the absence of the money necessary to
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start the business in the first place. The financial aspect of big businesses was ensured by
unsecured loans from state banks, loans that were often used in lucrative transactions
with state companies or government agencies. Many of those banks were bankrupted by
early 2000s, such as Bancorex, Banca Agricola, Dacia Felix, and the International Bank
of Religions. Bancorex was involved in one of the biggest scandals of corruption, but for
almost a decade managed to escape investigation because of the free credits offered to
judges, prosecutors, and senior police officials (Gallagher, 2005, 117).
If former members of the nomenklatura were able to capitalize their old power
positions and relations, the former Securitate officers were competing with them for piece
of the pie. Besides using Securitate as the main instrument for coercion, Ceau§escu also
relied on it to ensure the control of all foreign trade. As such, those officers were in a
privileged position in the new regime and managed to successfully use that advantage
and become the new rich in post-communist Romania. In 1990, a document that included
the names of 400 Securitate officers who "were running the foreign trade organizations"
was given to some foreign journalists and published in The Times on 22 May 1990
(Deletant 2001, 40). According to that document, Securitate colonels were holding all
main positions in the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Therefore, it is of little surprise that
many of the new businessmen in 1990s had worked for the secret police prior to 1989.
Additionally, the new head of the Romanian Security Service (RSS), Virgil Magureanu,
was forced to resign after 1997 when it emerged in mass media that he built a forty-three
room villa in his native village of Giurtelecul Hododului, in north-west Romania.
Magureanu claimed that his entire family contributed to the building of the villa, but after
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his resignation it was revealed that he used his position and circumvented the legal
provisions in order to build it (Gallagher 2005, 114).
As previously mentioned, under Ceau§escu, one of the duties assigned to
Securitate forces was to supervise and control the customs sector. That control allowed
for the creation of informal networks which were very profitable to all parties involved,
i.e., party-cadre, Securitate officers and customs personnel. Those informal relations
survived the breakdown of the communist regime and proved to be very lucrative in the
new political context. One example is illustrative not only of the pervasiveness of
corruption and the ramifications of the informal networks, but also of the government
officials' attitude towards curbing corruption. In 1998, the Romanian newspaper
Evenimentul Zilei published the transcript of a discussion that took place five years
earlier between Virgil Magureanu, the head of the Romanian Secret Service (RSS), and
Mike Nasser, a famous cigarettes smuggler whose brother and associate was jailed in
Romania. Nasser informed Magureanu that army officers had been paid $1.3 million for
their cooperation for supplementing the cigarette smuggling with arms dealing,
everything with the knowledge of the Romanian Secret Service. Iosif Boda, a member of
the Social Democratic Party of Romania, claimed to have strongly advised the prime
minister at the time, Nicolae Vacaroiu, to remove the head of the customs services and
the Financial Guard. The latter had replied: "Leave them be, leave them to compromise
themselves!" (Gallagher 2005, 119).
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5.2. The Pervasiveness of Informal Institutions

The power of informal relations might also explain the lack of significant change
in the state bureaucratic apparatus. A very informative example of how the local
bureaucracy worked during the post-transition period and of its collaboration with elected
officials can be found in agriculture. One of the main strategies in reforming the
agricultural sector in post-communist Romania was land restitution, that is, the returning
of land and land rights to the people who owned it prior to collectivization. The land law
was adopted in 1991, but its implementation was largely left to the discretion of the local
administrative unites, communes, and their leaders. Commune mayors had concentrated
significant power in their hands and they managed to control the local land commissions
by promoting their own people. Hence, commune mayors and village land commissions
became real "hotbeds of corruption" (Verdery 2002, 12). Many of the local mayors were
former party cadres who used their previous established connections in order to secure
their current positions at the local level. As such, they made sure that every decision they
made would have little chance of being overturned at higher administrative levels (i.e.,
the county land commission). As a rule, every decision that was contested at the county
level was sent back to the commune mayor and his commission to be solved. Since the
latter had the final say in every decision that was made, the implementation of land
reform was at their discretion.
The high level of administrative discretion was enhanced by a loophole in the
land law that failed to include any sanctions if local officials did not implement the law.
Therefore, there was little that courts could do in a land dispute, although not many cases
reached the inside of the courts. Besides having the authority to distribute the land with
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discretionary powers, local officials also had the advantage of inside information. That
advantage was highly significant, especially when faced with inaccurate information
regarding the collective farms due to the communist party cadres' habit of falsifying
information to please their superiors (Verdery 2002). The local officials could easily
manipulate the lack of information to their benefit and to justify their decisions. Again, it
comes to no surprise that the primary beneficiaries of land restitution were former party
cadres and people with inside information and the right connections.
The communist legacy of corruption became especially problematic in the health
care sector, where the embedded informal norms and rules put an additional burden on
the poor. Studies showed that low income individuals paid proportionately more out-ofpockets payments than the high income group, and they were also more likely to report
paying bribes to health care providers (Mastilica and Bozikov 1999). The old practice of
bribery, relations and connections had become increasingly more important during the
transition, especially in sectors that continued to function largely unreformed.

6. Conclusion

In post-communist countries corruption is part of the communist legacy and it is
now "the main cause of departures from the rule of law" (Rose 2001, 101). Under
communism, corruption was tolerated because it was considered to play a functional role.
That is, corruption was required for the effective functioning of an increasingly deficient
state command economy and as a substitute for institutional reform. However, by the late
1980s the functional corruption became dysfunctional and every aspect of communist
societies was penetrated by the informal corrupt rules and norms. The breakdown of the
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communist regimes left behind a fluid formal institutional context characterized by a
partial tabula rasa and by different processes of institutional change and reform. The
dismantling of the old and compromised formal institutions and the need for designing
new democratic institution generated additional space for the informal institutions to
thrive. Additionally, both new and reformed or replaced formal institutions needed time
to become fully articulated and routinized; that is, the implementation and enforcement of
new rules and norms required additional institutional structures, personnel, and funding,
not to mention the willingness to invoke sanctions when necessary. Furthermore, the new
rules and norms had to be accepted and legitimized by the mass public. Often, the
democratic rules conflicted with the informal ones which were already socially
embedded.
The transition to a market economy, especially the privatization process, also
created new opportunities for corruption to thrive and to become "a problem of
governing" and "a daily expectation among the mass publics" (Moreno 2002, 496). The
old party nomenklatura and Securitate officers managed to not only maintain their
informal power relations, but to also expand them in the post-communist setting. They
were in position to influence the policy-making process, to profit from ambiguous laws
and legislative loopholes, and to manipulate them to their benefits. Furthermore, their
role in the expansion of corruption after 1989 was manifest at both central and local
levels.
The expansion of corruption after 1989 demonstrates how informal institutions
can be powerful and resilient and how they play a significant role in democratization
processes. The success of the dual transition depends not only on the creation or re-
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creation of strong and effective formal institutions, but also on the ability to control and
reduce competing informal institutions. Curbing corruption might be one the most
difficult tasks that new democratic regimes must address because, as Rose (2001, 101)
put it, "Getting rid of a dictator is much easier than getting rid of corruption... Getting rid
of corruption is less dramatic and more impersonal."
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CHAPTER III

THE EUROPEAN UNION CONDITIONALLY AND ITS ROLE IN CURBING
CORRUPTION

1. Introduction

The EU was the most influential international actor in promoting democratic
consolidation and fighting corruption in the former communist countries in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE). By the mid-1990s, the EU had developed a clear strategy of
democracy promotion, and with the beginning of accession negotiations in 1997, the fight
against corruption became part of the accession requirements. Thus, along with the
transposition and implementation of the acquis communautaire, candidate countries had
to convince the EU that they were capable of effectively tackling corruption. They agreed
to be regularly monitored by the European Commission with regard to their progress in
the preparations for the accession.
The goals of this chapter are first to briefly outline the EU strategy of democracy
promotion by focusing specifically on the issue of conditionality and to briefly discuss
the acquis communautaire.33

The next section reviews Romania's road towards

accession, followed by the analysis of EU pressure on the Romanian Government to
transpose the acquis and fight corruption in each sector under study. The third section
evaluates the EU impact on the domestic political will and the evolution of the EU

33

Henceforth, the acquis communautaire will be referred to as the acquis.
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pressure as illustrated in major newspapers. The last section briefly summarizes the
findings.

2. The European Union and Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern
Europe

The events of 1989 created the opportunity for the EU to demonstrate that it is an
important actor in the global arena and that it can play a significant role in promoting
democracy in the neighboring countries from which it was separated for almost five
decades. When the communist regimes collapsed in CEE, the EU was not prepared for
such a task, lacking a clearly defined strategy for democracy promotion in the former
communist countries. Thus, in June 1993, the European Council elaborated a set of
criteria, known as the Copenhagen criteria after the city where the decisions were made,
that countries would have to fulfill in order to become EU members. The Copenhagen
criteria included stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights, protection of minority rights, a functioning market economy and the capacity to
manage the competitive pressure of the EU common market (Council of Europe 1993).
The first four criteria became known as the political criteria and the last two as the
economic criteria. According to the Treaty of the European Union (1997), a country that
fulfills these criteria can apply for membership, which according to the EU meant that
once a country has begun accession negotiations, it has fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria
and has moved "convincingly towards consolidation" (Pridham 2006, 378). This,
however, would not mean that democracy is consolidated, but that it would be on the path
and that EU membership would ensure the achievement of that goal (i.e., democratic
consolidation). Hence, while the EU did not play an important role in the democratization
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process per se, mainly because by the time the EU began closely monitoring the
candidate countries the latter had already adopted their new democratic institutions, it did
significantly impact their democratic consolidation processes (Hughes et al. 2004, 166).
The emphasis on strengthening the new democratic institutions in CEE was in line with
EU interests in promoting stability in the area through the routinization of democratic
norms (Pridham 2006) while maintaining the heterogeneity specific to the European
continent in the area of political institutions.
The 1993 Copenhagen criteria were expanded in 1997 when the EU elaborated
the Agenda 2000 regarding applications for EU membership of candidate countries,
Romania included. Thus, the new pre-accession process required the "strengthening of
state capacity, the independence of judiciaries, the pursuit of anti-corruption measures",
as well as other economic, social, and cultural rights, especially those dealing with
"trafficking in women and children and gender equality" (Pridham 2006, 380). Those
conditions became part of the Copenhagen criteria and were intended to minimize the
risks associated with the inclusion of politically and/or economically unstable countries
into the EU. The decision of the European Council to begin pre-accession negotiations
with all candidate countries in December 1997 was an important step in promoting
democratic consolidation, and the use of conditionality exercised in CEE countries
became an essential tool for ensuring the success of that process. Despite being included
in the pre-accession negotiations, Romania remained placed on the list of countries for
which visas were required and human and drug trafficking were considered to be two of
the main problems that the country was facing at the time, due largely to ineffective visa,
admission and border control policy (EC Commission 1997, 93). However, political
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considerations and security and stability issues (particularly in Balkan area) weighed
heavily in the final decision to include Romania in the pre-accession negotiations.

2.1. EU Conditionality

EU conditionality is considered to follow the Western tradition of "second
generation" aid conditionality that began developing in 1980s. It combines economic
conditionality (the "first generation" conditionality) with political conditionality (Hughes
et al. 2004, 15). In other words, beginning with 1980s, the international organizations that
were already practicing economic conditionality, such as the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund, and even the EU, started expanding their aid conditionality by including
political criteria that would address good governance and democratic institutions. Among
these international organizations, the EU has been the most influential in promoting
democracy abroad, specifically in the CEE countries where, through the pre-accession
preparations that these countries had to make in order to join the EU, it has developed a
model of "democracy promotion through integration" (Dimitrova and Pridham 2004, 95).
The EU success in democracy promotion rests on the particular leverage that it
exercised in the candidate countries.34 Since 1990, the EU has exercised two types of
leverage: passive leverage, represented by the benefits of EU membership, and active
leverage, which built upon the passive leverage but, as the name indicates, it involved a
much more active role on the part of EU in promoting democracy in the candidate
countries during the pre-accession process (Vachudova 2005, 63). Until the middle of
34

Antoaneta Dimitrova and Geoffrey Pridham claim that there is a direct link between the EU's ability to
strengthen democracy abroad and the EU membership. Hence, the EU influence reduces significantly when
the EU membership card is off the table. For a more elaborate discussion of this argument see
"International Actors and Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe: The Integration Model and
Its Limits", Democratization 11 (December 2004): 91-112.
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1990s, the EU primarily exercised its passive leverage of membership benefits.
Nonetheless, the attraction of those benefits was substantial because they would bring
international recognition of the new democratic system and would reunite the "old"
European continent. Furthermore, the economic benefits associated with EU membership
were even more considerable, especially when contrasted with the negative aspects of
passive leverage. That is, the isolation from the other EU countries would have serious
economic consequences such as the redirection of aid, expertise, and foreign direct
investment to serious candidate countries as well as reduction of trade opportunities with
EU members (Vachudova 2005, 71).
After 1995, the EU began exercising its active leverage more, which was much
more powerful not only because it built on the passive leverage of membership benefits,
but also because of the pre-accession requirements that candidate countries had to fulfill.
Three characteristics of the pre-accession process are considered to have increased the
power of active leverage, namely the asymmetric interdependence, enforcement, and
meritocracy (Vachudova 2005, 106). Any type of aid conditionality is based on an
asymmetric relationship between the donor and the recipient, with the donor having the
advantageous position in this relationship. In this sense, EU conditionality was no
different than the aid conditionality practiced by other international organizations.
However, while the EU depended little on the CEE countries, economically or politically,
the latter depended greatly on integration in order to increase their chances for a
successful transition to market economy. The asymmetric interdependence allowed the
EU to make credible threats of exclusion, which would have had significant
consequences for those left outside the enlargement process. The asymmetric
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interdependence was coupled with the enforcement of the EU non-negotiable accession
requirements, which were designed to make candidate countries show their commitment
with the EU policies (Vachudova 2005, pp. 109-11). Thus, the candidate countries had to
demonstrate their capacity to implement European policies and to consistently enforce
them prior to accession.
The third and important characteristic of EU active leverage is meritocracy. That
is, the EU used a merit-based approach to evaluate the progress towards membership
made by candidate countries, an approach that was designed to give credibility to the
entire accession process. The meritocracy of the active leverage was ensured by the
European Commission (EC), the institution responsible for assessing the candidate
countries' progress in the transposition and implementation of the acquis. The instrument
used to publicly present the results of the evaluation process took the form of Regular
Reports. Although the Regular Reports were sometimes inconsistent with the reality on
the ground or contained mistakes, "it is striking how in general they [candidate countries]
accept[ed] the logic and the overall fairness of the process" (Vachudova 2005, p. 113).
Borzel and Sedelmeier (2006) also emphasize the fact that the EU credibility rested on its
ability to avoid political favoritism during the accession process. The assessment of the
candidates' progress towards accession had to reflect to a large degree the reality on the
ground; otherwise, the incentive structure created by the awarding of the membership on
a merit base would have been undermined.
It is important to mention that the Eastern enlargement process was different from
the previous enlargements. Thus, in the case of CEE countries, the EU insisted on a
"strict, earlier, and comprehensive alignment...with the acquis (the existing body of EU
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legislation, institutions and procedures) prior to accession" (Borzel and Sedelmeier 2006,
61). The adoption of the acquis in its entirety and without questioning was not only a
requirement but it was also viewed as a proof of the candidates' commitment and ability
to uphold and enforce EU legislation and policies after the accession. Therefore, the
candidates' success rested upon their ability to adopt and transfer in practice the acquis.
While it seemed a straightforward process, the reality was more complicated for several
reasons. First, the adoption of the acquis resembled a top-down process in which the
candidate countries had little say because their progress towards accession depended on
the adoption of the EU legislation and the adjustment of the national legislation to the
former in a rather inflexible way, particularly with regard to the market economy and
certain sectoral policies (Borzel and Sedelmeier 2006, 63). Second, the adoption and
implementation of the required acquis was sometimes associated with significant costs
for the governments of the candidate countries, which explains their initial focus on the
"easier" to adopt chapters of the acquis. Third, as an essential part of the EU
conditionality, the adoption and implementation of the acquis was supposed to be
accompanied by clear rules of transfers, benchmarks, and monitoring criteria, but often
the rules were ambiguous and the implementation was ambivalent (Hughes et al. 2004,
particularly 23-25). Despite all these problems, the enlargement process was largely
considered to be fair and candidate countries strived to fulfill the EU requirements,
largely due to the benefits provided by the EU membership.
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2.2. The Acquis: Transposition and Implementation

The acquis amounts to 80,000 pages of legislative texts and is continuously
growing in order to keep pace with the new EU developments in the fields of policy,
directives and declarations, and jurisprudence (Grabbe 2002, 253). Broadly defined, the
acquis applied to the CEE enlargement was defined as "all the real and potential rights
and obligations of the EU system and its institutional framework" (Gialdino 1995 cited in
Grabbe 2002, 253). This definition allows for more minimalist or maximalist
interpretation of those rights and obligations and the EU "has presented a quite
maximalist interpretation to applicants" (Grabbe 2002, 253). During the Eastern
enlargement, the acquis was divided in 31 chapters

in order to make the transposition

and implementation process easier for the candidate countries. The acquis chapters differ
in their complexity and importance attached to their adoption and implementation, but, in
order to become full members, candidate countries must close all the acquis chapters
opened during the accession negotiation process. The rule of law and corruption were
given particular attention due to their significance for achieving democratic consolidation
and therefore the progress made in establishing the rule of law and un-rooting corruption
were closely monitored. Cleaning up corruption in the customs sector was another highly
significant issue for the EU (Chapter 25 of the acquis) and public procurement sector
would become increasingly more important as the accession date approached. As it will
be discussed later, the EU does not have a unified health care policy and therefore
reforming this sector was not part of the EU accession process per se.

35

The list of the chapters of the acquis is presented in the Appendix A.
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An important aspect of the acquis refers to the costs of adopting and
implementing EU legislation and policies. For example, the adoption of legislation
included in the Justice and Home Affairs chapter (the 24th chapter of the acquis), while
not extensive, was highly problematic due to the security ramifications that would result
from imposing EU border regimes that would separate the candidate countries politically
from their eastern neighbors and minority populations (Grabbe 2002, 255). That explains
the EU's demand for full compliance with its border policies well in advance of
accession, while the CEE countries attempted to postpone the adoption and
implementation of this chapter of the acquis until the last stages of pre-accession. That
was the case of Hungary and Poland which delayed the adoption of Schengen rules to the
final stages of their accession negotiations (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005, 216).
Additionally, judicial cooperation, another issue included in Chapter 24 and closely
monitored, was difficult to achieve given the need for reform of the judicial systems in all
former communist countries and particularly in Romania.
As mentioned, the EC was assigned the responsibility of closely monitoring
candidates' progress towards accession. The Agenda 2000 that the EC issued in 1997 and
that served as a foundation for the decision to begin pre-accession negotiations was used
as a benchmark for the first round of evaluations conducted in 1998. The following
Regular Reports would be issued annually and would assess the progress made since the
previous report as well as the remaining problems to be addressed prior to accession.
Thus, the EC used its monitoring reports to determine the major areas where the
candidates' legislation was contrary to the acquis and to set priorities in the Accession
Partnership (Grabbe 2002, 258). The signing of the Accession Partnerships between the
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EU and the applicant countries increased the power of EU conditionality especially
because of the credible promise of membership and its important benefits. In addition, the
Regular Reports were important tools of EU conditionality because they were used by the
European Council to decide whether or not to grant a country admission to the next stage
of the accession process (Grabbe 2002).

2.3. Romania's Road towards Accession

Immediately after the change of regime in December 1989, Romania began
renegotiating its relations with the EU as part of the process of returning to Europe after
more than four decades of isolation. The first important step was marked on February 1,
1993 when the Romanian Government was the fourth

in CEE to sign a Europe

Agreement that provided for free trade in industrial goods, political dialogue with the EU
and cooperation in a variety of areas (Phinnemore 2005). The Europe Agreement entered
•jn

into force only two years later, but an interim agreement

#

allowed for the trading

provisions to be implemented beginning with May 1, 1993. The signing of the Europe
Agreement opened the door to a closer cooperation for the CEE signatories, whose
ministers and officials were invited to participate in the regular meetings of the European
Council.
The entry into force on February 1, 1995 of the Europe Agreement gave a new
impetus to Romania's integration process due to the inclusion of the country into the preaccession negotiations. The Romanian Government expressed its wish to be included in
36

The other three CEE countries were Hungary, Poland, and the former Czechoslovakia.
Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European Economic Community and
the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and Romania, of the other part, OJL 81, April 2,
1993.
37
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the eastward expansion by submitting a formal application on June 22nd, 1995, along with
the "Snagov Declaration", a document signed by the fourteen political parties in
Parliament at the time that expressed their full support for EU membership (Jereb 2005).
The EU's decision regarding the Romanian application for membership came in July
1997, when the EC issued its opinion regarding all CEE applications for membership.
The EC concluded that the country's "new institutions are democratic and their stability
now seems guaranteed"38 but they "need to be anchored by greater respect for the
primacy of law at all levels of the apparatus of State" (EC Opinion 1997, 18).
Furthermore, the EC recommended that "the negotiations for accession should be opened
...as soon as it [Romania] has made sufficient progress in satisfying the conditions of
membership" (EC Commission 1997, 114). The report emphasized the serious difficulties
that the country would face in areas of market economy and the considerable efforts that
would be needed in such areas as the judiciary and border control. Despite the EC
conclusion, the European Council decided to opt for a "comprehensive" and "inclusive"
enlargement, with each state proceeding at its own pace, depending on its degree of
preparedness for accession (European Council 1997, 1). This "regatta" approach (Bojkov
2004) to enlargement was designed, as previously mentioned, to ensure the meritocracy
of the process and to allow candidate countries to conform to the EU requirements
according to their domestic political, social, and economic conditions. In line with the
same approach, the EC measured progress based on the "decisions actually taken,
legislation actually adopted, international conventions actually ratified (with due attention
given to implementation), and measures actually implemented" (EC Regular Report
Romania 2000, 6). This measurement method was used consistently throughout the
38

Emphasis added.
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accession process, particularly beginning with 2000. Prior to that date, progress in
transposing the acquis was evaluated based mainly on adopted legislation (EC Regular
Report Romania 1998 and 1999).
In March 1998, Romania and the EU signed the Accession Partnership, treaty that
established within a legislative framework the country's working priorities in the preaccession process. A year later, the EC recommended the beginning of accession
negotiation between the EU and Romania, alongside five other countries: Bulgaria,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia. The Helsinki European Council approved the EC
recommendation and on February 15, 2000 Romania began accession negotiations with
the EU. The EU decision was based mainly on political considerations and factors
unrelated to Romania's progress in establishing the rule of law and fighting corruption.
Thus, the geographically strategic location of the country "in a region which is of key
sensitivity for security in Europe" and its role during the war in Yugoslavia and the
conflict in Kosovo weighed heavily in the EU's decision. The importance of another
geographical asset, namely the Danube, added to the final decision regarding the
accession negotiations. The Danube was considered to be of special strategic importance
because it offers access to the southern Caucasus region (EP Report 2000, 7 and 13-14).
Additionally, the NATO decision not to issue a membership invitation to Romania in
1999 influenced the EU decision to begin accession negotiations with Romania. The EU
considered that Romania should be rewarded for the economic consequences of the
embargo on oil sales to Serbia, a feeling that was clearly expressed by the President Emil
Constantinescu (Phinemore 2005, 17).39 Nonetheless, as the accession date approached,

39

President Emil Constantinescu's response to the NATO decision not to issue the membership invitation in
April 1999 reflected the general feeling in Romania: 'Every day, personalities from NATO and the EU come
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the EU pressure on the Romanian authorities to demonstrate political commitment to
implement reforms and curb corruption increased significantly, as it will be shown later
in the chapter.
Of the 31 chapters of the acquis that Romania as a candidate country had to
transpose prior to accession, five were soon opened and closed by the Romanian
Government, followed by nine more chapters out of which one was also closed by the
end of 2000. But the adoption and implementation of the acquis slowed down in the next
years. Thus, by the end of 2002, only 16 chapters were closed whereas the negotiations
with the other CEE countries, except Bulgaria, were completed (Phinnemore 2005, 4).
Hence, Romania was not included in the first big enlargement that took place in 2004 and
a new deadline for accession was set for January 2007, a date that seemed appropriate
and more realistic to both parties involved (i.e., the EU and Romania).40 Nonetheless, the
appropriateness of the chosen accession date would be questioned by the EU over the
next years particularly due to the slow progress shown by Romania in preparing for the
accession, as it will be seen in the next sections.

3. The Role of the EU in Building Political Will to Fight Corruption

Building political will and sustaining it over time is a difficult endeavor and
international actors can play an important role in pressuring for the creation and support
to Bucharest and tell us that during the (Kosovo) conflict we behaved like member states of NATO. But
nobody offers us security guarantees or speaks about recovering our losses in respect of the embargo . . .
While we are patted on the back and congratulated, our losses mount day by day'. International Herald
Tribune, 23 July 1999.
40
In 1995, when Romania applied for membership, the Romanian Government indicated that it would be ready
for accession by 2000. When the accession negotiations were opened in 2000, the Romanian chief negotiator at
the time, Aurel Ciobanu Dordea, indicated that 2010 would be a more realistic target date for Romania's
accession. The Romanian foreign minister, Petre Roman, declared shortly thereafter that Romania will be ready
for EU membership by January 2007, which was established as the accession date (Phinnemore 2005).
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of the domestic "islands" of political will necessary for fighting corruption. Since
corruption is difficult to counteract due to its non-transparent and illegal nature, the
domestic commitment to fighting corruption is an essential condition. Nonetheless, it is
also necessary to gain the support of national and international actors and the EU role
was to encourage the creation of and support for the domestic political will required for
fighting corruption. Since the EU goal was to avoid a costly enlargement, the pressure
was to reform particularly those sectors that were more likely to increase the costs if
corruption was not addressed pre-accession, such as the judicial system on which rests
the rule of law and the customs sector which is critical for the security and even
economic prosperity of the EU members. Hence, it is no surprise that the highest priority
was given to reforming and cleaning up of corruption of the judiciary and customs, while
the public procurement sector increased in importance over time as the accession date
approached. At the same time, the lack of a common European health care policy
translated into insignificant pressure to reform and fight corruption in this sector.

3.1. EU Pressure

The following sections examine the pressure exercised by the European Union on
the Romanian Government with regard to the adoption and implementation of
institutional strategies, that is, strategies designed to reform and fight corruption within
the judiciary, customs, public procurement, and health care sector. The EU pressure was
measured by assessing 1) the EC Regular Reports (1997-2006, inclusive) evaluating the
progress made in reforming and fighting corruption; 2) the European Parliament (EP)
evaluation reports on Romania's progress towards accession; 3) the presentation in the
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written media of corruption in association with EU integration, the statements made by
EU officials regarding the level of corruption in Romania, and the newspaper articles
presenting corruption as an impediment for integration (i.e., reason for postponing the
scheduled integration with one year) in the absence of visible progress in reducing
corruption and implementing institutional reforms;41 4) other studies and reports
assessing the country's progress in reforming the judiciary, fighting corruption, and
preparedness for accession; and 5) interviews with public officials, anticorruption
experts, representatives of magistrates' associations, journalists, and NGO activists.
Hence, the next four sections present in chronological order the pressure exercised by the
EU on the Romanian Government as reflected in the European Commission (EC) annual
monitoring reports on Romania's preparedness for accession. The last part analyzes the
data from three national newspapers from 1997 until 2006 inclusive.

3.2. The Judiciary

The reform of the judicial system was one of the main requirements that any
candidate country to EU accession had to fulfill. Hence, the establishment of the rule of
law was consistently and closely monitored by the EC throughout the accession
negotiation process. The first EC evaluation, issued in 1997, was the Agenda 2000Commission's

Opinion on Romania's Application for Membership of the European

Union. From the very first evaluation, the judiciary was at the center of the monitoring
process due to its essential role in the establishment of the rule of law. In its 1997
Opinion, the EC concluded that "much still remains to be done in rooting out corruption"

41

The three newspapers are: Evenimentul Zilei (The Daily Event), Jurnalul National (The National
Journal), and Romania Libera (The Free Romania).
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(18) and that "steps need to be taken urgently in tackling it" (108). Furthermore,
corruption was considered to be largely responsible for the low level of trust in public
institutions.
In 1998, the EC Regular Report focused mainly on the state of the judicial system
and the administrative problems that were considered to be a high priority for reform.
Thus, problems such as long judicial proceedings and their ineffective enforcement, the
absence of accessible case-studies and court verdicts, the low status and remuneration of
the magistrates, and the high number of vacancies were considered to be some major
concerns that the Romanian Government should address. The main emphasis was on
designing a comprehensive reform strategy that included clear objectives, benchmarks,
and monitoring instruments, and which would be adequately supported by the
government in terms of funds and personnel. The EC recommended the adoption of
immediate measures that would address the problems affecting the functioning and
effectiveness of the judiciary and, implicitly, its role in fighting corruption. The judicial
system was considered to be an essential institution in the fight against corruption, but
that was difficult to achieve as long as the very integrity of the institution was affected by
corruption.
A major impediment in curbing corruption was considered to be the lack of an
anticorruption law that would specifically address the issue of corruption by clearly
defining it, identifying its manifestations, the sanctions that corrupt activities would
incur, the measures that would further prevent corruption, and the bodies responsible for
the implementation of such a law. The absence of an anticorruption law was associated
with the lack of anticorruption bodies that would specifically target corruption crimes.
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Hence, in the presence of an incomplete legal basis for fighting corruption, the EC
reached a similar conclusion as in 1997, namely that "[M]uch remains to be done in
rooting out corruption" (EC Regular Report 1998, 50).
In 1997 the National Council for Action Against Corruption and Organized Crime
was established, an anticorruption body that was designed to offer political support for
the fight against corruption. However, the Council lacked the legal basis to act in
corruption cases, those functions belonging to the Public Ministry (i.e., the Prosecutor's
Office), and therefore there was no surprise when the Legislative Council ruled that this
anticorruption body had only a consultative role and it could not overlap with the judicial
bodies responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption (Jurnalul
National, 04.18.1997). The very limited role that the Council played in the fight against
corruption was noted by the EC in the 1999 Regular Report along with the lack of
progress in curbing corruption and, very importantly, the lack of "sufficient
determination" in effectively addressing the problem (14). Once again, the EC conclusion
was that, in the absence of an anticorruption law, the legal basis for fighting corruption
remained incomplete and the creation of anticorruption units within the Prosecutor's
Office was an ineffective measure as long as there was missing a clear and effective
cooperation between the activities of those units.
The 1999 assessment acknowledged the progress made in reforming the judiciary
by taking note of the implementation of several measures targeted at increasing the
effectiveness of judicial activities. Among those measures were the improvement of
promotion requirements and salary conditions for magistrates; the reduction of the
powers of the Prosecutor's Office and a restructuring of this office which led to more
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effective prosecutions; the reduction of backlog of court cases; the consistent
enforcement of judicial decisions; and the creation of specialized anticorruption sections
within the Ministry of Judiciary (EC Regular Report 1999, 12-14). Despite the more
optimistic tone, the EC concluded that "the judicial system remains weak" (EC Regular
Report 1999,13) and that "[FJurther measures are needed to ensure the independence and
efficiency of the judiciary" (EC Regular Report 1999, 77).
Seven months after Romania began the accession negotiations with the EU and
began the transposition of the first chapters of the acquis, the European Parliament noted
that corruption was the second major obstacle to Romania's accession to the EU (EP
Report 2000, pp. 14-15).42 The EC acknowledged in its 2000 report that Romania had
taken some steps in fighting corruption and reforming the judicial system, but that
corruption continued to remain a "widespread and systemic problem" (EC Regular
Report 2000, 18). While the adoption of the first anticorruption law (law no. 78/2000)
was saluted as a "first step in the right direction", the EC noted that "substantial actions
will be required to address this problem" (EC Regular Report 2000, 19). As with regard
to the functioning of the judiciary, the EC concluded that measures needed to be taken to
increase its independence, administrative capacity, and transparency of the judicial
procedures.
A year later, the EC assessment concluded that while "considerable advances"
had been made in the previous years with regard to the reform of the judicial system,
"Romania has made mixed progress in meeting the priorities related to...judicial
capacity" (EC Regular Report 2001, 109). More specifically, the EC report highlighted
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The first major problem in 2000, according to the European Parliament was the issue of institutionalized
children.
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several important recurrent problems such as the infringements on the independence of
the judiciary (particularly from the executive); the extension of the General Prosecutor's
powers by allowing him to introduce extraordinary appeals against judicial decisions in
cases where the latter are "obviously

ungrounded", but without clearly defining the

criteria for such decisions; the lack of change in the poor working conditions of
magistrates; and the lack of progress in introducing adequate IT systems that would
facilitate case handling and would increase access to case law and legislation (EC
Regular Report 2001, 20). Those problems were correlated with the lack of progress in
fighting corruption and the ineffectiveness of the judiciary having a direct impact on the
fight against corruption. Despite the adoption of the Law no. 78/2000, the
implementation process was delayed due to the absence of secondary legislation
stipulating the procedures necessary for enforcing the law in practice. Furthermore, the
anticorruption section created within the General Prosecutor's office and which was
supposed to lead the fight against corruption was never operational due to a lack of
funding, personnel, and equipment.
Another sensitive and recurrent issue noted by the EC was with regard to the
freedom of information. While the principle of freedom of information was enshrined in
the

Constitution,

its

actual

implementation

was

problematic

and

the

EC's

recommendation was to urgently correct the problem. In October 13, 2001, a day prior to
the publication of the EC Regular Report, Romania adopted the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA)43 complying thus partially with the EU requirement to guarantee the freedom
of information. Just three months prior to the adoption of FOIA, the EP also "urged"

43

Law no. 544/2001.
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Romania to "support social dialogue" with non-governmental actors whose interests were
directly impacted by the adopted legislation (EP Report 2001, 11).
In 2001, the EC recommended that the Romanian government increase the
independence of the judiciary, improve judicial capacity, and accelerate the fight against
corruption by beginning the implementation of the anticorruption law, supporting the
existing anticorruption bodies, and guaranteeing in practice the freedom of information.
In addition, the EC criticized the lack of clear regulations of the "conflict of interest for
both political and civil servant positions" and "the public disclosure of high ranking
politicians and civil servants' income and assets" (EP Report 2001, 16). Overall, the
progress registered by Romania in the adoption and implementation of the acquis was
considered to be modest.
Although an important step forward in the fight against corruption was taken in
2001 with the adoption of FOIA, the tone of the evaluation reports became increasingly
more critical in 2002 when the EC determined that Romania has made limited progress in
reforming the judiciary and that corruption continued to be a "widespread and systemic
problem" (23-25). The main problems identified in the 2001 report were considered to
have remained unsolved a year later with important consequences for the independence
and effectiveness of the judiciary. Nonetheless, the EC noted the adoption in October
2001 of the first National Anticorruption Strategy (NACS I), applicable for 2001-2004,
and it strongly encouraged its immediate implementation. The delay in the adoption of
the secondary legislation necessary for the actual implementation of the NACS I a year
after its adoption was considered to be a negative indicator for the commitment to curb
corruption.
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In November 2002, the EC also issued the Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania
that would indicate the key steps that the two countries must undertake in order to
prepare for the accession. The Roadmaps included benchmarks against which the
countries' progress in harmonizing their national legislation with the acquis and in
developing their administrative capacities would be monitored. The Roadmaps specified
the list of short and medium term issues that needed to be addressed and which would be
continuously monitored and updated until the accession (EC Roadmaps 2002, 2). One of
the aspects particularly emphasized was the close monitoring that the EC would provide
for the reforming of the judicial system, an essential sector for the countries' democratic
consolidation. Some of the "serious concerns" in the judicial system which were
considered to be a priority for Romania to address were the independence of the
judiciary, the system of extraordinary appeals against final judicial decisions which
affected the principle of legal certainty, the lack of a comprehensive strategy to improve
the functioning of the judiciary, and corruption within the judicial system (EC Roadmaps
2002, 25).
The pressure to make further progress in reforming the judiciary and fighting
corruption continued in 2003. That same year, the EC noted the adoption of the
legislation known as the Anticorruption Package (Law no. 161/2003) and, particularly, of
the provision regulating the declarations of income and assets in the conflict of interest
for dignitaries and other public officials (EC Regular Report 2003, 121). Nonetheless, the
EC also mentioned the absence of progress in ensuring the de facto independence of the
judiciary and the continuous high influence that the Minister of Justice exercises through
the direct appointment of judges and the influence of the decisions made by the Superior
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Council of Magistracy (SCM), the body de jure responsible for the magistrates' careers
and the independence of the judiciary. Furthermore, the report stressed the failure to
allocate the resources necessary for ensuring the proper functioning of the National
Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office, a fact that implicitly limited its capacity to prosecute
cases of corruption and particularly of high-level corruption cases. The failure to
thoroughly prepare the Anticorruption Package legislation and the decision to use the
legislative mechanism of a vote of confidence severely restricted the opportunities for
discussion, especially with non-governmental actors, and for improving the legislative
proposal. Therefore, the Anticorruption Package, including the provision regarding the
declarations of assets and incomes and the conflict of interests, contained potential
loopholes and incomplete definitions of conflict of interest (EC Regular Report 2003,
21). Overall, the report concluded that there was no noticeable progress in curbing
corruption or in guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, but that there was the
political will necessary to change that (EC Regular Report 2003, 121). An important
recommendation that the EC made in 2003 and which was consistent with the previous
reports regarded the enforcement of existing legislation. That is, the EC concluded that
Romania had a good anticorruption legislative framework and that it should focus on
implementing it. However, as the SIGMA noted in 2004, the Romanian Government
focused mainly on introducing and proposing new legislation and less on implementing
the already adopted legislation (SIGMA 2004, 3).
The slow progress in establishing the rule of law and fighting corruption was
severely criticized by the European Parliament (EP) in February 2004. Thus, the EP
report stated that "finalizing accession negotiations at the end of 2004 and becoming a
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member in 2007 is impossible unless Romania fully implements [...] anti-corruption
measures, especially addressing corruption at the political level" (European Parliament
2004, 5). The independence and functioning of the judiciary, the limitation of the powers
of the Ministry of Justice, and the implementation of anticorruption measures, especially
those measures addressing high-level corruption, were the most pressing problems
underscored in the February report. Furthermore, the EP insisted that the European
Commission (EC) would develop a new accession strategy for Romania, a strategy that
would "give full priority...to the establishment of the rule of law" (EP Report 2004, 11).
In contrast to the EC conclusion in the previous year regarding the existence of the
political will to fight corruption and reform the judiciary, the EP stressed the "need" for
such political will.
The 2004 EC Regular Report underscored the significance of the judicial reform
legislation adopted in July 2004 which was seen as an important step in reforming the
judiciary and increasing its independence. Nonetheless, the EC also mentioned the
problems that continued to affect the effectiveness and independence of judiciary, such as
the power of the Minister of Justice to appoint judicial assistants, the non-permanent
status of the members of the SCM which could lead to conflicts of interest, the powers of
the General Prosecutor to launch extraordinary appeals in criminal cases, the lack of
progress in the enforcement of judgments in civil cases, and the high number of
vacancies among judges (EC Regular Report 2004, 19).
While judicial reform seemed to be moving forward, the fight against corruption
continued to be perceived as problematic. Hence, there was no visible progress in
reducing it, especially that the number of successful prosecutions of corruption cases
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continued to be very low. Furthermore, the study emphasized another serious problem,
namely the integrity of the institutions in charge with fighting corruption. In an attempt to
stimulate the Romanian authorities in their fight against corruption and in the
transposition and implementation of the acquis prior to the scheduled accession date, in
December 2004, the European Council decided to adopt special safeguard clauses for
Romania.44 Thus, the Accession Treaty signed between the EU and Romania included
four such clauses: a general economic safeguard clause, an internal market safeguard
clause, a specific Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) safeguard clause, and a postponement
clause. The first three clauses were designated for a period of three years during which
they could be activated if the EU considered that there was not enough progress made in
reforming the relevant sectors. The JHA safeguard clause addressed specifically the
issues of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and should progress be lacking
in reforming the judiciary and curbing corruption, the clause would be activated. The
fourth safeguard clause introduced a new and more severe condition that would allow the
European Council, upon the recommendation of the EC, to activate it and to postpone the
accession by one year, to January 2008 (EC Report 2005, 25).
The adoption of the safeguard clauses was unprecedented and it was designed to
show Romania as well as other potential candidate countries that they have to
demonstrate ex ante their commitment to EU rules and institutions. Furthermore, the EU
wanted to make sure that the new candidate countries (i.e., Romania and Bulgaria) would
be prepared to meet EU requirements by the scheduled accession date, January 1st, 2007.
After the first enlargement that expanded the EU with ten countries, the sentiment among
EU members was less favorable. Thus, two years prior to the scheduled accession date,
44

The safeguard clauses were adopted also for Bulgaria.
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the EU decided to lean more on the "stick" approach in order to ensure Romania's
preparedness for accession.
Additionally, 2004 was a year of increase tensions and changes within the EU.
The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which started working on October 4th, 2003,
was supposed to quickly revise the most important aspects of the European Constitution
so that the final text could be approved by all member states. However, an agreement
could not be reached under the Italian Presidency and the IGC continued its negotiations
regarding the text of the Constitution in 2004 under the Irish Presidency. A political
agreement was finally reached on June 18, 2004 and the IGC completed its work on
October 29, 2004, when the Constitution was signed in Rome (European Union 2009).
The intense negotiations have revealed the serious concerns among the old EU members
regarding the future of their states and of the EU in the context of the Eastern expansion.
Consequently, more pressure began to be exercised on the candidate countries to
accelerate their judicial reforms, establish the rule of law, and combat corruption.
Moreover, 2004 was also the year when the Prodi Commission completed its
mandate and was replaced with the new European Commission (EC) led by Jose Manuel
Barroso. The EC led by the former Italian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, was expected
to implement comprehensive reforms that would improve its functioning and restore the
good image of the institution severely damaged by the 1999 corruption scandals
involving the Santer Commission. However, by mid-2004 it became obvious that the
actual implementation of the ambitious reforms would be a priority for the next
Commission, the team led by Prodi failing for the most part to move beyond the proposal
stage of the reform process. The new Commission President, Barroso, was determined to
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"revitalize" the reform process and to overcome the problems inherited from the previous
EC (Cini 2005). That meant also increasing pressure on the candidate countries to
demonstrate their commitment to reform and anticorruption efforts.
The increase in the external pressure and the change in leadership in Romania, as
a result of the 2004 national elections, positively affected the speed of the reform process
in the judicial system and in the fight against corruption. The progress in implementing
institutional reform measures and in aligning the judicial system with the EU
requirements was noted by the EC in its 2005 assessment report. Thus, the Regular
Report acknowledged the adoption of important reform measures that were designed to
increase the independence of the judiciary by limiting the role played by the Ministry of
Justice and increasing the role of the SCM. The latter was recognized as the de facto
guarantor of judicial independence and it became solely responsible for magistrates'
professional careers. Additionally, the National Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office
(NAPO) was given jurisdiction over the high cases of corruption and was assigned
additional personnel and funding. Hence, a year after the adoption of safeguard clauses,
the EC concluded that there was "an increase in the political will to tackle corruption"
(EC Regular Report 2005, 11).
As in the previous years, the report also mentioned the continuous shortcomings
in the effectiveness of judicial activity due to heavy workloads, frequent delays in
obtaining court judgments, and lack of progress in the enforcement of judgments of civil
cases. Furthermore, the EC emphasized the lack of progress in reducing the level of
corruption which was assessed as being "serious and widespread" (EC Regular Report
2005, 11). One of the main problems identified was the poor implementation of existing
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anticorruption legislation and the continuous existence of corruption within the judicial
institutions responsible for fighting corruption. Hence, the EC recommended "immediate
action [...] to increase Romania's capacity to fight [corruption] effectively and to
efficiently prosecute significant high-level corruption cases" (EC Regular Report 2005,
70). In addition to those criticisms, in Fall 2005 the EC assigned red flags to the chapter
on judiciary and anticorruption. The red flags were designed to highlight the significance
the EU attached to the fulfillment of EU requirements prior to accession and their
determination in enforcing the sanctions (i.e., activate the safeguard clauses) attached for
failure to reform the judiciary and curb corruption ex ante.
The closer and more detailed assessment of the implementation of the acquis and
reform measures continued in 2006, when the EC issued two evaluation reports regarding
Romania's preparedness for the accession. At the time of the May 2006 report, there was
still a significant level of uncertainty regarding the EU's decision towards Romania's
accession in January 1st, 2007. However, the more interventionist approach adopted by
the EU in 2004 led to changes, particularly in fighting corruption within the judiciary and
reforming this sector, a fact illustrated by the change in the color of the flags attached to
the judicial and anticorruption areas, which became yellow. Thus, the May 2006 EC
report noted the continuous progress made by Romania in the implementation of the
anticorruption legislation and in the efforts to eradicate corruption within the judicial
institutions (EC Regular Report May 2006, 35). Despite those positive steps, the EC
recommendation was to increase the efforts in fighting corruption.
The last pre-accession Regular Report issued by the EC in September 2006
emphasized once again Romania's efforts to implement the acquis, to increase the
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independence and effectiveness of the judicial system, as well as to curb corruption
within judicial institutions. The report also mentioned the need for the continuous
implementation of anticorruption strategies that would lead to a more transparent and
efficient judicial process; that would increase the capacity and accountability of the SCM;
and that would prevent and not only fight corruption. One of the requirements that
Romania had to fulfill prior to accession was the creation of the National Agency of
Integrity (NAI) responsible for monitoring the implementation of the laws regarding the
declarations of income and assets, conflicts of interests, and incompatibilities with
holding public office positions (EC Regular

Report

September 2006, 5). That

requirement, however, was not fulfilled prior to accession and it became part of
Romania's obligations during the post-accession monitoring period. The failure to create
such an institution and to allocate necessary funding and personnel for its effective
functioning could potentially trigger the activation of the JHA safeguard clause.

3.3. Customs Sector

The EU has also focused attention on ensuring that the customs sector was
aligned with European customs legislation and regulations and that corruption was
effectively counteracted in the customs sector. One of the first steps towards
preparedness for accession was to adopt and implement the acquis specific to the customs
sector, which consisted of the Community Customs Code and its implementing
provisions, the EU's Combined Nomenclature, the Common Customs Tariff including
trade preferences, tariff quotas and tariff suspensions, and other customs-related
legislation outside the scope of the customs code. In addition, the 1995 Europe

135

Agreement, which served as the legal basis for Romania's relations with the EU,
stipulated the creation of a free-trade area with the EU and the progressive elimination of
customs duties on a broad range of products and according to a clear timetable set in
accordance with the Romanian authorities (EC Agenda 1997, 97).
In 1997, when the EC issued its Opinion on Romania's

Application

for

Membership to the European Union, the Romanian customs sector was undergoing
organizational changes. The first EC assessment regarding the organization and
functioning of the Romanian customs revealed that there were significant deficiencies
that needed to be addressed and that it was "unlikely that Romania [would] be ready to
fulfill the responsibilities of an EC customs administration within the next few years"
(EC Agenda 1997, 99). More specifically, some of the main problems identified included
legislation incompatible with the EU legislation; customs charges that have equivalent
effect of customs duties (e.g., custom modernization charge); and the lack of an
appropriate computerized system necessary for "the management, in the customs
union/internal market, of the customs and indirect tax provision" and for the "mutual
administrative assistance in custom, agricultural and indirect tax matters" (EC Agenda
1997, 98-99). In addition to legislative and procedural problems, other important issues
were an insufficient number of qualified custom officers and low salaries allocated to
customs personnel which in turn made the recruitment of qualified customs personnel
increasingly more difficult. The heavy workload due to the inadequate number of
customs officers commensurate with the work load and the low salaries associated with
the heavy work negatively affected the "quality" of customs officers, in terms of integrity
and honesty. Hence, the EC underscored the need for establishing a customs sector with
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"motivated staff showing a high degree of integrity" and for taking steps to "urgently
tackle corruption" within this sector (EC Agenda 1997, 98 and 108).
In 1998, the EC focused on assessing the progress made in aligning the Romanian
customs sector with the European acquis in this area. Hence, the Regular Report
acknowledged the adoption in 1997 of the new customs code as well as the secondary
legislation necessary for its effective implementation; the adoption of a new statute on
customs personnel; the creation of a special customs surveillance corridor along
Romania's borders that would allow for unexpected checks; and the increase in
investments in physical and information infrastructure (EC Regular Report 1998, 42).
However, corruption per se was not identified as an urgent problem in the customs sector
at that time and the criticism focused on the deficient alignment of the Romanian
Integrated Tariff (TARIR) system with the Community Integrated Tariff (TARIC);
serious problems in the physical and information infrastructure; and the lack of
compatibility between the Romanian and EU customs legislation (EC Regular Report
1998,43-44).
A year later, in addition to evaluating progress made in aligning the customs
sector with EU requirements, the EC noted also the progress made in fighting corruption
within customs. Thus, the adoption of the Statute of rights and obligations of customs
officers was considered to be a "major step forward" in fighting corruption and in
improving the functioning of customs sector (EC Regular Report 1999, 75). Other
measures that indirectly contributed to fighting corruption included improvements in
supplying information to the users of customs services and the creation of a new division
for counterfeited and pirated goods. Nonetheless, the harmonization of the Romanian
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customs legislation with the European one was still lacking in certain areas (particularly
counterfeited and pirated goods) and specialized training for customs officers was still
absent (EC Regular Report 1999, 75). The latter problem was considered to be very
important for curbing corruption by ensuring the uniform and non-discretionary
application of customs regulations and procedures. The EC requirement for the creation
of a Customs School that would offer initial and continuous training to customs personnel
was based on the assumption that professional training would prepare customs officers in
the areas of ethics and professional conduct, which would lead to the creation of an
honest customs service. The EC's final conclusion was that progress has been made in
improving the administrative capacity of the customs authorities, but that several
outstanding problems needed special attention such as the uneven application of
legislation, undue bureaucratic burdens imposed on economic operators, and the fight
against corruption (EC Regular Report 1999, 76).
The efforts to increase legislative harmonization with the acquis in this sector, to
improve administrative capacity, and to increase transparency and efficiency in customs
procedures were part of the fight against corruption within customs. In 2000, the EC
noted the efforts made by Romania to reform the customs sector, including the adoption
of a five year development strategy of customs administration, applicable for the period
2000-2005, and the creation of new structures designed to increase control and combat
illegal trafficking of goods. The EC also acknowledged the measures taken to more
specifically address the problem of corruption, such as the adoption of the Code of
Conduct in March 2000 and the introduction of financial incentives that would reward the
professional performances of customs officers. But it also recognized their very limited
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impact in reducing the level of corruption within customs (EC Regular Report 2000, 7879). Furthermore, the positive measures were considered to be "undermined by
corruption in the Romanian customs service" and corruption was still assessed as a
serious recurrent problem, a problem that the Romanian Government should continue
treating as a priority (EC Regular Report 2000, 75).
In 2001, the EC noted that limited progress was made in response to the
recommendations and criticisms in the previous report and particularly in reducing the
level of corruption in customs. Nonetheless, two changes were noted. The first instance
of progress was the creation, in October 2000, of the National School of Public Finance
and, in early 2001, of the Internal Control and Audit Division. Secondly, in an attempt to
prevent and reduce corruption, cooperation protocols were established with other
institutions that had border-related competencies, such as the border police, the national
police, and the financial guard (EC Regular Report 2001, 91). This was an issue that had
been highlighted by the EC in its previous Regular Reports and that was considered an
important step towards increasing the efficiency of all border activities. Despite these
positive developments, the EC's conclusion was that "substantial efforts are still needed
to fight fraud and corruption" within the Romanian customs sector (EC Regular Report
2001, 107). Additionally, the Regular Report noted that the short term priority of
reforming and combating corruption within the customs sector was still yet to be
completely fulfilled by Romania.
In the following year, corruption within Romanian customs was again an issue
underscored by the EC in its annual evaluation report of Romania's preparedness for
accession. The EC recognized the positive developments that took place from 2001,
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particularly the elaboration and adoption of the Action Programme Against Corruption in
the Customs Administration and the Sector Action Plan Against Corruption, both part of
the National Action Plan Against Corruption. In addition, at the beginning of 2002 the
Code of Conduct and Discipline of the Customs Staff was adopted that responded to the
EU requirements in that area (EC Regular Report 2002, 110). Moreover, cooperation
with other domestic institutions responsible for border control continued in 2002 and new
protocols of border cooperation were signed with customs agencies from neighboring
countries (i.e., Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Moldova
and Ukraine). Despite the positive developments made in aligning the Romanian customs
legislation with the acquis and in achieving a good level of harmonization in this field of
legislation, the EC underscored the need for further improvements of administrative
capacity, the training offered to customs officers, and the uniform implementation of
customs procedures and regulations. The continuous reliance on "on-the-job" training for
customs personnel, the use of non-professionals to provide that training, and the little
progress made in curbing corruption within this sector were all strongly criticized (EC
Regular Report 2002, 115).
The consistent EC criticism appeared to have led to the adoption of new measures
designed to increase the administrative and operational capacity within the customs
sector and to tackle corruption. Thus, the Regular Report noted the creation, in July 2003,
of the National Control Authority responsible for the coordination of a series of services
within the customs administration; the undertaking of surveys to assess the level of
corruption among customs personnel and the factors that lead to corruption, the adoption
of a "policy of education and prevention for customs personnel", and the organization of
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a public awareness campaign (EC Regular Report 2003, 108). Two other positive
developments were the introduction of the policy of rotating customs personnel and the
establishment

of consultative

committees

between

customs

administration

and

professional and employers' associations in order to increase transparency and dialogue.
In a similar effort to increase transparency and also to reduce bureaucratic discretion,
measures were taken to modernize border control equipment.
Despite those positive developments, the EC highlighted in its report several
important and recurrent problems and recommended the adoption of urgent measures to
solve them. One of those problems was represented by corruption and, despite the
assessment that Romania generally met "the commitments and requirements arising from
accession negotiations in this field", the EC recommended that additional efforts should
be made to "develop customs ethics and combat corruption" (EC Regular Report 2003,
109). Two other serious problems regarded the limited progress in the "legal
approximation in customs co-operation" and in the cooperation in practice between the
customs administration and other institutions such as border police, financial guard, and
the economic branch of the police specialized in tax crimes (EC Regular Report 2003,
107).
Beginning with 2004, the EC started focusing more on the issue of corruption in
customs, a fact that coincided with the increased pressure on the Romanian Government
to produce visible results in curbing corruption also in the judiciary. Thus, in 2004,
corruption was assessed as being a "major problem" that was difficult to tackle due in
part to the limited cooperation between the National Customs Authority and the
organized trade associations and traders. The lack of professional induction and
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management training for customs personnel and the absence of effective in-house
training were considered as negatively affecting the implementation of customs rules and
procedures and undermining the efforts to reduce corruption (EC Regular Report 2004,
131-132). The EC also noted the positive steps taken to tackle corruption, such as the
adoption of a new Customs Officers Statute that replaced the old one in effect since 1998.
In addition to rules on grades, functions, rights, obligations, and incompatibilities, the
new Statute also contained several provisions addressing specifically the issue of
corruption (EC Regular Report 2004, 130). Another positive development in the fight
against corruption was the establishment of a hotline for the public to report corruption
cases and the appointment of an external anticorruption counselor, for a limited period of
two years, attached to the Prime Minister and responsible for advising on issues of
anticorruption strategies within customs administration (EC Regular Report 2004, 131).
However, the EC concluded that the Romanian authorities still had to show real progress
in fighting corruption and that more efforts were necessary in order to effectively address
corruption.
A year later, the limited success in fighting corruption was again highlighted in
the EC Regular Report. More specifically, it was noted that despite the adoption in April
2005 of a new anticorruption strategy for the customs sector, "the practical inter-agency
cooperation needs to become a daily reality" and enforcement of anticorruption measures
are "needed urgently" (EC Regular Report 2005, 70). In addition, several other issues
were considered to be major priorities, such as "plans to redeploy staff after accession,
rationalizing the training approach and channels, and the full use of the School for Public
Finance facilities" (EC Regular Report 2005, 72). The latter problem was once again
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prompted by the limited specialized training available to customs officers, particularly inhouse training, a recurrent problem in the Romanian customs sector. Nonetheless,
progress was made in preparing the customs sector for the accession, particularly with
regard to the uniform and consistent application of customs procedures, the alignment of
Romanian legislation with the EU customs legislation, and the increased number of
control and disciplinary measures for individual customs officers. While not enough to
lead to a more positive evaluation, the steps forward were considered to be signs of
political commitment to curb corruption within customs (EC Regular Report 2005, 7273).
About half a year later, in May 2006, the EC evaluations revealed that "Romania
has made significant progress on strengthening its administrative and operational
capacity" and that it "generally meets the commitment and requirements arising from the
accession negotiations in the area of customs" (EC Regular Report May 2006, 37).
Corruption was assessed as a problem that was more aggressively and effectively
addressed by the Romanian authorities. Thus, progress was noted in developing
simplified procedures, increasing usage of IT services for clearing operations, and in
uncovering and sanctioning corrupt customs officers. Importantly, the EC mentioned the
fact that business operators were reporting an improvement in the operations of the
Romanian Customs Authority. Overall, the report offered a positive evaluation of the
customs sector but it still recommended the maintenance of the fight against corruption as
a "top priority" (EC Regular Report May 2006, 38). In the last monitoring report issued
by the EC prior to Romania's accession, the fight against corruption in customs was
assessed as registering real progress. The evaluation was based on the increasing number
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of checks conducted by the National Customs Authority as a result of public complaints
and on the increased number of disciplinary sanctions for customs officers (41
disciplinary sanctions and one criminal investigation). Moreover, in September 2006, 30
customs officers were arrested as a result of a joint operation between the National
Anticorruption Directorate (NAD), the Ministry of Administration and Interior, and the
Customs Authority, which was interpreted as a progress in the inter-institutional
cooperation responsible for fighting against corruption and a sign of real political will to
curb corruption (EC Regular Report September 2006, 35).

3.4. Public Procurement

The public procurement sector was consistently evaluated as part of the
Romania's alignment with the acquis regarding the European Union's internal market as
defined in the Article 7a of the European Treaty (i.e., Maastricht Treaty). According to
that article, the internal market is "an area without internal frontiers in which the free
movements of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured" (EC Regular Report 1998,
22). In order to align with the EU's internal market, Romania had to ensure that it had an
open-market economy that could sustain the EU competition and that was regulated by
the common market principles. Public procurement was one aspect of the market
economy that Romania had to adjust to EU legislation and procedures and in which
corruption had to be addressed.
Until 2001, the EC focused its attention on evaluating the transposition of the
acquis and the harmonization of Romania's legislation in the public procurement sector
with European legislation in this area. Previous reports mentioned the incompatibilities
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between Romanian public procurement legislation and the European counterpart; the
national preference for awarding contracts; the cumbersome procedures regarding
contracting and ensuring that rules are applied (EC Agenda 2000 1997, 40); the lack of
adequate equipment and trained personnel (EC Regular Report 1998, 46); the lack of
central publication of tenders and registration; and the weak sanctions for noncompliance with public procurement procedures (EC Regular Report 1999, 39 and 65). In
2000, the EC concluded that the short-term priority represented by the adoption and
implementation of public procurement legislation compatible with the European
legislation was achieved only to a "very limited extent" (EC Regular Report 2000, 39).
Nevertheless, corruption was not mentioned as a problem affecting particularly this sector
and consequently, there was no specific pressure exercised on the Romanian authorities
to address it.
The situation changed slightly in 2001, when the EC noted that an important step
forward in fighting corruption was represented by the adoption, in April 2001, of a
government ordinance that introduced new public procurement procedures and
established "the right to appeal against the award of public contracts" (EC Regular
Report 2001, 22). However, that was the sole mention of corruption in association with
public procurement, although the implication was that the major problems identified by
the EC in previous years were conducive to corruption in that sector and that by
addressing them, corruption was also being tackled. Thus, in 2002, the EC assessment
concluded that Romania had made progress in fighting corruption including in the public
procurement sector by "developing public procurement through electronic tenders" (EC
Regular Report 2002, 26). In 2003, the EC Regular Report focused mainly on the
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transposition of the public procurement acquis, the level of actual implementation of the
adopted legislation in this area, the administration of public procurement sector, and the
development and functioning of electronic procurement.
The next year, in 2004, in addition to the problems identified in the previous
reports with regard to the transposition of the acquis and the functioning of the public
procurement sector, the EC noted a series of troublesome governmental ad hoc decisions
derogating from the Romanian public procurement rules and procedures. The issue was
particularly serious due to the value of the contracts awarded by the government without
public tender. Such cases included the awarding of a contract of €2.242 billion for the
construction of the Bor§-Cluj-Brasov motorway, the awarding of a contract of €650
million for an integrated border surveillance system, and other contracts worth up to
€2.023 billion in aggregate that were being negotiated at the time of the EC evaluation.
Those ad hoc decisions led the EC to seriously question Romania's commitment to
implement and enforce open and transparent procurement rules (EC Regular Report
2004, 54). The concern was expressed again in 2005, when the EC concluded that
"[U]nless legislation is fully aligned, coherent and implemented correctly, there is a
serious risk that Romania would not have a functioning public procurement system in
place in time" for the accession (EC Regular Report 2005, 33).
In 2006, the year prior to Romania's accession to the EU, the EC noted that
important efforts were made to align the legislation with the acquis in this area and to
prepare this sector for integration. Thus, the conclusion of the 2006 Regular Reports
(both in May and October) was that Romanian public procurement legislation was
aligned with the acquis and that the country was prepared for the accession in that area.
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Corruption in public procurement was no longer mentioned as being a problem in that
sector per se, although corruption in Romania was still assessed as being widespread.

3.5. Health Care

The EU role in reforming and curbing corruption in the Romanian health care
sector was significantly limited by the lack of a common European health care policy.
According to the Treaty of the European Union, health care is the sole responsibility of
member states and the EU does not play any role in regulating national health services.
However, the same treaty specifies that the EU's internal market includes the free
movements of people, goods, and services and many of these activities (e.g., drugs,
health professionals) are subject to the European Union law of competition or free
movements (McKee 2004, McKee and Mossialos 2006). The result is a paradoxical
situation where the delivery of health care is left to the discretion of the national states,
but certain aspects of health care policy are subject to the EU legislation. However, the
lack of a common health policy meant that there was little pressure on the candidate
countries to make progress in reforming and improving the health care sector, and even
less pressure to curb corruption in this sector.
Due to the absence of a unified EU health policy, it is not surprising that the EC
evaluations of the Romanian health care sector were brief and limited to tracing the
efforts to reform the system by decentralization, introduction and implementation of the
Social Health Insurance System in 1999 (EC Regular Report 1999), and the adoption of
the measures necessary for the introduction of the European Health Insurance Card as
from the date of accession (EC Regular Report 2004). An important part of the brief
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evaluation of the health care sector was to summarize the recurrent problems in the
system, such as the precarious situation of the health system; the small budget allocated
to the health care sector (which was much smaller compared to other EU countries); the
poor quality of health services; the problems with access to health care of poor and
minorities; and the need for the development of a coherent reform plan. Most of these
problems were repeated in every EC Regular Report from 1997 until 2006 inclusive.
Corruption was mentioned for the first time in the health care sector only in May 2006,
when the EC concluded that petty corruption was a concern in that sector (EC Regular
Report May 2006, 9). In the last EC report issued in September 2006, health care sector
was once again mentioned as "particularly vulnerable" to corruption (EC Regular Report
September 2006, 35). The major recommendations were to increase the efforts necessary
to improve the health status of the population, the access to health care services, and
transparency in the health system (EC Regular Report September 2006, 29). However, in
order to achieve those goals, the Romanian Government would have to focus also on
fighting corruption in health care sector.

3.6. European Union Pressure and Written Media Coverage

In addition to evaluating the data from official European and Romanian
documents and studies, the EU pressure on Romanian Government is measured by
monitoring the frequency of newspaper articles that address the issue of corruption in
relation to Romania's integration to the EU, the statements made by EU officials
regarding the problem of corruption in Romania, and the articles focusing on corruption
as an impediment to accession. From 1997 until 2006, a total of 296 articles covering EU
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pressure were published in the three major newspapers. The data from newspapers shows
a significant increase in the EU pressure in 2004 (see Figure 2 below), the year that
Romania finalized the accession negotiations with the EU. That year was the one that
brought the most severe criticisms from the European Parliament, criticisms that led to
the elaboration by the European Commission of a new strategy for Romania's preparation
for accession. The year 2004 was crucial for Romania because it represented the
necessary step towards EU membership in 2007. A failure to finalize the accession
negotiations in December 2004 would have resulted in the automatic postponement of
accession date.
In 2005, there was a decrease in the coverage of EU pressure in the newspapers,
although the number of articles focusing on corruption in relation to Romania's accession
process continued to be higher than in the previous years. There are at least three
explanations for the decline in the newspaper coverage in 2005 and 2006. First was the
change in leadership as a result of the 2004 November national election which, at least
rhetorically, was highly committed to ensure the country's timely accession and to
produce visible results in the fight against corruption. One such leader was particularly
welcomed by the EU due to her previous anticorruption activity which won her
international recognition. That leader was Monica Macovei who became the Minister of
Justice in January 2005 and was highly praised by EU officials for her determination to
establish the rule of law and fight corruption, particularly high-level corruption. A second
explanation was the decrease, particularly in the second half of 2006, of EU officials'
statements regarding corruption in Romania. The May 2006 EC Regular

Report

concluded that there was a visible increase in the political will to fight corruption in
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Romania, a conclusion that led to the change in the color of the flags (from red to yellow)
raised in the previous report for the judiciary and anticorruption areas. Although, as
indicated by a number of interviewees, the change in the EC assessment was based
mostly on the promise of fighting corruption and the appearance of political will and less
on the actual results in curbing corruption, the improved assessment of the country's
preparedness for accession appears to have affected both EU officials' statements and
their coverage in Romanian newspapers. The third explanation is based on the media's
propensity towards sensationalism. While corruption is always likely to attract many
readers, positive stories are not so interesting for the newspaper editors and a change in
the tone of EU officials' statements might not have made for very interesting stories.

Figure 2
Presentation of the EU Pressure in Romanian Newspapers
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Nonetheless, the evaluation of media coverage of EU pressure from 1997 until
2006 inclusive shows an increase in the EU pressure beginning with 2004. Thus, the
closer the scheduled date for Romania's accession, the higher the pressure to ensure the
country's preparedness for integration. The data clearly indicate the significant increase
in 2004 of the EU pressure, an increase indicated also by the evaluation of the European
documents regarding Romania's preparation for EU membership. Furthermore, the EU
pressure continued to be much higher throughout 2005 and 2006 compared to the
previous years, which clearly indicates that the higher the significance the EU gave to
corruption and the closer the accession date, the higher the pressure on the Romanian
government to effectively address corruption.

4. EU Pressure and Romanian Political Will

This section analyzes the impact of EU pressure on the Romanian government
and, more specifically, on the domestic political will to fight corruption. According to the
theoretical model, the external pressure exercised throughout the decade prior to
Romania's accession to the EU should lead to an increase in the political will to
effectively address corruption. Political will is analyzed by assessing: 1) the analytical
rigor in diagnosing corruption, 2) the inclusion and cooperation of main stakeholders, 3)
the anticorruption reforms adopted because of the EU pressure, 4) the creation of an
objective monitoring system, 5) the statements made by political parties and political
elites regarding the fight against corruption publicized in the major newspapers, and 6)
the use of corruption as a campaign issue during the 2000 and 2004 national elections.
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4.1. The Analytical Rigor in Diagnosing Corruption

A first indicator of real political will is represented by the thoroughness with
which the government assessed the problem of corruption, its effects, the factors that
sustain it, the institutions more vulnerable to corruption, and the potential solutions for
effectively curbing corruption. Such assessments include a comprehensive diagnosis of
corruption and an evaluation of the effectiveness of the anticorruption strategies at the
national level. Additionally, assessments of corruption were conducted at the sectoral
level, specifically in the judiciary and customs.
One such instance of political will manifested itself in 2000 three years after
President Emil Constantinescu declared the war on corruption. From the first evaluation
of Romania's preparedness for accession, the EC noted the absence of an anticorruption
law in Romania and consistently requested the adoption of such a law as well as the
development of a coherent national anticorruption strategy. In order to be able to develop
a comprehensive and effective anticorruption strategy, the first step required a complete
assessment of the problem. Therefore, in 2000, the Romanian Government commissioned
the World Bank to conduct a comprehensive Diagnostic Survey of Corruption in
Romania, the first such assessment since 1990. The study provided information on both
perceptions of the level of corruption and experiences with corruption, and concluded
that corruption was perceived to be widespread in the country with half of the households
declaring that it was part of their everyday life (World Bank 2000, 20). The customs
sector was ranked as the most corrupt sector in the country followed closely by the
judiciary. The health care sector was ranked the fifth most corrupt sector, after the State
Property Fund and Parliament (see Figure 3 below).
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Figure 3
The Perceived Level of Corruption in Customs, Judiciary, and Health Care Sectors
(2000)

Source: World Bank, Diagnostic Survey of Corruption in Romania, 2001, p. 5.

The study also included a series of strategies designed to reduce corruption and
create an independent and accountable judicial system. Moreover, the survey asked
respondents to evaluate their support for various anticorruption reforms. Enterprises and
households favored the adoption and implementation of severe anticorruption laws
(particularly those that would severely sanction corrupt officials), as well as reforms that
would increase ethics education in schools and the transparency and effectiveness of
public administration. The study found that public officials also supported the
strengthening of public administration, as well as more severe punishments for bribe
takers and bribe givers, increases in salary for public servants, the creation of a merit153

based promotion system, improvements of judicial activity, and increased transparency
(World Bank 2000, 30-31). The World Bank study served as the foundation for drafting
the first National Anticorruption Strategy (NACS I), applicable for 2001-2004.
Since public procurement is a sector relatively new in Romania and less visible to
the general public, questions regarding the problem of corruption in this sector were not
included in the surveys administered by the World Bank. Although corruption in public
procurement has significant implications for the economy due to the way it distorts the
way the public contracts are assigned, which in turn affects the quality of the services or
products provided as a result of the corrupt transaction, it is not perceived as having a
similar direct impact on peoples' lives as the other three sectors. Hence, it is not
surprising that evaluations of corruption in public procurement are not a priority for the
Romanian government.
A similar instance of political will in response to the EU pressure manifested in
2005, when the government commissioned the Freedom House to assess the
implementation and effectiveness of the NACS I. According to the Minister of Justice
Macovei, the Freedom House Audit was specifically requested by the EU in order to
identify the exact problems with the anticorruption strategy and its implementation and to
identify the reasons for the lack of real progress in curbing corruption (Evenimentul Zilei,
11 February 2005). The report concluded that, despite of the inclusion in the NACS I of
the suggestions made by the World Bank, its success was very limited, the strategy
failing for the most part to achieve its proposed goals (Freedom House 2005, 18-20).
Despite consistent requests from the EU to address the high level of corruption,
specifically corruption at the political level, the primary focus of the NACS I was on
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curbing petty corruption. Furthermore, the NACS I was perceived to be a "compilation of
good intentions and thoughts without any prioritization...something without a beginning
or an end" (Interview, L.§tefan, Ministry of Justice, January 12, 2007).45 The same
opinion was shared by representatives of civil society organizations, who characterized it
as lacking clear objectives, effective monitoring instruments and necessary budgets for
efficient implementation (Interview, NGO Representative 2, January 10, 2007). The
findings and suggestions of the Freedom House report were incorporated into the second
National Anticorruption Strategy (NACS II), applicable for the period 2005-2007. As
such, the NACS II was better designed in terms of clear objectives, institutions
responsible for the implementation of each objective, clear deadlines, budget, and
monitoring criteria.
Also in response to the external pressure exercised by the EU, beginning with
2005, the Ministry of Justice commissioned Transparency International Romania (TI
Romania) to conduct annual surveys of magistrates' perception of judicial independence
and the problems that affect it. According to the EU, the low but "sadly justified" level of
public trust in the judiciary was mainly the result of corruption within the judicial system
(European Parliament 2004, 11). In 2005, only 8.7 percent of magistrates considered
corruption as having a negative impact on judicial independence. Moreover, they
considered corruption to be the result of low salaries in the judicial system (TI Romania
2005, 9). However, as the 2006 TI Romania report also showed, magistrates did not
perceive corruption as being a problem in the judicial system. Corruption as a major
problem in the judiciary was considered to have been created artificially for political
45

Laura Stefan was the Director of the Department for Relations with the Public Ministry, Prevention of
Criminality and Corruption within the Ministry of Justice. She resigned from her public office position
after the Minister of Justice Macovei was forced to resign in May 2007.
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reasons and to have been used by the executive to justify the problems in the system,
problems due mainly to the lack of funds and personnel. The increase of magistrates'
salaries was considered to be the key to solving corruption because it would reduce the
temptations of accepting bribes (Interview Magistrate Professional Organization, March
26 2007).
However, the perception of corruption as not being an important problem in the
judiciary contradicted Minister Macovei's assessment of the major issues affecting the
independence and effectiveness of the judiciary. The Ministry's position from 2005 until
spring 2007 (while Macovei was Minister of Justice) was that corruption was a major
problem in the judiciary that should be addressed more effectively. That approach led to
severe disagreements between the Ministry of Justice and the Superior Council of the
Magistracy, the guarantor of judicial independence in Romania. The latter claimed that
corruption was a problem in the judiciary only because the Minister of Justice claimed it
to be (Interview, L. §tefan, Ministry of Justice, January 12, 2007). The anticorruption
campaign launched by the Ministry of Justice in 2006 that targeted corruption in the
judiciary only increased the tension in the relationship between the two institutions. TI
Romania continued to monitor the magistrates' perception of judicial independence and
of the factors affecting it after Romania's accession to the EU. Thus, in 2007, the study
found that magistrates acknowledged the existence of corruption in the judiciary and that
too little was being done to effectively address it. Moreover, magistrates expressed
support for more severe sanctions against their corrupt colleagues, specifically their
exclusion from magistracy, in order to improve the image of their institution (TI Romania
2007, 15).
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EU pressure on the Romanian Government to curb corruption in customs sector
led to a similar instance of political will. In 2006, the Romanian Customs National
Authority (CNA) in collaboration with the British Embassy in Bucharest commissioned a
survey of perceptions

of corruption in customs

sector. The survey

assessed

representatives of companies and customs officers' perception of the factors affecting the
effectiveness of customs activities, including corruption and one of its forms, unofficial
payments. The study found that the companies perceived an improvement in the
functioning of customs activity and a reduction in corruption in customs. Thus, only 29
percent of respondents' perceived corruption in customs to be a serious or very serious
problem in 2006 in contrast to 60 percent in 2004 (CIAD 2006a, 46). The customs
officers' perception was similar to that of the magistrates, namely that corruption was not
a major problem in their sector. The results of those surveys were interpreted by the
leaders of the CNA as a clear indicator of the success in fighting corruption in customs
administration.

4.2. Inclusion of Main Stakeholders in the Policy Making Process

In 2001, FOIA was adopted as a result of the cooperation between government,
opposition parties (specifically, the National Liberal Party), and civil

society
©

organizations. That marked the first real collaboration between government and nongovernmental actors since 1990, considered to be an "atypical collaboration" (Interview
Anticorruption expert 2, May 20, 2007). The adoption of FOIA was largely in response to
the external pressure exercised by the EU, which was consistently requesting the
regulation of the public's access to information. In addition to the EC recommendations
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for the adoption of such legislation, in July 2001, the European Parliament recommended
that the Romanian government adopt a freedom of information act and open and support
social dialogue (European Parliament 2004, 11). Seven months later, FOIA was adopted
by the Romanian Parliament. In addition to the external pressure exercised by the EU,
Romania also experienced pressure from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). When Romania was not included in the first wave of NATO enlargement in
1999 despite supporting the war in Yugoslavia, the absence of the legislation regarding
the access to information and classified information was considered to be one of the
reasons for the decision (Interview Anticorruption expert 1, April 12, 2007).
In 2003, also in response to the EU pressure, the Romanian CNA established
consultative committees composed of representatives of customs administration and of
professional and employers' associations (EC Regular Report 2003, 208). The activity of
these committees was considered to be progress in the establishment of a dialogue
between the customs administration and the professional associations. Nonetheless, in
2006, an evaluation study of the functioning of the customs sector found that there was
still room for improvements in the openness of the dialogue and the collaboration
between the parties involved in these committees (CIAD 2006b, 1).
Another example of political will came in 2005 when Minister Macovei initiated a
close collaboration with the main stakeholders in the system (i.e., judges, prosecutors,
their professional associations, and civil society organizations). Macovei was one of the
founders of TI Romania and a renowned anticorruption expert within the EU. While it is
undeniable that EU pressure increased significantly in 2004, it is also important to note
Macovei's commitment and "unhierarchical approach" to reform and the fight against
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corruption (Pridham 2007, 541). Her commitment led to the close collaboration between
the Ministry of Justice and the main stakeholders in the system, particularly in the first
half of 2005, a collaboration that translated into the drafting of a legislative proposal
designed to further improve the process of judicial reform and reduce corruption. The
Constitutional Court's determination in early July 2005 that four of the articles included
in the bill were unconstitutional is considered to have triggered a change in Macovei's
attitude that led to a decrease of cooperation with non-governmental actors for her
remaining time in office (SoJust 2006, 27). Nonetheless, the EU role in that specific
instance was manifested mostly as support for the demonstrated domestic political will,
and less as pressure.46
In 2005, another example of collaboration between government and professional
and civil society organizations can be found. The dialogue and cooperation between the
two parties led to the adoption of new public procurement legislation the following year
that introduced more objective and transparent criteria for the acquisition of advertising
space for public institutions and the granting of non-repayable funds to NGOs (Interview
Anticorruption expert 2, May 20, 2007). This instance of political will was noted by the
EC in the Regular Report issued in October 2005 and was assessed as being a step
forward in the fight against corruption by increasing the transparency and effectiveness in
public procurement activities.

46

The overt EU support for Monica Macovei and her approach to fighting corruption was not well received
by many officials in Romania, including Government, Parliament, and magistrates, a fact that was
expressed by several magistrates during interviews and reflected in the mass media. Furthermore, in Spring
2007, the Parliament withdrew its support for the Minister of Justice and she was forced to resign.
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4.3. Adoption of Anticorruption Reforms

A very important indicator of political will is represented by the adoption of
anticorruption reforms and, specifically, of anticorruption reforms whose implementation
leads to a reduction of corruption. This section summarizes the main anticorruption
reforms adopted in response to EU pressure in the decade prior to Romania's accession,
whereas the impact of the reforms will be addressed in the sectoral chapters.
The first example of political will was the adoption in 2000 of the Law on
Preventing, Detecting, and Punishing Acts of Corruption (Law no. 78/2000). The
adoption of an anticorruption law was one of the main priorities on President Emil
Constantinescu's agenda during the 1996 electoral campaign and in his first year in
office. Nonetheless, it took almost three years and two EC Regular Reports that criticized
the incompleteness of the Romanian legal basis in the anticorruption area for this law to
be finally adopted by the Romanian Parliament. In 2000, the law was considered to be an
important step forward in the fight against corruption, but two years later, the EC noted
that the enforcement of the law was weak and no substantial results could be seen in
fighting corruption (EC Regular Report 2002, 26-28). In October 2000, also in response
to external criticism, the law establishing the creation of the National School of Public
Finance was adopted. The school was designed to offer continuous and professional
training to customs officers, a problem that was consistently highlighted by the EC in its
monitoring reports.
NATO's attention to freedom of information issues came with Romania's effort to
obtain NATO membership in the second wave of enlargement and buttressed EU attempt
to compel Romania to adopt the FOIA. Although imperfect, the law was considered to be
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an important tool in the fight against corruption, particularly for the watchdog NGOs and
newspapers in their investigations and monitoring of various governmental activities
(Freedom House 2005, 49). In 2001, in another manifestation of political will in response
to EU pressure, the Internal Control and Audit Division (ICAD) was created in the
customs sector. ICAD was charged with monitoring the implementation of customs
reforms at the national level and address corruption in customs sector. However, until
2005, the role of the ICAD in fighting corruption was limited to responding to allegations
of corruption in customs by investigating them and sending a report to the Discipline
Committee in the NCA (Interview S. Puica,47 May 24, 2007). Also in response to external
pressure, new public procurement procedures were adopted and implemented, including
the right to appeal against the award of public contracts (Government Ordinance no.
60/2001). Interestingly, although the new legislation was set to enter into force in
December 2001, the legislation entered into force in April 2001, one day after the
meeting between European Commissioner Gunther Verheugen and the Romanian Prime
Minister Adrian Nastase (Interview Public Procurement Expert 1, April 17, 2007).
A year later and in response to consistent EU criticism of the lack of progress in
curbing corruption and particularly in addressing high-level corruption, the National
Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office (NAPO) was created. The new institution was
designed to specifically respond to the EU request to fight against high-level corruption
but, as it will be shown later, it largely failed to achieve its proposed goals prior to
accession. The same year, two important instances of political will took place in the
customs sector. In 2002, the Code of Conduct and Discipline of the Customs Staff was

47

§tefan Puica is the Director of the Internal Control and Audit Division within the National Customs
Authority.
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adopted and implemented, a novelty in the Romanian customs administration. The aim of
the Code was to reduce the level of bureaucracy and corruption in customs sector and it
clearly stipulated what constituted proper and improper professional and personal
conduct, the acts that would generate or constitute corruption, and the penalties for
engaging in such acts (Code of Conduct of the Customs Staff 2002, 1 and 6). In addition,
the Action Programme

Against

Corruption

and the Sector Action Plan

Against

Corruption as part of the National Plan Against Corruption were elaborated and adopted.
Both plans were designed to more effectively target corruption in customs by focusing on
the implementation of anticorruption strategies in customs, including the implementation
of the newly adopted Code, the identification of the factors that favor or sustain
corruption in customs, the continuous training of customs officers, and the creation of a
mechanism to report corrupt activities within customs sector (Studiu Impact Pre-Aderare
2002, 78).
One of the problems that was constantly criticized by the EU was the absence of
legislation regulating the declarations of income and assets and the conflict of interests
for dignitaries and other public officials. In 2003, as part of the legislative package
known as the Anticorruption Package (Law no. 161/2003), a provision addressing
specifically those issues was adopted. This legislation annulled the secrecy provision
enshrined in the Law no. 115/1996 and it made mandatory the publication of declarations
of assets, income, and interests. That instance of political will was considered to be
especially important, with long-term positive consequences for the fight against
corruption.
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As EU pressure intensified in 2004, the overt threats to suspend accession
negotiations in the absence of visible results, particularly but not limited to reducing
corruption and increasing the independence of the judiciary, gave the EU more leverage
in its relationship with Romania. The most important example of the EU impact on
political will was the adoption and implementation of a major legislation package of
judicial reforms, known colloquially as the three-law package.48 The EU pressure was so
significant that year that, at the specific request of the EP, the European Commission
participated directly in drafting the judicial reform legislation package that would be
adopted in July 2004 (Pridham 2007, 357). The unprecedented measure taken by the EC
was part of the more interventionist approach developed specifically for Romania. Also
in an attempt to show the EU that there was the necessary political commitment to fight
corruption, it was adopted a new Customs Officers Statute that replaced the one adopted
in 1998. An important difference between the two Statutes was the inclusion in the 2004
version of several specific provisions addressing corruption in customs.
The pressure on Romania to comply with the EU requirements and to produce
results in the fight against corruption continued in 2005 and was reflected in the increase
in the number of instances of political will. One such instance was the adoption of NACS
II that took into consideration the results of the Freedom House Audit of the NACS I. In
addition to the general anticorruption strategy, the Action Plan for Implementing the
Reform Strategy in the Judicial System 2005-2007, the Anticorruption Strategy of the
National

Customs Authority

Procurement

System

2005-2007,

2005-2007

and the Reform Strategy of the Public

were adopted. The three sectoral anticorruption

48

The legislative package was comprised of the Law 304/2004 On the Organization of the Judiciary, the
Law 303/2004 On the Status of Magistrates, and the Law 317/2004 On the Superior Council ofthe
Magistracy.
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strategies were designed to demonstrate the EU the existence of political will to address
corruption and fulfill EU requirements as scheduled. Furthermore, the new public
procurement legislation adopted in May 2005 was supplemented by the establishment, in
July, of the National Authority for Regulating and Monitoring Public Procurement
(NARMPP) and the Review Council. The former, which began functioning that fall, was
created in response to the criticism that there was ineffective central monitoring of public
procurement activity, while the latter addressed the lack of an effective ex-ante review
process. Perhaps the most important instance of political will was the transformation in
fall 2005 of the National Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office into the National
Anticorruption Directorate, a change that increased the jurisdiction of NAPO 49 to cases of
high corruption.
In 2006, the impact of the external pressure and the possibility of missing the
January 1st, 2007 accession resulted in two other important instances of political will. The
first such instance was in March 2006, when the jurisdiction of NAPO was extended to
Members of Parliament (MPs), reversing the Constitutional Court's decision from the
previous year. According to that decision, only the Prosecutor's Office attached to the
High Court of Cassation and Justice could investigate and prosecute MPs. Thus, in spring
2006, NAPO was legally authorized to investigate and prosecute high-level cases of
corruption involving MPs. Another important act of political will that spring was the
adoption in April of the new Public Procurement Act through a Governmental
Emergency Ordinance (OUG no. 34/2006). That same spring it was created the National
Council for Resolving Contestations (NCRC) in public procurement sector, an institution

49

Although NAPO became NAD in Fall 2005, for the sake of consistency will be referred as NAPO
throughout this study.
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that the EU demanded to be created for years. The NCSA began functioning in January
2007, after Romania was already an EU member, but the adoption of the legislation
stipulating the creation of such an institution along with the Government Decision no.
942/July 2006 establishing the Unit for Coordination and Verification of Public
Procurement (UCVPP), was interpreted by the EU as being an indicator of real
commitment to comply with the European public procurement procedures and
regulations.

4.4. The Creation of a Monitoring System

Another indicator of political will is represented by the creation of a transparent
monitoring

system

which

evaluates

the

implementation

and

effectiveness of

anticorruption strategies, publicizes the results, and identifies solutions for the potential
problems uncovered during the evaluation process. The first such example of a
monitoring system was represented by the creation in 2001 of the National Committee for
the Prevention of Criminality (NCPC) responsible for the elaboration, integration, and
monitoring of government's policy for prevention of criminality at the national level
(NACS I 2001, 3). Within the NCPC, a Central Group for the Analysis and Coordination
of the Corruption Prevention Activities (CGACCPA) was created to ensure the
implementation and monitoring of NACS I. The CGACCPA was composed of "experts
from institutions with duties in the prevention and social control of corruption, and also
representatives of the civil society, of the non-governmental organizations and
international bodies" (NACS I 2001, 17). The monitoring activity conducted by the
CGACCPA was considered to be deficient due to the constant transfer of de facto
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responsibilities from NCPC to the Control Group of the government. The latter became
the Control Group of the Prime Minister, only to be dismantled in 2004 after the
responsibility for monitoring the implementation of NACS I was transferred to the
Ministry of Justice (Ministry of Justice, Raport de Activitate 2004, 10). In addition, the
format of reporting the progress made in the implementation of anticorruption strategies
changed several times, thereby decreasing the possibility of comparing the results for the
entire period of the NACS I (Freedom House 2005, 153).
An attempt to make the monitoring system more efficient was made in May 2003
when at the initiative of the Ministry of Justice, the body assigned the responsibility of
enforcing the anticorruption measures, an electronic reporting format and data base
named "Integrated Weekly Progress Reports" (IWPR) was created. The new data base
was designed to gather information from 31 public institutions and to assist "the
identification of practical results on corruption prevention as well as the monitoring of
these results through measurable indicators" (Freedom House 2005, 153). However, once
again, the system failed to achieve its proposed goals. First, the requirement of filling out
weekly reports led to superficial and incomplete reports, which contained mostly general
information and no reference to specific results. Second, many institutions failed to send
the required weekly progress reports, which made the monitoring process incomplete and
ineffective. And third, the progress reports were not available to the public (Freedom
House 2005, 153-154).
In 2001, the Internal Control and Audit Division (ICAD), responsible for
monitoring the implementation of reform measures and anticorruption strategies, was
also created. As previously mentioned, ICAD began to be more actively involved in
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monitoring the implementation of anticorruption strategies and in uncovering corrupt
activities in 2005, after a year of increased pressure from the EU to produce visible
results in reducing the levels of corruption. Thus, in 2005 territorial divisions responsible
for offering a closer monitoring of anticorruption strategies were also created. The
territorial divisions were considered to be an important step in increasing the
effectiveness of ICAD and the implementation of anticorruption strategies in the customs
sector (Interview S. Puica, May 24, 2007).
The increased EU criticism in 2004 and 2005 regarding the lack of progress in
curbing corruption also led to the elaboration of a new monitoring system designed to
assess the implementation of the NACS II. The monitoring system attempted to remedy
the deficiencies identified by the Freedom House in the functioning of the previous
system responsible for evaluating the implementation of NACS I. Thus, it was created a
Council for the Coordination of the Implementation of the NACSII (CCI) composed of
twelve representatives of public institutions organized under the authority of the Prime
Minister and coordinated by the Minister of Justice (NACS II 2005, 9). As a change from
previous years, a government Decision (HG no. 233/2005) stipulated that the quarterly
meetings of the CCI were open to the representatives of civil society and foreign advisors
in the area of corruption. In addition, a Technical Working Group (TWG) was formed
with responsibility for monitoring the implementation of anticorruption strategies in the
judiciary. The TWG was composed of representatives of the major institutions in the
judicial system and it prepared monthly reports regarding the implementation of the
anticorruption strategy in the judicial system, reports that were made available to the
public. At the sectoral level, in July 2005 the National Authority for Regulating and
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Monitoring Public Procurement (NARMPP)50, responsible for ensuring a more efficient
central monitoring of the activity in public procurement, was established.

4.5. The Statements Made by Romanian Elites Regarding the Fight against
Corruption and the Use of Corruption as a Campaign Issue

These two indicators of political will assess the presentation in the written media
of the declared political will to fight corruption. The evaluation of newspaper articles
published between 1997 and 2006 inclusive and covering the politicians' statements
regarding the fight against corruption and the presence of corruption on the politicians'
electoral agendas indicates an increase in the media coverage of declared political will in
the year following a national election (see Figure 4). That is, there is an increase in the
number of articles on the statements regarding the fight against corruption in 1997, 2001
and 2005. While the increase in the number of articles presenting the politicians'
statements about the fight against corruption in 2005 may have been in part a response to
the EU pressure, there is nothing particularly different from 1997 or 2001 when the same
pattern is visible. What the data show is an increase in the use of corruption as a
campaign issue in 2004 compared to 2000, which indicates an increase in the significance
of corruption on candidates' electoral agendas. The latter can be explained by the increase
in the significance of corruption articulated by the EU and the increased external pressure
exercised throughout 2004. The increase in the use of corruption as a campaign issue is
especially important given the fact that the official election campaign in Romania begins
30 days prior to the national election date. Hence, the articles covering the use of

50

A detailed analysis of NARMPP and its activity is presented in Chapter VII, Public
Fighting Corruption in a Newly Designed Sector.
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procurement:

corruption as a campaign issue were published over a very short period of time.
Nonetheless, the data from newspapers regarding the two indicators of political will do
not show a significant increase in politicians' rhetoric in response to the EU pressure in
2005 or 2006.

Figure 4
Presentation of Rhetorical Political Will in Romanian Newspapers
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It is interesting to note the fact that the number of statements about fighting
corruption was at its highest in 2002, a year when the EU pressure was less intense
compared to 2004 and when there was no national election. But in 2002 the EU issued
the Roadmaps for Romania and Bulgaria, document that emphasized the importance of
curbing corruption and the fact that anticorruption strategies would be closely monitored
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for the remaining pre-accession period. In addition, 2002 was marked by tensions
between President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Adrian Nastase with regard to the fight
against corruption, which led to a series of articles presenting the exchange of statements
regarding the two leaders' visions and strategies to tackle corruption. Also in 2002, the
legislation regarding the establishment of NAPO was developed and adopted, a
legislative project that led to important disagreements between the governing coalition
and the opposition parties with regard to the necessity of such an institution and the
jurisdiction that NAPO would have if created. The result was an overall increase in the
number of politicians' statements regarding the fight against corruption and the strategies
that would be utilized.
While the qualitative analysis is less conclusive with regard to the impact of the
EU pressure on the rhetorical political will, the statistical analysis offers a more definitive
conclusion. Thus, the Spearman rank correlation51 test revealed that the EU pressure is
positively correlated with rhetorical political will, r(40)= 0.342, p= 0.015 (1-sided).
Furthermore, the results confirmed the existence of a very significant relationship
between the two variables, an increase in the number of newspaper articles that address
the issue of corruption in relation to Romania's integration to the EU being associated
with an increase in the number of articles presenting statements made by policy-makers
with regard to combating corruption. Hence, the impact of the EU pressure on rhetorical
political will was both qualitatively and statistically significant during the decade prior to
the country's accession. Although less evident in the graphic representation of the
qualitative data, the correlational analysis confirmed the existence of a statistically
51

Because count data do not conform to a normal distribution, a nonparametric Spearman rank correlation
was used to evaluate the association between the two variables. For this test, the 10 year time span was
divided into 40 quarters (4 per year) and the number of newspapers was aggregated quarterly.
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significant relationship between EU pressure and political will. Furthermore, a one-way
ANOVA test was run in order to determine if the EU pressure had significantly increased
after 2004 and the results confirmed the existence of a statistically significant increase in
the EU pressure, F(l,38) = 21.514, p < 0.000.52 The graphic presentation of the ANOVA
test result is presented in Figure 5.

Figure 5
The Change in the EU Pressure

Post 2004

Pre 2004
Time

Because EU Pressure is a discrete variable, in the previous ANOVA test the
assumptions of normality and homogeneity were violated, a fact confirmed by the Levene

52

An F-value is a statistic used to determine whether the differences between the mean scores of two or
more levels of the same variable are notably different from each other. The time variable was created by
assigning the value of zero for the years prior to 2004 and the value of 1 for the years beginning with 2004.
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statistic test of homogeneity of variances and the P-P plot of EU Pressure distribution.
Consequently, a confirmatory rank ANOVA test was conducted and the results confirmed
those obtained in the previous test, i.e., F (1, 38) = 24.120, p < 0.0001 (see Figure 6).
Hence, the EU pressure not only increased as the deadline for Romania's accession
approached, but its impact on political will had become qualitatively and statistically
significant.

Figure 6
The Change in the EU Pressure (with rank one-way ANOVA)

Post 2004

Pre 2004
Time

5. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the impact of EU pressure on the political will of
the Romanian leadership in the decade prior to the country's accession. As hypothesized,
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an increase in the significance of corruption for the EU resulted in an increased domestic
political commitment to fight corruption, a change that was particularly visible in the last
three years of the pre-accession period. The EU pressure was at its highest level in 2004,
a fact evidenced by the data from EU documents and Romanian newspaper coverage.
Although EU pressure decreased in intensity in the ensuing two years (2005 and 2006), it
remained at much higher levels compared to the pre-2004 period. The impact of the EU
pressure on the demonstrated political will is graphically presented in Figure 7, which
shows an important increase in the instances of demonstrated political will

c-3

in 2005.

Figure 7
Number of Instances of Demonstrated Political Will under EU Pressure
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To measure the demonstrated political will per year, the total number of instances of political will that
manifested each year as measured by the four indicators of demonstrated political will (see pages 146-161)
were summed together and the resulting numbers were then graphed to show the changes that occurred
over time.
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A comparison of the demonstrated and rhetorical political will (see Figure 8)
shows a significant, although not unexpected, discrepancy between the two components
of political will. As anticipated, rhetorical political will is constantly higher than the
demonstrated counterpart indicating that it is easier to make statements and promises than
to translate them into practice. Nonetheless, beginning with 2003 the trends of rhetorical
and demonstrated political will follow a similar pattern, which is particularly visible in
2005 and 2006.

Figure 8
Demonstrated vs. Rhetorical Political Will

Year
Demonstrated Political Will

—•—Rhetorical Political Will

Hence, the analysis has shown that the increase in the external pressure led to an
increase in the number of instances of political will, particularly in the last two years
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prior to accession. However, not all changes adopted under the EU pressure led to a
decrease of corruption, as it will be shown in more detail in the next chapters. For
example, the creation of NAPO failed to result in the investigation and conviction of
cases of high corruption. Only under the threat of missing the January 1st, 2007 accession
deadline has the jurisdiction of NAPO been changed so that the institution would be
legally authorized to investigate and prosecute high-level cases of corruption involving
MPs. Moreover, most changes in the public procurement sector were adopted in 2006,
months prior to accession and, consequently, their impact in reducing corruption was
unattainable. Moreover, the pressure exercised by the EU on the Romanian government
differed from sector to sector. The analysis confirmed that the greatest pressure was
exercised in the judiciary and customs sector, pressure that led to an increase of political
will to reform and fight corruption in these two sectors. The lack of a unique EU health
care policy resulted in an insignificant pressure on Romania to address corruption in this
sector, while corruption in public procurement became more important for the EU in the
last two years of the pre-accession process. Hence, although the presence of the EU
pressure was clearly established and its impact on the Romanian political will
demonstrated, the decrease of corruption depended also on the actual implementation of
institutional strategies.
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CHAPTER IV

PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL WILL

1. Introduction

The fight against corruption is a difficult endeavor that requires, in addition to the
political will to combat it, the support of the general public directly or indirectly affected
by corruption. Public opinion is recognized in the literature on corruption as being an
important element in fighting corruption, particularly in the long run, by pressuring the
government to take action and by sustaining the efforts of those political actors really
committed to anticorruption reforms. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the
role played by the public opinion in the fight against corruption. The next sections
analyze the impact of the public opinion on political will. More specifically, I first assess
the salience the public assigns to corruption by analyzing public polls data (i.e.,
Barometers of Public Opinion) from 1997 until 2006 inclusive. Then, I examine the role
played by the media on reflecting the problem of corruption through the uncovering of
corruption cases and the presentation of rhetorical political will. The data was collected
from three Romanian newspapers (The Daily Event, The National Journal, and The Free
Romania) and consists of articles presenting cases of corruption published in the ten-year
period prior to the EU accession. The next section analyzes the reporting of rhetorical
political will in the three Romanian newspapers by assessing articles presenting the
policy-makers' statements regarding the fight against corruption and the use of corruption
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as a campaign issue and the statements made by three major political figures.
Furthermore, I statistically test the relationship between the public opinion pressure and
political will measured by the newspaper articles. The chapter concludes with a summary
of findings and their limitations.
A cautionary note is in order here, namely the fact that it is methodologically
difficult to clearly discern the impact of the EU from that of public opinion on political
will. The main reason is due to the abundance of evidence showing the EU impact and
the scarcity of proof revealing the direct impact of the public opinion, as it will become
clear later in the chapter. Nonetheless, public opinion is a salient factor in fighting
corruption and it is expected to affect the political leaders' perception of how important
curbing corruption is for the public, influencing thus their actions.

2. The Role of Public Opinion in Fighting Corruption

The fight against corruption entails a long lasting and combined effort of political
actors, international institutions and/or organizations, and non-governmental domestic
actors such as NGOs, professional organizations, and the general public. Political will is
recognized as a crucial element in combating corruption, but even when it is present, the
anticorruption advocates may face difficult obstacles in adopting and/or implementing
anticorruption strategies. The public's support for the fight against corruption becomes an
important element in supporting it and in increasing the chances of success (World Bank
2001). According to Rasma Karklins (2002, 1), anticorruption policies in post-communist
countries "will work only if they are based on the behavioral support of strategic
subgroups of the populace", particularly those subgroups that are most affected by
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corruption. In other words, while political will is important, a sustained fight against
corruption requires the long-term commitment and cooperation of the public.
Furthermore, public opinion can have an impact by pressuring policy-makers to take
action in corrupt cases, as it was the case in Latvia in 2002 when due to public opinion
pressure the government stopped the privatization of a youth sports facility, the Sun-Park,
built in 1913 (Karklins 2002, 8). The public's victory in that case has two implications:
first, it demonstrates that massive public support for or against a specific policy or
government action can be successful; and second, it shows that public opinion pressure
offers an impetus and support for those political actors committed to introduce reforms to
take action, that is, the public supports the creation and sustenance of the political will
necessary to fight corruption.
Public opinion and particularly the impact of public opinion on elections, public
policies, and public attitudes have captured scholars' attention for decades. Studies have
shown that public's attitude towards formal institutions, public policies, and/or political
leaders are largely shaped by the perceptions of collective-level experiences (Mutz 1998).
In other words, people are more likely to evaluate the government's performance based
on the perceptions of the experiences of others and less on their own personal
experiences. Through the information provided by mass media, people either learn that
their experiences are shared by others, in which case they are holding political leaders
and governmental policies accountable, or that they are alone in their experiences, in
which case they are discouraged to attribute their experiences to political leaders and
their policies. Hence, individuals' perceptions about collective experiences largely shape
their opinions and influence their attitudes toward government and political leaders.
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Individuals' personal experiences are not to be dismissed either because they do
contribute to the creation of one's personal opinion and attitude towards government and
its policies, but they tend to be reinforced and influenced by the perceptions of collective
experiences. Another important aspect is that the perceptions of collective experiences
tend to be more negative than the aggregate individual experiences, which may explain
the public's tendency to be more dissatisfied with the government's performance at the
aggregate level compared to the individual level (Mutz 1998).
In a study of corruption and how people deal with it in post-communist countries,
William A. Miller and his collaborators (2001, 91) found that the public's perceptions of
government and public officials were extremely negative and that they were much more
negative than the individuals' actual experiences with corruption in official dealings.
Furthermore, they found that perceptions of corruption in Eastern Europe, as in other
countries, are "grossly inflated". Nonetheless, as Diane C. Mutz (1998) points out, the
perceptions of collective experiences are very important and they influence the public's
attitude towards government and other public institutions as well as the public's trust in
democratic institutions. Even though the actual experiences of corruption may be smaller
than the perceptions of corruption, the latter may still very well have significant impacts,
such as the undermining of democratic institutions.
In countries where corruption is systemic, as is the case of Romania, the
presentation in the media of corruption scandals and of victims of corruption is likely to
influence the public's perception of corruption and their attitude towards political leaders,
formal institutions, and governmental policies designed to curb corruption. The
individuals' experiences of corruption or those of their relatives or friends will be
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reinforced by learning that corruption is not an isolated occurrence. The public opinion
with regard to corruption is therefore expected to be largely negative, given that
corruption is an economically, socially, and morally damaging phenomenon which
affects particularly the less economically wealthy part of society.
If public opinion is influenced by the information presented by the mass media,
one can hypothesize that an increase in the coverage of corruption cases in the media is
likely to lead to a more negative public attitude towards political leaders, government,
and the effectiveness of anticorruption strategies. The latter would be true only if the
anticorruption strategies adopted by the government are presented in a negative light and
if the public perceives them to have no impact. An important aspect though is represented
by the influence that the public may exert on mass media with regard to corruption. It
may be the case that high levels of perceptions of corruption influence mass media by
stimulating it to focus more on uncovering and presenting cases of corruption,
particularly from the sectors in which people perceive corruption to be most damaging
for their lives. Therefore, it may well be the case that while public opinion is being
shaped by the mass media, the latter is also responding to signals sent by the public by
focusing more on corruption. In other words, there is a reciprocal relationship between
mass media and public opinion which makes it difficult to establish with absolute
certainty the direction of causality. Hence, the presentation in the written media of
corruption cases may be an indicator of the impact produced by the public opinion and a
means to test if there is a relationship between public opinion and political will.
Monitoring public opinion through surveys is an important part of democratic
politics because it assesses the public's attitudes toward formal institutions, political
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leaders, and public policies. Furthermore, it helps identify and define problems in society
and design or refine strategies to solve them by mobilizing the necessary political will
required for successfully addressing the problems (Center for Democracy and
Governance 1999, 13). Due to the hidden nature of corruption, surveys remain the most
common avenue for assessing public's perceptions and experiences of corruption. When
conducted regularly and in a similar format, surveys can serve as important tools for
identifying trends and changes in public opinion and attitudes toward corruption, in the
perceived levels of corruption, and in the perceived effectiveness of anticorruption
strategies. Surveys can also serve as important tools for policy-makers to learn what
problems the public perceives to be the most important, how effective the measures
designed to address those problems are, what the public expects them to do in order to
effectively address the identified problems, and what the level of trust in public
institutions is. Moreover, surveys can give incumbents crucial information that would
help them prepare for re-election and increase their chances of success. Hence, elections
and, more importantly, the potential for electoral defeat may represent an important
constraint on outright corruption if incumbents believe that they run the risk of being
investigated and prosecuted upon leaving office (Rose-Ackerman 2002, 3). Even in the
absence of such a high risk, the public can more directly participate in the fight against
corruption by the simple exposure of corrupt officials who depend largely on their public
image for maintaining their positions (Karklins 2005). Thus, elections become important
tools for the public to directly show its satisfaction with the policy-makers' fight against
corruption and to penalize those perceived to have failed to keep their electoral promises
by either playing a minimal (or no role) in fighting corruption or by engaging themselves
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in corrupt activities. Since one of the policy-makers goals is to be in office, they have to
appeal to the public and make sure that they address or, at minimum, promise to address
the problems the public considers to be most pressing.

3. The Salience of Corruption for the Public

The salience of corruption for the public is assessed by analyzing data from the
World Bank's Diagnostic Survey of Corruption in Romania, Gallup Organization in
Romania, and the Barometers of Public Opinion (BOPs) conducted in Romania from
1997 until 2006, inclusive. The BOPs were administered twice per year, in spring and
fall,54 at the request of the Open Society Foundation Romania and they were designed to
evaluate the public opinion on a variety of issues, such as the state of the economy, their
attitude towards democracy, satisfaction with Government's performance, trust in public
institutions, and corruption, among other issues. An important limitation of these surveys
is represented by the fact that only a very small number of questions were repeated in
every survey. Thus, some of the questions assessing directly the problem of corruption
were included beginning in 1998, others were added in 2003 or later, and only one set of
questions was asked in almost every survey.55 Hence, in order to determine the existence
of a pattern in public's perceptions of corruption and the significance they attribute to this
problem, I have selected three sets of questions from the BOPs. The first set of questions
assesses the public's perception of corruption at the national level from spring 2003 until
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Although the BOPs were conducted twice per year, they were conducted at uneven intervals. For
example, the 1997 public opinion surveys were conducted in June and December, while the 1998 BOPs
were conducted in May and October. The list with the exact dates and BOP codes is included in Appendix
D.
55
The question I am referring to and which was asked every year beginning with 1998, except 2002 and
2006, assesses the respondents' experiences with corruption and is analyzed in a later chapter.
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spring 2006. The second set of questions evaluates the public's trust in public
institutions56 from 1998 until 2006 inclusive. The third set of questions analyzed in this
chapter evaluates the public's perception regarding the most corrupt sectors in the
country from spring 2003 until spring 2005.57

3.1. Public's Perception of Corruption

The 2001 World Bank Diagnostic Survey of Corruption in Romania, conducted at
the request of the Romanian Government, revealed not only the seriousness of corruption
in Romania, a fact already established by other international institutions and
organizations, such as the EU, Transparency International, or Freedom House, but also
the significance the public attributes to corruption. The study analyzed the data collected
through a national survey administered in Romania in 2000 and found that about sixty
seven percent of the public believed that "all" or "most" officials are corrupt and that
corruption was a widespread problem (World Bank 2001, 6). In 2002, the Gallup
Organization conducted a regional study of corruption in the Balkan area and concluded
that, for the second year in a row, sixty percent of Romanians considered corruption as
being the most important problem in the country (Gallup Organization, 2002, 4). The
perception of corruption as being widespread was again expressed in 2003, when another
national survey showed that eighty percent of Romanians believed corruption to be
generalized (BOP Spring 2003). Two years later, in 2005, the percentage of those
perceiving corruption as being pervasive in all sector and at all levels of society

56

The public institutions included in this set of questions are presidency, government, Parliament,
judiciary, and political parties. The latter were not included in the question asked in the 2004 BOPs.
57
Unfortunately, this set of questions was included only in spring 2003 and dropped after spring 2005
limiting thus the possibility of drawing a definite conclusion upon their analysis.
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continued to remain very high (BOP Spring 2005). Furthermore, half a year prior to
Romania's accession to the EU, eighty three percent of Romanians believed that
corruption was the cause for the problems the country was facing (OSF, BOP Spring
2006), as illustrated in Figure 9.

Figure 9
Perception of Corruption as a Salient Problem
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Source: World Bank (2000), Gallup Organization (2001-2002), Open Society
Foundation Romania (2003-2006).

What these results show is the consistent perception of corruption as being
generalized and a major problem that negatively affects people's lives. Moreover, the
increase in the level of perception of corruption suggests that corruption is believed to
have become a more serious problem and to be responsible for the further deterioration of
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the living standards. An alternative explanation of the increased perception of corruption
may be the higher exposure people have to information about corruption and its negative
consequences. The exposure to campaigns of raising awareness about corruption is likely
to sensitize the public to the existence of this problem and to make it less tolerant to
corrupt behavior, not necessarily less likely to engage in corruption if that is required in
their daily lives. The side effect of anticorruption campaigns and overexposure of
corruption cases is the creation of an environment where every act of misconduct or
incompetence may be viewed as corruption. Nonetheless, if people perceive corruption as
being generalized, their trust in public institutions is also affected and, implicitly, their
trust in democracy. Hence, if the public believes that corruption is a major if not the
major problem in the country, it indicates that corruption is a highly salient problem for
the citizens.

3.2. Public's Trust in Democratic Institutions

The trust people have in democratic institutions influences the stability and
legitimacy of those institutions. Low levels of trust in public institutions risk undermining
the latter's legitimacy, a fact particularly perilous in societies undergoing transitions to
democracy or in those attempting to consolidate the newly created democratic
institutions. Post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe are characterized by
significant levels of distrust in government and other public institutions, distrust that
emerges from centuries of negative experiences with their government, the more recent
legacy of the communist regimes, and the current everyday experiences in dealing with
public officials (Rose-Ackerman 2002, 1). Susan Rose-Ackerman (2002, 2) differentiates
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between two types of trust in post-communist societies: trust that one will receive a
preferential treatment in his/her dealings with public officials and trust that rules will be
enforced fairly and impartially. For democracy to consolidate and to achieve legitimacy
in the eyes of the people, the second type of trust needs to prevail. In other words,
governments need to be accountable to the people for their actions and they need to be as
transparent and open in their activities as possible in order to increase people's trust in
democratic institutions and to legitimize them, particularly in countries characterized by
decades of distrust in public institutions. Furthermore, Rose-Ackerman (2002) finds that
corruption has a corrosive effect with regard to trust in democratic institutions. The
predominance of the first type of trust, in which individuals rely on their personal
connections and the belief that you have to pay extra in order to receive the service one is
legally entitled to, erodes even further people's trust in government and other public
institutions.
In countries where corruption is systemic, low levels of trust in public institutions
are a reflection of the perceived high levels of corruption. Hence, trust in public
institutions may be used as a proxy measure of corruption in order to assess the public's
perception of the extension of corruption. In the Romanian case, where corruption has
been assessed to be widespread, trust in public institutions provides a basis for inferring
the public's concern with corruption. It should, however, be noted that corruption is only
one of the factors that influence the level of trust in public institutions. Other factors such
as poverty, unemployment, low living standards, or high prices may also influence the
citizens' trust in formal institutions. However, if corruption is generalized and considered
to be responsible for the problems a country is facing, then one can infer that trust is
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negatively correlated with corruption (i.e., when corruption is low, trust in public
institutions is high). Therefore, the BOP questions58 assessing the public's trust in public
institutions from 1997 until 2006 inclusive were analyzed in order to indirectly determine
the significance the public assigns to corruption by determining the levels of trust and
how they changed throughout the decade under study.
The analysis revealed, as shown in Figure 10, that throughout the entire ten-year
period, the public expressed a low level of trust in public institutions. Thus, if at the
beginning of 1997 the average percent of people expressed "some trust" in public
institutions, the following years their level of trust decreased significantly so that in 2000,
the level of trust was at the lowest score of the entire decade of less than "little" but more
than "very little" trust. The electoral victory of the democratic forces in the 1996 election,
which marked the first political turnover of power since the fall of communism, explains
the high level of trust expressed by the public in the spring 1997 survey.
The coming to power of the former opposition forces, the Romanian Democratic
Convention (RDC) and its leader, Emil Constantinescu brought not only international
recognition that Romania was on its path to democracy, but also high hopes for citizens
that things would improve and corruption would be combated. People's hopes and trust in
the new leadership were first expressed in the 1996 elections which ensured the
democratic forces a clear majority in Parliament and Constantinescu's victory in the
presidential election. The latter's declaration of war against corruption in early January
1997 associated with the expectations of a more rapid democratization process and an
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The questions used slightly different scales in 2001,2002, 2003, and 2006, which required adjusting the
scales to a common scale for all twenty surveys. The common scale for the question: "How much trust do
you have in the following institutions?" rates respondents' answers on a four-point scale: 1 = "Vey Little",
2 = "Little", 3 = "Much", and 4 = "Very Much".
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improvement of the living standards explain the higher levels of trust the people had in
public institutions.

Figure 10
Public's Trust in Formal Institutions

Time
—•—All Institutions

Source: Barometer of Public Opinion 1997-2006, Open Society Foundation Romania

The delay in the adoption of the anticorruption law until the next electoral year
(i.e., 2000), associated with the ineffectiveness of the National Council for Action
Against Corruption and Organized Crime, created in 1997 but lacking any legal basis to
act in corrupt cases, and the implicit lack of visible result in reducing the levels of
corruption explain the continuous decline of people's trust in public institutions. The
uncovering of a series of corruption scandals in which high ranking officers and public
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officials, including members of the executive, Government, and Parliament, further
undermined the public's trust in the Romanian democratic institutions. For example, in
April 1998 and just two months prior to the administration of the first 1998 BOP, the
media began coverage of one of the biggest corruption scandals during Constantinescu's
administration. The scandal which started as a cigarette-smuggling case became the top
story for all Romanian newspapers for weeks due to the extent of corrupt relations
uncovered and the importance of those involved (i.e., high ranking army and customs
officers, members of the Protection and Guard Service responsible with the President's
protection, and other high ranking public officials). The Cigarette I scandal, as was called
by the media, was followed shortly by two other scandals, Cigarette II and Cigarette III,
whose impacts on the public's trust in public institutions was made visible in the spring
1998 BOP.
The uncovering in 1999 of new cases of corruption involving high governmental
officials and members of Parliament undermined even more the public's trust in public
institutions. Two examples of such big scandals involved members of the former Social
Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR)59, including its leader and former President of
Romania, Ion Iliescu. The first scandal, known as the Costea Affair, named after the
French businessman of Romanian descent Adrian Costea, was brought first to the
attention of the Romanian media by the French authorities who were suspecting Costea
of laundering around €6.5 million. As part of the French investigation, numerous MPs,
ministers, and also a former prosecutor were called to testify before a commission of
French judges and prosecutors. During an interview with a journalist from Evenimentul

59

PDSR (Romanian acronym) became the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in June 2001. See Chapter I for
more information on its transformation.
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Zilei (May 18, 2000), Costea claimed that he provided the Party of Social Democracy in
Romania (PSDR) with hundreds of tons of posters for Ion Iliescu's 1996 presidential
campaign. Less than a year later, the Romanian media claimed that Costea was also
involved in a second big scandal of corruption regarding the illegal smuggling of
petroleum over the Yugoslav border during the UN embargo (Open Society Institute
2002, 479). In this second case, allegations of corruption and investigations were brought
upon a series of ministers, state managers, and other high ranking officials from customs
and police sectors.
Despite the involvement in a series of big scandals, the PDSR and its leader, Ion
Iliescu, were victorious in the 2000 elections. The public's disappointment with the
performance of both President Constantinescu and his party was clearly expressed when
the Christian-Democratic National Peasant's Party (CDNPP), the main party in the RDC,
did not pass the three percent electoral threshold and has never managed to enter the
Parliament again. The adoption in 2000 of the Law on Preventing, Detecting, and
Punishing Acts of Corruption (Law no. 78/2000) was too small and too late a measure to
save the CDNPP and its leader from an electoral defeat.60 However, the adoption of the
first anticorruption legislation, associated with the change in leadership, which brought to
power what appeared to be a changed PSDR, and the promise of a less disappointing
management of the economy and fight against corruption may explain the statistically
significant improvement of public's trust in public institutions in 2001 to slightly more
than "little". The adoption in 2001 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the
first National Anticorruption Strategy (NACS I), applicable for 2001-2004, the creation
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In an unexpected move, Emil Constantinescu decided to leave the presidential campaign in mid-July
2000, surprising his supporters and the other political candidates to the presidency.
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of the National Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office in 2002 helped maintain the public's
trust in a plateau for the two year-period (i.e., 2001-2002).
The increasing external pressure exercised by the EU on the Romanian authorities
to more effectively fight against corruption which coincided with another election year
(i.e., 2004) appears to have slightly affected the level of trust the public expressed to have
in country's democratic institutions. Nonetheless, on the four-point scale, the average
level of trust continued to be assessed as "little" suggesting at least two important things:
first, that corruption had consistently been perceived as a very serious problem that
affected people's lives; and, second, that the anticorruption strategies adopted by the
Romanian authorities appeared to be perceived as having a limited impact, an effect that
was captured by the low levels of trust people have in government, Parliament, president,
political parties, and the judiciary.

3.3. Public's Perception of the Most Corrupt Sectors in Romania

For the purpose of this study, it is of particular importance to assess the public
perception of corruption in the four sectors. If the public believes that corruption is a
major problem in the judiciary, customs, health care, or public procurement, then one can
expect more pressure on the Government to curb corruption in those sectors. Hence, high
levels of perception of corruption are expected to have an impact on the political will
necessary to fight corruption. One flaw of these surveys is represented by the fact that
they do not ask questions regarding the public procurement sector, which is not very,
surprising given the fact that the general public is less directly involved or affected by the
public procurement transactions, although it may be affected due to the lower quality of
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the services provided as a result of corrupt transaction. Hence, this section assesses the
public's perception of corruption in the judiciary, customs, and health care.

3.3.1. The Judiciary

The first assessment of the most corrupt sectors in Romania was done by the
World Bank in a 2000 survey and the data was incorporated in the 2001 Diagnostic
Survey of Corruption in Romania. The study found that more than fifty percent of
respondents perceived "all" or "most" officials in the judiciary to be corrupt. The surveys
conducted by the Gallup Organization in its assessment of corruption in the Balkan area
in 2001 and 2002 revealed similar results. Thus, for the two consecutive years, more than
fifty percent of Romanians believed that "all" or "most" officials in this sector are
corrupt. The patterns established in early 2000 appears to have continued almost
unchanged for the next three years, according to the data collected by the Open Society
Foundation Romania. If in spring 2003, almost sixty percent of respondents perceive
magistrates as being corrupt, a year later the percent of those believing that "all" or
"most" magistrates are corrupt decrease to almost fifty percent. Nonetheless, the
following year the perception of the judiciary as being corrupt increased again to almost
sixty percent, as summarized in Figure 11.
The high perceived levels of corruption in the judiciary shows the significance the
public attributes not only to corruption but also to this sector. Judiciary, as a crucial
institution in establishing the rule of law and in ensuring the fair and impartial
implementation of the legal norms, is particularly important to be corruption-free. The
fact that the public believes corruption to be such an important problem in this sector
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clearly indicates the significance people also attribute to curbing corruption in the
judiciary.

Figure 11
Public's Perception of Corruption in the Judiciary
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3.3.2. Customs

Although corruption in customs affects less people directly compared to the
judiciary or health care, people indirectly feel the impact of corruption in customs
because the latter plays an important economic role by levying taxes and customs duties
and by ensuring the flux of trades. Customs also plays an important role in combating the
illegal trafficking with human beings and illegal goods, especially drugs. Hence, people
may have less direct contact with customs officials, although the opening of borders and
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the new economic opportunities have led to an increase of those dealing with customs
officials, but their lives are still affected if corruption is a problem in this sector.
In the 2000 assessment of corruption in customs, the World Bank (2001) found
that more than fifty percent of Romanians believed customs officials to be corrupt. The
perception of corruption in customs increased in 2001, when Gallup Organization found
that more than sixty percent of respondents believed that "all" or "most" customs
officials are corrupt. The perception of corruption slightly decreased in 2002, but it
continued to be high with more than fifty percent of respondents believing customs
officials to be corrupt (Gallup Organization 2002), as presented in Figure 12.

Figure 12
Public's Perception of Corruption in the Customs Sector
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Unfortunately, the public was no longer asked to assess the problem of corruption
in this sector and therefore, it is difficult to establish a longer pattern. The fact that
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corruption was perceived as being so high among customs officials indicates that this
sector was of significance for the public. On the other hand, the absence of questions
regarding corruption in customs sector suggests that corruption in this sector was
assigned less significance by those commissioning the public polls.

3.3.3. Health Care

If a corrupt judiciary or a corrupt customs sector has more or less direct
implications for the public, corruption in health care affects them in a more direct and
sometimes tragic way. Since health is a highly valuable commodity that people cherish
dearly, they are also more likely to press for the cleaning up of this sector from corrupt
elements and for reducing the opportunities for corruption. If in 2000, the percent of
those believing that "all" or "most" officials in the health care sector are corrupt was less
than fifty percent, by 2005 their number increased to almost sixty percent. As Figure 13
shows, beginning with 2001, the percent of Romanians believing health care sector to be
corrupt slightly increased over time.
It is interesting to note the fact that corruption in health care and corruption in the
judiciary are perceived to be almost at similarly high levels. Although only some
individuals are directly affected by corruption in the judiciary, unofficial payments in
health care sector are heavy burdens for many people who find health care inaccessible.
Furthermore, corruption in this sector has important consequences for the "social equity"
the Romanian health care system appears to provide (World Bank 2001, XII) and
therefore it ranks high on people's priority list regarding the eradication of corruption.
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Figure 13
Public's Perception of Corruption in the Health Care
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4. Mass Media and Political Will

The relationship between the public opinion and mass media is complex and it
makes it difficult to establish a clear direction of causality. If public opinion is influenced
by the mass media, one can also expect to see a reaction from mass media in response to
the concerns expressed by the people in the public opinion surveys. As the fourth estate,
the media can also affect the fight against corruption by the pressure exercised through
the exposure of corruption. Corruption is a very incendiary topic and newspaper editors
know that big scandals are more likely to sell, especially if those scandals are directly
salient for the public. It may also be the case that certain decisions to expose corruption
scandals or to publish alleged corrupt affairs are motivated less by a desire to combat
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corruption or high ratings and more by the intent to smear the reputation of political or
business rivals. While it would be interesting to identify the real motivations behind the
publication of corruption scandals and their impact on political will, the role played by
mass media is outside of the scope of this study. Nonetheless, an assessment of the
newspaper articles uncovering corruption is still pertinent for this study and it may well
reflect a reaction of the media to the public's perception of corruption and thus, an
indirect measure of the public opinion's effect on political will. Hence, this section
presents the number of newspaper articles presenting cases of corruption that have been
published from 1997 until 2006 inclusive in The Daily Event, The National Journal, and
The Free Romania by disaggregating them sector by sector (i.e., the four studied sectors)
and by discussing the total number of articles.
Two thousand eight hundred and one (2,801) articles presenting cases of
corruption were collected from the three newspapers61 from 1997 until 2006 inclusive.
In order to count the number of cases of corruption in the four sectors under study, it was
necessary to develop a coding rubric that disaggregates the total number of articles by
cases of corruption in different sectors. The coding rubric was created by analyzing the
cases of corruption presented in the articles and developing a list of 15 codes. 62 To
confirm the correct interpretation of the qualitative data and the application of the coding
rubric, two other Romanian raters were asked to code every single article. The three
independent ratings were then used to calculate the kappa coefficient for multiple raters,
«

61

If a newspaper presented the exactly same article that covered the exact same case of corruption over
several days, the article was counted only once. If the same case of corruption was presented in more than
one newspaper, all the articles were counted because they reflected coverage in different newspapers.
Therefore, some cases of corruption were reported in all three newspapers, while others were presented
only in one or two of the three newspapers analyzed. Furthermore, some cases of corruption received more
coverage (i.e., multiple articles) in the same newspaper than others. As long as they were not identical and
they presented new information about the case, they were counted.
62
A complete list of codes is presented in Appendix B.
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which estimates the proportion of agreement among raters after accounting for chance
(Stemler, 2007). SAS code was used to estimate the kappa coefficient by employing
Fleiss' method for establishing agreement among three or more raters for nominal data
(Fleiss, 1981). A kappa coefficient of 0.70 was estimated, which, according to Landis and
Koch (1997), indicates a substantial agreement among raters. For this study, four codes
are of particular importance, namely Judiciary, Customs, Health Care, and Public
Procurement, which allow the identification of the number of cases of corruption
presented in newspapers in each of these four sectors over the decade prior to the
country's accession to the EU.
From the total number of articles regarding cases of corruption, 13.63 percent
(382 articles) was represented by articles presenting cases of corruption in the judiciary.
The number of articles exposing cases of corruption in the other three sectors was
smaller, varying from 4.32 percent (121 articles) in customs, 3.14 percent in health care
(88 articles), to 4.56 (128 articles) percent in public procurement. Figure 14 graphically
summarizes the number of articles presenting cases of corruption in the four sectors from
1997 until 2006 inclusive.
As expected, the number of articles uncovering cases of corruption in the
judiciary is predominant, clearly indicating the significance attributed to this sector and to
combating judicial corruption. The graph also shows that the highest number of articles
about corruption in the judiciary was published in 2001, the first year after the adoption
of the Law on Preventing, Detecting, and Punishing Acts of Corruption (Law no.
78/2000) and the first year of the Iliescu-Nastase administration.63 It appears that, at least
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This was Ion Iliescu's third official term as president, although only the second full term, the first term
being for only two years (i.e., 1990-1992), and Adrian N&stase's first term as Prime Minister.
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with regard to corruption in the judiciary, the pressure exercised by the written media, as
captured by the number of newspaper articles, was the highest at the beginning of the
Social Democrats' (i.e., SDP) coming to power, only to decrease over the next four years.

Figure 14
Publicized Cases of Corruption Per Sector
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Nonetheless, the number of articles uncovering cases of corruption in the four
sectors does not appear to correlate well with the perception of corruption in the four
sectors under study, as captured by the public opinion survey data. The latter indicates
high and constant levels of corruption in the judiciary and health care sectors (Figures 11
and 13.), while the newspaper articles reveal a very low percentage of articles uncovering
corruption in the health care sector. Furthermore, while the high number of cases of
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corruption in the judiciary in 2001 does match the high perception of corruption in this
sector for that year, the relationship does not hold for the next years when corruption was
perceived to have slightly increased (e.g., 2003 and 2005). Hence, it appears that the
exposure of corruption case by the written media is quite limited in all sectors under
study except the judiciary. However, this does not necessarily mean that mass media has
not paid attention to corruption, but that most of those articles focused on cases of
corruption which, as shown in Appendix B, fall in two collective categories of firms and
public officials. Thus, only these two broad categories encompass more cases of
corruption than the judiciary, which ranks third with 13.63 percent of the total number of
newspaper articles. Moreover, the police sector follows closely the judiciary with regard
to the number of cases of corruption exposed by the written media (12.74 percent), a fact
of particular importance since police is part of the justice system and the high level of
corruption in this sector will enhance the perception of a corrupt judicial system.
At the aggregate level, the total number of articles appears to capture the concern
the public has with regard to corruption, particularly after 2001, as illustrated in Figure
15. Hence, the written media appears to have played a role in the fight against corruption
by exposing sometimes the involvement of high public officials in corrupt affairs and by
bringing to the public's attention the extent of corruption and the declarations of
rhetorical political will made by various actors, as it will be shown in the next section.
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Figure 15
Total Number of Cases of Corruption
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5. Rhetorical Political Will

Political will has two obvious components, namely, the declared or rhetorical
component and the demonstrated component. While the latter is more difficult to assess
and requires the analysis of tangible acts of political will such as legislation, policies,
establishment of anticorruption agencies, rhetorical political will is easier to observe. In
Romanian case, the rhetorical component of political will is discernable and it can be
inferred that the public declarations of political commitment to curb corruption are, at
least in part, due to the high levels of perception of corruption expressed by the public.
Unfortunately, the lack of data64 showing the direct impact of the public opinion on

64

Such data may include anticorruption public demonstrations, letters written to representatives requesting
the adoption and implementation of more effective anticorruption measures, or elections. Only the latter are
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political will makes it difficult to definitely confirm the relationship between the two
variables. Rhetorical political will is assessed by evaluating the number of articles
presenting statements made by political parties and political elites regarding the fight
against corruption and the number of articles presenting the use of corruption as a
campaign issue during the 2000 and 2004 national election (i.e., 405 articles).
Additionally, I analyze public statements made by three high officials, namely President
Emil Constantinescu (1997-2000), Prime Minister (PM) Adrian Nastase (2001-2004),
and President Traian Basescu (2004-2006).

5.1. Newspaper Articles and Rhetorical Political Will

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is an increase in the number of
articles presenting statements made by policy-makers with regard to the fight against
corruption in the first year when a new administration is in office (i.e., 1997, 2001, and
2005), as illustrated in Figure 4.6., below. This indicates that, at least rhetorically, every
new government declared itself to be highly committed to combat corruption and
perceived the first year as the opportunity to demonstrate to the public that it deserved its
votes and trust.
The comparison of the number of newspaper articles presenting statements
regarding the fight against corruption and the articles presenting cases of corruption, from
1997 until 2006 inclusive (see Figure 13), shows the existence of a relationship between
rhetorical political will and public opinion. That is, the increase in statements indicating a

available and the data clearly indicates that the public sanctioned the policy-makers for their failure to
effectively address the problem in all three national elections (i.e., 1996, 2000, and 2004). The use of
corruption during elections and the consequences of anticorruption rhetoric are discussed in the next
section.
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higher rhetorical political will coincides with the increase in the number of articles
uncovering cases of corruption. Moreover, the correlation analysis65 revealed that the
number of articles presenting cases of corruption is strongly positively correlated with
political will. The correlation66 value of r (20) = 0.745, p < 0.01 reveals that an increase
in the number of articles uncovering cases of corruption leads to an increase in the
number of statements made by policy-makers to fight against corruption. If the increase
in the number of corruption articles is the result of the high perception of corruption, then
one could infer that there is a statistically significant relationship between public opinion
and rhetorical political will. However, since the motivations behind the publication of
those corruption articles is not entirely known, one could only speculate that public
opinion is one factor that explains the existence of this statistically significant
relationship.
The evaluation of the articles presenting the use of corruption as a campaign issue
in 2000 and 2004 indicates an increase in the number of those articles from one election
to the other (see Figure 16). Although the increase appears to be small (only 11 articles),
it follows the same pattern as the number of articles uncovering cases of corruption.
Furthermore, when counted together with the articles presenting statements about
combating corruption, the increasing trend becomes more visible, with 39 articles in 2000
and 57 articles in 2004.

65

The Spearman rank correlation 1-tailed test conducted in this case is appropriate for testing the existence
of a hypothesized relationship between two variables. However, the statistical significance of this
correlation remains unchanged when the Spearman rank correlation 2-tailed test is conducted.
66
A correlation measures the degree of linear association between two variables. The values for a
correlation range between ±1, with larger values denoting stronger associations and the sign indicating
whether the values for the two variables increase correspondingly or in opposing direction with each other.
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Figure 16
Rhetorical Political Will
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Nonetheless, the small number of newspaper articles presenting declarations of
rhetorical political will indicates that the policy-makers' response to public opinion
concerns regarding corruption is poorly captured by the written mass media. The
implication is also that the politicians do not react to the signals sent by public opinion
surveys, in which case it would be expected to see them less concerned about corruption
during election campaigns and the voters less likely to sanction the incumbents for poor
performance in combating corruption, which is the subject of the next section.
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5.2. Politicians, Elections and Rhetorical Political Will

The 1996 national elections were the first elections when corruption was a main
campaign issue, a fact illustrated by the declarations made by the presidential candidate
of the main opposition party at the time, the Christian-Democratic National Peasant's
Party (CDNPP). Thus, in August 1996, while preparing for the presidential campaign,
Emil Constantinescu made a public statement presenting the position of the party he was
leading, i.e., CDNPP, with regard to corruption and the fight against it. In his statement
Constantinescu claimed that the country was facing a very difficult situation marked by
the expansion of corruption at the highest levels with serious consequences for the public.
In his opinion, the only means to redress the situation was for him and his party to win
the elections because they were not involved in the previous administration and therefore,
they were not part of the abuses committed by Ion Iliescu's

administration

(Constantinescu, Discursuri 1996). Hence, it seemed only logical for new political actors
to take the reins of power and to steer the country in the right direction which would
result in a society without corruption. The determination to combat corruption was again
expressed at the National Conference of the CDR in October 21, 1996 when
Constantinescu stated that "a vote for CDR means a vote for departure from poverty and
corruption" (Constantinescu, Discursuri 1996a).
The first public manifestation of President Constantinescu's rhetorical political
will took place shortly after he took office. Thus, on January 8, 1997 he addressed the
Romanian public in a televised message in which he was calling for their support in the
fight against corruption. In his message, Constantinescu acknowledged that he was
"elected president after a campaign that assigned the problem of generalized corruption

as the highest priority" and that corruption was a threat to national security and therefore
it required immediate and decisive attention (Constantinescu, Discursuri 1997). That day
marked the beginning of the "war on corruption", a battle that later proved to be more
difficult to carry out than initially thought, as any other big wars, such as the American
"war on drugs" or "war on terrorism". One of the sectors singled out in that speech was
customs, a sector where corruption was a problem with large consequences for the
country's economy due to the important amounts of money diverted from the national
budget every year. Constantinescu's speech was intended to mark the beginning of a new
era dominated by political will to combat corruption, establishment of the rule of law, and
the beginning of the real transition to democracy in Romania, a fact recognized also by
external actors and scholars.
The optimism manifested immediately after the November 1996 elections
continued for the first few months in office, when the fight against corruption became a
"national priority and a component of the programs of European and Euro-Atlantic
integration" (Constantinescu, Discursuri 1997a, 3). While the translation into practice of
electoral promises proved to be difficult, the instances of rhetorical political will
continued to manifest throughout the next three years, although they were increasingly
becoming mixed with feelings of frustration at the lack of visible results in the fight
against corruption. Thus, in 1998, Constantinescu's discourse changed from unlimited
optimism to the recognition that corruption cannot be completely eradicated and that
what was needed was a "Clean Reform" (Reforma Curata), a process that emphasized
upholding moral values and ethics in governance. Furthermore, the new message sent by
the President Constantinescu was that, while combating corruption was important, it
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should not be done at the expense of democracy (Constantinescu, Discursuri 1998). That
is, not all means justify the ends and sacrificing democratic principles is not worth the
eradication of corruption.
One of the last examples of President Constantinescu's declarations of political
will to fight corruption dates back to March 2000 when he claimed that "the results of the
fight against corruption are concrete and verifiable" and that the fight "did not and will
not differentiate based on the social or political affiliation" of those corrupt
(Constantinescu, Discursuri 2000, 1-2). Hence, throughout his entire presidential
mandate, Constantinescu made public declarations of political will to fight corruption.
Unfortunately, his declared determination to address the problem of corruption was
undermined by the frequent scandals of corruption and in which close members of
Constantinescu's administration were allegedly involved (e.g., Cigarette I and Cigarette
II are two illustrative examples of the large scale of high level corruption at the time).
The 2000 national election for Parliament and Presidency brought again the
problem of corruption on the list of issues debated by the candidates. As in the previous
election, it proved to be easier to use corruption as a campaign issue by the political
parties in the opposition, which had an easier time to assign blame for the lack of
progress in reducing corruption as well as for all the other problems the country was
facing at the time, such as low salaries, unemployment, and poverty. In his final speech,
Constantinescu claimed that his administration achieved a "fundamental objective",
namely "the dismantling of networks of big corrupts", although, in the fight against
everyday corruption, he admitted that the state institutions lost the battle (Constantinescu
2000a). He also criticized the SDP's attack with regard to his administration's failure to
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effectively tackle corruption, a fact that by Constantinescu's own admission was a reality
but which was still seen by the former President as an unfair attack given the fact that the
first anticorruption law (Law no. 78/2000) was adopted during his administration.
The lack of success in the "war on corruption" was presented by the former Prime
Minister Adrian Nastase in his book, European Romania: A Social-Democrat

Project

{Romania Europeana: Un Proiect Politic Social-Democrat), in which he presents the
problems Romania was facing when he became PM in December 2000 and the
accomplishments achieved during his mandate. According to him, the Constantinescu
administration managed very poorly both the internal and external affairs of the country.
Not only did the previous administration fail to accomplish the electoral promises with
regard to combating corruption and establishing the rule of law, but it got itself involved
in corruption scandals and grossly mismanaged the economy. Furthermore, according to
Nastase (2007, 102), the dialogue between the EU and Romania "decreased in intensity",
which in turn affected the EU's decision to open accession negotiations with Romania
and delayed by three years the country's accession to the EU.
In addition to the external situation regarding the country's preparation for the EU
accession, the new SDP government established after the 2000 elections had to deal with
a domestic situation characterized by a "deterioration of the relationship between the
government and the governed", a relationship undermined by the latter's lack of trust in
the former (Nastase 2007, 109). Moreover, according to the former Prime Minister
Nastase, the weakness of the Constantinescu's central administration set the stage for the
development of the "local barons", i.e., the local leaders with significant power and
influence in that region, who were being consistently exposed by mass media as principle
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actors in corruption scandals. Hence, the SDP government inherited "generalized
corruption in administration, doubled by a chronic lack of competent personnel at both
central and local levels" (Nastase 2007, 112).
What is particularly striking in Nastase's recollection is the fact that the "local
barons" are presented as a problem developed during the previous administration and for
which the SDP was not to blame, especially when most of the "local barons" who made
the front page of newspapers in corruption scandals were from Nastase's own political
party, i.e., SDP. His assessment regarding the strength of the previous central
administration was accurate and it may well explain the development of the "local
barons", but the latter did not disappeared during Iliescu's administration, when Nastase
was PM. Contrary to what one might expect from such a strong statement made by
Nastase, the "local barons" continued to expand their power and influence and to increase
in number during the four year of SDP governance. For example, in Gorj county the
prefect 67 acted like a "local baron" throughout the entire Nastase government, controlling
the entire local administration and thus reinforcing the perception of government officials
as "patrons of corruption" (Precupetu 2007, 17).
While Nastase was quick to assign the whole responsibility for the generalized
corruption in the country to the previous administration— notwithstanding the fact that
his own party was in power for the first six years after the transition— he failed to
account for the maintenance of the high levels of perceived corruption in the country or
for the harsh criticism made by the EU throughout his party's governance, criticism
which peaked in early spring 2004 and which led to the drafting of the safeguard clauses
for Romania, a novelty in the EU enlargement history. Moreover, the EP criticism in
67

The prefects are governmental political appointees and the highest public officials at the country levels.
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February 2004 regarding the lack of progress in curbing corruption emboldened Nastase
to make other declarations of political will to tackle corruption by declaring a month later
that his government is dedicated to "zero tolerance towards corruption" (Big Brother e la
Guvern! 2004). Nonetheless, his public declarations of commitment to combat corruption
proved unsuccessful because the electorate's response in November 2004 led to Nastase's
defeat in the presidential election and the removal from power of his political party.
The declarations of political will continued to be part of the electoral campaign in
2004, when the opposition candidates found themselves once again in a position to assign
blame for the lack of progress in reducing corruption. Thus, the presidential candidate
Traian Basescu said in one of his speeches that, "[I]f there will be a single minister
suspect of corruption, I will execute him myself' (Mihai 2004). This and other attacks on
the government (e.g., "Nastase is a Mafioso") made Basescu popular among the
electorate and ensured his victory in the presidential campaign. At the same time,
Basescu's party, the Democratic Party (DP), which participated in elections as part of a
coalition with the National Liberal Party (NLP), won enough votes to allow them to form
a governing coalition without SDP. Like his predecessor, Ion Iliescu, Basescu included
corruption on the list of threats to the national security, particularly high level corruption,
and made the fight against corruption a national priority. Furthermore, in his inaugural
speech in front of the Parliament, Basescu promised to save the country from corruption
and poverty, the former being intimately connected with the latter (Istodor 2004). The
examples of rhetorical political will continued to appear throughout the next couple of
years and they proved to be effective enough for the EU to conclude that Romania has
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demonstrated the existence of a real commitment to fight corruption and establish the rule
of law.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the relation between the public opinion
and political will in the decade prior to Romania's accession to the EU. The analysis
showed that corruption has been a major concern on the public's agenda throughout the
period under study and that it almost certainly affected the public's trust in public
institutions. Thus, the levels of perception of corruption continued to increase after 2000
with more than eighty percent of respondents considering it as being generalized at all
levels of society in the year prior to the country's accession to the EU. As expected, high
levels of corruption were negatively correlated with trust in public institutions, the latter
being low throughout the decade and indicating a generalized mistrust in the formal
institutions responsible for curbing corruption, such as the Parliament, government,
presidency, judiciary, and political parties. The survey data also revealed that the public
perceived corruption in the judiciary and health care as being very serious problems, and
corruption in customs sector was also ranked high when the respondents were asked to
evaluate it. Public procurement, on the other hand, was never part of a national survey
and therefore there is no data available to assess the public's perception of corruption in
this sector.
The analysis also revealed the difficulty in demonstrating with absolute certainty
the impact of public opinion on political will. This was due in part to the absence of
evidence showing that anticorruption measures were adopted and implemented in
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response to the pressure exercised by the public opinion. While one can infer that
anticorruption strategies have been developed also in response to the high significance
the public attributes to the problem of corruption, in the absence of concrete proof, the
relationship remains somewhat speculative. The fact that in three elections, 1996, 2000
and 2004, the government was voted out of office indicates that the public has an
important tool at its disposal to exercise pressure on the government, namely elections.
The fact that political parties were successful in their employment of anticorruption
rhetoric when in opposition indicates also that this type of discourse is a useful tool only
under limited conditions and that it invariably hurts the governing parties which cannot
successfully defend themselves against accusations of corruption. The use of corruption
as a campaign issue and the consistent manifestation of rhetorical political will do
indicate the existence of a pressure exercised by the public opinion on the policy-makers
to address this issue. Nonetheless, the link between public opinion and demonstrated
political will is difficult to conclusively demonstrate. Furthermore, the abundance of
evidence showing the impact of the EU on political will makes it even more difficult to
discern the effect of public opinion on political will. Whereas the EU pressure is
supported by evidence, the impact of public opinion pressure is verifiable at the rhetorical
level of political will.
Hence, it appears that the theoretical model is less precise as initially designed
and that it is not only difficult to discern the effects of the domestic and external actors on
political will, but it is also difficult to prove the impact of the former on the demonstrated
political will. The analysis revealed that another factor, mass media, may play an
important role in fighting corruption and influencing political will. However, since the
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role of the fourth power in state is beyond the scope of this study, its impact on political
will was not analyzed in detail. What this chapter has shown was the existence of a
statistically significant positive correlation between the number of articles presenting
cases of corruption and rhetorical political will, measured as number of articles
presenting statements made by policy-makers regarding the fight against corruption and
articles reporting the use of corruption as a campaign issue during the two national
election years, 2000 and 2004. Nevertheless, the number of corruption cases publicized
was poorly correlated with the high levels of perception of corruption captured by the
public opinion surveys, which indicates that while mass media may play a role in fighting
corruption and in shaping public opinion, more data is necessary to discern the exact role
and its impact.
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CHAPTER IV

CORRUPTION AND THE RULE OF LAW: REFORMING THE JUDICIARY
<ro

"In Romania, judiciary is the poster boy for corruption ".

1. Introduction
The success of democratization process rests greatly on the ability to develop an
independent, accountable, and transparent judiciary capable of implementing the rule of
law. The rule of law represents one of the main tenets of a democratic system and its
absence endangers the democratization process and the survival of newly created
democratic institutions. In post-communist countries, such as Romania, a major challenge
was not the creation of new judicial systems but of reforming the old ones inherited from
the communist era, a task perhaps more challenging than starting from a tabula rasa
situation. In addition to redesigning the judicial systems, the new democracies had to
tackle another problem inherited from the previous regimes, namely corruption. In doing
that, they had to adopt a series of institutional strategies designed to reform the system
and, at the same time, to combat corruption.
This chapter focuses on the institutional anticorruption strategies adopted by the
Romanian government in the decade prior to the country's accession to the EU. The first
section briefly presents the organizational structure of the Romanian judicial system. The
68
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following section presents the measures used to assess the institutional strategies and
analyzes each strategy adopted and implemented in the Romanian judiciary from 1997
until 2006inclusive. The final section assesses the effectiveness of institutional strategies
and their impact on combating corruption in the judiciary.

2. The Structure of the Romanian Judiciary

2.1. Brief History of the Judiciary

The modern Romanian legal system originated in mid-nineteenth century and it
has its basis in the Napoleonic Code. The structure of the judiciary follows closely the
French model, with the Ministry of Justice playing an important role in its administration
and in the maintenance of law and order (ABA/CEELI69 2002). After the Second World
War, the Ministry of Justice was responsible for defending the communist order,
protecting individual rights, and "reeducating those who violate the country's law, in that
order of preference" (Library of Congress Countries Studies, accessed December 2008).
The Office of the Prosecutor General (Procuratura), established in 1952,
represented the main instrument through which the Ministry of Justice operated and
exercised its authority. The Procuratura functioned through the court system and it had
the following main tasks: to decide jurisdictional questions, to compile statistics on
crime, and to oversee the central criminology institute and forensic science laboratory.
Theoretically, the judicial system was independent during the entire communist period,
but the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) managed to control it through the appointed
judges, the enforcement of the party discipline, and especially through its two main
69

ABA/CEELI is the acronym of the American Bar Association/Central European and Eurasian Legislative
Initiative.
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instruments of control—the Ministry of Interior and the security service (Securitate). The
Procuratura was required to investigate and resolve any charges issued by the Ministry of
Interior and Securitate and to represent the interests of the party and government in all
legal disputes. Prosecutors at both national and lower-level had greater latitude in issuing
arrest warrants, reviewing evidence, monitoring investigations, arraigning suspects, and
filing suits than did prosecutors in other legal systems (Library of Congress Country
Studies, accessed December 2008).
The socialist legal system was dominated by public law—administrative and
criminal law—and the institutions necessary to enforce it. Hence, the judiciary was
responsible primarily for noneconomic matters, which in turn explains the lack of judges
and lawyers who have expertise in the areas of law applicable to market economy
(Anderson et al. 2005). Therefore, the judicial system was marked by a lack of
independence during the entire communist period, serving mainly to protect the interests
of the Communist Party and the communist nomenklatura.

While the

1989

anticommunist revolution brought with it a significant wave of change, the principle of
the separation and balance of powers—legislative, executive and judicial—was explicitly
stipulated only in the revised 2003 Constitution (Article 1, Paragraph 4). The lack of a
specific stipulation of the state being organized on the principle of the separation of
powers may have affected the judicial reform process and it may explain the continuous
interference of the executive power in the activity of the judiciary.
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2.2. The Structure of the Courts System

The Romanian judiciary operates on four tiers: local courts or the courts of first
instance in the large cities (judecatorii), county courts (tribunals), courts of appeal, and
the High Court of Cassation and Justice.70 The judecatorii hear low-level criminal and
civil cases, usually involving cases of divorce, separation of goods, property claims, and
minor crimes, and they preside over cases individually. The tribunals are the next tier and
hierarchically superior to judecatorii. They are organized at the level of each county and
in addition to hearing appeals (de novo) from the judecatorii, they act as courts of first
instance for more important civil and criminal cases, as well as administrative and
commercial law cases. The tribunals are comprised of specialized sections for criminal,
civil, commercial, and administrative law cases (ABA/CEELI 2002, 1). In the last few
years, four specialized tribunals were created in Romania: one Tribunal for Minors and
Family in Bra§ov, and three Tribunals for Commercial Cases in Cluj, Mure§, and Arge§
(Justitia Romana, accessed March 2009). The third type of primary courts is the Courts of
Appeal, which were created in 1993 when the Law on Judicial organization went into
effect (ABA/CEELI 2002, 2). There are a total of fifteen Courts of Appeal in Romania
and each of them has in its district tribunals and, where they exist, specialized tribunals
(Justitia Romana, accessed March 2009). The Courts of Appeal act as courts of first
instance in serious civil and criminal matters, hear appeals from the tribunals, and act as
courts of last appeal for cases that originate in judecatorii and in bankruptcies cases. The
court of last resort in Romania is the High Court of Cassation and Justice (HCCJ) which
hears appeals from the Courts of Appeal and the military courts, as well as nullification
70

Prior to October 2003, the High Court of Cassation and Justice was called the Supreme Court. For
consistency reasons, the former name will be used throughout the dissertation.
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petitions. In some cases in which high-level officials are charged with serious crimes, the
HCCJ has first-instance jurisdiction (ABA/CEELI 2002, 2). The HHCJ is divided into
four specialized sections: civil and intellectual property, criminal, commercial, and
administrative law matters. The court usually sits in panels of three, but for some matters
it sits in panels of nine or in plenary (Justitia Romana, accessed March 2009). In the
Romanian court system, all judges and prosecutors are considered "magistrates" and they
are members of the "magistracy" (ABA/CEELI 2001, 1).
There are also three specialized courts: the Constitutional Court, the Courts of
Accounts, and the military courts. The Constitutional Court is responsible for reviewing
whether Parliament has passed laws in accordance with the Constitution and for
supervising the procedures for electing the President and conducting national referenda
(ABA/CEELI 2002, 2). Art. 142 of the 2003 Constitution stipulates that the
Constitutional Court has nine members, each of whom is elected for a period of nine
years with no possibility of renewal. Three members are appointed by the Chamber of
Deputies, three by the Senate, and three by the President. Additionally, the composition
of the Court is renewed by one-third every three years, and each of the qualified public
authorities nominates one appointee. The Court of Accounts is a special court responsible
for ensuring that government funds are being used properly by the public institutions. The
appeals from this court are heard first by the Courts of Appeal and then by the HCCJ. The
military courts represent a separate court system similar to the regular court system but
which hear only matters involving military personnel and police (in this case, the latter
are considered to be part of the military system). The military courts are managed and
funded by the Ministry of Defense (ABA/CEELI 2002, 2).
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Since 1990, the Ministry of Justice administers the lower courts by overseeing
budgetary and personnel matters, while the HCCJ and the Constitutional Court are selfmanaging. The article 125 of the 1991 Constitution stipulates that, "Justice shall be
administered by the Supreme Court of Justice and other courts established by law."
Additionally, in accordance to the article 130 of the Constitution, the Office of the
Prosecutors is replaced by the Public Ministry which has the duty "to represent the
general interests of the society and defend legal order, as well as the citizens' rights and
freedoms" and which discharges its powers through Public Prosecutors. The structure of
the Prosecutors' Office is similar with the structure of the court system with Prosecutors'
Offices attached to the courts at each tier as presented in Figure 17.

Figure 17
The Structure of the Romanian Judicial System
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This study focuses on the reforms developed and implemented in the judicial
system and, more specifically, on the institutional strategies designed to restructure and
clean up the courts system and the prosecutors' offices attached to them. Since lawyers
are not considered officers of the court (as are judges and prosecutors) their role will be
mentioned only to the degree that it is relevant to the current analysis.

3. Institutional Strategies

The process of reforming the judiciary and fighting corruption within the sector
requires the adoption and implementation of complex institutional strategies. Some of
these strategies have a general impact and some are designed to target specifically
corruption within the judiciary. The effectiveness of these institutional strategies depends
not only on their implementation but also on how they were designed and, implicitly, on
the political will that led to their adoption. That is, if there was demonstrated political
will to curb corruption, the anticorruption institutional strategies would be more likely to
succeed in achieving the intended goals. Hence, the analysis of institutional strategies
will implicitly reveal the existence of demonstrated or merely rhetorical political will to
fight corruption.
The literature on corruption suggests a set of strategies that should be
implemented in order to efficiently reform the judicial system and curb corruption at the
same time. There appears to be a consensus among anticorruption scholars and judicial
reform analysts with regard to the strategies that need to be developed and implemented
in order to increase the independence of the judiciary, strengthen its accountability, and
increasing the transparency (Larkins 1996, Magalhaes 1999, ABA/CEELI 2002, Botero
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et al. 2003, Anderson et al. 2005). The institutional strategies analyzed here include 1) the
enforcement of legislation, 2) the creation and effectiveness of oversight institutions and
anticorruption agencies, 3) the increase in transparency, 4) the adoption and
implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5) the adoption,
implementation, and effectiveness of whistleblower and witness protection, 6) the
adoption and implementation of ethics codes, and 7) the existence and implementation of
merit-based civil service. Some of these institutional strategies have a general
applicability that extends beyond the boundaries of one sector while some of them are
specific to each sector. The latter institutional strategies, specifically, the enforcement of
anticorruption legislation within the judicial institutions (i.e., courts and prosecutor's
offices), the anticorruption organization (NAPO), the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), and the whistleblower and witness protection, are discussed in more detail in this
chapter with regard to the process of adopting the original legislation and the following
legislative iterations. In the next empirical chapters, these institutional strategies will be
assessed specifically with regard to their implementation.

3.1. The Legislative Foundation

One of the most direct means of assessing the fight against corruption is to
evaluate the implementation and enforcement of legislation designed to combat
corruption. If political will to fight corruption consists of more than simple public
declarations intended to impress domestic and external audiences, it should materialize in
the adoption and implementation of anticorruption legislation. Furthermore, demonstrated
political will should lead to the adoption of anticorruption legislation that is effective and
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not merely adopted to boost the policy-makers' image as anticorruption fighters. That is,
effective anticorruption legislation should be comprehensive in nature, it should have a
clear and precise language (i.e., it does not leave room for multiple interpretations), it
should clearly stipulate the sanctions for breaking the rules, and it should include
measures designed to prevent and not only to punish corrupt behavior. The ideal
anticorruption legislation should be able to achieve the balance between preventing and
sanctioning corruption, but since it is hard to tell what that balance should be, legislation
that incorporates preventative measures would be considered more comprehensive than a
legislation that focuses exclusively on sanctioning corrupt behavior.
The existence of well-designed anticorruption legislation represents an important
but insufficient step in the fight against corruption. The next difficult task in combating
corruption consists of the actual implementation and enforcement of this legislation. The
judiciary, as the guarantor of the rule of law, is responsible for ensuring the effective
implementation and enforcement of anticorruption legislation. Therefore, all cases of
corruption, regardless of the sectors where they were committed, are being investigated,
prosecuted, and sanctioned by the magistrates, as the officers of the law. This section
assesses the magistrates' success in the fight against corruption by evaluating the cases of
corruption investigated, indicted, and sanctioned in the decade prior to the country's
accession to the EU. Prior to analyzing the available data, a brief discussion of the two
main anticorruption laws adopted and implemented in that period is in order.
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3.1.1. Anticorruption Legislation

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the first legislation specifically addressing
the problem of corruption was adopted in 2000 and mainly in response to the external
pressure exercised by the EU. Prior to that year, the corruption offenses were covered by
the Penal Code which criminalizes four types of offenses: bribe taking (Art. 254), bribe
offering (Art. 255), receiving unjustified advantages (Art. 256), and influence peddling
(Art. 257). The need for adopting an anticorruption law was also emphasized by
President Emil Constantinescu during his 1996 presidential campaign, when he also
promised to decidedly tackle corruption once in office. However, the political reality
characterized by conflicts between the members of the governing coalition (particularly
between the Christian-Democrats and the Liberals), conflicts that resulted in three
government reshuffles in four years,71 and corruption scandals involving high profile
members of the government delayed the adoption of a legislation that would make it
more difficult to continue engaging in corrupt activities.
Nonetheless, in May 2000, the Law on Preventing, Detecting, and Punishing Acts
of Corruption (Law no. 78/2000 and henceforth, Anticorruption Law) was published in
the Official Journal of Romania (Monitorul Oficial) nr. 219/18, two months after the law
was adopted by the Parliament. Intended to be comprehensive, the law mainly reinforces
the list of offenses and the corresponding sanctions already described in the Penal Code,
although it additionally criminalizes offenses associated with corruption which were not
covered in the Penal Code. However, the Anticorruption Law did not define the concept
71

The first Government was led by Victor Ciorbea (CDNPP) from December 12, 1996 until April 17,
1998; the second Government, led by the Prime Minister Radu Vasile (CDNPP), lasted until 22 December
1999; and the third and last Government during Constantinescu's presidency was led by Mugur Isarescu
(Independent) from 22 December 1999 until 28 December 2000.
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of corruption and it failed to create an institution responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of corruption offenses as stated in the initial proposal. The government's
proposal to create such an institution under its own supervision was quickly rejected by
the Parliament, which saw in it an attempt of the executive to expand its power (Chamber
of Deputies, November 9, 1999). More importantly, the law failed to differentiate
between grand and petty corruption and the severity of sanctions led to concerns about
potentially uneven application of the law because judges might be reluctant to uphold it
in cases of petty corruption (Pruna 2000). The law also failed to offer any protection for
whistleblowers or those denouncing cases of corruption. Additionally, the secondary
legislation necessary for the implementation of the law was delayed more than a year, as
noted by the EC in its 2002 Regular Report on Romania. Despite its flaws and delays in
implementation, the Anticorruption Law was significant because it was the first
anticorruption legislation. The law was amended in 2004 (Law no. 521) when the abuse
in service against the public interest was added to the list of offenses of corruption
covered by the original law.
A second important piece of legislation known as the Anticorruption Package, or
Law 161, was adopted in 2003. As the name indicates, this legislation attempted to be
among the most comprehensive anticorruption legislation adopted in the post-communist
Romania. The Anticorruption Package introduced a very important provision that
abolished the 1996 provision of confidentiality regarding the declarations of income and
TJ

assets and the conflict of interests for dignitaries and other public officials.

The

mandatory publication of these declarations made it more difficult for public officials to
72

According to the Law no. 115/1996, the declarations of assets of dignitaries and other public officials
were confidential.
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hide their illegally acquired assets and/or the incompatibilities with holding a public
office position. Furthermore, the law stipulated that the declarations of assets must be
updated annually and another declaration must be completed before leaving the public
office. Failure to update the declarations of assets by the end of each year (i.e., December
31) may attract an audit conducted by the Commission for the Control of Assets
organized within the Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction in that area.

Except for this

provision, the Anticorruption Package fell short of achieving the ambitious goals,
namely, the introduction of substantive changes in the fight against corruption. Thus, the
Government opted for the legislative mechanism of a "vote of no confidence", which
severely restricted the opportunities for discussion, especially with non-governmental
actors. The package included several new laws and amendments to other nine laws that
covered a variety of issues from business to public procurement, and which were
considered even by some of those who supported the package (i.e., members of the
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR)) as not belonging to this
package. Additionally, the provisions regarding the sanctions and monitoring of the very
declarations of assets and conflict of interests were incomplete and not clear enough
(Romanian Parliament, March 31, 2003). Furthermore, whistleblowers were required to
submit "convincing evidence" to the commissions set up for investigating such matters in
order for an investigation to be launched. Failure to produce the "convincing evidence",
which implied the conduct of a private investigation for gathering the necessary evidence
to support the allegation, might result in libel punishable with prison time from six
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In 2004, the Center for Judicial Resources concluded that the activity of the Commissions for the Control
of Assets was still not made public and from the sixteen Commissions organized throughout the country,
only one answered to their FOIA request (CRJ 2004). In addition, I was unable to find any information
regarding the activity of these Commissions on the web pages of the Courts of Appeals within which the
former are functioning.
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months to three years (Freedom House 2005, 40). Nonetheless, the public disclosure of
politicians and public servants' income and assets as well as their declarations of interests
opened the door to irreversible changes in the fight against corruption, which in
association with the FOIA made it easier for civil society, mass media, and private
citizens to find information and expose corrupt public officials.

3.1.2. Enforcement of Anticorruption Legislation

The adoption of anticorruption legislation was an important step forward for
Romania in the fight against corruption. Nonetheless, the implementation and
enforcement of this legislation is another if not more important step in combating
corruption. A law that it is not enforced loses any power since those who break it know
that they can get away without being sanctioned. Hence, the actual enforcement of the
legislation and the sanctioning of those found guilty of committing corruption offenses is
an essential part of the fight against corruption. Furthermore, punishing corrupt behavior
is supposed to deter others from engaging in corrupt behavior, especially if the sanctions
match the crime.
The data regarding the number of convictions in corruption cases (i.e., received
definitive sentences) in the decade under study were obtained from the Ministry of
Justice upon filing a FOIA request in April 2007. The data include the number of
corruption cases divided per type of offenses, as presented in the Table 3. As the data
show, 1997 and 1998 are the years with the highest number of corruption cases solved,
which would suggest that the fight against corruption was much more effective at the
beginning of the decade under study and prior to the adoption of anticorruption
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legislation. Despite the higher number of convictions given for offenses of corruption in
those two years (see also Figure 18), the impact of those successes was not perceived by
either the Romanian public or the EU.

Table 3
Total Number of Corruption Convictions (1997-2006)
Year

Bribe
Taking

Bribe
Offering

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
TOTAL

314
215
168
117
123
145
119
139
79
75
1494

124
107
57
35
75
52
56
72
76
59
713

Receiving of
Unjustified
Advantages
33
22
13
10
6
9
1
3
1
1
99

Influence
Peddling

Offenses
Connected to
Corruption

165
190
143
136
131
154
126
120
98
90
1353

1
1
18
38
55
113

Source: Ministry of Justice, Response to FOIA Request (June 26, 2007)

What these data do not tell us is the value of the damage caused by the corruption
offenses, the rank of the individuals sanctioned for corrupt behavior (e.g., high public
officials, elected official, low public officials, private individuals) or the sectors in which
the corruption offenses occurred. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Justice did not compile
the data according to the abovementioned parameters and, therefore, it is impossible to
decipher, based on this data, the cases of corruption prosecuted, indicted, and convicted
by sector and/or by the value of the damaged produced. Nonetheless, the data are still
valuable because they indicate the changes in the enforcement of anticorruption
legislation.
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The evolution of the total cases of corruption convictions every year from 1997
until 2006 is presented in Figure 18. The high number of cases of corruption solved in
1997 and 1998 may be explained by the significance of those cases. That is, if most of the
convictions in those two years were for small cases of corruption (i.e., cases where the
value of the damage was small and the quality of the individuals sanctioned was that of
low-level public servant), the high number of convictions may reflect a very active
agenda but a less effective fight against corruption, as long as corruption was perceived
as being associated with high public officials and politicians.

Figure 18
The Evolution of Total Corruption Convictions per Year (1997-2006)74

Year

Source: Ministry of Justice, Response to FOIA Request (May 9, 2009)

74

The values represent the aggregated number of corruption convictions given each year regardless of the
type of corruption offense.
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Hence, the conviction of one hundred train conductors for receiving small bribes
is less likely to be perceived as an effective fight against corruption as long as the "big
fish" go unpunished. As one former junior staffer75 at a judicial institution mentioned in a
personal interview she was extremely disappointed when an analysis of corruption cases
prior to 2006 revealed that train conductors were the most corrupt category of public
employees in the country (NGO Interviewee 1, January 2 2007).
While the Ministry of Justice did not provide details regarding the value of the
damage caused or the quality of the public officials convicted for corruption, the EC
Regular Reports consistently criticized Romania for failing to bring to justice a single
high case of corruption prior to the adoption of anticorruption legislation. Furthermore,
the national written media and civil society seconded the external criticism regarding the
Government's failure to enforce the legislation in cases of high or grand corruption.
Therefore, it is not very surprising that after the, Anticorruption Law and Anticorruption
Package were adopted and started being implemented, the number of corruption cases
and of the individuals convicted for corruption offenses decreased as reflected in the
Figure 19.
The decline in the number of cases of corruption solved and in the number of
individuals convicted for corruption offenses after 2002 may be explained by the creation
of the National Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office (NAPO). The details regarding this
special anticorruption body will be presented in the next section; for now, it is important
to mention the fact that NAPO was created to investigate and prosecute medium and high
level corruption and it became the main institution to address cases of corruption in
Romania. Hence, the change of focus in the fight against corruption means also a smaller
75

The identity of the interviewee will remain anonymous at her request.
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number of cases of corruption indicted and sentenced. That is due, at least in part, to the
complex nature of medium and high level corruption cases which require more time and
the combination of experts from various areas in order to gather the appropriate evidence
for court trials

Figure 19
Total Number of Individuals Convicted for Corruption Offenses

Year
Source: Ministry of Justice, Response to FOIA Request (May 9, 2009)

As NAPO adjunct chief-prosecutor Carmen Galea explained in a personal
interview (February 23, 2007), due to their secret nature corruption cases are difficult to
prove in court and therefore require more time to gather all the necessary evidence that
would increase the chances of a successful indictment and prosecution. Additionally, the
complexity of high corruption cases, the continuous challenge of keeping up with the new
anticorruption legislation, the long duration of judicial procedures and of solving all the
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appeals invoked by the defendants' "army of lawyers" affect even more the effectiveness
of anticorruption prosecutors measured as number of corruption convictions. Hence, the
shift of focus to more complex cases of corruption explains the decrease in the number of
corruption convictions given since the establishment of NAPO. The activity of the NAPO
since it began functioning is summarized in Figure 20.

Figure 20
NAPO Activity 2003-2006
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Source: National Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office, Synthesis of Activity Reports 20032006 (http://www.pna.ro, accessed February 2, 2009)

As Figure 20 indicates, the activity of NAPO has constantly increased since it
started functioning in 2003. The increase in the number of cases solved by NAPO in 2004
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is explained by the change in the anticorruption office's jurisdiction that year. Thus, in
2004, the jurisdiction of NAPO was expanded to include also small cases of corruption,
as it will be explained in more detail below. Nonetheless, the increase of total number of
cases that NAPO had to solve each year was due in part to the cases remained unsolved
from the previous year or years. Column two in Figure 20 presents the percentage of
cases solved from the total number of cases. Moreover, most cases were dismissed due to
the lack of evidence or because they were falling outside of NAPO jurisdiction and only a
small percentage of cases were indicted (column three, Figure 20). However, if in 2003
only 15 percent of indictments ended in convictions, in 2006 convictions were
pronounced in almost 60 percent of the cases indicted. Hence, the data indicates an
improvement in the activity of NAPO to successfully investigate and prosecute cases of
corruption.
Additionally, in 2006, NAPO began the investigation of a very high profile public
official, the former Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, an investigation that at the time
appeared to be a clear sign of demonstrated political will and effectiveness in enforcing
the rule of law. However, the investigation was stopped in 2007 due to procedural
problems and the Parliament's failure to vote in favor of lifting the parliamentary
immunity for, at the time, Senator Nastase.76 The same year, nine judges and six
prosecutors were investigated for corruption offenses and five of them (four judges and
one prosecutor) were indicted for such offenses. One judge and one prosecutor received
definitive sentences and four other judges were convicted for corruption offenses by the
end of the year (SCM 2006, 197).

76

On March 4th 2009, the Parliament voted for the lifting of NSstase's parliamentary immunity, which
allows NAPO to continue the investigation started in 2006.
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The number of cases of corruption prosecuted and convicted is an explicit
indicator of the way anticorruption legislation is enforced, but the publications of
declarations of interest and assets is also part of the anticorruption legislation and its
enforcement also reveals the consistency and effectiveness in fighting corruption. As
officers of the law, magistrates should set an example with respect to the compliance with
the formal rules by filling out and making public their declarations of interest and assets
as required by the Anticorruption Package. The situation for the three years after the
adoption of this anticorruption law was not very encouraging, magistrates failing for the
most part to comply with these legal requirements. Thus, a study conducted by the
Society for Justice (SoJust) in 2006 found that many of the financial disclosure
statements (i.e., declarations of assets) were not signed which would indicate that the
authors were reluctant to assume responsibility for their declarations.77 Moreover, a
closer examination of those declarations of assets revealed that some magistrates were
shareholders in private businesses, including nine judges and six prosecutors within the
no

HCCJ, a situation specifically forbidden by the law.

The Superior Council of the

Magistracy, the institution responsible for noting and taking appropriate measures to
solve those infractions of discipline, failed to take any action (So Just 2006, 21). As with
regard to the publication of the declarations of interest, the same study found that there
were courts that failed to comply with the provisions of the Anticorruption Package and
make public those declarations. Among those courts were the HCCJ and some local

77
A brief examination of the declarations of assets conducted by this author in March 2009 revealed that
the situation remains unchanged in many local courts. Moreover, there are some cases when the
declarations are signed but left completely blank.
78
The position of magistrates is incompatible with any other professional positions, except that of a
university professor, in order to ensure the magistrates' objectivity in caring out investigations and
sentences.
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courts (judecatorii), such as those in Bra§ov (SoJust 2006, 85). These findings suggest
that, at least until the end of 2006, the enforcement of the Anticorruption Package was
deficient within the very sector responsible for the enforcement of those legal provisions.
Furthermore, it indicates the existence of an internal resistance to reform, which may
explain the difficulty in combating corruption and improving the image of the judicial
institution in the eyes of the general public.

3.2. Oversight Institutions and Anticorruption Agencies

Internal oversight institutions (e.g., judicial councils) that have the power to
oversee the administration of justice and internal audits may also strengthen the
accountability of the judicial process and increase its performance. Judicial councils
composed of judges are considered to better assess the needs of the institution or branch
rather than the individual interests. They may deter some of the pressure from the
executive and legislative branches to intervene in the administration of justice.
Additionally, the existence of an internal disciplinary process may allow magistrates to
be free from threats of retaliation from other branches for decisions they may have
delivered while still being hold accountable for their activities (Dakolias and Thachuk
2000, 385). Furthermore, oversight institutions can play a role in fighting corruption by
ensuring that magistrates' behavior is compatible with their important public function and
that no behavior that threatens the image and effectiveness of the institutions goes
unpunished. In addition to internal audit oversight institutions, the creation of
anticorruption agencies increases the chances of success in fighting corruption. An
institution responsible with specifically targeting corruption is likely to be more effective
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if the appropriate resources are made available and if it has the necessary authority to
investigate and prosecute corruption offenses. The next two sections evaluate the
Superior Council of the Magistracy (SCM), the internal audit institution, and the National
Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office (NAPO), the main anticorruption body created in
post-communist Romania. 79

3.2.1. The Superior Council of the Magistracy

Article 133 of the 1991 Constitution stipulates that the Superior Council of the
Magistracy recommends to the President of Romania the magistrates for the positions of
judges or prosecutors and that it is the body responsible for solving the infractions of
discipline committed by magistrates. While the 1991 Constitution assigned limited
responsibilities to the SCM, the latter's role changed radically with the adoption of the
revised Constitution in 2003. Thus, the new Constitution stipulates that the main role of
the SCM is to "guarantee judicial independence" (Article 133, Paragraph 1) and that it is
the sole body responsible for the magistrates' careers. The adoption in 2004 of the Law
on the Superior Council of the Magistracy (Law no.317), as part of the judicial reform
package, has further strengthened the role of the SCM and since February 2005, when the
formal transfer of powers from the Ministry of Justice to the SCM was completed, the
SCM is exercising in practice its authority.
The main competences of the SCM, as described by the Operating Rules
Regarding the Activity of the SCM (SCM Decision no. 326, 24 August 2005), include
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The anticorruption literature mentions the important role that the Ombudsman may have in fighting
corruption. However, that is not the case in Romania where this institution plays no role in combating
corruption and was reluctant to any suggestion that might have expanded its role to the area of
anticorruption (Interview Anticorruption Expert 2, May 20, 2007).
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defending the magistrates against any acts that could affect their independence and
impartiality; protecting magistrates' professional reputation; ensuring the observance of
the law; and ensuring the observance of the criteria of competence and professional ethics
in the course of magistrates' careers. In addition to the duties regarding the career of
judges and prosecutors (i.e., proposing to the President of Romania the appointment and
removal from office, ordaining the promotion of magistrates, proposing to the President
of Romania the bestowing of distinctions upon judges and prosecutors), the SCM also has
specific duties concerning the admission in magistracy, the evaluation, training, and
examinations of judges and prosecutors;

tasks regarding the organization and

functioning of courts and prosecutor's offices; and responsibilities

concerning

disciplinary actions.
According to the SCM Law (i.e., Law 317/2004), the institution is organized in
two sections (one for judges and one for prosecutors) and has nineteen individual
members (nine judges, five prosecutors, two representatives of civil society, and three de
jure members with no right to vote—the Minister of Justice, the president of the HCCJ,
and the General Prosecutor). The elected members of the SCM (i.e., judges and
prosecutors) are chosen by their peers after a brief campaign in which those interested in
a membership position at the SCM propose their candidacies. The latter are publicized on
the SCM's webpage and in the Official Journal (Monitorul Official) in order to ensure the
access of every magistrate to the list of candidates' names and professional biographies.
The first election took place in December 2004, when the SCM members were elected for
six-nonrenewable years. The elections were contested by the civil society on procedural
grounds because many candidates were appointed by their hierarchical chiefs (i.e,
80

The duties regarding the magistrates' careers will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

236

presidents of courts or chief prosecutors) and no challengers attempted to run against
them. Some of the low ranking magistrates who applied for the SCM positions were
subjected to pressure from their superiors to quit the campaign (SoJust 2006, 6). Under
those circumstances many magistrates were reluctant to propose their candidacies
considering it too risky to potentially defeat a hierarchical superior (Interview Judicial
Expert, May 22, 2007). Hence, those elected were again people with old mentalities
whose motto was "to introduce small changes and see what happens", being afraid to
substantially reform the system. Furthermore, the SCM candidates were elected without
most of the magistrates knowing who they are and what, if any, their platform is
(Interview Magistrate Professional Organization, March 26, 2007). The situation was
tainted even more when the media discovered that one of the prosecutors elected to the
SCM, Ilie Picioru§, had participated during communism in a political investigation that
resulted in the death in preventive arrest of a Romanian dissident (Freedom House 2005,
101). That case was of particular importance not only for the reputation of the new
judicial institution, but also because the SCM Law stipulates that those who collaborated
with Securitate during communism could not be elected to the SCM. While Picioru§ was
not found to have been an informant to the Securitate, his involvement in that
investigation tainted his reputation as a prosecutor.
Article 23, Paragraph 2 of the SCM Law stipulates that the activity of the
members of the SCM has a full-time, exclusive character and that those elected to serve
in the SCM must suspend their positions at the courts of law or prosecutors' offices for
the duration of their mandate at the SCM. Given the important responsibilities bestowed
upon the new SCM, the new members were required to devote their entire working time
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to ensure the effective functioning of this institution. However, the SCM Decision no.
326/24 August 2005 stipulates that those elected members that had a dual mandate at the
time the decision was published could "choose" to suspend their positions as judges or
prosecutors in which case they must express their request in writing. This specification
gave the elected members the option to continue holding dual mandates and most of them
chose to keep their previous jobs as judges or prosecutors. The unusual situation was
noted by the EC in the Regular Reports from 2005 and May 2006 and it strongly
recommended that dual mandates be disallowed. The external recommendations were
also supported by the President Traian Basescu, the magistrates'

professional

organizations, and civil society organizations all of them emphasizing that the large
amount of work and important responsibilities that are assigned to the SCM require a
complete dedication and dual mandates negatively impact the effectiveness of their
activity as members of the SCM. In response to the EC recommendation against dual
mandates (EC Regular Report 2005, 11), the President of the SCM claimed that "the
technical staff is well prepared" to carry out daily activities and that the SCM "carries out
its activity in plenary session and on panels" (SoJust 2006, 10). The SCM members'
reluctance to suspend their positions at the courts of law or prosecutors offices led to the
situation where they received payments for two different positions with overlapping
working hours. Besides the issues of illegality and ineffectiveness that might arise, the
situation poses an ethical question especially when those members were the ones in
charge of defending the integrity and good reputation of all magistrates. Nonetheless, by
the end of 2006 only six of the total sixteen members with the right to vote chose to end
their dual mandate and opted for permanent activity at the SCM (SoJust 2006, 9).
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An indicator of demonstrated political will to fight corruption is represented not
only by the creation of institutions designed to actively participate in this fight, but also
by the human and financial resources allocated for the effective functioning of these
institutions. In order to effectively conduct its activity, the SCM has its own
administrative apparatus organized in departments, offices, and commissions responsible
among other things with managing human resources, administrating financial resources,
managing the legal issues regarding the judiciary and the magistrates, EU integration and
the implementation of PHARE programs, public relations, and conducting of internal
audits. In order to develop its complex organizational structure and to ensure a proper
functioning of the institution, in 2005, the SCM was assigned 139 administrative
positions and 23 management positions. By the end of that year, 130 of the administrative
and 21 of the management positions were staffed (EC Regular Report 2005, 11). In 2006,
the total number of positions representing the technical staff of the SCM was increased to
234, 78 percent of those positions being staffed by May 2006 (EC Regular Report 2006,
7). The increase in personnel was influenced by the changes in the budget allocated to the
SCM.81 Thus, if in the first year of activity the budget allocated to the SCM was
224,950,600,000 ROL ($20,992,695),82 the following year, the financial resources
allocated almost doubled, increasing to 456,320,000,000 ROL ($37,238,754) (SCM
2005a, 17). The significant increase in the financial and human resources show a positive
change in the political will to reform and clean up the judiciary, a change that indicates a
continuity and even escalation of efforts to establish the rule of law and clean corruption.
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Prior to 2005, the SCM did not have a separate budget allocated being under the direct subordination of
the Ministry of Justice.
82
ROL is the Romanian currency. All values were adjusted for inflation and discounting and are expressed
in real 1997 USD, the first year of the research study. See Chapter VI for a detailed explanation of the
adjusting calculations.
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An important part of the SCM organizational structure is represented by the
working groups and the commission responsible for monitoring the implementation of
Ol

the judicial reform process.

In May 2005, the SCM organized six working groups

composed of elected members of the SCM, members of its technical staff, judges and
prosecutors, university professors, psychologists and other professional categories
depending on the specific task of the working group (SCM Decision no. 152, 26 April
2005). The working groups were responsible for coordinating and ensuring the effective
implementation of the Action Plan for the implementation of the Judicial Reform
Strategy (JRS) applicable for 2005-2007 and the 2004 Twinning Programs funded by the
EU through PHARE program. An evaluation of the working groups conducted by the
Society for Justice in 2006 concluded that the working groups are "unproductive" and
that there was "strong evidence to question whether the magistrates' career is seriously
treated" (So Just 2006, 10). Among the irregularities uncovered by the report were cases
when the members of the working groups who missed a meeting were informed that they
"abstained" from voting or cases when absent members were told that they have been
appointed to conduct other working groups.
To ensure the effective monitoring regarding the achievement of the Action Plan
for the implementation of the JRS, the Monitoring Commission of the SCM and the local
monitoring commissions were created. The local monitoring commissions presented
monthly reports which were discussed at the central level and which, according to the
SCM Activity Report for 2006 (16), ensured a permanent dialogue between the SCM,
83

The six working groups are: 1) Legislation; 2) Organizational Structure and Administration of the SCM,
of Judicial Courts and Prosecutors' Offices, and of the Other Institutions Coordinated by the SCM; 3)
Socio-professional Profile of Judges and Prosecutors and their Professional Formation; 4) Optimum
Amount of Activity of Judges and Prosecutors and the Restructuring of Courts and Prosecutors' Offices; 5)
Ethics Code of Judges and Prosecutors; and 6) Relation with Mass-Media and Civil Society.
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courts and prosecutors' offices, the National Institute of Magistracy, and the National
School for Clerks, and which increased the level of responsibility and accountability of
those in charge with implementing the reform measures. The central Monitoring
Commission met four times in the two years prior to Romania's accession to the EU (two
meetings per year) to assess the state of the judicial reform (15 April and 23 September in
2005 and 18 April and 13 November in 2006). From the minutes of the meetings, one can
learn that while efforts were made to implement the reform measures, the complexity of
those measures, insufficient funds, and inconsistent legislation affected the process of
implementing the JRS. Nonetheless, the minutes of those meetings lack detail and while
they present the main objectives discussed during the meetings, for the most part they fail
to specify the exact problems identified in the implementation of the reform measures.
For example, at the first meeting that took place in April 2006, the Commission discussed
the establishment of objective criteria necessary for ensuring the random assignment of
cases to judges and prosecutors, but it did not present any information regarding the
actual implementation of those legal provisions. Hence, there is a lack of data regarding
the random assignment of cases to judges and prosecutors, the problems encountered in
practice, and/or the cases when the exceptions to the law were applied making the
measurement of the effectiveness of these legal provisions difficult to assess.
In fall 2005, the Ministry of Justice commissioned Transparency International
Romania (TIRo) to conduct a study assessing the magistrates' perception of judicial
independence. The study was repeated in 2006 and the magistrates' response with regard
to the activity of the SCM is summarized in Table 4. The data show that in 2005 the
magistrates revealed significant levels of contentment with the activity of the SCM, sixty
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one percent of magistrates declaring a high and very high level of satisfaction with the
activity of the institution.

Table 4
Magistrates' Satisfaction with the SCM Activity
Level of satisfaction
2006
2005
(Percent)
12
Very high
8
High
36
53
30
28
Low
11
Very low
7
3
6
Not at all
Source: Transparency International Romania, Studiu Privind Perceptia Magistratilor
Asupra Independentei Sistemului Judiciar 2005-2006
(www.transparency.ro/doc/Per_mag.pdf, accessed July 7, 2007)

The magistrates' responses changed in 2006, when the percentage of those
declaring a high level of contentment with the SCM activity decreased thirteen percent.
The change may be explained by the fact that in 2005, the SCM was still a very new
institution and magistrates' responses reflected more their expectations regarding the
SCM activity and its role in protecting them and guarantying judicial independence. A
year later, the magistrates' evaluation of the SCM activity was based on more
information and, as one interviewee said, the SCM was inefficient because it lacked clear
objectives and priorities and it was like "placing the wagon in front of the horses"
(Interview Magistrate Professional Organization, March 26 2007).
An important reason for which the magistrates' evaluation of the SCM was less
positive in 2006 has to do also with the way they assessed the response of the institution
responsible for guaranteeing their independence and protecting them from external
pressures and infringements in their activities. Thus, if in 2005 sixty four percent of
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respondents said that the SCM "sometimes" has a prompt reaction to infringements in
their activities, in 2006 the number of similar responses decreased to 34 percent. The
number of those answering "yes" to the question regarding the SCM's ability to guarantee
the magistrates' independence from political pressure decreased 17 percent in 2006
(specifically, to 43 percent) (TI Romania 2006, 53-54). All of these results support the
previous conclusion, namely that the satisfaction with the activity of the SCM and the
trust in its ability to actually guarantee judicial independence was in 2005 based more on
expectations than reality. Furthermore, the magistrates' disappointment was influenced
by the manner in which the SCM conducts its activity, namely, solving all the problems,
regardless of their importance, in plenary sessions. In addition to loading unnecessarily
the schedule of plenary meetings, that way of conducting their activity was perceived by
magistrates as inefficiency and lack of responsibility (NGO Interviewee 4, March 16
2007). However, it should be mentioned that the SCM is still a very young institution and
it is still in the process of consolidating and finding its way in a changing environment.

3.2.2. The National Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office

This major anticorruption institution was created two years after the adoption of
the Anticorruption Law and in response to the EU criticisms regarding the lack of results
in the fight against corruption that followed its adoption. The creation of NAPO was
intended to be a clear demonstration of political will to fight corruption, specifically high
and medium level corruption, and to show both the EU and the Romanian public that no
one is above the law. Nonetheless, the initial steps in the creation of NAPO indicate that
the establishment of an institution that would have jurisdiction in cases of high corruption
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was a complicated process that would require significant political will and willingness to
compromise of all the parties involved in the legislative process. The parliamentary
debates regarding the adoption of the NAPO

legislation revealed

significant

disagreements between members of Parliament in the opposition parties

and those

Of

represented in the governing coalition.

The opposition parties' attempts to increase the

independence of NAPO from political interference failed almost entirely. A small victory
was attained regarding the appointment of the NAPO chief prosecutor by the Minister of
Justice at the recommendation of the SCM, creating thus an appearance of independence
from the executive power.
The legislation regarding the creation of NAPO was among the most amended
and changed legislation in post-communist Romania. Since 2002, the original legislation
was amended and changed no less than ten times, sometimes even twice in the same
month. The frequent changes were in response to the external pressure of the EU for
substantive reforms and the domestic pressure to protect particularistic interests and
maintain the status quo through non-substantive reforms. The changes attempted to
address the weaknesses in the initial legislation regarding mainly the competencies of
NAPO, the prosecutors' power to issue warrants, the status of judicial officers delegated
to NAPO, and the budget. Thus, the competencies of NAPO were modified first in 2003
through the Anticorruption Package, which expanded the NAPO jurisdiction to all cases
where the damages caused by the corrupt act exceeds the equivalent in RON of €100,000
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The three main opposition parties were The Democratic Party, The National Liberal Party, and The Party
of Great Romania.
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The predominant political party in both the Parliament and Government was the Social Democratic
Party; the other two main political parties in the governing coalition were the Democratic Alliance of
Hungarians in Romania and The Conservative Party.
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(as stipulated by the initial NAPO legislation86) or the value of the object or service that
is used to facilitate the corrupt transaction (i.e., the bribe) exceeds €10,000. The same
legislation also introduced a distinction between the corruption cases that fall under the
jurisdiction of the central NAPO and those that are to be investigated and prosecuted by
its territorial services. Thus, the latter would investigate cases of corruption when the
damages were between the equivalent in RON of €100,000 and 10,000 and the value of
the bribe was between €10,000 and 3,000. These specific stipulations were changed again
in the following years. Thus, in 2004 the NAPO jurisdiction was initially decreased to
cases of corruption where the damages caused were no higher than €10,000 (Emergency
Ordinance 24/2004) and than a few weeks later increased again to €100,000 (Emergency
Ordinance 103/2004). The value of the bribe followed a similar pattern, being first
decreased to €3,000 and later increased to €5,000. These changes in competencies in a
period of weeks indicate first the attempt to reduce the jurisdiction of NAPO to small
cases of corruption (something that NAPO was already focusing on, despite its initial
provisions) and the failure to demonstrate political will to fight high corruption. Second,
the changes in jurisdiction in matters of weeks reflected the effect of the external pressure
exercised by the EU. Thus, after the adoption of the Emergency Ordinance 24/2004, the
EC issued its Regular Report on Romania in which it criticized the reduction of NAPO
competencies and warned against the shift of focus from high corruption to petty
corruption. As a result, a new Emergency Ordinance was adopted (no. 103/2004) that
increased again the competencies of NAPO.
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NAPO was created based on the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 43/2002, Ordinance that passed
the Parliament and was adopted as the Law no. 503/2002.
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However, all these changes did not affect the initial provisions regarding the
NAPO jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute members of government and/or the
Parliament. Thus, according to the Constitution, only the Prosecutor's Office of the High
Court of Cassation and Justice can investigate and prosecute these high officials. That
decision was reinforced in May 2005, when the Constitutional Court ruled that NAPO
does not have the competency to investigate and prosecute MPs and other members of
government. The situation changed in 2006 when a new law was adopted (Law no. 54)
that extends the NAPO competency to government officials and MPs. Despite this new
provision, the procedures required in investigating an MP for corruption continue to
remain complicated and long, which may give the defendants the opportunity to hide or
destroy any compromising material.
The establishment and functioning of NAPO depended also on the financial and
human resources allocated. The evolution of the NAPO personnel since its first year of
activity (i.e., 2003) until the end of 2006 is summarized in Table 5. As the data show, the
number of prosecutors, judicial police officers, experts, and auxiliary staff (including
specialists in finances and public administration) has increased every year.

Table 5
The Evolution of NAPO Personnel
Auxiliary
Judicial
Total
Total
Experts
Personnel
Police
occupied allocated
35
22
2002
16
37
110
91
121
462
2003
130
31
373
41
462
2004
110
161
150
510
111
452
149
43
149
510
2005
162
118
52
169
501
566
2006
Source: National Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office, Synthesis of Activity Reports 20032006 (http://www.pna.ro, accessed February 2, 2009)
Year

Prosecutors
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While the positions allocated to NAPO have increased, the number of positions
filled each year was a little less than ninety percent throughout the entire period.
According to the NAPO adjunct chief-prosecutor Galea, filling out the positions poses a
challenge because not too many prosecutors are interested in working there due to the
high pressure and exhausting working hours that investigating and prosecuting sometimes
very difficult and politically charged corruption cases require (Personal Interview,
February 23 2007). Nonetheless, the positive change regarding the human resources
allocated indicate a real concern for fighting corruption and a demonstration of political
will to address this issue. The increase in personnel was influenced by the changes in the
financial resources allocated to the NAPO. Table 6 presents the evolution of the budget
allocated to this anticorruption institution from 2003 until 2006. As the amounts in ROL
indicate, the budget allocated to NAPO in 2004 was almost three times higher than in the
previous year, which does coincide with the increased external pressure exercised by the
EU. The following two years the budget decreased although, even in 2006, it continued to
be more than twice the budget allocated for the first year of NAPO activity.

Table 6
The Evolution of NAPO Budget
Year
Budget (USD)*
Budget (ROL)
168,700,000,000
20,348,982.28
2003
57,630,454.22
542,188,000,000
2004
48,743,843.80
522,322,500,000
2005
42,801,468.77
524,484,950,000
2006
Source: National Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office, Synthesis of Activity Reports 20032006 (http://www.pna.ro, accessed February 2, 2009)
T h e USD budgets are adjusted for inflation and discounting and expressed in real USD
1997 value.
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Despite the frequent changes in the legal provisions regarding the organization
and functioning of the NAPO, the evidence shows that this institution played an
important role in fighting corruption. The increase in the human and financial resources
allocated to NAPO also indicate a demonstrated political will to tackle medium and high
corruption, although the external pressure played an important role in stimulating the
manifestation of such political will. Moreover, the change in the statute of NAPO in fall
2005, followed by the adoption of the provision assigning NAPO jurisdiction to
investigate MPs represents another important positive change in combating corruption
and increasing the effectiveness of this anticorruption institution.

4. Transparency

Another important set of anticorruption strategies focus on increasing the
transparency of judicial procedures. Transparency and accountability are very much
intertwined and strengthening one relies on strengthening the other. Judicial transparency
plays an essential role in the fight against corruption, particularly in a country where
secrecy and lack of transparency have ruled people's lives for decades. In addition to the
adoption of legislation that guarantees the freedom of information and the access to
information of public interest, transparency in the judicial sector can be increased by
allowing the public and media access to judicial proceedings, the publication of judicial
records, and the maintenance of trial records that could be accessed by those interested in
learning more about the judicial proceedings in specific cases. Furthermore, one of the
main goals of the Strategy for the Reform of the Judiciary (SRJ) applicable for the period
2005-2007 was to ensure the increase of transparency of judicial proceedings. The next
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two sections assess the existence and implementation of such strategies in the Romanian
judiciary.

4.1. Public and Media Access to Proceedings

A means to deter corrupt behavior in the judiciary is to hold public trials allowing
citizens and the media to observe the behavior of judges and prosecutors in action.
According to the Romanian Constitution (art. 128) the "[proceedings shall be public,
except for the cases provided by law." The same provision can be found also in the Law
on the Organization of the Judiciary (henceforth the Organization Law), Law no.
304/2004, Article 11. The civil procedure code and the criminal procedure code specify
that, if an open hearing risks threatening the public order, the morality, or the parties
involved the proceedings will be closed. However, there were no reports that those
provisions have been abused in practice (ABA/CEELI 2002, 29).
Additionally, Article 106 of the Organization Law stipulates that every court and
prosecutor's office must establish a Bureau for Public Information and Relations. The
next article of the same law establishes the role of this Bureau, namely to ensure the
communication between the judicial institutions and the public and mass media in order
to guarantee the transparency of the judicial proceedings. The 2005 Report on the State of
the Judiciary elaborated by the SCM lists the progress made in making the activity of the
judiciary more transparent. Thus, with regard to the communication between citizens and
the judiciary, departments of information and relations with the public were created at the
local courts and the prosecutors' offices attached to them and they were endowed with
new equipment necessary for their effective functioning (internet connection, faxes, copy
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machines) and trained personnel. Furthermore, web pages were created for the major
judicial institutions such as the Ministry of Justice, SCM, HCCJ, Prosecutor's Office
attached to the HCCJ, and the National Institute of Magistracy. These web pages are used
to make available information of public interest regarding the organization, financial and
human resources, and the activity of those institutions.
In addition to these measures, beginning with 2005, the SCM organizes every
year an "Open Doors' Day" on the European Day of Civil Justice (i.e., October 25), a
manifestation designed to familiarize the public with the activity and role of the
institution in guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary and monitoring the
implementation of the judicial reform. Furthermore, this manifestation is organized at all
judicial courts and prosecutors' offices in the country in an attempt to educate the public
about the way the judicial institutions work and the means to gain access to more
information regarding the activity of those institutions. According to the 2005 SCM
Activity Report, the "Open Doors' Day" manifestations were a success; many students,
journalists, civil society representatives, and members of the general public visited the
judicial institutions on October 25, 2005. The events were interpreted as increasing the
public's confidence in the judicial system (SCM 2005a, 69). These efforts were
supplemented with the publication and distribution of thirty two Guides for the Public,
which offered information regarding the evolution of judicial proceedings and the SCM
competences. The guides were distributed during the Open Doors' Day events in 2005
and 2006 and they were also made available on the web page of the SCM (SCM 2006,
261). Hence, anyone interested in learning more about the functioning of the judiciary or
specific judicial procedures can consult the guides published on the SCM web page.
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In 2006, the SCM also published a Guide for Good Cooperation between Courts,
Prosecutors' Offices, and Mass Media in an attempt to improve the relationship with the
media, a relationship that had been very tense for more than a decade. Thus, in 2005, fifty
seven percent of the magistrates that participated in a study regarding the independence
of the judiciary conducted by TI Romania said that the media "often" and "very often"
exercise pressure on the judicial system. Furthermore, seventy four percent of them
identified the mass media as having the most negative influence on the independence of
the judiciary because it influences judicial decisions and rulings. The number of those
considering mass media having the greatest influence on their judicial activity continued
to be high in 2006, with fifty-six percent of judges and forty one percent of prosecutors
ranking the media as the number one source of interference in their activity (TI Romania
2006, 23-24). Some of the blame for the tense relationship may be placed with the media.
According to one interviewee, the problem in Romania is the lack of a
"responsible media that knows how the justice system works. Media tends
to cover scandals and they [journalists,] often write what is happening
which only shows how little they know about the justice system; they do
not have the facts right; they do not have the notion of 'presumption of
innocence', so when an accused is released before the trial, the judge is
immediately considered as being corrupt. Moreover, that happened even if
the judge acted correctly and applied the law—all these influence the
judges and influence them because it puts pressure on them" (Interview
Judicial Expert, May 22 2007).
For example, a judge found out from reading a newspaper about a decision that she was
yet to make (Interview Magistrate Professional Organization, March 26 2007).
Although some journalists lack the necessary judicial knowledge or may have
their own personal agenda, the situation improved over time and more attention has been
given to the way they cover judicial cases, a fact confirmed by a representative of the
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magistrates' professional organization in a personal interview (March 26 2007).
Nonetheless, magistrates continue to perceive the media as having played a major role in
portraying a negative image of the judicial system, thus affecting the trust people have in
judicial institutions. However, the changes introduced since 2004 in the judicial system
give magistrates the means to defend against unfair attacks from the media, the SCM
being responsible for defending the magistrates' reputation and protection from any
external interference. Therefore, decisions based on anything else but the law cannot be
justified by external influences made by the media, the executive, or interest groups.
Although the SCM considers the implementation of the measures designed to increase the
transparency of the judiciary a success story, the magistrates seem to be less optimistic
with regard to their relationship with the media and the public continues to perceive the
judicial system as being afflicted by corruption.

4.2. Publication of Judicial Decisions and Maintenance of Trial Records

An important means of ensuring the transparency of the judicial process is to
make public the judicial decisions and appellate opinions, to publish the latter and even to
open them to academic debate. The decisions of the High Court of Cassation and Justice
are published on an annual basis as are some the important decisions of the courts of
appeal and tribunals. Beginning with 2001, HCCJ has also posted on its website an
annual report of its activity (i.e., cases entered at the beginning of the year, cases solved
and unsolved by the end of that year). Lower court decisions are not usually published,
but since 2000 all judges are required to issue written opinions. Prior to that, judges were
required to issue written opinions in civil and commercial cases only if one party
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requested it or intended to appeal the court's decision. There are also a number of
journals that publish law reviews and comment on the developments in the law and/or on
important judicial such as Dreptul (The Law) and Nona Revista Romana de Drepturile
Omului (The New Journal of Human Rights).
The ABA/CEELI assessment of the judicial reform in Romania prior to 2002
concluded that no court transcripts were maintained. Judges usually summarized the
testimony of a witness and the court clerks recorded the summary by hand or typing, after
which the witness signed the summary. As a consequence the process was slow and often
resulted in judicial case records that were not clear. The 2004 Organization Law
introduced a change regarding the recording of court proceedings. Thus, the court
proceedings were to be audio or video recorded or recorded in writing by the court clerks.
The change, while intended to achieve a better maintenance of trial records, required time
to be fully implemented, especially given the poor situation of the courts in Romania. In
spring 2006, a study financed by the United States Trade and Development Agency
(USTDA) was conducted in order to identify the equipment necessary for ensuring the
recording of the judicial sessions at the Courts of Appeal. After the completion of the
study (scheduled for the end of May 2006), the acquisition of the equipment was to take
place (SCM 2006b).
In 2000, steps were taken towards the implementation of a PHARE project
designed to set up a file management system that would improve the maintenance of trial
records as well as the communication among courts. The pilot project testing the
Electronic Court Register Informational Systems (ECRIS) was implemented at the HCCJ
and later at nine other locations in Bucharest. Nonetheless, the program could not be run
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in 2001 because the IT infrastructure of courts was deplorable. Three years later, in 2004,
an evaluation of needs and available means was still lacking and the only statistic
available was with regard to the number of computers in courts (a total of 3402
computers for 234 courts) (Freedom House 2005, 107). Given the poor situation of the
Romanian judicial institutions, particularly with regard to information technology
equipment, in 2005, the Ministry of Justice was allocated from the national budget EUR
22 million to buy IT equipment and to ensure that all prosecutors' offices and eighty
percent of the judicial courts would have the necessary IT by the end of 2006. A separate
amount of EUR1.27 million was allocated to the NAPO for similar purposes (Ministry of
Justice 2005a, 7 and 20). In 2006 a web site was created that gives access to all judicial
courts in the country (http://portal.just.ro) and where the courts can post immediately
their courts judgments. This measure was an important step forward - particularly if the
courts post judgments in real time - in increasing the transparency of judicial activity and
in unifying the judicial practice countrywide.

5. Freedom of Information

The most obvious example of political will is represented by the adoption of the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 2001. The process of drafting and adopting this
legislation was the result of an unusual collaboration between government, opposition
parties (specifically, the National Liberal Party), and civil society organizations
(Interview Anticorruption Expert 2, May 20 2007). This is the first such law adopted in
the history of Romania that had an important impact by increasing transparency and
legitimizing people's access to public information. It is no surprise that FOIA is
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considered to be a very important anticorruption tool especially for watchdog NGOs and
newspapers which use it frequently to get access to information that used to be
confidential (Freedom House 2005, 49).
The main impetus behind the adoption of FOIA in 2001 was the external pressure
exercised by the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). When
Romania was not included in the first wave of NATO enlargement in 1999 despite
supporting the war in Yugoslavia, the absence of the legislation regarding the access to
information and classified information was considered to be one of the reasons (Interview
Anticorruption Expert 1, April 12 2007). In addition there was added pressure from the
EU, which consistently requested the adoption of such legislation. Thus, in July 2001, the
European Parliament (EP) recommended that the Romanian government adopt the
Freedom of Information Act and open and support a social dialogue (European
Parliament, Report 2001, 11). An incentive was offered in the form of a project financed
by the EU for the implementation of FOIA in the candidate countries, a project that
Romania wished to be part of (Legislative Debate, Chamber of Deputies 24 April 2001).
As a result, a few months after the EP report, the Romanian Parliament adopted the first
legislation regarding freedom of information in post-communist Romania. External
pressure was combined with a change in domestic leadership following the 2000
elections, which again brought to power the Party of Social Democracy in Romania
(PDSR) and its leader, Ion Iliescu, who ruled the country for the first six years after the
1898 Revolution. In 2000, both Iliescu and his party declared their commitment to
establish the rule of law, fight corruption, and prepare the country for EU accession. They
sought to demonstrate to both the EU and the Romanian electorate that they had changed
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and were truly committed to embracing and supporting democracy. Hence, the increasing
external pressure on the new domestic leadership eager to show the EU that it was
committed to meeting the Copenhagen political criteria led to the reversal of the previous
policy of non-collaboration with actors outside the government and to the adoption in
October 2001 of FOIA.

5.1. Evaluation of the Law: Provisions, Sanctions, and Limitations

The Law no. 544/2001 (i.e., FOIA) stipulates the categories of information that
are of public interest, the avenues to request such information, the timeline for receiving
answers from the public institutions regarding the submitted FOIA requests, the
categories of information that is excluded, and the penalties for refusal to respond to
FOIA requests. Article 2 Paragraph (b) stipulates that information of public interest is
"any information regarding or resulting from a public authority or a public institution's
activities, irrespective of the support, or the form, or the mode of expressing the
information." Moreover, the law stipulates the categories of information that public
institution must provide "ex officio" (Article 5), such as legal regulations regarding the
organization and functioning of the public institution; the structure, organization of
departments, functioning schedule, and hearing schedule of the public institution; the
contact information of the person responsible for the dissemination of public information;
the financial sources and the budget; the periodical activity report; and the list of the
documents of public interest. The latter provision was criticized by various NGOs
because it allows each public institution to discretionarily decide what the list should
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include and the result may be the exclusion from the list of information of public interest
without a legitimate reason or justification.
As previously mentioned, the law clearly states the timeline for receiving a
response to a FOIA request (Article 7). Thus, the public institutions are "bound to answer
in writing" in ten days or, depending on the complexity of the information requested,
thirty days, from the time the request was registered at the specific public institution. In
case the information requested is too complex or difficult to compile in the thirty days
period, the petitioner must be informed in ten days about that situation. If the institution
refuses to answer favorably a FOIA request, it must inform the petitioner in five days
from receiving the request and to justify its refusal.
An important and controversial part of the FOIA is represented by Article 12,
which lists the category of information that is exempt from public disclosure. Hence, this
category includes information regarding the national defense, public security and order,
procedures in a penal or disciplinary investigation and judiciary procedures whose
disclosure would jeopardize the investigation or the trial, and personal data. Additionally,
the law stipulates that the information regarding Romania's economic and political
interest, the debates of the public authorities, and economic and financial activities that
would jeopardize the principle of honest competition also constitutes confidential
information. While it is understandable the legislators' intent to protect any information
that would jeopardize national security and the good functioning of the market, the
economic and political interests of Romania are of interest to the general public who is
likely to be affected by how those interests are protected and sought. Furthermore, the
debates of public authorities should be public, with few exceptions which are already
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stipulated in the law (i.e., disciplinary and judiciary procedures), because they are funded
with public monies and they should be made accountable to the public. As with regard to
the provision regarding the economic and financial information, this stipulation is
considered by critics to be non-constitutional since it constitutes a restriction beyond the
limits allowed by the Constitution (APADOR-CH87 2002, 4).
Nonetheless, no changes to address these issues were made until 2006, when
iterations to the FOIA law were introduced by the adoption of two other laws. Thus,
according to the Law no. 371/2006, the definition of public institutions was expanded to
include "any public authority or public institution that uses or manages public funds, [...]
and any company under the authority of a central or local government at which the
Romanian state or, if necessary an administrative-territorial unit is the sole or majority
holder" (Article 2, Letter a) making thus mandatory for these institutions to provide
information of public interest. Furthermore, any information regarding the economic or
financial activities of public institutions and which does not fall under the category of
confidential information is subject to the FOIA law. The second important change was
introduced by Law no. 380/2006 which stipulates that information regarding public
procurement transactions is of public interest and must be provided to anyone interested
in such information.
To increase the chances of successful implementation, the law has to clearly
stipulate the sanctions that may incur if the rules are ignored or broken. Chapter III,
Articles 21 and 22 of the FOIA Law stipulate such penalties for failing to comply with
the law. Thus, an explicit or tacit refusal to carry out the provisions of the law would
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APADOR-CH is the acronym for the Association for Defense of Human Rights in Romania-the Helsinki
Committee.
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result in disciplinary sanctions for the public servants guilty of breaking the law. The
petitioner has thirty days at his/her disposal to file a complaint against the public servant
who refused to answer the FOIA request and an administrative investigation would be
launched based on that complaint. The petitioner may opt for a different venue and file a
complaint to the administrative section of the Court within thirty days after the period for
receiving a response to the FOIA request has expired. If the Court decides in favor of the
complainant, it can force the public institution to provide the requested information. If the
Court finds in the favor of the public institution, the plaintiff can appeal the Court's
decision. The Court procedures in these cases are judged by emergency procedure and are
exempt of stamp fee. Nonetheless, these provisions have two caveats. First, the
documents that can fall under the administrative Court's decision are limited by the
provisions of the Law no. 29/1990 regarding the functioning of the administrative
sections of the Courts which may limit the plaintiffs' chances of filing a complaint if the
Court decides that those documents fall under the category of exempt documents.
Second, the penalties section of the FOIA does not include a penal sanction for those
employees who intentionally destroy or hide documents that contain information of
public interest. Such a provision might limit the temptation of some "loyal" employees to
protect the secrets of the public institution at the expense of the public good (APADORCH 2002, 6). Although the FOIA Law was less than perfect and it left room for
improvements, it represented an important step forward in fighting corruption by
increasing the visibility of the activity in the judicial sector and creating a legal avenue
for the public access to important information regarding the functioning and activity of
judicial institutions.
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5.2. The Judiciary Response to FOIA Requests

The effective implementation of FOIA began in 2002, but the data regarding the
number of FOIA requests received by the central judicial institutions (i.e., Ministry of
Justice, NAPO, and the SCM) are available beginning with 2003 and 2005. The
information summarized in Table 7 shows the number of FOIA requests received at the
three main judicial institutions, differentiated according to the number of requests
answered favorably and requests rejected for various reasons such as nonexistent
information or confidentiality.

Table 7
The Evolution of FOIA Requests Received by Judicial Institutions
2 ( 103

Institution Positive
Answer

2( >04

2C105

2d106

Rejected

Positive
Answer

Rejected

Positive
Answer

Rejected

Positive
Answer

Rejected

Ministry
of
Justice

706

22

153

67

186

84

1159

55

NAPO

20

0

110

0

229

0

336

0

SCM

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

112

-

143

0

Source: Ministry of Justice, Annual Reports regarding the Implementation of FOIA
2003-2006 (http://www.just.ro, accessed March 6, 2009), NAPO, Annual Reports
regarding the Implementation of FOIA 2003-2006 (http://www.pna.ro, accessed March
6, 2009), and SCM, Activity Reports 2005 and 2006
(http://www.csml909.ro/csm/index.php7cnKN24, accessed February 26, 2007 and
March 16, 2009).

The data reveal an increase in the number of requests for access to information of
public interest and of the number of requests answered favorably. This suggests at least
two things. First, the public became increasingly aware of the right to access public
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information and comfortable with employing this avenue. Second, judicial institutions
became increasingly more at ease with favorably answering FOIA requests. A 2007 study
conducted by the Pro-Democracy Association and Transparency International Romania
and funded by the EU as part of the PHARE project "Transparent Governance", found an
increase in the response of central institutions to FOIA requests. That is, if in 2003 the
rate of response was seventy percent, in 2006 the percentage increased to almost eighty
percent. Among the central institutions monitored were the Ministry of Justice, the
Superior Council of the Magistracy, and the High Court of Cassation and Justice. The
first two institutions had a perfect score regarding the rate of response to FOIA requests
at the beginning of 2007 when the study was conducted, while the HCCJ had a rate of
response of almost ninety percent. Furthermore, the SCM had a perfect score with regard
to the completeness of responses given to FOIA requests, while the Ministry of Justice
and the HCCJ scored less than sixty percent (Pro-Democracy and TIRo 2007,44-49 and
90).
Additionally, I made several FOIA requests to the Ministry of Justice, NAPO, and
the SCM between January 2007 and March 2009 and I received timely and favorable
responses from all of them, although not all responses were complete. The data indicate
that the judicial institutions have made progress in implementing the legal provision of
the FOIA law. Moreover, the SCM, as the institution responsible for guaranteeing the
independence of justice, sets a good example in ensuring the transparency and openness
of judicial activity.
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6. Whistleblower and Witness Protection

An important goal of the fight against corruption is to encourage and support the
public to not engage in corrupt behavior and to join the anticorruption combat. In other
words, the long-term success in fighting corruption requires citizens' active cooperation
in exposing corrupt acts. In order to ensure that those who come forward with
information regarding corrupt activities are not sanctioned for their honesty, legislation
must ensure that they are legally shielded from any form of punishment and that, if
necessary, their identities and safety are protected. Hence, it is important to adopt and
implement legislation protecting whistleblowers and potential witnesses in difficult cases
which may endanger their safety or life.
The Law on Witness Protection (Law no. 682/2002) was adopted two years prior
to the legislation regarding whistleblowers also as part of Romania's commitment to
fulfill EU requirements. Although the law, which follows the American model, was
adopted in 2002, its implementation was delayed until 2004 when the secondary
legislation stipulating the regulations regarding its actual implementation was adopted.
Both primary and secondary legislation regarding witness protection are comprehensive
with regard to the conditions that must be met in order for someone to be considered a
witness and the measures that need to be taken in order to ensure his/her and, if
necessary, their families' safety. The law also stipulates the creation of a National Office
for Witness Protection (NOWP) under the direct subordination of the General
Inspectorate of Romanian Police. NOWP is funded from the state budget under the
chapter "Public Order and National Security" and NOWP activity falls under the category
of "classified information." Therefore, the NOWP communicates its progress directly to
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the Government which, in turn, presents the NOWP annual activity reports to the
Parliament in closed sessions. Hence, no data regarding the NOWP activity or allocated
resources (financial or human resources) can be disclosed, a fact that was confirmed by
the response I received to my FOIA request filed last year.
In Romania, the first Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers (Law no. 571) was
adopted in December 2004 as part of the country's plan to align Romanian legislation to
the acquis. The law clearly stipulates the avenues available to whistleblowers to disclose
the information they have about any corruption offense or any suspicion of corruption
that may take place in their institution. Furthermore, the law protects whistleblowers from
any sanction by, first, considering their disclosures as being done "in good faith until
proven otherwise," and by shielding them from any disciplinary action. If disclosing the
whistleblowers' identities may endanger their safety, the law requires them to be
protected according to the Law on Witness Protection; that is, the whistleblowers'
identities must be kept secret (Article 12, Paragraph l.a). Beginning with January 2005
and thirty days after the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers entered into force, all
public institutions were required to amend their Internal Rules and Regulations to include
the new legal provisions that would encourage whistleblowers to come forward with
information regarding illegal or corrupt behavior.
While the implementation of the Law on Witness Protection is "confidential
information", the situation should be different with regard to the Law on the Protection of
Whistleblowers. Nonetheless, a study conducted by the Pro-Democracy Association in
2006 regarding the implementation of this law in public institutions found that out of
thirty three institutions, including the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Health, only
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two institutions, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment, were able
to present the new Internal Rules and Regulations reflecting the whistleblower
provisions. The response given by the Ministry of Justice was that the new Internal Rules
and Regulations were still in process of being amended. Moreover, except for this study,
there is no information regarding the implementation of the Law on the Protection of
Whistleblowers or its effectiveness, a finding supported also by the anticorruption experts
interviewed in Romania in 2007.

7. Ethics Codes

An important means to deter corruption in the judiciary is through the existence
and implementation of clear ethics codes. Romania was late in developing and
implementing clear codes of conduct for magistrates. The first Code of Ethics of
Magistrates was adopted in 2001, but it was not made public and instead was distributed
selectively to certain magistrates (SoJust 2006, 20). According to the 2001 Code, any
breaches of its rules would be subject to disciplinary sanctions. The same Code stipulated
what constitutes corrupt behavior and the sanctions assigned to such offense. The first
change to the 2001 Code was introduced in 2004 when the Law on the Statute of
Magistrates (Law no. 303/2004) was adopted. A year later, the latter legislation was
changed in order to increase the clarity of incompatibilities and sanctions becoming the
Law on the Statute of Judges and Prosecutors (henceforth the Statute Law). The same
year, the SCM adopted the new Code of Ethics of Magistrates (SCM Decision no. 144
from April 26, 2005) which was later changed into the Code of Ethics of Judges and
Prosecutors (SCM Decision no. 328/2005 from August 24, 2005) due to the amendments
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introduced by the Law no. 247/2005, Law on the Reform in the Property and Judicial
Sectors and other Adjacent Measures (henceforth the Reform Law).
Article 3 of the new Code of Ethics stipulates that "[J]udges and prosecutors are
bound to protect the independence of justice" and that they "must exercise their
profession with objectivity and impartiality, acting only by law, without any attention to
exterior pressure and influence of any kind". These canons indicate that the primary
responsibility for ensuring the independence of the judiciary rests above all in the hands
of the magistrates. Moreover, Article 7 specifies another important canon according to
which "[J]udges and prosecutors have the duty to promote the supremacy of law, the rule
of law and to defend the fundamental rights and liberties of citizens." The Code further
establishes the responsibilities of magistrates in conducting their activities in order to
ensure the dignity and honor bestowed upon them by their professional positions as well
as the incompatibilities of their functions with other activities. Thus, Articles 21 and 22
stipulate that magistrates can also practice as university professors or instructors at the
National Institute of the Magistracy and that any other position is incompatible with that
of a magistrate. Furthermore, Article 11 specifies the conditions under which magistrates
can offer judicial assistance to relatives and the situations in which they are prohibited
from intervening in order to favorably influence the course of an investigation or a trial in
which members of their families are involved. An important change introduced by the
Reform Law and reflected in the new Code of Ethics is represented by the exclusion of
ethics violations from the category of infractions that attract disciplinary actions. Hence,
if prior to August 2005 the magistrates who violated the Code of Ethics were sanctioned
for that, the changes introduced exclude those breaches from the category of conduct
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violations that would trigger disciplinary sanctions. In addition, the provisions regarding
corrupt behavior and sanctions were also excluded. The SCM claimed that the changes
followed an opinion of the Council of Europe (Interview Judicial Expert, May 22 2007).
oo

The new Code was published in three law journals

and was introduced on the

curriculum of the NIM in fall 2005. Additionally, the SCM organized in association with
the Twinning Convention 2002 an awareness campaign for the magistrates regarding the
new Code, a campaign that targeted magistrates at local courts countrywide. A total
number of 1137 magistrates participated in the campaign, which lasted three weeks (one
week in June and two weeks in September 2005). The awareness campaign was finalized
with a seminar on the "Impact of the Deontological Code of Judges and Prosecutors" and
which brought together the presidents of the Courts of Appeal, the general prosecutors of
the Prosecutors' Offices attached to those courts, two foreign experts (Peter Lampe and
Christiane Berkani89), INM instructors, and members of the SCM (SCM 2005, 2-4). To
ensure that all magistrates have access to the new Code, the SCM requested that all courts
and prosecutors' offices give a copy of the Code to their magistrates and that a copy of
the Code be posted in a visible place in the institution, a request that was not difficult to
fully implement, according to the SCM Working Group responsible for monitoring the
implementation of the Code of Ethics (SCM 2005a, 3). In May 2005, the Code was
posted on its web page in both Romanian and English versions (SCM 2005b).

88

The three journals are: Palace of Justice (Palatul Justipei), Human Rights (Drepturile Omului), and
Information Bulletin IRDO (Buletinul Informativ IRDO).
89
Peter Lampe (Denmark) and Christiane Berkani (France) are two judges that participated, along with
other four foreign experts, to the campaign designed to promote the Ethics Code in the Magistracy. They
were part of the Twinning Convention 2002 program, led by the pre-accession EU commissioner Dieter
Schlafen. Lampe and Berkani are singled out because they participated to several seminars and shared their
expertise with Romanian magistrates.
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Hence, the Code of Ethics was designed to serve as a guide for how magistrates
should behave in the exercise of their professions. The law regulating the disciplinary
actions against magistrates is the Law on the Statute of Judges and Prosecutors, Law no.
303/2004, with the amendments introduced in 2005 (Law no. 247/2005) and 2006 (Law
no. 356/2006). The updated law lists in Article 99 the activities that constitute
disciplinary infractions and in Article 100 the sanctions that may be applied for such
violations. The Working Group No. 6, "Magistrates' Deontology and Responsibility",90
in charge of overseeing the implementation of the Code of Ethics, is also responsible for
identifying any disciplinary violations and reporting it to the Disciplinary Commissions
of the SCM. In 2005, only four magistrates (two judges and two prosecutors) were
sanctioned and the sanctions applied were warnings (one judge and one prosecutor) and
fifteen percent salary reduction for a period between one and three months (again, one
judge and one prosecutor). In the following year, ten judges and three prosecutors were
disciplined. In addition to the increase in the number of sanctions, there was also a
change in the severity of sanctions applied, three judges being excluded from the
magistracy (SCM, Response to FOIA Request 2007).

Nonetheless, a paradoxical

situation is worth mentioning, namely the fact that although the violations of the Code of
Ethics are no longer to be considered disciplinary infractions, half of the total disciplinary
sanctions applied in 2006 were for violations of that Code (SCM 2006a, 22). The
justification presented by the SCM was that ethics violations are taken into consideration
in the professional evaluations of the magistrates. Nonetheless, the justification does not
explain the fact that those sanctions appear to be in clear violation of the law.
90

When it was established in May 4, 2005, this Working Group was No. 5 and called "The Deontological
Code of Judges and Prosecutors". The adoption of the new Code and the changes introduced by the Law
no. 247/2005 led to the change of title.
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The information collected from the interviews with judicial experts, NGO
representatives and representatives of the magistrates' professional organizations paints a
somewhat contradictory situation of how well the Code of Ethics is known and applied.
Thus, according to one interviewee, the Code is not really known and there is little
interest to focus on this issue. Moreover, the magistrates are in a "state of revolt" and
they feel like being ethical is not that important given the difficulties they confront in
their daily activities due to improper working conditions and heavy caseload.
Furthermore, many magistrates feel that it is futile to focus on a Code of Ethics when
they are being consistently accused of being corrupt (NGO Interviewee 4, March 16
2007). The opinion expressed by a judge differs with regard to several issues. First, she
considers that all magistrates are familiar with the Code because it is part of their
professional training. Second, the Code is clear, brief, and concise and is learned in the
law school. Third, no magistrate would be able to practice without knowing the Code
(Interview Magistrate Professional Organization, March 26 2007). Nonetheless, the latter
opinion may be a little too optimistic and subjective, particularly in the light of different
opinions and reports that indicate the poor emphasis put on teaching the law students the
Code of Ethics (SoJust 2005). Nonetheless, clear efforts were made to disseminate the
new Code and to stress its importance for the establishment of a professional and ethical
judicial system.
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8. Merit-Based Civil Service

8.1. Selection/Appointment Process

In order for the process of selection and/or appointment of magistrates to increase
the independence of the judiciary, the process should be based on objective criteria such
as passage of an exam, performance in law school, experience, professionalism,
reputation in the legal community, and participation to other specialized training
(ABA/CEELI 2002, 6). Following the adoption in 2004 of the three-law package of
judicial reform,91 the SCM assumed full responsibility for the recruitment, career
development, and sanctions of magistrates. Under this legislation, the Ministry of Justice
can no longer appoint judges directly, promote magistrates to higher courts and
prosecutors' offices, promote magistrates into management position in the SCM, or
decide the removal of magistrates, as it used to do on the basis of previous Law on the
Organization of the Judiciary, Law no. 92/1992.
Since September 2004 when the new legislation began to be implemented, SCM
has been the only institution that appoints graduates of National Institute of Magistracy
(NIM) as assistant judges, and after they successfully finalize this stage of professional
formation,92 SCM proposes them for tenure to be appointed by the President of Romania.
Prosecutors of the basic court system are also appointed by the President on the
recommendation of the SCM. The 2004 Organization Law stipulates that, in order to be
eligible for appointment to the magistracy, a person must be a Romanian citizen and
91

The Law on the Organization of the Judiciary (no.304/2004), the Law on the Superior Council of the
Magistracy (no.317/2004), and the Law on the Statute of Judges and Prosecutors (no.303/2004).
92
The final examination consists of a written and oral exam before a joint board of examiners made up of
three members: one member of the NIM's training staff and two judges or prosecutors appointed by SCM.
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resident, hold a law degree, have no criminal record, have a good reputation, speak the
Romanian language, and be physically and mentally able to hold office.
In addition to graduating from NIM, another avenue for entering the magistracy is
available to those who have practiced law for five years. Thus, they have to pass a
professional examination organized by NIM at the request of the SCM. The law also
stipulates for a direct appointment method to the basic court system, a method that does
not require attending the NIM or taking a qualification examination. Thus, Article 32 of
the Statute Law specifies that university law professors, magistrates or assistant
magistrates at the HCCJ who, prior to leaving those positions, worked for at least five
years and had a good professional standing, can be appointed as magistrates without
passing an examination. Between July 2000 and June 2001, 45 judges were appointed by
SCM through the direct appointment method.
This method continues to be viewed with skepticism because it does not ensure
for a transparent process of selecting the candidates. The Minister of Justice may
recommend a single candidate instead of a list of candidates and, sometimes, the SCM
receives the name of the candidates on the same day that the candidates are scheduled for
an interview and it does not have time to check the professional background of the
candidates. Additionally, the Minister of Justice participates in the candidates'
interviews, and although it does not have the right to vote on the nomination, his/her very
presence may influence the SCM decisions (ABA/CEELI 2002, 7).
Despite these shortcomings and the criticisms brought by the EU and civil society
organizations, the SCM has continued to use this form of appointment (see Table 8)
motivating its decision by the high number of unfilled positions and the insufficient
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number of candidates that participate to the NIM examinations. As these data indicate,
after the amended Statute Law entered into force, the two main avenues for entering the
magistracy were graduating from the NIM or passing an examination organized by the
same NIM.

Table 8
Number of Magistrates Admitted in the Magistracy
20105
Prosecutors

2006
Prosecutors

Avenue
Employed

Judges

NIM Graduates

86

86

104

53

Exam

152

70

70

79

Judges

Direct
50
48
60
25
Appointment
Total
286
216
199
182
Source: SCM, Report on the State of the Judiciary 2005 and 2006,
(http://www.csml909.ro/csm/index.php?cmd=24, accessed February 26, 2007)

Due to the insufficient number of magistrates available, the SCM continued to opt
for the direct appointment measure in order to ensure an optimal activity at the judicial
courts and prosecutor's offices. One reason for the insufficient number of magistrates is
represented by the low number of law school graduates who manage to pass the entry
exam to the NIM. Thus, the Society for Justice reported in September 2006 (19) that for
years "there have been only 120 candidates (from 3,000) passing the exam, although
there have been 180 seats." This situation has at least two potential explanations: first,
that the law students are very poorly prepared and they cannot pass a thorough
examination, and second, that the problem rests with the way the exam is organized, in
which case the organizers should consider introducing certain changes that would
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improve the situation. In any case, the examination should be based on objective criteria
and should not lower the standard just to accommodate more poorly prepared law school
graduates.
The 2004 Organization Law (Art. 48) specifies that the appointments for president
and vice-president positions in courts are to be made exclusively based on an
examination process organized by SCM, through the NIM. Nonetheless, an enforcement
procedure for these legal dispositions was still lacking in August 2005 (TIRo 2005b). In
accordance with the same Organization Law, the presidents for the specialized sections in
tribunals were appointed by the presidents of the tribunals, which limited the former's
independence in relation to their direct superiors. The situation was considered to be a
direct consequence of the lack of clear and objective criteria for candidates' evaluation
(TIRo 2005b, 32-33). Additionally, the Ministry of Justice had continued to exercise
significant influence in the selection and appointment process of the General Prosecutor,
the head Prosecutor of the NAPO, and the chief prosecutors within the Public Ministry.
Table 9 summarizes the number of judges and prosecutors appointed to executive
positions (i.e., presidents or vice-president of the judicial courts and prim-prosecutors or
general prosecutors) either directly or through an examination, the latter avenue starting
to be employed after August 2005 when the Law no. 247/2005 entered into force.
The same trend noticed in the case of the process of entering the magistracy is
visible in the case of the recruitment of magistrates for executive positions. Thus, if in
2005, some magistrates were directly appointed to executive positions, in 2006, the only
avenue for filling those positions was through an examination organized by the NIM.
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This indicates progress in the process of recruitment by the employment of more
objective criteria for evaluating the candidates.

Table 9
Recruitment of Magistrates for Executive Positions
Year

2005
Prosecutors

2006
Prosecutors

Judges
Judges
Direct
53
81
0
0
appointment
141
Exam
35
65
70
Total
88
146
141
70
Source: SCM, Report on the State of the Judiciary 2005 and 2006
(http://www.csm 1909.ro/csm/index.php?cmd=24, accessed February 26, 2007)

8.2. Objective Judicial Promotion Criteria

The existence and enforcement of objective criteria for the promotion of
magistrates are also means necessary for increasing the transparency of the judicial
activity. They also represent effective means for strengthening the independence of the
judiciary from external and internal influences. According to the Law on the Statute of
Judges and Prosecutors (no. 303/2004), the judicial advancement for magistrates is
decided through an examination process, organized by the NIM at the request of the
SCM. To be considered for advancement and eligible for participating at the examination,
the magistrates must have received a "very well" on their last professional evaluation,
have not been disciplined in the previous three years, and have served a certain minimum
period in the lower courts: five years to be appointed to the tribunal, six years to be
appointed to courts of appeal and the prosecutor offices adjacent to them, and eight years
for the HCCJ (Statute Law, Art. 44 (1)). The promotion exam to executive positions
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consists of oral and written tests that include both theoretical and practical issues and of
the development of a specialized study. However, at the beginning of 2005, the objective
criteria of performance and integrity according to which judges should be evaluated were
still lacking, as was a coherent evaluation system for prosecutors (Freedom House 2005).
In August 2005, SCM introduced a series of changes in the evaluation process of
magistrates. Prior to that date, the evaluations were made at the end of each year and
covered such matters as the number of cases processed by each judge, the rate of reversal,
and the quality of the opinion writing. The evaluations were prepared by the courts
presidents and were considered to be subjective and to allow them to use their powers
discretionarily in the absence of objective evaluation criteria. This was a reason of
concern especially when the same court presidents were also members of the SCM and
could decide in disciplinary hearings, as was the case of most members of the SCM at the
time. The SCM Decision no. 24/2005 specifies that the evaluations will be made every
three years by a committee established by SCM. The decision also introduced new
criteria of evaluation, such as participation in seminars, studies abroad, and a foreign
language. However, the procedures regarding the promotion exams (which became the
rule in 2005) were changed three times by March 2006.
The evolution of promotions to executive positions at courts and prosecutors'
offices through an examination is summarized in Table 10. The data provided by the
SCM indicate that, since the legal provisions stipulating the new criteria and avenue for
promotion were adopted in 2005, this was the only avenue employed. What is interesting
is that in 2005 more judges were promoted to executive positions than the number of
positions opened to be filled, a discrepancy which may be explained by either a misprint
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in the SCM report or the last minute opening of six more positions which were filled with
the candidates which passed an exam and were the top of the list below the passing line.

Table 10
Promotions to Executive Positions via Exams
Prosecutor's Offices

Courts
Year

No. Positions
Opened

No. Positions
Filled

No. Positions
Opened

No. Positions
Filled

2005

90

9693

90

42

2006

278

159

200

65

Total

368

255

290

107

Source: SCM, Report on the State of the Judiciary 2005 and 2006.

Regardless, the data show an increase in the number of positions opened for
executive positions and the number of magistrates promoted through an exam. Moreover,
the data indicate that more than sixty seven percent of executive positions for prosecutors
remained opened at the end of 2006.Two explanations for the significant number of
positions remained unoccupied at the end of 2006 may be the degree of difficulty of the
exam and the level of preparation of the candidates. One of the new promotion criteria to
executive positions consists in the preparation and presentation of a management project,
which magistrates claim to be too difficult and something that they were never thought
how to do (NGO Interviewee 4, March 16 2007). Despite the difficulties in developing
the best means to ensure objective criteria for magistrates' promotion, the employment of
an exam is a sign of progress and it is a better option than a promotion based on the
subjective evaluation of the hierarchical superiors.

93

This is the number presented in the SCM Report.
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8.3. Continuous Professional Training

According to the 2004 Statute Law and the subsequent iterations, the National
Institute of Magistracy (NIM) is responsible for ensuring the initial professional training
of the future judges and prosecutors (i.e., law school graduates) and it is an important part
of the continuous professional training program. The NIM's activity is directly
coordinated by the SCM, which approves the organization of entry exams in the
magistracy and promotion exams as well as the curriculum for the professional training
programs. The first program of continuous training for magistrates was approved by the
SCM in 2005 and it was developed in response to the new challenges imposed by the
changes in the legislation, the process of accession to the EU, and the Judicial Reform
Strategy (SRJ). By the end of 2005, the NIM organized 87 seminars that addressed a
variety of topics, including the changes of the penal law, the EU laws and practices,
human rights, ethics and deontology, intellectual property, and juvenile law. The
seminars were designed to train 15 to 25 magistrates per seminar the latter being
organized as two or four day seminars (NIM, Program for Continuous Training 2005).
Hence, in 2005, an average number of 1740 magistrates participated in those seminars.
Due to the budgetary increase in 2006, the NIM was able to almost double the
number of seminars offered organizing 157 seminars. Thus, 2551 judges and 793
prosecutors participated in the program of continuous professional training organized by
the NIM in 2006. Additionally, the topics covered by the seminars were also more
diverse including training in fighting corruption, human trafficking, organized crime,
money laundering, financial crimes, and foreign languages (SCM 2006, 204-206). These
data indicate an increasing concern for ensuring a continuous training for magistrates, a
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concern that is translated into higher resources allocated for these programs and higher
number of seminars covering more important judicial topics, although there is no
evidence to assess the effectiveness or the real impact of those seminars.

9. The Impact of Anticorruption Strategies

This chapter assessed the implementation of institutional strategies designed to
reform the judicial system and fight corruption within this sector. The analysis has shown
that in order to combat corruption, the Romanian Government opted for a multi-pronged
approach as suggested by anticorruption experts and scholars. Given the significance of
this sector for the rule of law, democratic consolidation, and EU accession, it is not very
surprising to discover the significant effort made to reform and clean up the judiciary. As
hypothesized, the increase in the external pressure to reform the judiciary and fight
corruption led to an increase in the demonstrated political will, which was manifested in
the adoption of institutional strategies that addressed the problem of corruption from
multiple angles. The analysis has demonstrated that the results achieved in reforming and
curbing corruption in the judiciary have been mixed and while some progress has been
made, there still remain important weaknesses.
There was progress in the establishment of judicial oversight and anticorruption
institutions with significant impact also for the enforcement of anticorruption legislation.
The adoption of the 2004 judicial reform package resulted in one of the most important
changes in this sector since the fall of communism, namely, the de facto independence of
the SCM, the guarantor of judicial independence and the agency solely responsible for
the magistrates' careers. The increased political commitment to reform and fight
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corruption in the judiciary manifested in the last two years prior to the EU accession
through an increase in the financial and human resources allocated for the functioning of
the SCM and NAPO. Moreover, the creation of NAPO represented an important step in
the fight against corruption which, besides the symbolic message sent to the Romanian
public and the EU that there was political will to curb corruption, led to a focus on
medium and high level corruption. The latter was particularly important to tackle in order
to show the public that the law is impartial and no one is above it and, of course, because
it was consistently requested by the EU. The adoption in 2003 of the legislation regarding
the publication of declarations of assets and income and the conflict of interest for
dignitaries and other public officials was another point of progress in the fight against
corruption, especially when coupled with FOIA.
t

The adoption of the legal provisions guaranteeing the public's access to
information represented an important step forward, particularly for a populace marked by
decades of secrecy. The creation of new avenues for the public to check the activity of
public institutions and how they manage their finances has contributed to the institutional
strategies designed to increase the transparency of judicial procedures and the functioning
of judicial institutions. The creation of bureaus and departments responsible for
informing the public and mass media about the activities of judicial institutions, along
with the creation of web pages, the drafting of guides with judicial information for the
public, and the organization of "Open Doors' Day" events contributed to an
unprecedented openness and transparency of the judiciary, reflected also in the increasing
number of favorable answers given to the FOIA requests.

278

Another important part of combating corruption was to restore to public's trust in
the judicial system and the adoption and dissemination of the Code of Ethics was part of
that strategy. The Code of Ethics was designed to offer magistrates a guideline for
professional behavior and the SCM along with the Ministry of Justice developed a series
of seminars to ensure the dissemination of the Code and to raise awareness about its
existence and content. The introduction of new rules regarding magistrates' careers
represented a first step towards the establishment of a system that rewards quality and
merit and where the old rules of corruption are no longer prevalent. Additionally, the
SCM began implementing a series of seminars through the NIM designed to ensure the
continuous professional training of magistrates in already familiar areas as well as in new
ones, such as the EU legislation, the fight against corruption, and the fight against
international organized crimes.
Nonetheless, there still remain important deficiencies to address in the judiciary
which require a continuous effort from policy-makers, magistrates and the public if the
judicial reform and the fight against corruption are to be successful. Thus, the
enforcement of anticorruption legislation in cases of high corruption remains to be
demonstrated since no high official has to date been successfully prosecuted for
corruption offenses. While NAPO made several attempts to bring "big fishes" before the
court, it failed due to either insufficient evidence or the MP's lack of support in
investigating one of their own. Furthermore, the continuation of the dual mandates
situation of the SCM members negatively impacts their work at the SCM and the courts
or prosecutor's offices where they hold positions, the functioning of their institutions, and
the image of the SCM in society. The limitation represented by the avenue of attack in
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cases of negative responses to FOIA requests (i.e., refusal to provide information) is
another important deficiency. In a society where the judicial institutions are regarded
with distrust by most people, the use of the judicial process to receive an answer from
public institutions reluctant to comply with the FOIA legal provisions makes the access
to public information a cumbersome and expensive procedure that only some could
afford.
While the adoption of new rules regarding the admission into Magistracy and
promotion represents important progress their application has had mixed results which
has underscored the existence of serious problems. Thus, the number of those directly
appointed to magistrates' positions continues to remain high despite the fact that this
avenue is to be used rarely and only to supplement the number of positions left available
after the organization of exams to fill them. Furthermore, the number of promotions via
examination remains low despite the important number of positions opened for career
advancement. These problems indicate that, even though the rules regarding the
magistrates' careers have been changed several times since their adoption (i.e., since
2005), there is still left room for improvement in both the quality of the rules, the design
of the exams, and the quality of candidates/magistrates. The impact of the legislation
designed to encourage a change in the institutional structure of corruption by protecting
those who whistle to blow on illegal or suspicious activities is another problem. On
paper, the legislation looks perfect and it conforms to the international standards, but in
practice it cannot be assessed and none of the interviewees was able to provide any
information regarding its implementation or effectiveness. Hence, it is evident that the
implementation of this legislation is deficient, non-transparent, and ineffective.
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The analysis of the institutional strategies targeting the judiciary revealed that for
the most part they were adopted and implemented in a short period of time and that the
most progress was made in the last two years prior to Romania's accession to the EU.
Due to their late adoption and implementation, it is difficult to assess their effectiveness
and to definitively conclude that they achieved the desired goals. On the other hand, there
is sufficient evidence to show that progress has been made and that it would be difficult
to reverse the process of reform at this point.
Although the analysis of the institutional strategies shows that Romania has made
progress in reforming the judiciary and combating corruption within this sector, the
effectiveness of institutional strategies should also be felt by the public. Thus, the
public's perception and experience with corruption in the judiciary should decrease as a
result of the implementation of varied anticorruption strategies. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, the public perceives corruption to be a very serious problem in the
judiciary placing this sector among the most corrupt sectors in the country. But
perceptions may be inflated and while they are important in assessing the level of
corruption in a country, they may offer a distorted image of reality due to the influence
exerted by the media, friends, and political figures. A more accurate estimate of
corruption would be to measure the actual experiences with corruption, although a
cautionary note is in order in this case too, namely that corruption is an illegal activity
and people may be reluctant to admit of taking or giving bribe. Nonetheless, if a
particular sector is corrupt and people perceive those working in that sector as being
corrupt, they should logically also report many experiences with corruption when
interacting with those public officials. Hence, if corruption continues to be perceived as a
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widespread problem, the actual experiences with corruption should indicate a similar
situation.
Unfortunately, while perceptions of corruption were measured almost every year
in Romania, the actual experiences with corruption were not. Hence, the Barometers of
Public Opinion, commissioned by the Open Society Foundation Romania, provide
comparable data for only two years or four data points (i.e., fall 2003, spring and fall
2004, and spring 2005), as illustrated in Figure 21 Despite the very short span, the
comparison is still important because it indicates a potentially significant discrepancy
between perceptions and actual experiences with corruption.

Figure 21
Comparison of Perceptions vs. Experiences of Corruption in the Judiciary
(2003-2005)
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Source: Barometer of Public Opinion 2003-2005, Open Society Foundation Romania
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The question about the level of perception of corruption was measured on a
frequency scale94 and in order to make it comparable to the question assessing the actual
experiences with corruption, only the percent of those who answered that "very many"
and "almost all" magistrates are corrupt were added and graphed. Ninety five percent
confidence intervals were calculated around the data points in order to determine if there
are significant differences over time.
As Figure 21 shows, the two slopes are significantly different and while they do
appear to move parallel to each other, the level of experiences with corruption is
consistently lower than the level of perception. While the percent of individuals
interacting with the courts over the course of a year may be smaller than in other sectors,
the low number of answers confirming the existence of corruption in judicial courts
suggests that corruption is a smaller problem than indicated by the level of perceptions.
Furthermore, the slight decline in the actual experiences with corruption after 2003
indicate that institutional strategies work but are less visible by the public, particularly if
there is no direct interaction with the judicial system.
While these findings are encouraging, the very fact that corruption continues to be
perceived as being such a significant issue is problematic because it affects the trust
people have in the judiciary and, implicitly, in the rule of law. Moreover, it may also
indicate that anticorruption strategies do not work as well as expected if their impact is
not perceived by the general public. On the other hand, it may be the case, as suggested
by several interviewees, that the perception of high corruption in the judiciary is
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The answers to the question "How widespread do you think corruption is among magistrates?" was
measured on a four point scale: 1= "Almost None", 2="Very few", 3="Very many", 4="Almost all". The
questions assessing the experiences with corruption, "In order to be treated fairly in courts did you have to
offer additional money, gifts, favors..?", was measured on a binary scale: l="No" and 2="Yes".
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artificially sustained by those who have vested interests in maintaining a "weak third
power in state", namely politicians. Magistrates blame the ministers of justice
(particularly Macovei, who launched an anticorruption campaign in the judiciary in 2006)
and President Basescu for creating a negative image of magistrates and the judicial
system. For those working in the judiciary, corruption is a political tool to gain votes and
avoid taking care of important problems; that is, it is easier to accuse magistrates of being
corrupt than to ensure that they have proper conditions to work and are decently paid for
their work. Cases when judges were accused of being corrupt in open court also do not
help to improve the image of the judiciary or to make the magistrates more honest (NGO
Interviewee 4, March 16 2007 and Interview Magistrate Professional Organization,
March 26 2007). On the contrary, "the over emphasis on corruption affects the morale of
judges, it makes them angry, and it does not make the corrupt to give up the bad habits"
(Interview Judicial Expert, May 22 2007).
Although there is clear evidence that demonstrates progress in reforming the
judiciary and combating corruption, the visibility of those results is less obvious. The
short time span for implementing many important institutional strategies explains in part
the continuous perception of corruption as being very problematic in this sector. A longer
time is necessary in order for the strategies to produce results and for their effectiveness
to become noticeable by the general public. Perhaps, a change of focus of anticorruption
rhetoric from the judiciary to other problematic sectors (such as health care) may help
improve the image of the current "poster boy" for corruption.
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CHAPTER VI

COMBATING CORRUPTION IN THE CUSTOMS SECTOR

"The stigma of corruption in customs was artificially createdfrom a small
minority of corrupt customs officials and now it is referred to as
generalized! "95

1. Introduction

Corruption in customs sector represents a particular problem due to the important
role this sector plays for a nation's economy and the safety of its citizens. A corrupt
customs sector negatively impacts the trade community and the budget revenue with
serious fiscal and economic consequences. Furthermore, corruption in this sector favors
illegal trafficking of toxic goods or drugs, with potential serious repercussions for public
health, or even the illegal trafficking of humans. Consequently, a corrupt customs sector
alters the image of the country and the government both at the national and international
level. Since joining the EU meant that Romania would become the former's eastern
border, reforming and cleaning up of the customs sector prior to January 1, 2007 became
one of the top priorities for the Romanian government.
This chapter assesses the institutional anticorruption strategies adopted and
implemented by the Romanian government in the customs sector in the decade prior to
the EU accession. The first section presents a brief recent history of the customs sectors
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Interview Constantin Barbulescu, Vice-President of the National Customs Authority, May 24, 2007.
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and the organizational structure of the Romanian customs system. The following sections
analyze the institutional strategies adopted and implemented in this sector. The chapter
concludes with an evaluation of these institutional strategies on reforming and curbing
corruption in customs.

2. The Organizational Structure of the Customs Sector

2.1 .Brief History of the Romanian Customs System

The modern institution of Romanian Customs was established in 1859, a year that
marks the creation of the national Romanian state. That year, new legislation regulating
the functioning and structure of Romanian customs sector was adopted along with an
increased effort to build a modern infrastructure necessary for the functioning of the
customs institutions. The modernization and its positive effects were undermined first in
1938, when the constitutional monarchy was replaced by the king Carol II' s personal
dictatorship, and then again in 1945, when the communists took control of the
government. The first measures undertaken by the communist regime aimed at the
absolute control of the customs services, which was achieved by the replacement of
"bourgeois" customs employees with those loyal to the Romanian Communist Party
(RCP) and the adoption of new legislation. The communist legislation intended not only
to ensure the absolute control over the country's borders, but also to integrate Romania
within the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance).95 To ensure the
absolute enforcement of the new legislation, the communist government assigned
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COMECON was the economic organization of communist states from 1949 until 1991 and included, in
addition to the countries with a full membership status (i.e., Soviet Union and the communist countries of
the CEE), communist countries from outside the region, such as Vietnam, Mongolia, Cuba, and China.
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Securitate, the Romanian Secret Police, the role of keeping under close surveillance the
functioning of customs sector. The infiltration of Securitate officers in the customs sector
ensure the full control of the communist regime in this sector and succeeded in isolating
the country from the outside world, including the communist one. The customs sector
underwent also a restructuring of its institutions by the creation, in 1973, of the General
Department of Customs (GDC), the institution responsible for the unitary functioning and
effectiveness of customs services in Romania. In the following years, a number of
Regional Departments of Customs were established under the authority of the GDC, a
structure that had been largely maintained after the fall of the communist regime in 1989
(Ciupala n.d.).

2.2. The Structure of the Customs Sector

After 1990, the General Department of Customs (GDC) continued its activity as
an institution subordinated to the Ministry of Finance and responsible for the unitary
functioning and effectiveness of customs services at the national level. At the regional
level, the GDC exercises its authority through ten Regional Departments of Customs,97
forty seven Internal Customs Offices and sixty three Border Customs Offices (Center for
Judicial Resources 2004). The activity and functioning of the GDC was stipulated in the
Government Decision no. 498/1994 and the Government Decision no. 147/1996, the
latter being changed in 1998 by the Government Decision no. 939. All these legislation
were designed to reform the customs administration and to prepare it for the alignment
with the EU legislation.
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The ten Regional Directorates of Customs are located in Arad, Brasov, Bucharest, Cluj, Constanta,
Craiova, Galati, Iasi, Oradea and Timisoara.
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In 2003, in an effort to increase the efficiency of the Ministry of Finance to collect
taxes and revenues, the GDC was transferred under the direct supervision of a newly
established department, namely the National Control Authority. The latter, established
within the Ministry of Finance to ensure a unitary control and more efficient management
of the fiscal system, was dismantled in spring 2004 due to unsuccessful attempts of
achieving its goals being replaced, by the National Agency for Fiscal Administration
(NAFA). At the same time, the GDC became the National Customs Authority (NCA),
whose organizational structure is captured in Figure 22.

Figure 22
Organizational Structure of the National Customs Authority (Simplified)

Source: National Customs Authority of Romania, http://www.customs.ro/ (accessed
August 14, 2009)
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The transformation of the GDC into the NCA was mostly symbolic, the structure and
functioning of the customs institutions remaining practically unchanged (Interview C.
Barbulescu, May 24, 2007). Thus, the NCA, established by the Government Ordinance
no. 366/2004,98 is responsible for implementing the government's customs policy at the
national level, for representing the Romanian state in the international arena, and for
ensuring the proper and effective management of customs institution, including managing
financial resources and customs personnel.

3. Institutional Strategies

The customs administrations, although different in their organizational structure
from country to country, have similar objectives: to control the goods that cross state
borders (imports, exports, and transit goods), to collect duties and taxies, to implement
trade policies, to combat illegal crossing of goods and people, and to protect the public
(Hors 2001). In order to achieve these objectives, customs authorities perform a series of
technical operations, which can be divided in two broad categories: cargo processing and
enforcement (Gill 2001). Cargo processing includes such operations as manifest and
customs declaration processing; classification, valuation, and assessment of goods;
payments of customs duty; transit cargo processing; and export processing. The
enforcement refers to all operations performed by customs authorities to monitor and
detect non-compliance, fraud and contraband (Gill 2001, 134). Generally, the cargo
processing operations offer customs officers the opportunities to exercise more discretion
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The Government Decision no. 366/2004 was amended in 2005 (Government Decision no. 165) and again
in 2009 (Government Decision no. 110).
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in the implementation of customs rules and procedures creating, thus, more opportunities
for corruption.
Nonetheless, the most common types of corruption encountered in customs
suggest that corrupt behavior is not limited to the cargo processing aspect of customs
activities. These types of corruption, which can occur isolated or in combination, have
been categorized as a) routine corruption, when private operators pay bribes in order to
obtain the normal completion of customs operations or to hasten that process; b)
fraudulent corruption, when private operators bribe customs officers to let them pass the
goods without paying any taxes or to undervalue the goods in order to pay less taxes; and
c) criminal corruption, when private operators bribe customs officers to allow an
absolutely illegal, lucrative operation (e.g. drug trafficking, human trafficking, etc) (Hors
2001, 15). While these forms of corruption revolve around bribe-taking or bribe-giving,
other forms of corruption such as nepotism, favoritism, clientelism, or misappropriation
of public funds may also occur in the customs sector. To effectively address all types of
corruption and to ensure the long-term effects of those anticorruption strategies, the fight
against corruption needs to be comprehensive and multi-pronged. This chapter analyzes
the following institutional strategies: 1) the enforcement of legislation, 2) the creation and
effectiveness of oversight institutions and anticorruption agencies, 3) the increase in
transparency, 4) the adoption and implementation of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), 5) the adoption and implementation of ethics codes, and 6) the existence and
implementation of merit-based civil service. Due to the lack of data regarding the
adoption, implementation, and effectiveness of whistleblower and witness protection, this
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strategy is no longer included in the discussion of institutional strategies in this and
subsequent empirical chapters.

3.1. The Legislative Foundation

Reforming the customs sector and combating corruption required, in addition to
the general anticorruption legislation, the adoption and implementation of legislation
addressing the very functioning of customs institutions and the transposition of the
Chapter 25 of the EU acquis. Perhaps the most important legislative step was represented
by the adoption of the new Customs Code (Law no. 141) on July 24, 1997, which was
also the first step taken towards aligning Romanian legislation to the common EU
customs legislation (Ciupala n.d.). Three years later, in November 2001, the Parliament
also adopted the secondary legislation (Government Decisions no. 1114) regarding the
rules for implementing the 1997 Customs Code, completing thus the first part of aligning
the Romanian customs legislation to the EU requirements. The 1997 Customs Code was
abrogated in 2006 by the adoption of a new version of the Customs Code (Law no. 86),
which ensured the complete transposition of the acquis and the correction of any
differences that existed between the Romanian and EU legislation in this sector. Due to
the significance and urgency of finalizing the process of aligning the Romanian
legislation with the EU common legislation before January 2007, the 2006 Customs Code
was adopted with almost complete unanimity (only seven MPs voted against it and six
abstained from a total of 188) and no substantive debate. The Customs Code was
complemented by a series of other legislation regulating the functioning of this sector and
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combating corruption, such as legislation regarding the increase of transparency, access
to information, and customs personnel, all of them discussed later in this chapter.
To specifically tackle corruption in the customs sector, the

Anti-Corruption

Strategy of the National Customs Authority 2005-2007 (ASNCA 2005-7) and the Action
Plan Against Corruption for 2005 and 2006 were developed and approved in response to
the Freedom House 2005 Evaluation Report of the anticorruption strategies adopted and
implemented by the Romanian Government in the period 2001-2004. The ASNCA 20057, approved in March 30, 2005 by Government Decision no. 231, was designed to
"indicate the concern of the customs administration to fulfill its political, economic and
social duties, with maximum integrity and professionalism" (National Customs Authority
2005, 2). Furthermore, the ASNCA 2005-7 was developed on the following principles: 1)
the rule of law, 2) responsibility, 3) prevention, cooperation and coherence, 4)
transparency and social dialogue, and 5) public-private partnership. As these principles
indicate, the ASNCA 2005-7 was envisaged as a multi-pronged approach to fight
corruption, a fact reflected in the three main chapters that comprised the section on
Priority Action Directions. That is, the attack on corruption in customs included strategies
on prevention and transparency, consolidation of internal investigation capacity
(specifically the Internal Verification Division"), and cooperation within the customs
sector and with other state institutions responsible for fighting corruption (such as the
Border Police and the General inspectorate of Romanian Police). The Action Plans
Against Corruption for 2005 and 2006, which accompanied the ASNCA, included the
specific measures with the associated deadlines, resources, the institutions responsible for
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The Internal Verification Division and the Internal Control and Audit Division mentioned in Chapter III
are one and the same, only the title used by the EC in its Regular Reports is different.
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their implementation, and the indicators for evaluating the results. The Internal
Verification Division was assigned the responsibility of monitoring the implementation
and the effectiveness of the ASNCA 2005-7.
Regarding the enforcement of legislation and sanctions, there is no data available
regarding the number of customs officers indicted and/or convicted for corruption
offences in the period studied here, except for 30 customs officers arrested by the NAPO
in September 2006. That elaborate operation was the result of the cooperation between
NCA, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, and the NAPO and it was noted by the
national media and the EC in its final pre-accession Regular Report. Other allegations of
corruption in customs sector are presented in the mass media, but the official data
obtained from NAPO and Ministry of Justice, upon filing FOIA requests, does not
distinguish the offenses of corruption by sector or by professional category.

3.2. Oversight Institutions and Anticorruption Agencies: The Internal Verification
Division

In addition to the NAPO, the institution responsible for investigating and indicting
medium and high level corruption in all sectors, the Internal Verification Division (IVD)
was established in 2001 to monitor the proper implementation of customs legislation and
detect any violations of custom rules. Moreover, beginning with 2005, the IVD was
assigned sole responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the ASNCA 2005-7,
which included the prevention, discovery and sanctioning of corruption offenses among
customs personnel.
The Internal Verification Division, created in 2001 as an "independent and
impartial division, directly subordinated to the Vice-President of the National Agency of
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Fiscal Administration" (National Customs Authority 2005, 7), represented a step forward
in the fight against corruption in customs sector. Until 2005, when territorial divisions of
the IVD were created, the central IVD was the only institution responsible for the
monitoring, combating, and discovery of any violation of customs legislation, including
corrupt activities in the customs sector. Upon the discovery of any irregularities, the IVD
would inform the Disciplinary Committee and propose sanctions for such violations
(Interview S. Puica, May 24, 2007). In 2005, in an effort to demonstrate an increased
political will to combat corruption, the responsibilities of IVD were expanded to include
the prevention of corruption; the monitoring of customs officials; the discovery of any
violations of the ethics code or customs statute which could lead to corruption; and the
collaboration with other institutions responsible for combating corruption, such as the
border police, national police, and the financial guard. According to the Director of the
IVD, §tefan Puica, the effectiveness of IVD has improved since the creation of the
territorial divisions "by increasing the risk of being caught if violating the customs
legislation and rules or if engaging in corrupt activities" (Interview S. Puica, May 24,
2007). The re-structuring of IVD in 2005 made it easier to conduct unexpected
inspections increasing, thus, the chances of detecting any irregularities. Moreover, the
creation of territorial divisions contributed to an improvement in the communication
between the central and local customs divisions with positive consequences for the
effectiveness of customs activity.
The capacity of IVD is directly impacted by the resources, human and financial,
allocated for its functioning. However, this type of information is not available to the
public and the only data available regarding the personnel assigned to the IVD was
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obtained during the personal interview with the Director of IVD, S. Puica, in May 24,
2007. According to him, the IVD and its territorial divisions suffer from a more general
problem specific to the customs sector, namely, the insufficient personnel. Since no
specific number was given, it is impossible to determine the exact number of people
assigned to conduct the control and verification work within the customs sector.
A similar problem exists with regard to the financial resources allocated for the
functioning of IVD. The information regarding the financial resources allocated to the
NCA is public information and, although it does not shed direct light on the resources
apportioned to the IVD, it provides important information about the Romanian
Government's commitment to reform and combat corruption in the customs sector. The
budgetary information was obtained as a result of a FOIA request, filed in March 9, 2009,
and it covers the entire decade under study here. To show the exact evolution of
budgetary resources allocated to the customs sector since 1997 two issues were
considered, namely, inflation and discounting. Accounting for inflation implies adjusting
the costs from each year (i.e., the budgets), expressed in "nominal" terms, to the price
level of a single year (in this case, the first year of the analysis, 1997), after which they
are expressed in "real" terms. The consumer price index (CPI), which reflects the price
changes due to inflation, is used to calculate the "real" values of costs (Levin and
McEwan 2001, 88). For example, to calculate the real value for 1998, the CPI100 for 1997
(i.e., real 1997 ROL) is divided by the CPI for 1998, which is then multiplied by the
nominal cost of 1998. The real values of each year, expressed in ROL, are then adjusted
for "their time value, a procedure that is referred to as "discounting"" (Levin and
100

The CPIs were obtained from the Romanian National Institute of Statistics, available at
http://www.insse.ro/cms/rw/pages/ipc.en.do (accessed June 15, 2009). See Appendix E for a presentation of
CPIs and the adjusted budgets for inflation and discounting.
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McEwan 2001, 90). Discounting, often confused with adjusting for inflation, is not only a
different procedure, but it must be considered even when there is no inflation at all. To
calculate the discounted value (or the "present" value) for the 1997-2006 budgets, I used
the formula 101 provided by Levine and McEwan (2001, 92) and the mean value of the
monthly discount rates provided by the National Bank of Romania from February 2002
until December 2006, the only discount rates available and which are presented in
Appendix D.
The calculated discounted budgets were then converted to U.S. dollars by using
the 1997 currency exchange rate provided by the National Bank of Romania, namely
7167.94 ROL to $1. Furthermore, to show the statistically significant changes in the
amounts of financial resources allocated over time, I calculated the confidence intervals
around the discounted budgets, expressed in real 1997 dollars. The confidence intervals
(CIs) placed around the budgetary values become larger over time, which is explained by
the formula for calculating the discounting budgetary values. That is, when calculating
the lower and upper ninety five percent CIs, the only value that changes is the discount
rate, which decreases or increases depending on the CI calculated. Hence, the lower
ninety five percent CI would have a higher value because the denominator is smaller,
while the upper bound of the ninety five percent CI will have a higher value. Figure 23
presents the evolution of the budgetary funds allotted to the customs sector in the decade
prior to the country's accession to the EU.
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The formula is: PV=Ct/(l+r)t"1, where PV is the "present" value, called here the "discounted value"; C is
the cost or budget; r is the discount rate; and t is the year in which the cost outlay will be made. For more
information, see Levine and McEwan, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 2001, 92.
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Figure 23
The Evolution of Budgetary Funds Allocated to the Customs Sector
(Real 1997 Dollars)

Time
Source: National Customs Authority, Response to FOIA request (March 9, 2009)

As shown in Figure 23, beginning with 1998, there was an important increase in
the budgetary funds allocated for the reform of the customs sector, but the highest point
was reached in 2001 the year that the IVD was created. The statistical significant increase
in the budgetary funds in 2001 is explained by several factors. First, the victory of the
Social Democratic Party and his leader, Ion Iliescu, was regarded with concern in
Brussels due to the poor performance the SDP had under the previous six years of
Iliescu's presidency (1990-1996). Consequently, the newly elected government was
determined to show the EU that it was committed to develop and implement important
reforms that would restructure the customs sector and combat corruption. Allocating
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significantly higher financial resources was one important means of demonstrating their
political will. Second, in Romania, as in other countries in CEE, the budget is divided in
several separate sections, such as the "current budget", "budget for development and
modernization", and "appended budget" (Allen and Tommasi 2001). In 2001, there was a
slight increase in the budgetary funds assigned for development and modernization and
an increase in the extra-budgetary funds, in addition to the allocation, for the first time, of
non-refundable external credits (see Appendix E). The sum of all these separate budgets
explains the difference in the budgetary funds allocated to the customs sector in 2001,
this being the only year when funds from all four different types of budgetary sources
were brought together. The statistically significant decrease in 2002 and then again in
2005 can be explained by the reduction of the special funds allocated for modernization
and development and the absence of any other extra-budgetary or external credits for the
customs sector. Another explanation is represented by the changes produced by the
inflation rate and time, both affecting the real value of the money allocated over time,
even though the nominal values in ROL appeared to follow an ascendant trend (see
Appendix F).
Hence, it can be inferred that the financial resources allocated for the
development and functioning of the IVD followed a similar descending pattern as the
funds allocated to the NCA. The decision to establish territorial divisions in 2005 was
followed by a slight budgetary increase in 2006, although it is difficult to say how much
it was assigned for this purpose. An increase in the effectiveness of IVD, reflected by the
number of controls conducted and sanctions proposed for various violations of customs
legislation, including corruption offenses among customs personnel, would imply that
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there was an improvement in the resources, human and financial, allocated to the IVD. In
fact, the very creation of territorial divisions implies an increase in the number of
personnel assigned for these operations. Thus, if in 2005, the IVD performed a total of 90
inspections, 48 of them unannounced, in 2006 the IVD performed a total of 158
inspections, 123 of them being unannounced. Moreover, in 2006, the IVD also conducted
43 investigations of customs violations and misconduct. The increase in the number of
inspections performed was accompanied by an increase in the number of sanctions
proposed for various offenses discovered during those inspections or as a result of the
investigations of misconduct among customs personnel, as presented in Table 11.

Table 11
The Evolution of Sanctions Proposed by IVD

Year
2004
2005
2006

Written
Reprimand

Inform
Disciplinary
Committee

29

48

54

144

67

100

Inform
NAPO or the Temporary
Prosecutor's Transfer
Office

Total
Proposed
Sanctions

10

87

30

69

297

14

54

235

—

Source: National Customs Authority, Internal Document.

The data indicate that the restructuring of the IVD by establishing territorial
divisions had a positive effect on the activity of inspection, detection of misconduct and
corruption offenses, and even in the sanctioning of those offenses. If prior to 2005, there
was no cooperation between customs and prosecutor's offices, the situation changed and
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The Document was given to me by the Director of IVD, Mr. §tefan Puica, during the interview
conducted on May 24, 2007.

i
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the IVD became receptive to investigate allegations of corruption presented by mass
media and/or individual complaints. Nonetheless, the small number of cases referred to
the NAPO or other local prosecutor's offices suggests that there is still a long way to go
until corruption is no longer an issue in this sector. A problem in the cooperation between
IVD and penal institutions is considered to be the latter's reluctance to collaborate with
customs institutions which are perceived as being completely corrupt. Nonetheless, steps
towards improving the working relationship between these two types of institutions have
been taken since 2005 and a protocol between NAPO and NCA is underway (Interview
S. Puica, May 24, 2007).
Hence, it is safe to conclude that the creation of the territorial divisions has
positively impacted the overall effectiveness of the IVD, a fact reflected by the increasing
number of inspections and investigations, as well as by the activity of detecting and
sanctioning breaches of the code of ethics, including corruption, by the customs officers.
According to the 2006 report on the Measures Taken by the National

Customs

Administration to Prevent and Reduce Corruption among Customs Personnel, if in 2004
there was a generalized perception of corruption in the customs sector, two years later
that perception had completely disappeared, although some isolated cases of corruption
continued to tarnish the image of the customs institution (Autoritatea Nationala a Vamilor
2006a, 6). However, the two year period that shows an improvement in the activity of
IVD is too short to allow such a definitive conclusion, although it indicates a positive
direction in the fight against corruption.
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3.3. Transparency

An important aspect of the fight against corruption is the reduction of the
discretionary power of public servants. Increasing the transparency of the decisionmaking process and of the implementation and enforcement of legislation, rules, and/or
procedures is one main strategy designed to achieve that goal. Transparency in customs
sector includes not only the publication of the legislation, rules, and regulations specific
to this sector, but also open access to the information regarding all customs procedures.
Having that information allows individuals and firms to be prepared when entering the
customs offices (or points of taxation) and to adequately respond to any attempts of
harassment or intimidation made by the customs staff with the intent to gain unlawful
benefits. The existence of clear and transparent rules and regulations would thus decrease
the opportunities for corruption.
Attempts to increase transparency in customs sector were made beginning with
2000 when the Development Strategy of Customs Administration for 2000-2005 was
introduced. The restructuring and modernization of customs sector were also included in
the National Anticorruption Strategy for 2001-2004 (NASC I) and the Action Plan
Against Corruption that accompanied the NASC I. Thus, the first measures designed to
increase the transparency of customs procedures included the creation of public and
media relations divisions; the establishment of a hot line for the general public to report
any misconduct or corrupt activity; and the creation of a pilot pay-office station where
individuals and firms could pay all the taxes associated with the customs procedures
(Guvernul Romaniei 2002, 48-49).
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Another important step towards increasing transparency was represented by the
development and implementation of the Romanian Integrated Tariff (TARIR) and the
computerization of the customs system which would allow a more efficient activity. The
adoption, in 2005, of the Law no. 159 regarding the TARIR established the opportunity
for all clients and customs staff to access online the information regarding their customs
obligations and rights. The main impact of TARIR was to ensure the uniform
implementation of customs regulations and the reduction of opportunities for customs
staff to "harass" the clients (individuals or firms) during the processing of customs
operations (Autoritatea Nationala a Vamilor 2006a, 3). Hence, TARIR is considered to be
an instrument that "ensures the transparency of customs procedures and an effective tool
for preventing and combating corruption" (Interview C. Barbulescu, May 24, 2007).
Additionally, the creation of a functioning IT infrastructure allows the public to
access more easily the necessary information, increasing thus the effectiveness of
customs officers and clients' activities. Thus, in 2005 and 2006, the National
Computerized Transit System (NCTS) was implemented at 91 customs offices and, by
the end of 2006, it was completed also the implementation of the Automatic System
Customs Declarations (ASYCUDA). The impact of the computerized system of
processing customs operations was enhanced by the adoption in 2005 of the NCA
Decision no. 460 regarding the Norms for Simplified Customs Procedures and its
subsequent amendments. The adoption of these new norms allowed the clients to benefit
from the customs procedures employed by the EU countries and to process the customs
declarations without a direct contact with customs officers. By the end of 2006, 31
percent of the total customs declarations were being processed in the absence of a direct
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contact between the clients and customs officers and 1.167 firms were authorized to use
the simplified customs procedures (Autoritatea Nationala a Yamilor 2006b, 3).
Furthermore, after 2005, the activity of issuing customs authorizations was decentralized
allowing the territorial customs offices to issue the necessary customs authorizations,
speeding thus the customs procedures and reducing the opportunities for corruption at the
central customs authority (Interview S. Puica, May 24, 2007).
In addition to these measures, the development of the NCA website was another
step towards transparency. The website was also part of the reforming process that the
customs sector was undergoing and a new means of communicating to the public the
information regarding the customs legislation, procedures, the organizational structure,
the customs personnel, and other information of public interest. The adoption of FOIA in
2001 positively impacted the communication between customs authorities and the public,
as it will be shown in the next section.
The adoption of simplified customs procedures, the computerization of the
customs sector and the implementation of ASYCUDA, the adoption and implementation
of TARIR are all important measures designed to increase the transparency of activity in
the customs sector. According to the two interviewees from the NCA (C. Barbulescu and
S. Puica, May 24, 2007), these measures changed the public's perception of corruption
being generalized in the customs sector to corruption being an isolated incident. Their
claim was based mainly on the studies conducted by the Center for Institutional Analysis
and Development (CIAD 2006) among customs staff and representatives of companies103
in 2006. The studies showed that 73 percent of the representatives of companies are
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The sample of companies was selected from the total number of companies that are conducting activities
involving customs procedures.
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"content" and "very content" with the activity of customs officers and 45 percent of them
believe that the customs officers are performing their duties "correctly". Moreover, 69
percent of the representatives of firms consider that the effectiveness of customs activity
is "more" and "much more" efficient than in 2004. When asked how often they made
unofficial payments to the customs officers, 54 percent of them answered "never" and
only 10 percent said "often" and "always". Hence, the decrease of those saying that there
is "much" and "very much" corruption in customs from 70 to 29 percent appears to
justify the NCA officials' claim that corruption in customs is no longer a generalized
problem. However, the optimism regarding the reduction of corruption in the customs
sector should be considered with a little bit of caution given the fact that to several
questions about corruption or unofficial payments to customs officers more than 50
percent of the respondents chose the answer "Do not know/Do not answer." Due to the
sensitive nature of the questions, it is understandable the reluctance of many respondents
to answer truthfully, but their refusal to answer corruption questions does not necessarily
mean that they considered it to be less problematic.
The responses of customs officers to similar questions about corruption in their
sector revealed, as expected, a similar image as the one presented by the NCA officials.
Specifically, less than seven percent of the customs officers interviewed said that the
customs activities create opportunities for corruption, although 35 percent of them
admitted that some customs procedures create opportunities for unofficial payments
(CIAD 2006a). The answers to one question revealed the existence of a discrepancy
between the customs personnel and the leaders of their central institution, the latter
claiming that by the implementation of TARIR it was "almost completely eliminated the
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opportunity for a customs officer to arbitrarily apply the law in the customs sector"
(Interview C. Barbulescu, May 24, 2007). That is, 69 percent of customs officers said that
they have "much" and "very much" discretion in interpreting the customs regulations and
procedures, which suggests that the changes made on paper are still yet to reach those
who are applying them on the ground. That response was interpreted as a result of
"ignorance and old mentality" that still exists among customs officers and of the high
level of complexity of customs regulations (Interview S. Puica, May 24, 2007).
Nonetheless, the high percentage of customs officers who perceive themselves as
possessing a high degree of discretionary powers in the implementation of customs
procedures remains a concern, despite the positive steps taken to increase transparency in
this sector.

3.4. Freedom of Information

The measures designed to increase transparency in the customs sector were
accompanied by the implementation of FOIA. Beginning with 2002, every public
institution was required to comply with FOIA stipulations and to answer all public
requests for public information, even if it would not be a favorable response. Chapter
Five presented the legislation and its limitations and therefore this section will focus
specifically on the enforcement of FOIA in the customs sector. The data was obtained
from the NCA in response to a FOIA request filed on March 9, 2009 and it covers the
period from 2003 until 2006. According to the NCA, there is no clear evidence of FOIA
requests received and resolved during 2002 because the Public Information Division,
responsible for ensuring and monitoring the implementation of FOIA, was created only in
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November 2002. Nonetheless, the data available for the subsequent four years,
summarized in Table 12, is a good indicator of how the access to public information is
ensured in the customs sector.

Table 12
The Evolution of FOIA Requests Received by Customs Institutions
Year

Answered Favorably

Rejected

Total

2003

601

8

874104

2004

2342

28

2370

2005

5131

164

5420

2006

6825

12

6852

Source: National Customs Authority, Response to FOIA Request (March 3, 2009)

The data clearly show an increase in the number of FOIA requests received and
answered favorably, particularly beginning with 2005 a year that coincides with a change
in the country's leadership and the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Strategy for the
National Customs Authority 2005-2007. The increasing pressure exercised by the
approaching EU accession date also played an important role by increasing the pressure
to demonstrate a real commitment to combat corruption. Granting the public access to
information is a strategy that not only further enhances the transparency of customs
activity, but it also shows a commitment to communicate with the public.
In addition to the unprecedented high number of FOIA requests received and
answered favorably, 2006 was also the first year when the negative responses of the
customs institutions to FOIA requests were challenged. Thus, a total of 16 administrative

104

The remaining number of FOIA requests were redirected to other public institutions because the
information solicited was specific to those other institutions.

306

complaints were filed against the decisions of the customs institution to reject the request
for public information and in nine cases, the plaintiffs won. Although small, the number
of administrative complaints indicates that the public is not only familiar with the
avenues for disputing a FOIA decision, but that it is willing to actually use those avenues
to obtain the information desired. Nonetheless, the ultimate avenue for contesting an
unfavorable FOIA decision, the court of law, was never employed and it suggests that
people continue to be reluctant to employ the judicial avenue. There are at least two
explanations for their reluctance: the complexity and high costs associated with a court
trial (financial cost, time, energy) or the lack of trust in the courts to favorably solve their
requests. Nonetheless, the data shows progress in the implementation of FOIA and,
implicitly, in combating corruption by granting the public access to information from the
customs sector, information that used to be confidential prior to the adoption of FOIA.

3.5. Ethics Code for the Customs Personnel

The success in fighting corruption depends also on the conduct of those who are
directly responsible for implementing and enforcing the customs legislation and
regulations. The adoption of clear codes of conducts are an important strategy to prevent
and combat corruption. The first Code of Ethics for customs personnel was adopted in
2002 (NCA Decision nr. 44) and it was amended a couple of times in the subsequent
years. The Code, a novelty in the customs sector, stipulates the professional behavior of a
customs officer, the appropriate demeanor in relations to other parties (such as
representatives of other institutions, clients, and mass media), and the sanctions for
violating any of these rules. Additionally, the Code specifies what forbidden behavior is
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(including influence peddling, favoritism, nepotism, and the use of their official position
to gain unlawful benefits) and it stipulates that the cases of ethics violations and the
sanctions adopted will be publicized throughout the customs sector, without disclosing
the identity of the individuals sanctioned.
The last parts of the Code are devoted to the rules of disseminating it among the
customs personnel and making it available to the public, as well as the institution
responsible for monitoring the implementation of those rules, namely, the Internal
Verification Division. The IVD was assigned the responsibility to detect any breaches of
code of conduct, along with the Disciplinary Committee, the directors of the Regional
Customs Divisions, and the presidents of local customs offices (Article 33). According to
the Article 38, the Code must be made public by posting it in a visible place in all
customs offices and institutions. Furthermore, Articles 22-25 specify that the public is to
be given, upon request, the free form for filing a complaint against a customs officer,
form included in the appendix to the Code. The complaints, collected in a special box
placed in a visible place in all customs institutions, are sent for investigation to the NCA
headquarters in Bucharest.
Prior to the creation of the Internal Verification Division in 2001, the Disciplinary
Committee was the sole organization responsible for investigating any allegation of
misconduct and to appropriately sanction the guilty parties. The establishment of the IVD
and its territorial units transferred part of the responsibilities for investigating allegations
of misconduct from the Disciplinary Committee. Nonetheless, the latter was still
authorized to conduct its own investigations and it has continued to be the sole division
responsible for sanctioning customs officers for violations of the Code of Ethics. The
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IVD has the authority to investigate cases of ethical misconduct and propose sanctions,
which are then considered by the Disciplinary Committee.
The organization and functioning of the Disciplinary Committees in public
institutions is regulated according to the Government Decision no. 1.210/2003.105 The
adoption of clear rules pertaining to the establishment of the Disciplinary Committees
followed the adoption of the Law regarding the Statute of Civil Servants (Law no.
188/1999), which specifies the activities that represent disciplinary offenses, the
sanctions that could be imposed for those offenses, and the person responsible for
enforcing the sanctions proposed by the disciplinary committees, namely the president of
the public institution. Thus, according to the Government Decision no. 1.210/2003, every
public institution with more than 12 employees must establish a disciplinary committee.
Each disciplinary committee is composed of four members, two nominated by the
president or director of the public institution and two by the civil servants' union
(Articles 4 and 5), to ensure the creation of a balanced and equitable committee. Each
member has a three year mandate with the possibility of renewing it once (Article 8). The
Government Decision no. 1.210/2003 further details the conditions that a public servant
must fulfill in order to be nominated as a member of the Disciplinary Committee, the
incompatibilities with this position, the procedures of investigating and reaching a
decision, as well as the responsibilities that the president of the Disciplinary Committee
has regarding the recording and reporting of their work. Since the customs officers are
considered to be public servants, the Disciplinary Committee is organized and functions
according to these rules. The graphic evolution of the disciplinary sanctions applied in the
customs sector from 1997 until 2006 is captured in Figure 24.
105

This Decision abrogated the previous Government Decision no. 1.083/2001.
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Figure 23
The Evolution of Disciplinary Sanctions in Customs Sector

Year

Source: National Customs Authority, Response to FOIA Request, March 9, 2009

As the figure shows, the number of sanctions adopted and enforced varied quite
significantly and three distinct trends can be noticed. From 1997 until 2000, there is a
consistent increase in the number of sanctions, followed by a short decrease in 2001 and
increase again in 2002. The second visible trend begins in 2002 and it continues a
descend line until 2004, when the lowest number of disciplinary sanctions in the customs
sector was reached. Nonetheless, in 2005 there is again an increase in the number of
cases sanctioned, a change that continues an ascendant tendency in 2006. The evolution
of the number of disciplinary sanctions does not seem to have a unique explanation. The
first trend may be explained by the beginning of the reform in the customs sector, reform
that started with the adoption of the 1997 Code of Customs and the secondary legislation.
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The second descendant trend implies a slowdown in the efforts to discover and/or
investigate misconduct among customs personnel. The alternative explanation, that there
was less misconduct in the customs sector, is less believable given that customs sector
was still considered at the time as being one of the most corrupt sectors in the country
and that the EC began, around the same time, to mention corruption as a major problem
in this sector in its Regular Reports. The reversal in 2005 is explained by the Romanian
authorities' response to the EU criticism, specifically to the EU request for concrete
results in curbing corruption and for the implementation of measures necessary to
establish an ethical and professional customs service. A look at the types of sanctions
adopted, summarized in Table 13, offers a different view of the evolution of disciplinary
sanctions over time.
The data show that two types of disciplinary sanctions have been consistently
employed over time, namely, written reprimand and salary reduction for period varying
from 1 to 3 or 6 months. The former measure of disciplinary sanctioning was used the
most in 2006, while the temporary reduction of salary was the preferred measure in 2002
and, it should be noted, it is a more severe penalty than a written reprimand. The
termination of contracts of those found guilty of serious violations of the customs
legislation (i.e., corruption), a sanction used consistently throughout the period was also
the severest form of sanctioning representing the end of the career as a public servant in
the customs sector. The other forms of sanctions, such as warning, demotion and
relegation from executive position, ceased to be employed in the last three years of the
period studied here. There is no official explanation for why they were no longer
employed, but perhaps the warning and temporary demotions failed to produce the
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expected results, that is, to educate the customs officers with regard to the importance of
complying with the rules of the Code of Ethics and of upholding the customs legislation.

Table 13
The Evolution of Disciplinary Sanctions in Customs Sector per Type of Sanction and
Year
Type of
1997 1998
Sanction/
Year
Written
21
20
reprimand
Warning
28
21
Salary
37
reduction106
Demotion
21107 3
Relegation
13
from
executive
position
Contract
2
termination
Total
70
96
Source: National Customs
-

-

-

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

27

4

11

38

69

128

51
55

33
39

9
110

28
42

-

-

24
1

18
2

26
0

-

1

-

-

-

2

-

-

-

-

12

3

4

32

2

3

10

9

1999

2000

34

39

47
39

2001

11

10

-

15

152
157
168
129
157
84
52
89
Authority, Response to FOIA Request (March 9, 2009)

Hence, the data reveal important fluctuations in the commitment to prevent and
combat misconduct, including corrupt behavior, among the customs personnel. Although
the first impulse is to claim that the decrease in the number of disciplinary sanctions may
have been caused by the decrease in cases of misconduct or corruption in customs, the
increase in the last two years prior to the country's accession to the EU contradicts that
statement. A significant decrease in corrupt and/or unprofessional conduct among
customs personnel, if due to a real change in the customs sector, should have lasted more
than two years and not be followed by such an important increase. Nonetheless, the

106
107

The salary reduction was between 5 and 20 percent for a period varying from 1 to 6 months.
In 1997, 14 of the total demotions were temporary, for a period varying from 1 to 3 months.
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increasing number of disciplinary sanctions applied after 2004 indicate a growing
commitment to detect and punish any violations of the Code of Ethics and the customs
legislation, including corruption.

3.6. Merit-Based Civil Service

3.6.1. The Statute of the Customs Personnel

The rules regarding the activity of personnel in the customs sector, including the
criteria for selection and professional advancement, were reviewed in 1998 when the
Government issued the Ordinance no. 16 regarding the Statute of the Customs Personnel,
herein the 1998 Statute. The 1998 Statute specifies the responsibilities, obligations, and
rights of the customs personnel; the prerequisites for entering the customs sector; the
rules for promotion; the system for evaluating the activity of customs staff; the rules
regarding the organization of continuous professional training; and the remuneration
criteria according to the degree of the job complexity and responsibility. The Government
Ordinance no. 16/1998 passed the Parliament with a unanimous vote (Law no. 74/2002)
and several amendments, which refined and clarified some stipulations regarding the
professional career of the customs personnel including advancement criteria, disciplinary
offenses and sanctions, and remuneration.
According to the 1998 Statute, the prerequisites for candidates to positions in the
customs sector included Romanian citizenship; no criminal record; no active role in the
political arena; and a specific educational background in finances, accountability and/or
customs. All candidates that fulfill the job prerequisites are than required to pass an
entrance exam. Title V of the 1998 Statute specifies the documentation necessary for
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applying for the job position, the composition of the examination commissions, and the
options available for challenging the exam results. Additionally, the 1998 Statute
stipulates the rules for promotion to a higher position, which are all to be made via an
examination process and based on the customs officer's job performance and seniority
(Article 40). The latter requirement, seniority, limits the pace with which a customs
employee can advance in his/her career. Nonetheless, an exception to the seniority rule
could be made if the employee has "exceptionally high levels of education and expertise
in customs affairs" (Article 41, paragraph 2). Career promotions are generally made via
an examination although a second avenue exists for the high level positions in the
headquarters of the NCA and the Regional Departments for Excises and Customs
Operations. In those cases, the Minister of Finance, the director of the NCA or the
directors of the Regional Departments can directly appoint the people considered to be
best qualified for those positions.
These rules of selecting the customs personnel and career advancement were
modified in 2004 as a result of the legislative changes introduced by the adoption of the
Anticorruption Package (law no. 161/2003), the adoption of the Code of Ethics for the
customs sector, and the EU requirement to align the Romanian customs legislation with
the EU acquis and to combat more aggressively corruption in this sector. The 2004
Statute, proposed by the Government through the Emergency Ordinance no. 10/2004,
was approved by the Parliament with minor changes later that year becoming the Law no.
243/2004. Some of the changes introduced in 2004 involve promotions, which are all to
be made through an examination; job incompatibilities, as stipulated by the
Anticorruption Package legislation; criteria for entering the customs sector, which must
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comply with labor legislation and the legislation regarding the Statute of Civil Servants
(law no. 188/1999); and the customs employees obligation to continuously improve their
training through participation to seminars or conferences.
Despite the clear legislative provisions regarding the promotions criteria to be
used in the customs sector, all promotions between 2001 and 2005 were contingent on the
opening of positions that would allow others to advance. Since job openings were the
result of retirement or death, that period was marked by very few promotions and an
increasing dissatisfaction among customs employees who could not advance despite
fulfilling all the legal provisions required for promotions (Interview C. Barbulescu, May
24, 2007). In 2005, the Parliament approved the Government Emergency Ordinance no.
92/2004 regarding the pay scale and other rights of civil servants which ensured a better
vertical mobility of customs employees. Thus, by the end of 2005, 431 executive
positions out of a total of 532 were occupied via an examination and, by December 2006,
other 83 positions (out of which 51 executive positions) were filled via the same avenue.
The NCA Activity Report for 2005-2006 specifies that these changes were the result of
the increasing external (i.e., EU) and domestic pressure to combat corruption in the
customs sector (Autoritatea Nationala a Vamilor 2006b, 5-6). The acknowledgement of
adopting anticorruption strategies due to pressures outside of the customs sector is in
itself a positive thing, but the actual implementation of those strategies demonstrates a
commitment to address this problem in a more effective manner.
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3.6.2. Continuing Professional Training

As mentioned, the 2004 Statute of the Customs Personnel stipulates the customs
employees' obligation to continuously enhance their knowledge through the participation
in seminars and trainings organized within their sector. The institution responsible for
organizing and conducting training seminars in the customs sector is the School of Public
Finances and Customs (SPFC), established in October 2000. The SPFC was the product
of a partnership between the Romanian and Dutch Ministries of Finances and it was
designed to create a permanent infrastructure for the formation of public servants
working under the authority of the Ministry of Finance. The mission of the SPFC is
limited to improving the professional skills and knowledge of the public servants in the
Ministry of Finance (including the customs personnel) and not to offer them an initial
professional training (Ministerul Finantelor Publice 2009). In the subsequent years after
the establishment of the SPFC in Bucharest, three other regional centers were created in
Ramnicul Valcea, Foc§ani, and Oradea.
The data obtained from the NCA upon filing a FOIA request on March 3, 2009
summarizes the evolution of the training seminars organized in the customs sector
beginning with 2002 and the number of customs employees who attended those
1 08
seminars.

As shown in Table 14, there was a continuous increase in the number of

professional training seminars organized in the customs sector and a significant boost in
the number of participants. Thus, if the number of seminars more than doubled from 2002
to 2006, the number of customs employees who participated in those seminars increased
108

The response received from the NCA regarding the data from 1997 until 2001 was that the data was
stored on paper and discarded after being kept two years in the archives of the institution. Hence, there is
no exact record regarding the number of trainings and/or participants prior to 2002.
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five times, reaching 2000 employees by the end of 2006, which represents more than half
the total number of customs staff 109

Table 14
The Evolution of Training Seminars in the Customs Sector
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Number
18
16
20
36
45
Seminars
Numbers
400
560
1077
2000
490
Participants
Source: National Customs Authority, Response to FOIA Request (March 3, 2009)

The seminars covered a variety of topics, including tariff quotas, customs
declarations, intellectual property rights, EU integration, simplified customs procedures,
rules for classifying goods and calculating their customs value, and ethics and
professional deontology. The diversity of topics addressed during the trainings suggests
that the NCA was actively preparing for the EU accession and that the establishment of
an ethical customs service was one of the pre-accession goals. While the quality of those
seminars cannot be evaluated, the significant increase in the number of trainings and
participants shows a positive change in the political will to reform and combat corruption
in the customs sector, particularly in the two years prior to accession. The EU has
consistently criticized Romania for failure to ensure a proper training to its customs
employees, but in 2004, the issue of corruption in customs was singled out as a major
problem. The data indicates a prompt response from the Romanian authorities with
regard to the issue of continuous professional training, a change that was noted by the EC

109

Although the official number of positions allocated to the customs sector is 4586, in May 2007, there
were estimated to be about 3700-3800 positions occupied, a situation that was estimated to be better than in
the previous years (Interview C. Barbulescu, May 24, 2007).
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in its 2005 and 2006 Regular Reports. Nonetheless, the SPFC ensures the training of
customs employees after they entered the sector and it does not participate in their initial
formation, an issue for which Romania was consistently criticized by the EU. While the
organization of continuous professional trainings contributes to the professionalization of
the customs personnel, this still constitutes an "on-the-job" training. The problem
represented by the knowledge deficiencies of the newly hired customs employees is
recognized also by the high officials in the NCA. Thus, a customs employee needs, on
average, about four years to gain enough expertise and knowledge that would make
him/her a good employee. To learn in detail how the customs system works and become
truly efficient, a new employee needs between three and five years (Interview C.
Barbulescu, May 24, 2007). Hence, despite the progress made in providing an effective
"on-the-job" training, the issue of hiring well prepared employees continues to remain a
problem.

4. The Impact of Anticorruption Strategies

The institutional strategies designed to reform and combat corruption in the
customs sector have been the subject of this chapter. The analysis of these institutional
strategies revealed that important efforts were made to restructure, modernize, and align
the Romanian customs sector with the EU standards in this area. Given the important role
that the Romanian customs would play in the EU by becoming the latter's eastern border
after accession, it is understandable the pressure exercised on the Romanian authorities to
reform this sector and to create an honest and professional customs service. Hence,
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combating corruption has become a major concern for the EU and a main goal for the
NCA particularly in the last couple of years prior to accession.
Progress was made with regard to the adoption of new customs legislation, of
special importance being the Customs Codes of 1997 and 2006 and their secondary
legislation and the Anti-Corruption Strategy of the National Customs Authority 20052007 (ASNCA 2005-7) and the Action Plan Against Corruption for 2005 and 2006.
While the former legislation was designed to reform the customs sector by adopting new
rules and regulations, the latter addressed specifically the problem of corruption.
Moreover, the ASNCA 2005-7 and the two Action Plans revealed a multi-pronged
approach to tackle corruption, an approach that focuses on prevention, detection, and
punishment. As such, the ASNCA 2005-7 included measures to increase transparency, to
promote an ethical conduct in the customs sector, to create a system based on
professionalism and merit, and to discover and sanction any violations of the code of
ethics, of the professional statute, and any corruption activities.
An important step forward was represented by the establishment of the Internal
Verification Division (IVD) in 2001, although its activity has significantly improved after
the creation of territorial divisions in 2005. The restructuring of the IVD affected more
than just its functional structure and it resulted in an enhanced authority, the organization
becoming the sole unit responsible for monitoring the implementation of the ASNCA
2005-7, the effectiveness of anticorruption strategies, the implementation of the Code of
Ethics, the investigation of any allegations of misconduct or corruption, and the proposal
of sanctions for breaches of customs legislation, ethics, and/or corruption. These
measures were complemented by the adoption of measures designed to enhance the
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transparency of customs activity. The adoption of TARIR and the implementation of
NCTS and ASYCUDA were major steps towards the creation of a modern, effective, and
transparent customs sector. The computerization of the customs sector along with the
creation of the NCA website gave the clients and the general public access to essential
information regarding the customs procedures, customs legislation, organization structure
of the NCA, and other information of public interest. Additionally, the creation of the hot
line for the public to report any corrupt activities in the customs sector attempted to
include the public in the fight against corruption and to show that the NCA acknowledges
that corruption is a problem in this sector and it makes efforts to combat it. The adoption
of FOIA further increased the communication between customs institutions and public by
giving the latter the legal right to obtain customs documents which constitute information
of public interest such as activity reports, allocated budgets, activity of various
departments and/or divisions (e.g., IVD), or any other types of information considered to
be of public interest. The analysis showed that the NCA became increasingly responsive
to FOIA requests and that the public also manifest more interest regarding the customs
sector activity.
The creation of a professional and ethical customs service requires a reform of
customs personnel and the creation of condition conducive to honest conduct. To address
these issues, legislative changes were introduced in 2005 to ensure a better vertical
mobility of customs employees who fulfill the qualification and seniority requirements
for promotion. Furthermore, in response to increasing external (i.e., EU) and domestic
criticisms, the exam became the sole avenue for entering the customs sector and/or for
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promoting to a higher position. Thus, in 2005 and 2006, all open positions that were filled
in the customs sector were done via an examination process.
Despite this progress, the customs sector still has problems that require attention
and effort to be solved. Thus, although the information regarding the customs procedures
and documents necessary is published on the NCA website, a significant percent of the
customs personnel (69 percent) continued to believe in 2006 that they have significant
discretion in interpreting the customs legislation and procedures. The complexity of the
customs legislation, which is a reality, cannot be used as an excuse to abuse the public
position, especially when it is done to gain unlawful benefits. Furthermore, the
persistence of such a belief is indicative of other problems such as the deficient
knowledge of customs legislation and procedures, the lack of familiarity with the Code of
Ethics and, implicitly, with what constitutes ethical and professional conduct. The
continuous reliance on "on-the-job" training of customs employees affects the
effectiveness of customs institutions because of the required time to properly train the
new employees. Furthermore, it is unclear how well informed customs employees are
with regard to the Code of Ethics. While the legislative provisions stipulate that the Code
should be posted in each institution and it is published on the NCA website, no available
data exists regarding the number of employees actually informed about the rules included
in the Code.
Overall, the analysis revealed that while various institutional strategies were
adopted since 1997, the most anticorruption efforts were made in the two years prior to
the EU accession. These two years show an improvement in the administrative capacity
of the customs system to function as revealed by the 33.2 percent increase in the revenues
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levied to the state budget from the import goods (Autoritatea Nationala a Vamilor 2006,
12). The positive impact of institutional strategies is indicated also by the results of the
Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity surveys (BEEPS) conducted in
Romania in 2002 and 2005 (see Figure 25).

Figure 25
Frequency of Unofficial Payments/Gifts Made by Firms

2002

Year

2005

• Frequency of unofficial payments/gifts to get things done
« Frequency of unofficial payments/gifts to deal with customs/imports

Source: http://www.enterprisesurvey.com (accessed December 4, 2009)

The comparison of results reveals not only a decrease in the practice of unofficial
payments/gifts when dealing with customs, but also a decrease of their frequency when
dealing with public officials in general (e.g., taxes, licenses, regulations, services). A
cautionary note is, however, in order due to the higher number of respondents that chose
the answer "Don't know" in 2005 than in 2002. That is, in 2005 twice as many
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respondents (20.7%) as in 2002 (10.2%) said they "Don't know" how often their firms
have to make unofficial payments/gifts when dealing with customs, whereas the
percentage of respondents that chose the "Don't know" answer to the questions regarding
the frequency of unofficial payments/gifts made to get things done was almost four times
higher in 2005 (15%) compared to 2002 (3.9%). Nonetheless, even if one takes into
consideration the number of respondents who chose a safe answer (i.e., Don't know)
from any kind of reprisal, the change in 2005 is indicative of a positive change in the
fight against corruption in customs.
Additionally, in 2006, the World Customs Organization placed Romania as eighth
in Europe with regard to the amount of confiscated goods and ninth with regard to the
amount of counterfeited goods confiscated that year (Autoritatea Nationala a Vamilor
2006b, 15). Nonetheless, the NCA officials' claim that corruption is just an isolated
occurrence in the customs sector remains to be substantiated with more monitoring
reports and survey results. The arrests in September 2006, after the CIAD surveys were
completed, of 30 customs employees suggest that corruptions is more than just an
isolated case, although less than a systemic problem.
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CHAPTER VII

PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN A NEWLY DESIGNED
SECTOR

"You can get much farther with a kind word and a gun than you can with
a kind word alone!" (Al Capone)

1. Introduction

The public procurement sector, a "meeting point of the public and private sector
and their respective interests" (Bertok 2005, 89), represents on average between 15 and
30 percent of a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Transparency International
2006a). The public procurement sector is also one of the sectors in which the temptations
and opportunities for corruption are greater than in other public sectors. A corrupt public
procurement market has significant consequences not only for the country's GDP, which
may be significantly reduced, but also for the general public. Specifically, the poor are
more likely to be negatively affected by corrupt public procurement agreements because
such agreements reduce the funding available for social services and distort public
choices in favor of the powerful and wealthy (Soreide 2002). Therefore, combating
corruption in public procurement and implementing strategies that ensure a transparent
and effective functioning of the public procurement market should constitute a priority
for all governments. In the context of European accession, public procurement was
recognized as an important sector that should be aligned with the EU regulations in that
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area. Nonetheless, curbing corruption in this newly designed sector in post-communist
Romania became a priority very late in the accession process.
In this chapter, the institutional strategies designed to reform and combat
corruption in the Romanian public procurement sector are evaluated. The first section
briefly describes the functioning of the public procurement processes, the opportunities
for corruption, and the consequences of corrupt public procurement agreements. The
second section presents the public procurement sector in Romania, followed by the
sections that analyze the institutional strategies adopted and implemented in this sector.
The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the institutional strategies on reforming and
curbing corruption in the Romanian public procurement sector.

2. Public Procurement Market—General Overview

2.1. The Components of a Public Procurement Process

Public procurement is defined as "all contracts between a government
(government department, publicly owned corporation and other types of agencies) and
companies (public or private) or individuals" (Transparency International 2006a, 14). The
term "procurement" refers to the acquisition of a variety of goods or services ranging
from pencils, bed sheets for hospitals, gasoline for government cars, equipment for
schools or hospitals, light or heavy equipments for various government departments to
construction, advisory or any other services (Transparency International 2006a, 13).
While opportunities for corruption may appear in all procurement activities, the public
procurement sector is more problematic due to the nature of funds used for the
acquisition of goods and/or services and the public interests that need to be protected.
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As the definition implies, public procurement processes tend to be complex and in
some cases, very complex due to the nature of goods or services that need to be acquired.
For example, the acquisition of off-the shelf products (i.e., standard products that are sold
in open markets) is likely to be less intricate than the acquisition of complex, special
purpose projects (e.g., dams or port facilities) or the purchase of goods that require
specialized research and development (e.g., newly designed military aircraft) (RoseAckerman 1999). The degree of complexity will also influence the opportunities for
corruption that may appear throughout the public procurement process. Regardless of
their particular complexities, all public procurement processes entail similar stages and
the focus here is on the public procurement processes in general.
The first stage of the public procurement process is the identification of needs,
which entails the assessment of the goods or services that the public institution must
acquire. Once the needs assessment is finalized, the second phase consists of the actual
design of the tender, during which the criteria for evaluating the bidders and the choice of
contract specifications are established. The tender represents the third phase, when the
companies interested in winning the public contract submit their bids and the
procurement evaluation commission assesses the bids. Once the tender is completed, the
procurement commission makes a decision and chooses the winner, which represents the
fourth phase, namely the contract award phase. The fifth phase is the negotiations and
final agreement phase, during which the public entity and the contracting party (i.e., the
party that won the tender) discuss the final details of the contract before signing it. The
next important phase of any public procurement process, the sixth phase, is represented
by the actual execution or delivery of the contract, i.e., contract implementation phase.
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Once the contract has been implemented, the evaluation and control phase completes the
public procurement process. Figure 26 summarizes the seven phases of the public
procurement process.

Figure 26
The Phases of Public Procurement Processes

Due to the complexity of the public procurement processes, it is not surprising
that opportunities for corruption thrive in public procurement markets. Some phases of
the procurement process tend to create more openings for corruption than other phases, as
it will be shown next. Additionally, some public procurement processes involve
significant amounts of money, which only further increases the temptations for engaging
in corrupt activity to secure the contract.
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2.2. Opportunities for Corruption during Public Procurement Processes

In 1995, the Zimbabwe Quarterly Report disclosed the collusion agreement
between

senior

ministers

in

Posts

and

Telecommunications

and

a

Swedish

telecommunications company that was trying to win the tender, an agreement that
circumvented the local tender board procedures and involved kickbacks estimated at
about $7.1 million. In 2006, an investigation in Kenya found that the government lost
about $1.5 million through irregular drug procurement by the Ministry of Health (RoseAckerman 1999, 28-29). However, corruption is not specific to developing countries,
developed countries also face serious challenges from corrupt public procurement
agreements. For example, in Italy, the costs of several major public construction projects
fell significantly after the anticorruption campaign, "mani pulite," was launched in early
1992. For example, by 1995, the construction cost of the Milan subway, a rail link, and a
new airport terminal fell by well over half, amounting in savings of more than $2 billion
(Rose-Ackerman 1999, 29). As a result of the anticorruption campaign, the overall
successful bids in public tenders were estimated by 40 to 50 percent lower five years after
the mani pulite campaign was launched, indicative of the significant amount of public
money engulfed by corruption (della Porta and Vannucci 1997, 524). These examples
show that corruption in public procurement is a very costly problem for governments,
regardless of their level of economic development

and even the degree of

democratization or democratic stability.
Corruption may occur throughout the public procurement process, although the
early and late phases of the process are considered to be particularly exposed to high risk
of corruption (Transparency International 2006a, Sacerdoti 2005). Corruption enters the
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public procurement process when the needs are modified, falsified, under or overestimated, or just plain unnecessary. In these instances, demands for various purchases
are created to favor a particular company, although they would be of little value to the
society, or the procurement investment would be economically and/or environmentally
damaging (Transparency International 2006a). During the tender design phase when the
contract/project specifications are established, the temptations and opportunities for
corruption are even higher. Thus, contract specifications can be grossly underestimated to
ensure a rapid acceptance of the project or additional specifications are proposed at a later
stage when it is too late to change the original project. Emergency procurement projects
are especially prone to corruption because the products or services are presented as being
essential and it becomes easy to inflate the costs and speed to bidding process, favoring a
certain company in the process (Sacerdoti 2005). Additionally, the specifications can be
specifically tailored to favor a particular contractor. For example, "an African country
reportedly once set its telephone specifications to require equipment that could survive in
a frigid climate. Only one telephone manufacturer from Scandinavia could satisfy this
obviously worthless specification" (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 64).
The opportunities for corruption continue to present themselves in the next phases
of the tender and contract awarding. A particular type of corruption is represented by
collusive agreements, that is, anti-competitive behavior that occurs when business agree
amongst themselves the prices they will set and who will win which contracts. Collusive
agreements may take place also between public procurement officials and bidders.
Giorgio Sacerdoti (2005, 155) reports such an example of collusion and corruption when
the favored company was called to the bidding appointment an hour earlier than the other
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three bidders. When the bidding time came, a bomb scare was received and the other
bidders missed the bidding appointment. As a result, the favored company was declared
the winner and awarded the contract. A later investigation revealed that the bomb scare
was a hoax and the meeting between the procurement commission and the favored
company took place eactly where the bomb was reported to be. Also at these stages of the
procurement process, some bidders may acquire inside information which would give
them an advantage in the bidding process allowing them to omit certain "unimportant"
specifications or to make the lowest bid. The public procurement officials may use
subjective criteria for selecting the contract or fail to make public the grounds for
selecting the winner of the tender. Additionally, the publicity of the tender may be very
reduced to ensure that only a particular company would submit a bid. Claims of urgency
may also be (ab)used in order to justify the short notice for the tender period (Bueb and
Ehlermann-Cache 2005). Thus, Sacerdoti (2005, 156) gives the example of a company
that reportedly bought all 25,000 copies of a local newspaper in which the tender was
advertised.
Resourceful corrupt public officials and contractors also find ways to make
private profits during the contract implementation phase. Thus, goods can be diverted to
public officials for their private use or for re-sale; the goods or services provided can be
of a lesser quality than stipulated in the initial contract, the difference being paid to the
public officials who facilitated the contract or simply kept by the contractor; or the
majority of the contract activities can be concentrated in the first stages of the execution,
a process known as front-loading, either because the contractor does not intend to
complete the project or because it hopes to increase the price of the initial contract
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(Sacerdoti 2005, 156). During the project execution phase, opportunities for corruption
may appear due to sub-contracting, which is usually less closely monitored and is often
used to introduce or conceal fraud (Bueb and Ehlermann-Cache 2005, 167). Although the
contract is completed, corruption may appear in the form of falsified final certificates or
corrupt auditors who allow the acceptance of products or services that are below the
standards specified in the original contract. The difficulty in detecting corruption in the
public procurement sector is due in part to the fact that the consequences are not always
visible to the general public and those directly involved in the corrupt agreements are
interested in keeping their agreement hidden from the public scrutiny. But corrupt
agreements in public procurement have important consequences, as it will be shown next.

2.3. Consequences of Corrupt Public Procurement Agreements

While the beneficiaries of corrupt public procurement agreements are only a
handful, the implications of their actions are likely to be felt by the general population.
Hence, corruption in public procurement leads to inflated prices and products and
services of lower quality. For example, a contractor who won a public contract due to a
bribe will have to recover the money spent on the bribe and the simple avenue for that is
to decrease the quality of the products or services provided. While at a first glance that
may not appear to be too serious a problem, the construction of a building that is not
earthquake-proof or roads that are not solid enough to support the traffic may have grave
social consequences (Soreide 2002). Additionally, corruption in public procurement
distorts the allocation of public funds with big construction projects (e.g. big dams) being
preferred to health and education projects (Mauro 1997). Furthermore, corruption in
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public procurement will increase poverty and inequality in society by redirecting the
attention from serious social problems.
The consequences of corruption in public procurement markets puts an additional
burden on governments, which have to allocate more money for investments (services or
products) that are unnecessary or of a lower quality and for the maintenance of products
of lower quality. Corrupt public procurement agreements distort also the competition on
this market by making it more difficult for small or new businesses to enter the market
and/or to win public contracts. Other effects of corruption in this sector include a neglect
of innovation, potential adverse environmental impacts, an erosion of ethics, and, very
importantly, a deterioration of trust in government and other public institutions
(Transparency International 2006a). Hence, the ripple-effects of corruption negatively
impact a considerable number of people in society, even if the immediate visible
consequences of corrupt public procurement agreements may appear less significant.
Nonetheless, corruption in public procurement can be combated and important efforts
have been made to develop the most likely to succeed anticorruption and public
procurement reform strategies.

3. The Romanian Public Procurement Sector

3.1. Brief Outline of the Public Procurement Legislative Changes

The regulation of the Romanian public procurement market has a relatively short
history that begins after the communist regime was overthrown in December 1989. In
1991 and 1992, the Romanian Government adopted several Government Decisions to
regulate public procurement. These decisions were later complemented by a series of
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Government Ordinances and laws, such as Government Ordinance no. 12/1993 approved
by Law no. 83/1994 and implemented beginning in 14 October 1994. Over the next few
years, the legislation was further amended and, in 1998, a new public procurement bill
was drafted with the assistance of the World Bank and the European Commission.
However, the new procurement bill was never enacted and a year later, the government
issued a new Ordinance (no. 118/1999) in August and amended it through an Emergency
Ordinance (no. 202/1999) in December (Wiehen 2000, 4-5). Thus, for the first decade
after the regime change, the Romanian public procurement sector had undergone
continuous legislative changes with the legislation sometimes being amended several
times a year. The frequent changes in legislation made it more difficult for the public
procurement market to work effectively and it is likely that at least some of the
amendments were designed to protect some vested interests. It is important to note that
throughout the 1990s, there was no central public procurement authority and no central
database for the public procurement activities. The situation changed slightly in 1999
when the new Ordinance assigned the Ministry of Public Finance (MPF) the
responsibility to implement the public procurement policy.
The twenty first century brought with it new changes in the Romanian public
procurement sector, changes that were now targeting EU integration. Hence, new
legislation was adopted to align domestic public procurement regulations with the
European regulations and to ensure the complete transposition of the acquis until the end
of 2006. A partial adoption of the EU public procurement regulations was made in 2001
through the Emergency Government Ordinance no. 60, approved by the Law no. 212 in
2002. This law was again amended in August 2004 (Government Ordinance no. 75
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approved by Law no. 492/2004) only to be abrogated by the Government Emergency
Ordinance no. 34/2006. The latter transposed entirely the EU Directives no. 17 and no.
18/2004110 regarding the regulation of public procurement and ensured the timely
completion of the acquis transposition into the Romanian legislation.

3.2. The Organization of the Romanian Public Procurement Sector

There are differences among countries regarding the choice of a central
procurement authority that would oversee the entire activity on the public procurement
market or a delegated procurement authority, in which case the contracting authorities
have the responsibility to manage their own public procurement processes (e.g. Hungary).
Still, some countries (e.g. Slovakia) choose to combine the two solutions in which case
the responsibility for the public procurement activities is shared between the central and
delegated procurement authorities. No alternative seem to be clearly better than the other,
although the central procurement authority may offer some advantages particularly in
countries that are establishing the public procurement system (Wiehen 2000). Romania
opted for the central public procurement authority, which would potentially have offered
some advantages if the authority was benefiting from sufficient well-trained personnel
and the budgetary funding necessary to ensure its proper functioning. However, the first
central procurement authority, the Public Procurement Directorate (PPD) was established
in 2000 within the Ministry of Public Finance. The institution was replaced in November
2005 by the National Authority for Regulating and Monitoring Public Procurement

1,0

The two Directives are: 1) Directive no. 17/2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities
operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and 2) Directive no. 18/2004 on the
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public
service contracts.
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(NARMPP), which is now the central public procurement authority in the country. The
organizational structure of the NARMPP is presented in Figure 27, below.

Figure 27
The Organizational Structure of NARMP (2006)

Source: NARMPP Annual Activity Report 2006, http://www.anrmap.ro (accessed
October 6, 2009)

As was the case with other public procurement legislation, NARMPP was
established by a Government Emergency Ordinance (no. 74/2005) which was later
approved by the Parliament with some minor changes (i.e., Law no. 111/2006). The
NARMPP was created as a public institution subordinated to the government and under
the direct coordination of the Prime Minister. As its predecessor, the new central
procurement authority is responsible for developing, promoting, and implementing the
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public procurement policy. More specifically, the institution is responsible for drafting
procurement legislation that complies with the EU regulations in this area; supporting
policy development; monitoring and evaluating the awarding of public contracts;
providing professional advice to contracting authorities; and ensuring the training of
personnel involved in public procurement activities with a focus on the correct
implementation of the specific legislation.

4. Institutional Strategies

Corruption in public procurement has very serious implications for the general
public due to the redirection of public funds to unnecessary or unimportant purchases that
would deprive the population from important goods (e.g., aspirin) or services (water
supply). Moreover, corruption in public procurement negatively impacts the economy
and undermines competition among businesses by making it more difficult for small
companies to enter the market unless they agree to participate in corrupt arrangements.
Despite the fact that public procurement is a new sector in Romania, corruption infiltrated
it from the early stages of its creation. In a comparative study of public procurement in
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, Ase Grodeland (2005) found that in all
four countries informal networks and informal contacts are commonly used in public
procurement. Furthermore, these informal contacts are employed not only to obtain
information about tender procedures and requirements but also to influence the outcome
of the tender, to discourage competitors from participating in the tender procedure, to
ensure that competitors are disqualified on formal grounds from the competition, or to
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facilitate payments to ensure that certain interests are being favored during the tender
(Grodeland, 2005, p. 62).
Although these findings appear to be common to all four former communist
countries, Romania is set apart by the refusal rate for interviews (about 40%), which was
significantly higher compared to the other three countries included in the study.
Additionally, the Romanian respondents refused to answer more questions than their
counterparts in the study for fear of exposing themselves, despite the interviewers'
assurance that their identities would be protected by confidentiality (Grodeland 2005,
63). The findings about the Romanians' reluctance to talk about corruption in public
procurement are similar to my own experience in the field. The disinclination to talk
about corruption in this sector was manifested by representatives of contractors and
public officials alike. In fact, the most unpleasant experience was the attempt to obtain an
interview with a public official from the NARMPP who, although initially agreed to an
interview, refused afterwards to take my calls and after three weeks of attempts to contact
her, I decided to approach a different representative from that institution. The persistence
of an atmosphere of fear of reprisal if one discusses corrupt practices in public
procurement also explains the virtual absence of whistleblowers in this sector and, thus,
the lack of data regarding the implementation of this institutional strategy.
Nonetheless, increasingly more efforts have been made by various international
organization such as World Bank, EU, UN, and OECD111 to develop new procurement
regulations and to assist transition countries in their efforts of reforming and combating

11

' An exception from this international effort is the World Trade Organization, which decided in February
2003 to exclude the issue of corruption from their debates on the role of transparency in procurement
reforms claiming that "corruption is a moral issue" and, thus, outside the scope of the organization (Soreide
2005, 55).
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corruption in public procurement. This chapter focuses on the following institutional
strategies: 1) the enforcement of legislation, 2) the creation and effectiveness of oversight
institutions and anticorruption agencies, 3) the increase in transparency, 4) the
implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5) the adoption and
implementation of ethics codes, and 6) the existence and implementation of merit-based
civil service.

4.1. The Legislative Foundation

Building new institutions responsible for the coordination and proper functioning
of a new public sector begins with the development of the legislative base. In the case of
the Romanian public procurement sector, the legislative foundation underwent frequent
and significant changes in the first sixteen years after the regime change. To a certain
degree, some changes are to be expected given the novelty and complexity of the public
procurement sector. Nonetheless, there is the expectation that the legislation becomes
more comprehensible and clear so not to require repeated alterations. This section
analyzes the newest procurement legislation (i.e., since 2000) and the changes it
introduced in the public procurement sector.
When Romania began the accession negotiations with the EU in February 2000,
the public procurement sector was in need of serious and significant regulation, the
situation being described as "catastrophic" by one of the interviewees (Interview
Anticorruption Expert 1, April 12, 2007). The seriousness of the public procurement
market was such that it required the adoption of a special legislation regulating the
abusive clauses in public contracts (Law no. 193/2000). The adoption of this legislation
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was considered to be indicative of the negative conditions existing in public procurement
and the frequent abuses that were taking place in this market (Interview PP Expert 1,
April 17, 2007). In the light of the new commitments assumed by the Romanian
Government before the EU and given the significance of the public procurement sector
for the common European economy, new changes in the public procurement sector
followed shortly. However, as it was the case in the other two sectors, the external
pressure played an important role in the changes implemented since 2000.
Although new procurement legislation was completed in late 1999, its adoption
was consistently postponed by the Romanian authorities. Finally, in April 2001, just a
couple of days prior to the visit of the Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter
Verheugen, the Romanian Government adopted the Government Emergency Ordinance
(GEO) no. 60 (Interview PP Expert 1, April 17, 2007).112 A year later, the Parliament
adopted, with a unanimous vote, Law no. 212 on Approval of GEO no. 60/2001,
henceforth 2002 Public Procurement Legislation or 2002 PPL. The 2002 PPL covered all
public authorities and institutions at all levels of government and was largely based on
the text of the EC Directives regulating the public procurement on the common market
(SIGMA 2003). According to the 2002 PPL, the open and restricted procedures were the
basic procurement procedures for awarding public procurement contracts (Article 10).
The law allowed also the use of a negotiated procedures in clearly defined circumstances,
such as when following an open or restricted procedure no suitable tenders were
submitted; when the services sought to be acquired cannot be described in terms of
reference with sufficient precision to allow the award of the contract by a basic

112

The adoption of GEO no. 60/2001 just days prior to Verheugen's visit was also emphasized by the
Anticorruption Expert 1.
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procedure; or when the contracting authority purchases goods that are to be manufactured
or works to be made exclusively for scientific research purposes (Article 11).
Additionally, the request for tender procedure could only be used under the €40,000
threshold for goods and services and under the €100,000 threshold for works (Article 13).
The contracting authority was free to make direct purchases when the value of the goods,
services, or works to be acquired did not exceed the €2,000 threshold113 (Article 8,
paragraph 6).
The 2002 PPL also introduced more precise definitions of coverage exemptions;
precise definitions for selection and award criteria; minimum time limits for submission
of tenders; mandatory request for tender and performance securities; clear rules on value
estimations

and

technical

standards;

and

the

obligation

to

maintain

written

documentations and records. Every contracting authority that organized a tender was
obliged to organize a tender commission and to specify the tasks and responsibilities for
managing the procurement contracts within the authority. The commission was to consist
of a minimum of three people with professional experience and relevant background in
the field of procurement (Article 51). The decisions of the commission were used by the
contracting authority to award and conclude the contract. Additionally, the 2002 PPL
specified the common advertising rules. More specifically, every contracting authority
was required to publish the tender announcements, tender award notices and indicative
notices114 that were equal or higher than the €750,000 threshold in the Official Gazette of
Romania, Part VI, Public Procurement. Nonetheless, SIGMA found that in the course of
2004, the difference between the number of tender award notices published in the Official
113

All threshold values are calculated without VAT.
The indicative notices include all public procurement contracts envisaged to be concluded by the end of
the budgetary year.
114
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Gazette and that of contract award notices was about 2000, whereas the number of both
notices should be more or less equal (SIGMA 2005). The findings, while far from ideal,
represented an improvement from 2002 when in a similar assessment report SIGMA
found a discrepancy of about 4000 notices concluding that the "the legal obligation to
publish award notices is commonly neglected" (SIGMA 2003, 2).
Other important changes introduced by the 2002 PPL regarded the process of
reviewing complaints against the tender procedure. Thus, any individual or legal person
could submit a written claim to the contracting authority, which had ten days to make a
decision regarding the claim. Throughout this time, the contracting authority had the right
to suspend the tender and inform the Ministry of Public Finance and, in cases of
contracting works, also the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Housing of the
filed claim (Article 92). The Ministry of Public Finance was responsible for issuing a
response within seven days from receiving the complaint, although in practice the
Ministry of Public Finance would issue its opinion within two-week periods and
sometimes even in one or two months (SIGMA 2005). Importantly, this method of appeal
was available only up to the date on which the contract was signed, restricting thus the
opportunities for contesting the irregularities or illegalities of public procurement
procedures after that phase. However, the law specified that all decisions issued by the
Ministry of Public Finance could be contested in court, the only institution authorized to
award damages (2002 PPL, Section 3).
The changes introduced by the 2002 PPL transposed into the Romanian
legislation most of the EU procurement regulations, although it maintained the system of
granting domestic preference in the awarding of public procurement contracts. In addition
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to the removal of those preferences that contravene to the European procurement
procedures, the transposition of the 2004 EU Directives into the national legislation
became a priority in 2005. Hence, the last two years prior to accession saw a series of
important changes both in the legislation and institutional organization of the public
procurement system.
The first important step towards a complete alignment of the national
procurement legislation with the EU 2004 Directives was the adoption of the Reform
Strategy of the Public Procurement System 2005-2007 and the Action Plan for the
Implementation of the Reform Strategy by the Government Decision no. 901, on August
4th, 2005. The Reform Strategy was specifically developed to address the problems
identified by the EC in the Regular Reports and to ensure the full compatibility between
the national and European procurement regulations. More specifically, it attempted to
solve such problems as legislative overlaps; absence of a central entity responsible for
managing and monitoring the activity on the public procurement market, ad-hoc
derogations from the public procurement rules in big public contracts, lack of an efficient
system for solving complaints; the absence of a system for collecting data about the
actual functioning of the procurement market; and an ineffective system of ex ante audit
of public procurement procedures. Hence, the Reform Strategy had three main goals: 1)
to complete the legislative foundation; 2) to strengthen the institutional capacity for
implementing the legislation; and 3) to create a monitoring system that evaluates the
implementation of the Reform Strategy.
The first major goal of the Reform Strategy was formally attained in April 2006
when the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 34 (GEO no.34) was approved. This
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marked the complete transposition of the EU Directives into the Romanian legislation
and a step forward in reforming and combating corruption in the public procurement
sector. Some of the most important changes introduced by the GEO no. 34/2006 include
clear methods for calculating the estimated value of a procurement contract (Section 2);
rules for elaborating the tender documentation (Section 3); detailed procedures for
awarding the contracts (Chapter III); special rules for transparency (Section 6); more
precise provision regarding the conflict of interest (Section 8); and the new means of
solving legal disputes (Chapter IX).115 The new national procurement legislation closely
mirrors the EU Directives, for the most part translating word by word the EU Directives
(Interview C. Vulcu, NARMPP, May 18, 2007). Thus, the EU emphasis on the
importance of pre-evaluation stage of public contracts, the likelihood of foreseeing any
possible increase or decrease in the value of the products to be acquired, and the types of
products that can be procured is reflected in the national legislation. Furthermore, in
contrast to the 2002 PPL, the new legislation stresses the obligation of all contracting
authorities to disclose all the criteria (i.e., qualitative, technical, and performance factors
of the tender), regulations and any other necessary information to ensure a fair
participation to the procurement process for all bidders.
Another novelty introduced by the GEO no. 34/2006 is the environmental
standard referred to as "eco-label" (Article 37). The contracting authority may include
environmental characteristics in the technical specifications of the contract, which
requires bidders to produce appropriate evidence that shows the products or services are
eco-labeled. Nonetheless, the law also specifies that a contracting authority does not have
the right to reject a technical proposal for the sole reason that the products or services
115

The sections on transparency and complaints solving procedures are discussed later in the chapter.
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lack the eco-label as long as the tenderer demonstrates that the products/services are
compliant with the requested technical specifications (Article 37, paragraph 3).
The new procurement legislation describes in detail the specific procedures for
awarding procurement contracts. In addition to the procedures stipulated in the 2002 PPL
(i.e., open procedure, restricted procedure, negotiation with a single source, and request
for tender), GEO no. 34/2006 introduces negotiation procedure with prior publication of a
contract notice, negotiation procedure without publication of a contract notice, and
competitive dialogue. The law stipulates in detail the conditions under which each type of
procedure can be organized and the obligations of the contracting authorities from the
beginning until the concluding of the procurement contract. A change was also
introduced regarding the minimum thresholds required for organizing a request for tender
procedure. Thus, the contracting authority has the right to use this procedure only when
the estimated value of the public procurement contract (without VAT) is equal or less
than the equivalent in ROL of €75,000 for goods and services and €500,000 for works
(Article 124). The threshold for direct purchases of goods, services, or works was also
increased to the equivalent in ROL of €10,000 (Article 19). Due to the changes that
would follow Romania's accession to the EU, the rules for publicity of public
procurement contracts were also changed. Thus, beginning with January 1st, 2007, the
publication of indicative notices, tender announcement notices, and tender awarding
notices must be made not only in the Official Gazette, Part VI, Public Procurement but
also in the Electronic System of Public Procurement (ESPP)116 and in the Official Journal
of the European Union.

116

The ESPP is discussed in the Transparency section.
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The public procurement legislation adopted in 2006 was designed to show the EU
that there was the political will to reform this sector and to combat corruption in the
public procurement market. If in fall 2005, the EC assigned the Romanian public
procurement sector a red flag indicative of serious shortcomings, in the May 2006
Regular Report, the EC concluded that Romania made significant improvements in
reforming the public procurement system. Hence, the color of the flag assigned for this
sector was changed to green,117 the public procurement sector being no longer viewed as
a threat to Romania's timely integration (Interview C. Vulcu, NARMPP, May 18, 2007).
While GEO no. 34/2006 formally satisfied the EU because it ad litteram transposed the
EU Directives into the national legislation, the actual implementation of the new
provisions began on July 23, 2006. Consequently, the final evaluation made by the EC in
October was two months after the legislation entered into force, too short a period to
assess its impact. According to the representative of NARMPP, Codrin Vulcu, the new
procurement legislation is textbook-clear and anyone, regardless of the level of
knowledge about public procurement activities, would be able to organize or participate
in a public procurement procedure (Interview C. Vulcu, NARMPP, May 18, 2007).
Despite the higher level of clarity of the GEO no. 34/2006 compared to previous
laws, the public procurement legislation continues to be extremely complex because it
includes also secondary and tertiary legislation necessary for the unitary implementation
of the procurement procedures. In addition to the significant length of the procurement
legislation (estimated to about 900 printed pages), the continuous amendments make it
more difficult for practitioners to learn the new procurement regulations and effectively
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The colors used by the EC to evaluate the state of a specific sector varied from red to yellow to green,
with red being the lowest score and green the highest score, resembling the traffic lights.
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apply them in practice (Interview PP Expert 2, April 24, 2007). Moreover, some of the
language continues to leave room for interpretation and potential abuse, particularly by
the contracting authority. For example, the technical documentation can include certain
criteria that would favor a particular tender, although the law prohibits it. One of the
interviewees admitted to include such criteria in an acquisition contract for the company
he was working for. The company was seeking to modernize the IT network and it
drafted a technical documentation that could be satisfied only by Hewlett Packard.
According to the interviewee, the documentation was "at the legal limits" and the IBM's
complaint against the Tender Commission's decision was unsuccessful (Interview PP
Expert 1, April 17, 2007). Such manipulations of the public procurement regulations are
not uncommon and continue to be employed even after the new legislation. According to
one interviewee, he always has his firm's interest at heart when manipulating the
procurement regulations, but there are others who do it for their own benefit (Interview
PP Expert 1, April 17, 2007). In fact, GEO no. 34/2006 is considered to be one of the
least enforced areas of legislation in Romania due to its novelty, complexity, and lack of
sanctions for non-compliance (Interview PP Expert 1, April 17, 2007 and Interview PP
Expert 2, April 24, 2007).
Nonetheless, the adoption of the GEO no. 34/2006 appear to have ended the use
of ad-hoc derogations from public procurement procedures by the exercise of
Government Decisions, as used to be the case. For example, in 1997, the government
decided to stop the preparations for the international public procurement procedures
designed to purchase modern equipment for the Iron Gate Hydropower Plant (Portile de
Fier) and to directly give the contract to the Swiss firm Sulzer Hydro. The decision
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directly

favored the

Swiss firm and violated public procurement

procedures.

Additionally, the contract allowed for price changes and, over the years, the value of the
contract increased several times leading to losses estimated in the hundreds of millions of
Euros (Interview PP Expert 1, April 17, 2007). Once again, the pressure to apply the
procurement regulations in all cases specified by law came from the EU. According to
the NARMPP representative, C. Vulcu, the EU can be considered "the gun" in Al
Capone's quote118 (Interview C. Vulcu, NARMPP, May 18, 2007). Although the
Romanian authorities were aware of the major problems in the public procurement sector,
the lack of political will associated with vested interests and significant amounts of
money involved in public procurement contracts led to a consistent postponement of the
reform process. The adoption of the new procurement legislation in 2006 signaled an
important change in the political will to reform public procurement sector and combat
corruption.

4.2. Oversight Institutions and Anticorruption Agencies

In addition to the National Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office (NAPO), there are
four other institutions responsible for monitoring the activity on the public procurement
market. Three of these institutions were created in the two years prior to Romania's
accession to the EU and in response to the external pressure for reform and reduction of
corruption in this sector. These institutions are the National Authority for Regulating and
Monitoring Public Procurement (NARMPP), the Unit for Coordination and Verification
of Public Procurement (UCVPP), and the National Council for Resolving Complaints

118

See the motto at the beginning of this Chapter.
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(NCRC). The fourth institution responsible for auditing the public procurement
procedures conducted by the contracting authorities is the Court of Accounts.

4.2.1. National Authority for Regulating and Monitoring Public
Procurement

One of the criticisms made by the EC in the Regular Reports was the lack of a
central institution capable of effectively monitoring the activity of public procurement at
the national level. Prior to November 2005, when the NARMPP was established based on
the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 74/2005, the responsibility for monitoring the
public procurement sector was divided between the Public Procurement Directorate
(PPD) within the Ministry of Public Finance and the Ministry of Public Works,
Transportation and Housing. At the maximum capacity, PPD was functioning with 17
employees, which was a significant improvement from 2002 when it was comprised of
only 9 employees (SIGMA 2005). The process of monitoring and data collection was
based on quarterly reports that the contracting authorities were required to submit to the
PPD. However, "the reports were not submitted and no one bothered to compile the
information received from the few reports that were submitted" (Interview PP Expert 2,
April 3, 2007). In the three years of activity, the PPD was also responsible for reviewing
the complaints made against the public procurement procedures. Thus, the PPD received
427 complaints in 2002, 532 complaints in 2003, and 698 complaints in 2004. The exact
number of complaints solved in favor of the protesting tenderer is not known, although
about half of them are estimated to be solved favorably for the protesting tenderer
(SIGMA 2005).

348

The creation of NARMPP was designed to concentrate the monitoring activity
within a single entity and to ensure a better assessment of the public procurement market.
Leaving aside the other complex tasks that the new institution was responsible for (see
subsection 3.2.), the effective monitoring of about 12000 contracting authorities would
require significant manpower and money (Interview C. Vulcu, NARMPP, May 18, 2007).
The political will to demonstrate to the EU that reform was possible and Romania
deserved to become a member was reflected in the short period of time (four months) in
which the NARMPP became operational. The budgets allocated for 2005 and 2006 were
considered very generous and more than the institution was capable of spending
(Interview C. Vulcu, NARMPP, May 18, 2007). Thus, in 2005 the financial resources
allocated were in the amount of 8,695,984,417 ROL ($1,213,178) and increased in 2006
to 25,568,238,552 ROL ($3,567,027).119 In terms of personnel allocated, the original
design included a total of 127 positions, including the executive personnel (i.e., president,
vice-president, secretary general). The institution began functioning with a total of 20
people, but the number of filled positions increased in 2006 to 81 (including the
executive positions) (ANRMAP 2006).
Although the financial resources appear to have been generous enough to ensure a
proper functioning of the new central procurement institution, the shortage of personnel
definitely made things more complicated. The main reason for the difficulty in filling all
the positions assigned to NARMPP, according to the institution's own representative,
was the low salary. Thus, the salary of a junior public servant working at the NARMPP is
around €100, which is much lower than the salary in the private sector. The situation then
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All values were adjusted for inflation and discounting and are expressed in real 1997 USD, the first year
of the research study. A detailed explanation of the adjusting calculations is presented in Chapter VI.
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becomes the following: the new graduate gets a low paid job at a public institution,
acquires knowledge and experience in the public procurement sector, which enables
him/her to get a better paid job in the private sector (Interview C. Vulcu, NARMPP, May
18, 2007). Furthermore, since there is only a limited number of public procurement
experts in the country, the expertise gained working for the NARMPP gives them an
important advantage.
The monitoring activity of public procurement procedures began effectively in
2006 and throughout the year the NARMPP conducted 44 inspections, all of them in
response to complaints made by individuals, institutions, or the mass media. Pursuant to
those inspections, NARMPP proposed various measures designed to remedy the
irregularities discovered during the monitoring process. Additionally, the NARMPP
inspectors verified 23 indicative notices, 47 tender announcements, and the contract
documentation in 50 public procurement procedures (ANRMAP 2006). These ex ante
controls of notices and contract documentations sought to determine their conformity
with the public procurement legislation and to make the appropriate recommendations to
correct the identified problems. The responsibility for conducting ex ante investigations
of public procurement procedures was transferred on April 12, 2006 to the newly
established Unit for Coordination and Verification of Public Procurement (UCVPP)
within the Ministry of Public Finance. Hence, the NARMPP responsibility was reduced
to post hoc controls of public procurement procedures and the monitoring of the
implementation of the UCVPP recommendations by the contracting authorities.
The adoption of GEO no. 34/2006 led to the establishment of another institution
responsible for solving complaints in the public procurement sector, namely the National
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Council for Resolving Complaints (NCRC). In the second half of 2006, after GEO no.
34/2006 entered into force, NARMPP was also responsible for monitoring the
implementation of 39 decisions reached by the NCRC in response to complaints made by
tenderers. Additionally, pursuant to the changes introduced by the Law no. 111/2006 on
Approval of the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 74/2005 regarding the
establishment of NARMPP, the institution had to develop the new Regulations Regarding
the Awarding of Public Procurement Contracts to include the responsibility of
surveillance of public procurement procedures. The surveillance responsibility refers to
the inspection of the contract award procedures, the identification of any deviation from
the legal provisions, and the enforcement of sanctions for any identified contravention
(ANRMAP 2006).
Taking into consideration the young age of NARMPP, the record of its activity
indicates a determination to reform public procurement and to create an environment free
of corruption. However, the 14 months activity is insufficient to determine the actual
impact of NARMPP on the activity in the public procurement sector. Additionally, the
size of the institution (81 individuals) is disproportionate to the size of the public
procurement market and the number of contracting authorities (approx. 12000)
functioning on the market. The absence of local divisions makes the activity of the
central NARMPP even more complex and it potentially reduces its effectiveness since
any territorial inspection requires experts, time, and money. The shortage of public
procurement experts affects also the quality of inspections and recommendations that the
NARMPP can make. It was estimated that in the entire institution there are about four to
five public procurement experts, that is, people that posses the knowledge and
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understanding of the public procurement procedures. The rest of the personnel is
inexperienced and has a very limited knowledge of public procurement activities, but
they compensate for the lack of expertise by an attitude of superiority, which has led
some experts in public procurement to claim that NARMPP exercises "an unnatural
dictatorship in the public procurement sector" (Interview PP Expert 1, April 17, 2007).
Nonetheless, the future of the NARMPP depends on the quality of its personnel and the
political support it receives, political support that needs to be manifested both financially
and by supporting the independence of the institution. Although the Romanian
government demonstrated the existence of a real political commitment to improve the
public procurement sector prior to the accession, the situation has slightly changed after
January 1st, 2007. As such, the 2007 initial budget was half than that allocated for 2006
and the number of personnel was reduced from 127 to 90, although "the most difficult
part comes after the EU integration when we have to be completely operational and with
an efficient monitoring system" (Interview C. Vulcu, NARMPP, May 18, 2007).

4.2.2. Unit for Coordination and Verification of Public Procurement

To assist the NARMPP in the process of monitoring the public procurement
procedures, the Government passed Decision no. 942/2006 to create the Unit for
Coordination and Verification of Public Procurement (UCVPP) within the Ministry of
Public Finance. The responsibilities of the UCVPP include the ex ante supervision of
public procedures from the moment the tender announcement is published until the
procurement contract is signed. More specifically, the UCVPP observers verify if the
tender documentation and contract awarding procedures are in compliance with public
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procurement legislation. Throughout the inspections, the observers write intermediary
notes that specify the problems identified and solutions proposed for their correction. The
intermediary notes are not binding and the contracting authority can choose to correct the
problems or continue the procurement procedure as initially designed. At the end of
inspection, the UCVPP observers must draft the advisory notice if the identified
incompatibilities with the public procurement legislation were not solved based on the
solutions proposed in the intermediary notes. The advisory notice summarizes all the
problems recognized during the inspection and the intermediary notes submitted to the
contracting authority during the inspection. The advisory notice must be sent to the
contracting authority no later than 3 days after the contract awarding procedure was
completed and to NARMPP, the central monitoring institution in the public procurement
sector.
In contrast to NARMPP, the structure of the UCVPP includes, in addition to the
central unit, territorial branches designed to increase the effectiveness of ex ante
inspections of public procurement procedures. These inspections are intended to assist the
contracting authorities in the interpretation and application of public procurement
legislation. Hence, the UCVPP observers often serve as consultants for the contracting
authorities. Although the transfer of authority regarding the ex ante inspections took
place in April 2006, the central unit started functioning at partial capacity only in
December that year (Interview Cornelia Nagy, Director UCVPP, May 25, 2007). At the
time of the interview with the UCVPP Director, the central unit had 50 employees with
another 100 employees at the territorial units. The 150 employees is still a small number
of observers capable of conducting inspections of the approximately 12000 contracting
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authorities functioning in the public procurement market. Therefore, the selection of
which contracting authorities to be verified is based on a risk analysis. More specifically,
a coefficient is calculated based on the score, on a scale from one to three, of the main
risk factors of a public procurement procedure (i.e., estimated value of the contract; size
and type of contracting authority; funding source—state budget, private, EU; the type of
public procurement acquisition—services, goods, works; and the history and experience
of the contracting authority). A score equal or higher than 2.5 is considered to be high
risk; a score between 1.5 and 2.5 is of a medium risk; and a score below 1.5 corresponds
to a low risk. The contracting authorities with a high risk coefficient score are given
priority on the list of inspections to be conducted (Interview C. Nagy, Director UCVPP,
May 25, 2007). However, the UCVPP began actually conducting the verifications of
public procurement procedures only after January 1st, 2007, that is, after Romania's
accession to the EU was completed.
Although the impact of UCVPP activity remains to be seen, it is interesting to
note that although an institution with fewer responsibilities than NARMPP, it has a
higher number of employees with higher remuneration. The 75 percent bonus to their
regular salary is meant to reduce, if not eliminate, corruption temptations. While the
UCVPP employees are satisfied with their salaries, the NARMPP employees are highly
dissatisfied with the situation (Interview C. Vulcu, NARMPP, May 18, 2007). The high
salaries of UCVPP observers have the potential of attracting and retaining betterqualified people. Nonetheless, the limited number of well trained individuals in public
procurement led to a similar situation as in the case of NARMPP where the new
employees have very little or no knowledge about public procurement procedures.
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Consequently, the new employees must be trained on such issues as public procurement
legislation and procedures, as well as on what it means to be a public servant (Interview
C. Nagy, Director UCVPP, May 25, 2007). The lack of experience regarding public
procurement procedures is likely to affect the quality of inspections conducted by the
UCVPP inspectors. Additionally, in the public procurement market there is the
perception of overlapping responsibilities of UCVPP and NARMPP with the potential of
generating conflicting decisions (Interview PP Expert 1, April 17, 2007). An important
question that is yet to be addressed is what will happen if UCVPPP and NARMPP reach
conflicting conclusions pursuant to their investigations (which may happen in cases of
big public procurement contracts) of the same contracting authority? (Interview PP
Expert 2, April 3, 2007). So far, such situations have not appeared yet perhaps due to the
short period of activity of both institutions, although the authorities should consider such
scenarios.

4.2.3. National Council for Resolving Complaints

Part of the reform package initiated in 2005 was also the creation of a better
system for reviewing and solving complaints against tender procedures. The previous
system of filing complaints limited the period in which a complaint could be filed (i.e., up
to the date the contract was signed) and allowed the contracting authority to decide the
merits of the complaint and, subsequently, if to suspend the procurement procedures or
not. The latter provision gave significant latitude to the contracting authority to claim that
the complaint was not justify or that the tender fell under the "exceptional" conditions
specified by the law. Furthermore, under the old legislation, the contracting authority was
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required to notify the Ministry of Public Finance only in cases when a legal action was
initiated by the contestant. In a market dominated by informal rules, often the plaintiff
would withdraw the complaint or reach an agreement with the contracting authority
which could involve the promise of a future contract or the threat of being excluded from
any future contracts (Interview PP Expert 1, April 17, 2007).
To address these shortcomings, the National Council for Resolving Complaints
(NCRC) was established by the GEO no. 34/2006 and it was initially attached, although
not subordinated, to the NARMPP. Starting from January 1st, 2007 the NCRC became
financially independent from NARMPP and started functioning in a new location. The
organizational structure of NCRC includes 37 employees, 16 employees representing
technical and administrative staff, and it is led by a president elected for a three-year
mandate with the possibility of one renewal. At least half of the 21 members of the
NCRC must have legal expertise and all of them are required to have a minimum of two
years experience in public procurement (Articles 258 & 260). To reduce the corruptibility
of the members, their salary is 40 percent higher than the salary of other public servants.
The law also specifies the incompatibilities with the position of member of the NCRC
and the creation of a Disciplinary Committee responsible for adjudicating any ethical
violations committed by the NCRC employees (Article 265).
Upon receiving a complaint, the NCRC must decide the legality of the public
procurement procedures within 10 days or, in exceptional circumstances, within 20 days.
The NCRC has the right to request from the contracting authority all the documentation
regarding the specific public procurement procedure that is being contested. If the
contracting authority fails to produce the requested documentation within five days, the
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NCRC can penalize the head of the contracting authority with a fine representing 20
percent of the minimum wage for each day the documentation is late. The NCRC
decisions, which are reached in a panel of three members, are binding and all contracts
completed against the NCRC decisions are declared void (Article 280). According to
GEO no. 34/2006, if a plaintiff is dissatisfied with the administrative decision can contest
it in court. However, this last resort is rarely used for various reasons. One such reason is
the long time required to obtain a solution from the Court, which can take up to two years
(Interview C. Vulcu, NARMPP, May 18, 2007), although the law specifies that "the
complaint formulated against the decision of the Council [NCRC] shall be judged in
emergency procedure and with priority" (Article 283, paragraph 3). Other reasons include
fear of reprisal, embarrassment, or the promise of a future contract. For example, one
contractor participated in a public procurement tender for road construction and in the
final phase there were only two offers left, his included. His offer was for 150 billion
ROL, while that of his competitor was 300 billion ROL. Although his offer was clearly
more advantageous, he lost the tender. When he threatened with contesting the awarding
procedure, he was told: "Sit the hell still or next year you will not get any money for your
road constructions!" (Interview PP Expert 1, April 17, 2007). Out of a total of 338
decisions made by the NCRC in 2006, 28 were contested in Court but only five of them
were admitted by the Court.
The 338 decisions made by the NCRC in the few months of activity in the fall of
2006 indicate a promising start of this institution. However, the NCRC is criticized for
"the lack of expertise necessary to satisfactorily review the complaints and for failing to
take responsibility for the decisions passed; that is, the decisions are drafted in a standard

357

format" (Interview PP Expert 1, April 17, 2007). The NCRC decisions "lack the
justification necessary, although the amendment GEO no. 34 requires the justification of
all decisions to be made in writing and published on the website of the NCRC"
(Interview PP Expert 2, April 3, 3007). Additionally, "there is no record regarding the
actual implementation of the NCRC decisions or of any case where the non-compliance
with the NCRC decision was penalized" (Interview PP Expert 1, April 17, 2007). All
these weaknesses in the functioning of the NCRC may potentially undermine the
authority of the institution, if ignored. On the other hand, the institution has the potential
of becoming an important element in combating corruption in the public procurement
sector, especially if supported by the other two institutions with responsibilities for
regulating and monitoring activities in the public procurement market, i.e., NARMPP and
UCVPP.

4.2.4. The Court of Accounts

In addition to the newly created institutions, the control of public procurement
acquisitions of goods, services, or works falls under the jurisdiction of the Court of
Accounts (CA). The latter institution has a long history that dates back to 1864 although
its name and attributions have changed over time. The current CA was established by the
1991 Romanian Constitution replacing the Supreme Court of Financial Control that
existed during the communist regime. According to the Constitution, the Law no.
94/1992 and its subsequent amendments, the CA is the ultimate institution of ex post
financial control of the management of public money. The institution functions near the
Parliament to which it reports directly the findings of the financial controls executed. The
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CA responsibilities include also the elaboration of an Annual Activity Report that is
published in the Official Gazette, to ensure the transparency of the control processes
(Article 3, paragraph 2). The CA is independent in its activity, decides its own financial
control schedule and proposes its own budget. The latter requires the Parliament's
approval and it is an indicator of the political support for the functioning of the CA.
Figure 28 presents the evolution of the budgets allocated over the ten-year period.

Figure 28
The Evolution of Budgetary Funds Allocated to the Court of Accounts
(Real 1997 Dollars120)

Year
Source: Court of Accounts, Response to FOIA Request (June 25, 2007) and the
Ministry of Public Finance, http://www.mfinante.ro (accessed August 15, 2009)
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All values were adjusted for inflation and discounting and are expressed in real 1997 USD, the first year
of the research study. See Chapter VI for a detailed explanation of the adjusting calculations.
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With the exception of the year 2005, the budget of the institution has been consistently
adjusted to match the increasing responsibilities of the court. Once started, the CA
financial controls cannot be stopped, unless the Parliament makes a direct request for
their termination. The Parliament is also the sole institution that can request the CA to
conduct a specific financial control. No other public institution has the authority to either
make such a request or to stop a control initiated by the CA (Article 2). The CA
discharges its authority through the central and territorial units, the latter being situated in
191
the capital of each county (judet)

and in Bucharest.

The law on the organization and functioning of the CA does not include any
specific provisions regarding the role of the institution in the prevention, discovery or
sanctioning of corruption. Nonetheless, if any illegalities are discovered during the
financial controls, the CA informs the Prosecutor's Office and suspends the controls
(Article 31, paragraph 4). Through its jurisdictional powers, the CA can determine the
payment of financial damages for the losses caused to the state budget by the
mismanagement of public money (Article 40). The CA decisions, executed by the
Ministry of Public Finance, are binding and can be reversed only by the Jurisdictional
Council of the CA, the plenum of the CA (i.e., five financial judges), or the High Court of
Cassation and Justice. Consequently, the CA plays a limited role in preventing or
detecting corruption, the potential for an ex post financial controls being an insufficient
deterrent for corruption, since "it is practically impossible for the Court of Accounts to
cover all credit ordinators [accountants] each year" (SIGMA 2005a).
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The Romanian territorial-administrative units are counties (judefe) and they are administered by the
Office of the Prefect, located in the capital-city of each county. There are 41 counties and the municipality
of Bucharest, which is given an equal rank with a county.
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In monitoring public procurement activities, the most common problems
identified by the CA include the substitution of open or restricted procedures with the
selection of offers or acquisition from a single source; failure to invite domestic
contractors to the tender ; drafting of technical documentations in favor of a specific
contractor; failure to publicize the tender; drafting and signing of final contracts that
differ from the initial procurement contract; the inclusion of special clauses that allow for
additional price changes besides those allowed by the procurement legislation; and the
fragmentation of the public procurement acquisition in smaller contracts that fall below
the required threshold for organizing a public tender. In some cases, the CA controllers
discovered the inclusion in documents of fictitious operations, different prices for
services and/or goods than those accepted in the procurement contract, incomplete
services, and the advancement of unjustified payments (Curtea de Conturi 1998). In
2002, for example, the CA investigated 1571 public institutions and, in 144 cases, it
discovered more or less severe infringements of procurement regulations (SIGMA 2005,
5). Generally, the CA controls focus on the legality of procedures and less on the
efficiency of procedures, although some attempts to evaluate the efficiency of procedures
are sometimes made.
Although the mere exposure of such irregularities and damages to the state budget
is an insufficient measure to combat corruption, it can potentially lead to penal
investigations and to the restoration of public trust in public institutions. The CA
financial controls can also serve as important tools to increase the transparency of
complex public procurement procedures that resulted in significant losses of public
money. For example, between 2003 and 2005, the CA examined the procurement by

361

public institutions and public economic entities of over evaluated goods and services.
Thus, an investigation regarding the building procurement by two institutions under the
subordination of the Labor Ministry (i.e., National House for Pensions and Other Social
Assurance Rights (NHPSAR) and the National Agency for Labor Force Occupancy
(NALFO)) found that the values paid for the buildings was much higher than the value of
the entire unit of which the buildings were part, a unit that was privatized by the state in
early 2000. Additionally, the buildings required renovations for which significant
amounts of money were allocated, indicating that the members of the Tender
Commission failed to identify the best offers, to document the real values of transaction,
and negotiate the best offers. Consequently, the NHPSAR paid $3.94 million for two
buildings that were previously part of a privatized unit, while the privatization value of
the entire unit was $1.57 million (i.e., 2.5 times smaller). Following the procurement
acquisition, other $1.93 million were allocated for the renovation of one of the buildings,
which made it non-functional for more than two years after the purchase. The NALFO
acquired a building for the amount of $312,812 only four months after the initial owner
of the building made an offer of $242,021 billion. In the four months, the building
changed not only its value but also its owner twice (Petec 2006).
In the case of SNP Petrom SA, the CA financial investigation revealed significant
problems regarding the acquisition of gas stations in the period 1999 and 2002. Some of
the major problems included fictitious offers for public procurement procedures; failure
to organize public procurement procedures although all the legal conditions were met;
failure to register the acquisition of certain goods; acquisition of over-priced gas stations
from private individuals instead of economic entities, although the initial contract
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specified that the payments should be made to the economic entity; the acquisition of
ineffective gas stations (e.g., non-operational, below the SNP Petrom SA standards of
122

quality, required significant investments for renovation); the use of assessment reports
that over-estimated the value of the gas stations; the drafting and registering of
assessment reports after the completion of the procurement procedure; and the formal
organization of two tenders with the same two bidders, although with more expensive
offers in the second round. All these irregularities produced significant losses of public
money. For example, for the acquisition of two gas stations (B. Vacarescu and C.
Brancoveanu) were issued three assessment reports at three different values. Two of the
reports were issued by the same evaluators, although one was done at the request of the
SNP Petrom SA and the other at the request of the SC Midas Invest (the seller). The latter
assessment report was used in the contract negotiation phase, which resulted in an
additional $904,232 paid by the SNP Petrom SA to the SC Midas Invest (Curtea de
Conturi 2003). In 2004, the Nastase Government approved the privatization of SNP
Petrom SA, which was concluded weeks after the national elections and prior to the
transfer of power to the new government. As a result of the privatization process, the
Austrian group OMV acquired a 51 percent stake in SNP Petrom SA, becoming the
largest oil and gas group in Central Europe. According to the Romanian economic and
financial weekly Capital (June 20, 2006), the consultants who prepared the company for
privatization had significantly under-evaluated its price resulting in the SNP Petrom share
to be sold at half the price it was actually worth. Hence, while it appears that the
government attempted to solve some of the problems caused by the mismanagement of
122

The assessment reports are completed by special evaluators who are hired by the contracting authority in
order to determine the real value of the services, goods or works that it intends to purchase.
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public money by SNP Petrom SA, the privatization led to additional financial losses and
a continuous increase in gas prices.
These examples are illustrative of the magnitude of financial losses to the state
budget that may result during public procurement processes. They also reveal the
limitations of the role played by CA in preventing and discovering corruption in the
public procurement sector. Although the institution has significantly more authority than
any other control institution created in the public procurement sector, the sheer number of
public institutions that fall under the control jurisdiction of the CA is too high to ensure a
more prominent role in combating corruption.

4.3. Transparency

Transparency is an essential element in promoting good governance and fighting
corruption. Public procurement is one of the sectors where the lack of transparency is
particularly damaging for the economy, the business environment, and for the general
public by promoting corrupt activities and discouraging the development of a healthy
business environment.

Therefore, transparency

is considered to be "a central

characteristic of a sound and efficient public procurement system" (Soreide 2002, 25) and
it always ranks high on the list of priorities regarding the reform of this sector. In public
procurement, transparency refers to "well-defined regulations and procedures open to
public scrutiny, clear standardized tender documents, bidding and tender documents
containing complete information, and equal opportunity for all in the bidding process"
(Soreide 2002, 25). Transparency in public procurement involves the right and ability of
all interested participants in the procurement process to access the procurement
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legislation and procedures, as well as all the information regarding specific procurement
transactions (Bertok 2005). Nonetheless, absolute transparency in public procurement is
not possible given the nature of certain information (i.e., competition and business
secrets) that may be exchanged during the procurement process. Consequently,
transparency in public procurement must balance the need for openness and access to
information with the need to ensure the protection of confidential information. Finding
the right balance and ensuring that the provisions regarding the protection of confidential
information are not abused is not an easy task, but neither is it an impossible task.

4.3.1. Legislative Provisions

The principle of transparency has always been stipulated in the Romanian public
procurement legislation. While the 2002 PPL specified "the right" of the contracting
authority to ensure maximum transparency by making public the notice for participation
in other information media besides the Official Gazette (Article 17, paragraph 3), the
GEO no. 34/2006 stipulates "the obligation" of the contracting authority to ensure
transparency of procurement procedures. The change is significant because it makes it
mandatory for all contracting authorities to ensure transparency of all procurement
procedures and at all phases of a procurement procedure. Furthermore, the GEO no.
34/2006 includes a separate section on "Special Rules for Transparency Applicable to the
Public Procurement of Publicity Services" (Section 6). Thus, the contracting authority
has the obligation to publish the contract notice and the award notice for all media
publicity contracts that have an annual value higher than €2,000. Additionally, the
contracting authority must ensure public access to the information regarding the final
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beneficiaries of the publicity funds, the allocation criteria of the funds, the sums allocated
to each final beneficiary, and the completion deadlines of the contractual provisions. An
evaluation report regarding the impact of purchasing publicity services is also required to
be made public no later than 120 days after the completion of the publicity contract.
The mandatory publication of tender announcements, tender award notices and
indicative notices are also legislative provisions designed to ensure the transparency of
public procurement procedures. The enforcement of these provisions, especially with
regard to the publication of tender award notices, is a different matter. As it was shown
by the evaluation reports conducted by SIGMA in 2003 and 2005, there is still an
important discrepancy between the number of tender announcements and tender award
notices, with the latter number being usually much lower. The lack of sanctions for
failing to publicize the tender award notices, the cancelling of tender procedures, the
simple omission, or the need to protect an illegal procurement procedure are all
explanations for the lower number of tender award notices published (Interview C.
Vulcu, NARMPP, May 18, 2007 and Interview PP Expert 1, April 17, 2007).
An important change is embodied in the Article 215 of the GEO no. 34/2006,
which stipulates that "The public procurement dossier has the character of public
information." The access to the information included in the dossier is enabled by the
FOIA rules and restrictions can be applied only in cases of classified or secret
information. NARMPP is the institution responsible for monitoring the restrictions to
access to information and to sanction the contracting authorities responsible for such law
violations. The sanctions are in the form of fines varying between $3,560 (100,000,000
ROL) and $12,450 (350,000,000 ROL). However, as the NARMPP representative C.
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Vulcu admitted, if a procurement contract involves millions of dollars, a small fine is not
a very effective deterrent.

4.3.2. Electronic Procurement

The use of electronic procurement to increase transparency has been increasingly
promoted by various international organizations, such as the World Bank, UN, and EU in
the last decade. Electronic procurement refers to the procurement of works, goods, and
services through the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT),
particularly the Internet. The conducting of procurement transactions in the virtual space
has multiple benefits: increase in transparency; improved access to information and
service; reduction of the cost of information and transactions; increased efficiency of
public procurement activities; significant savings of the public money; encouragement of
small and medium enterprises to employ technology; and, very importantly, reduction of
corruption and/or collusion agreements by decreasing the risk of data manipulation or
misuse (Bertok 2005, World Bank 2005). The benefits of electronic procurement are
illustrated by the following examples. The introduction of the Government electronic
Procurement System in South Korea allowed the government to save about $2.7 billion of
all public procurement as compared to $26 million investment. Furthermore, between
1998 and 2002, the total government procurement volume increased about 30 percent,
although the staff of the Public Procurement Service was reduced from 1,058 to 935.
During the first two years of electronic procurement use (COMPRASNET), the Federal
Government of Brazil is estimated to have saved up to $1.5 million. Additionally, the on-
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line procurement is completed in less than 15 working days, while the normal
procurement process takes more than two months (World Bank 2005, 21).
In 2002, as part of a country-wide strategy of using ICT to increase transparency,
the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MCIT) and the General
Inspectorate for Communication and Information Technology (GICIT) implemented the
electronic government procurement (e-GP) system, e-Licitatie. The main objectives of
Romania's e-Licitatie are reflected in the legislation that defines the legal framework for
the functioning of on-line procurement transactions. Thus, according to the Government
1
Ordinance no. 20/2002 and subsequent amendments,

public procurement by electronic

bidding seeks to promote free and open competition, efficient use of public funds,
transparency

of

public

procurement,

equal

and

non-discriminatory

treatment,

confidentiality of commercial secrets and protection of intellectual property (Article 2).
The conducting of public procurement procedures by electronic means was made
mandatory for about 1,000 contracting authorities, mostly ministries and subordinate
institutions, as specified in the Government Decision no. 182/2002 and the subsequent 11
amendments. Until the changes introduced by the GEO no. 34/2006, e-Licitatie was not
open to any other interested contracting authorities besides those listed in the
Government Decision no. 182/2002. The latter defined also the products that could be
procured through e-Licitatie, which included about 80 product categories with thousand
of products. The complete alignment of Romanian procurement legislation with the EU
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The Government Ordinance no. 20/2002 was approved with changes by the Law no. 468/July 2002; the
initial legislation was subsequently changed by the Government Ordinance no. 23/January 2003 and the
Law no. 246/June 2003 approving it; the Government Ordinance no. 73/August 2003 and the Law no.
535/December 2003; and the GEO no. 34/2006 and the subsequent amendments to it.
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Directives led to the development of an extended version of e-Licitatie, which became
fully operational after January 1st, 2007.
E-Licitatie was designed by the GICIT and developed by a Romanian software
company using Microsoft ASP technology that allows corrections imposed by changes in
the economic environment (Ailioaie and Kertesz 2003). The 100 percent web-based
system gives equal access to all interested participants and it allows them to conduct their
activities in a safe environment (i.e., encrypted communication, digital certificates, secure
facilities protected by biometrics, smart cards, and video surveillance) (World Bank
2005). The costs of setting up e-Licitatie were estimated at about €100,000, while the
costs for the development of the new version are estimated at about €3.5 million. The
operational costs are covered by the money raised from the registration and transaction
fees that must be paid directly to the operator (i.e., GICIT). Thus, contracting authorities
had to pay a transaction fee of 0.25-0.5 percent of the contract value, while tenderers had
to pay an annual registration fee of €15 and a participation fee of €0.25 per electronic
reverse auction (World Bank 2005, 13).124 The requirement to pay registration and
transaction fees were a lesser concern for tenderers because they usually included those
expenses into the price offers. However, the obligation of tenderers to use e-Licitatie to
conduct procurement procedures with public institutions has resulted not only in greater
transparency, fairer competition, less paperwork, and less opportunities for corruption,
but also in smaller profit margins (in some cases to about 10 percent). The reduced prices
obtained as a result of electronic reverse auctions, usually welcomed by the buyers (i.e.,
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Electronic reverse auction is an auction where "several tenderers compete for the business to supply
products or services and successively bid the prices down" (Wagner and Schwab 2004).
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contracting authority), has led to dissatisfaction among some tenderers who continue to
favor the maintenance of the old offline system (World Bank 2005).
Dissatisfaction with the legal obligation of procuring products through e-Licitatie
was found also among contracting authorities. The two main reasons for their discontent
were the annual total amount of transaction fees that must be paid to the GICIT and the
length of the on-line procurement procedures (25 to 30 days), which in emergency cases
(e.g., medication) was considered too long. In the case of a hospital interviewed by the
World Bank in 2004, the total annual transaction fees paid to GICIT amounted to €10,000
(World Bank 2005, 10). The implementation of the extended version of e-Licitatie in
2006 removed the registration fee for tenderers and introduced a flat fee of maximum
$7.00 for participation in the procurement procedures, with 20 participations per month
being free of charge. The contracting authority has to pay a flat fee for each procurement
procedure between a minimum of $1.5 and a maximum of $30 (Marcu 2008). From
March 2002 until March 2005 about 3,300 suppliers participated in 388,000 electronic
reverse auction transactions with direct price savings of about €150 million. According to
the GICIT, the price savings is the direct result of the increase in transparency and
increase in competition specific to the electronic procurement procedures (World Bank
2005, 13). The open access to e-Licitatie of all contracting authorities after the adoption
of GEO no. 34/2006 and the introduction of the new version of e-Licitatie led to a
significant increase in the number of procurement procedures and participants. Thus, at
the end of 2007 9,500 suppliers and 9,300 contracting authorities were registered in eLicitatie. The number of electronic procurement procedures from March 2005 until the
end of 2007 was 262,000. The total value of electronic procurement procedures since the
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implementation of e-Licitatie in March 2002 was estimated at about €1 billion or $1,5
billion (Marcu 2008).
The introduction of e-Licitatie was designed to show the EU that Romania is a
serious candidate determined to implement comprehensive strategies that would
modernize the public procurement system. The complete transposition of EU Directive in
the national legislation along with the software changes made in 2006 were meant to
dismiss the concerns of some conservative European parliamentarians regarding
Romania's capacity to successfully fight corruption. Nonetheless, the success of the eLicitatie depends also on the access to internet of all contracting authorities and suppliers
and on the skills of those conducting the procurement procedures (i.e., tenderers and
contracting authorities). In October 2008, the financial newspaper Ziarul Financiar
reported that in January 2007 only 58 percent of enterprises with more than 10 employees
had access to the internet, Romania being last among the other EU members with regard
to internet connectivity. The use of e-Licitatie,

while important for increasing

transparency and reducing the opportunities for corruption by limiting the direct contact
between public officials and tenderers, it is not enough to curb corruption. Although an
important step towards increasing transparency, competition, and efficiency of public
procurement procedures, electronic procurement must be used in association with other
anticorruption strategies to be effective in combating corruption.

4.4. Freedom of Information

The adoption of FOIA in 2001 legitimized the right to access information of
public interest, including information regarding the public procurement procedures.
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However, prior to 2006, the public procurement dossier was not considered part of the
category of public information with the exception of the notices that were required to be
publicized in the Official Gazette. The 2002 PPL emphasized the need for confidentiality
by giving the contracting authorities the right to publicize the public procurement
information. Additionally, the absence of a central entity responsible for monitoring the
activities on the public procurement market made it more difficult for the public to
identify the information regarding public procurement transactions.
The special rules for ensuring transparency introduced by the GEO no. 34/2006
changed the character of public procurement information by classifying the procurement
dossier as public information. Subsequently, FOIA was amended in fall 2006 to include
the changes introduced by the new procurement legislation. The adoption of the Law no.
380 in October 5, 2006 made it mandatory for all contracting authorities to provide the
entire public procurement dossier to all parties interested. Additionally, the NARMPP
includes in the list of information of public interest that it manages 1) the complaints
forwarded by the contracting authorities to NARMPP; 2) the summary notes regarding
the conclusion of the controls of the award of tender procedures; 3) the reports on the
public procurement contract awarded by contracting authorities; 4) the decisions issued
by NCRC and transmitted to NARMPP to monitor the compliance with the NCRC
decisions; and 5) the advisory notices issued by the UCVPP regarding the irregularities in
the application of the procurement legislation. However, the response received from the
NARMPP to my FOIA request for the copies of such documents for 2006 said that the
first three categories of documents are available only in printed format and can be
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consulted exclusively at the NARMPP headquarters.125 Regarding the last two categories
of information, they should be requested directly from the other two institutions, although
the NARMPP manages them and lists them as part of their public information. Overall, in
2006, the NARMPP received a total of 11 FOIA requests and all were answered
favorably although there is no information regarding the completeness of responses
(ANRMAP 2006).
The only other institution responsible for monitoring public procurement
activities and which provides information regarding the FOIA requests received and
answered is the Court of Accounts. Information in this case is also incomplete. Thus,
there is no information regarding the number of FOIA requests processed prior to 2005
and a study conducted by the Pro-Democracy Association from December 2002 until
December 2003 revealed that none of their eight FOIA requests were answered by the
Court of Accounts (Asociatia Pro-Democratia 2004). In the last two years prior to
Romania's accession to the EU, the record of the CA improved not only with regard to
the number of FOIA requests answered favorably, but also with regard to the publication
of the records on this issue. Hence, in 2005 the CA received 189 FOIA request and
answered favorably 139 (i.e., 69 percent), while in 2006 it received a total of 112 requests
and answered favorably 74 of them (i.e., 66 percent). According to the Evaluation Report
on the Implementation of the Law no. 544/2001 by the Court of Accounts, 36 FOIA
requests were rejected in 2006 because they asked for either confidential or nonexistent
information.
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The list of these documents on the list of information of public interest was made after I concluded my
field work in Bucharest.
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The changes introduced in 2006 have the potential to significantly improve the
access of public to information regarding public procurement procedures, improving thus
the transparency of activities involving public money. The CA record indicates that the
institution has become increasingly more responsive to requests for public information,
although some responses are incomplete. Thus, a study conducted in 2007 found that
although the CA had 100 percent responsiveness to FOIA requests, in half of cases the
responses were incomplete (Asociatia Pro-Democratia & TI-Ro 2007). Nonetheless, the
upgrading of e-Licitatie to include the public procurement activities of all contracting
authorities has also the potential to make the public access to public procurement
information easier. That depends though on the adoption of the World Bank
recommendation to make the bidding documents publicly accessible for free without
having to register or be a certified user (World Bank 2005).

4.5. An Ethics Code for Public Procurement?

The public procurement sector like any other public sector should have an
established code of ethics to guide the behavior of those interacting in the public
procurement market. The complexity of public procurement procedures and, especially,
the participation of private entities/actors to the public procurement procedures makes it
more difficult for the development of a code of ethics that all participants would abide by.
Nonetheless, many countries have adopted a code of ethics for the participants in public
procurement. For example, all members of the Purchasing Management Association of
Canada (PMAC) and its affiliated Institutes and Corporation are obliged to abide by the
Professional Code of Ethics. The PMAC's Code of Ethics stipulates the values (i.e.,
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honesty, professionalism, responsible management, serving the public interest, and
conformity with the laws), the norms of ethical behavior among which the "value for
money" principle is central, the rules of conduct, and the enforcement procedures (PMAC
2009). The Australian Government has also developed a set of ethical norms for those
conducting public procurement activities. Although less comprehensive than the
Canadian one, the Australian norms of ethics in government procurement have value for
money as the core principle and emphasize the avoidance of any conflict of interest, theft
or corruption (Commonwealth of Australia 2005). In the U.S., the Williamson County
Procurement Code of Ethics specifically states that it is the obligation not only of public
officials but also of those who do business with the county to abide by these rules
(Williamson County 2007).
Romania has not yet adopted a Code of Ethics for Public Procurement, although a
proposal was advanced in 2003 as part of the PHARE program for public procurement
sector. The proposal included three sections: core principles and values, rules of conduct,
and enforcement mechanism. The document was inspired by the Canadian Professional
Code of Ethics, the American Williamson County Procurement Code of Ethics, and the
Code of Ethics used by all the employees of the Piedmont Technical College in Italy (zu
Eulenburg and Nemec 2003). However, the proposal was forgotten over the years and
"the authorities avoid talking about something like this" (Interview PP Expert 1, April 17,
2007). Consequently, the representatives of contracting authorities must abide by the
rules of conduct set forth in the Code of Ethics for Public Servants approved by the Law
no. 7/2004. The tenderers in public procurement procedures should abide by the rules of
conduct of their business, whenever there is such a code.
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4.6. Merit-Based Civil Service

A major problem in the Romanian public procurement sector is represented by the
lack of definition of the public procurement profession. Most of those working in this
sector do not have the appropriate knowledge and training required for conducting
sometimes very complicated public procurement transactions. Consequently, intensive
and extensive trainings are required to prepare the public officials responsible for the
public procurement activities of their institutions and the representative of firms that are
doing business with public institutions. Furthermore, trainings must be organized also for
the employees of institutions responsible for monitoring the legality of public
procurement procedures, such as UCVPP and NARMPP.
Prior to the creation of NARMPP, the institution responsible for organizing the
training seminars was the Public Procurement Directorate (PPD). The information
regarding the number of seminars and participants is summarized in Table 15, although
the data for 2005 is missing. The highest number of seminars and public officials trained
in public procurement legislation and procedures took place in 2003, the year that the
PHARE Program RO.0006.05.01 was implemented in Romania. The reform measures
introduced in 2006 transferred the responsibility for organizing training seminars to the
newly created NARMPP. The institution does not provide any information regarding the
number of participants to those seminars, but it is estimated that each seminar is attended
by 80 to 100 participants, which would give a conservatively calculated total of 540
participants in 2006. In addition to the large number of participants and the short duration
of the training (1-2 days), the low impact of the seminars was attributed to the quality of
presentations that tend to mechanically summarize extracts from legislation and to the

inexperience of trainers (Interview PP Expert 1, April 17, 2007 and Interview PP Expert
2, April 3, 2007).

Table 15
The Evolution of Training Seminars in Public Procurement
2004*
2006**
2003*
40
7
Number
23
(+ 72 PHARE)
Seminars
N/A
200
900
700
1000
Numbers
(+1400 PHARE)
Participants
Source: * SIG VIA, Romanian Public Procurement System A ssessment (June 2005)
**NARMPP, RaportAnual de Activitate (2006)
2001*
8

2002*
30

The training seminars offered by NARMPP are supplemented by the seminars
offered by private public procurement experts through the NGOs or professional
organizations to which they are affiliated. According to the public procurement experts
interviewed, their seminars are smaller in size (maximum 15-20 participants) and longer
in duration (minimum three days). That gives them an opportunity the address the
procurement procedures in more depth and to simulate public procurement acquisitions.
An interesting situation was created by the reduction of external funding (particularly
from the EU) for domestic NGOs, which led to a strong competition among them for
financial resources. Since "anticorruption is very hip, many NGOs have expanded their
mission to include the fight against corruption among their activities...but the result is
tension and conflicts among NGOs" (Anticorruption Expert 1, April 12, 2007). The
search for new financial sources led to a re-definition of some NGOs, including TI
Romania (TI-Ro), which began organizing a variety of training programs including in the
public procurement sector. Although financially the solution is justified and it can be
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claimed that TI-Ro is better prepared to train people on how to ethically conduct their
public activities, there is a serious downside to consider. That is, the TI-Ro experts
conduct seminars where they tell the participants how they should apply public
procurement regulations, which potentially weakens the organization's power to criticize
those individuals for the way they apply the legislation, especially if they followed the
TI-Ro experts' advice. There have been reported cases when TI-Ro criticized some of the
participants who attended its own seminars, which resulted in a media battle between the
organization and the contracting authority or tenderer criticized (Interview PP Expert 2,
April 3, 2007). The alteration of TI-Ro's mission from a watchdog to a training
institution has come at a price, altering the organization's image of impartiality and even
credibility.
Officials in the public procurement institutions responsible for regulating and
monitoring the activity in this sector are regulated by the general rules applied to all
public servants as established by the Law no. 188/1999 (Law on the Statute of Civil
Servants) and subsequent amendments. That is, the selection process consists of an
examination that must be publicized 30 days in advance and validated by an examination
commission. The principle underpinning career promotions and advancement is seniority
and all promotions are required to be made based on the results of an examination
organized by the public institution with the approval of the National Agency of Civil
Servants (Article 65). The law allows for a rapid promotion in special cases where the
public official completed a special professional training and obtained the degree of public
manager (Article 70). However, all central institutions in public procurement sector are
new and still in the process of completing their organizational structure. As a result, it is
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too early to discuss the career advancement of those public servants, although a salary
adjustment for NARMPP employees may be suitable given their responsibility, not to
mention the discontent produced by the higher salaries of the UCVPP and NCRC
employees.

5. The Impact of Anticorruption Strategies

Most of the important changes in the public procurement sector took place in the
two years prior to the country's accession to the EU. The increasing external pressure
exercised by the EU to reform the public procurement sector, to combat corruption and to
align public procurement legislation and regulations with the European Directives 2004
was the primary stimulus. As hypothesized, the lower level of external pressure exercised
by the EU during the first eight years analyzed resulted in a postponement of reform in
the public procurement sector. Additionally, the newness of this sector in Romania
coupled with the complexities of the public procurement procedures and the resistance to
strategies that would disrupt particularistic interests explains the delay in reforming
public procurement. The EU decision to include Romania in the CEE enlargement
process in 2000 led to more vigorous efforts to adopt and implement institutional
strategies.
The alignment of the Romanian procurement legislation with the European
procedures regulating the common market began in early 2000 and continued throughout
the remaining accession process. The 2002 PPL largely aligned national legislation with
the EU and represented important progress from the previous public procurement
legislation by adopting clearer definitions of coverage exemptions and for selection of
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award criteria, more precise rules on value estimations and technical standards, minimum
time limits for submission of tenders, the mandatory maintenance of written records, and
better mechanisms for resolving complaints about the tender procedures. The incomplete
transposition of EU procurement procedures coupled with the adoption of new EU
Directives in 2004 and the approaching deadline for accession made it more pressing for
the Romanian government to demonstrate its political commitment to reform and clean
up its public procurement sector. The change in leadership brought by the 2004 national
elections introduced a new impetus in the fight against corruption, momentum that
materialized in the adoption of a Reform Strategy and Action Plan for reforming the
public procurement sector applicable for 2005-2007; the adoption of a new public
procurement legislation that completely transposed the EU Directives (i.e., GEO no.
34/2006); and the establishment of new institutions responsible for regulating,
monitoring, and solving complaints in the public procurement sector (i.e., NARMPP,
UCVPP, and CNSC). The institutional strategies adopted since 2005 led to a significant
increase in transparency of public procurement procedures by classifying the entire
public procurement dossier as information of public interest and by amending FOIA to
legally create the avenues for accessing the procurement dossiers by those interested.
Importantly, the efforts to increase transparency and efficiency in the public procurement
sector by the introduction of the e-Licitatie in 2002 intensified in 2006 by the
development of an extended version of e-Licitatie that allows the participation of a larger
number of contracting authorities and tenderers and the transaction of significantly more
procurement procedures by electronic means.
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Nonetheless, there are still problems that need to be addressed in order to make
the public procurement sector more efficient, transparent, and, implicitly, to reduce the
opportunities for corruption. Although the GEO no. 34/2006 adopted ad litteram the 2004
EU Directives and, thus, satisfied the external requirements in this area, the legislation is
not always clear, the language leaves room for multiple interpretations, and, a year after
its adoption, it was considered to be one of the least respected laws in the public
procurement sector. Furthermore, the shortage of public procurement specialists impacts
the activity and effectiveness of the newly created central institutions responsible for
monitoring and regulating the activity on the public procurement market. The
inexperience of the NARMPP, UCVPP, and even NCRC employees generates
dissatisfaction among the participants in public procurement processes. The efforts to
train new people made particularly by the NARMPP, while laudatory, have been assessed
as having a low effect due to the huge number of participants and short duration of
training, which explains the nickname given by outsiders to those seminars, i.e., "mass
conferences" (Interview PP Expert 2, April 3, 2007). Additionally, the appearance of
overlapping responsibilities between NARMPP and UCVPP with the potential of
generating

conflicting

decisions

generates

anxiety

among

public

procurement

participants. Although the NCRC represents an improvement in the area of reviewing and
resolving complaints against the public procurement processes, the formal drafting of
issued decisions without proper justifications generates discontent among those directly
affected by the decisions. The long duration required to resolve a contestation in Court,
despite the legal provisions that such complaints should be given priority, further
discourages the use of this avenue for resolving complaints. The tendency then continues
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to be the practice of resolving complaints informally, a situation which is only likely to
create more opportunities for corruption. Although the absence of a Code of Ethics for
public procurement was not an obstacle to accession, the adoption of such a code that all
participants to public procurement procedures would abide by was considered important
enough by the EU to assist Romania in drafting such a proposal. In the absence of the
external pressure to adopt such a Code of Ethics, the proposal was forgotten and
continues to be omitted from any public debate, although it could standardize good
practices on the public procurement market.
Although progress has been made in reforming and combating corruption in the
Romanian public procurement, the newness of most substantial measures makes it
difficult to assess their effectiveness. Nonetheless, the comparison of results from the
Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity Surveys (BEEPS) conducted in
Romania in 2002 and 2005 indicates a positive change in how firms perceive corruption
(Figure 29). Specifically, the percentage of firms identifying corruption as a major
constraint was 5.86 percent lower in 2005 compared to 2002. Moreover, the percentage
of firms indicating that they were expected to make gifts in order to secure government
contracts was 9.51 percent lower in 2005 than in 2002. The decrease of corruption was
reflected also in respondents' response regarding the value of the contract that was paid
to secure a government contract. Thus, if in 2002 1.57 percent of the contract value was
assigned for the unofficial/informal payment (i.e., gift), in 2005 the value of the gift as
percentage of the contract value decreased to 0.35. These results indicate that the
institutional strategies have had a positive impact, which was noted by the firms
functioning on the public procurement market.
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Figure 29
The Perception of Corruption Expressed by Firms
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Firms expected to give gifts to secure government contracts

Source: http://www.enterprisesurvey.com (accessed December 4, 2009)

However, once again, the external pressure exercised by the EU has played a
significant role in creating and supporting the political will necessary for adopting and
implementing

difficult institutional

strategies.

The

evolution

of

reforms

and

anticorruption strategies in this sector is even more illustrative of the impact of external
pressure and its absence. That is, when EU pressure increased and was accompanied by
threats to postpone accession, there was a mobilization of political will and efforts were
made to produce the required change. In the absence of external pressure, the prevalence
was given to protecting particularistic interests and introducing incremental changes that
would not disrupt the old system. However, the progress made by Romania in the last
two years prior to accession is noticeable and it has the potential of reducing corruption
in the public procurement sector pending the continuation of those efforts.
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CHAPTER VIII

THE OVERDUE REFORM OF THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR

"Health care reform is like the Enchanted Bird: everyone describes it,
everyone imagines it in his/her own way, but no one has seen it in
reality!"126

1. Introduction

Health care systems are complex entities that have major economic and social
implications. Perhaps the most obvious economic implication is represented by the
governments' expenditures in the health care sectors, expenditures that affect the
organizational structure and functioning of health care systems. For example, in 2006, the
World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that the total amount of money spent on
health care in the world amounted to USD $4.7 trillion. While some countries spend more
on health care compared to others, there is a general agreement that health care systems
constitute important sources of financial expenses. When associated with the problems of
corruption, mismanagement and/or misallocation of health care funding, the prospects of
guaranteeing an efficient functioning of the health care system becomes increasingly
more problematic from both economic and social perspectives. From a social standpoint,
the delivery of effective and affordable health care services has direct implications for the
well being of individuals and society as a whole. Consequently, any reform of the health
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Interview V. Astarastoae, College of Physicians in Romania, May 22, 2007.
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care system has to also take into consideration the consumers of the health care services.
In post-communist Romania, major health care reforms were initiated after 1997 but with
moderate improvements in the functioning of the health care system and little impact on
corruption in this sector, as will be shown later in the chapter. The absence of a common
European health care policy meant that EU pressure was limited with regard to reforming
and combating corruption in the health care sector and that the main point of pressure
was the Romanian public.
This chapter assesses the institutional strategies designed to reform and combat
corruption in the Romanian health care sector from 1997 until 2006. The first section
briefly describes the unique characteristics of the health care system and the opportunities
for corruption in this sector with a particular emphasis on informal payments, their
magnitude, and consequences for the general public. The second section will present the
organizational structure of the health care system in Romania, followed by the sections
that analyze the institutional strategies adopted and implemented in this sector. The
chapter will conclude with an evaluation of the institutional strategies for reforming and
curbing corruption in the Romanian health care sector.

2. Health Care Systems—A Synopsis

2.1. Characteristics of Health Care Systems and Reform Trends within the EU

The health care system has four main features that set it aside from other sectors.
Specifically, the health care market is characterized by 1) high levels of uncertainty, 2)
asymmetry of information, 3) large number of actors, and 4) large sums of public money.
First, the uncertainty in the health care market (i.e., who falls ill, when illness will occur,
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what illnesses will people get, how effective the treatments will be) differentiates it from
other types of markets in terms of the possibility for market failure (Arrow 1963).
Consequently, medical care service markets and the health insurance market are prone to
inefficiency (Savedoff and Hussmann 2006, 5).
Second, the information asymmetry leads to the situation in which the patients
delegate decision-making to the physicians and the latter act as the agents of the patients
(Lewis 2006, Maynard 2006, Savedoff and Hussmann 2006). In this principal-agent
relationship, the patient trusts the physician to make the best decisions for his/her well
being. However, physicians have a duty not only to act in the best interest of their
patients, but also to protect the interest of their health care systems acting, thus, as
"double agents" (Maynard 2006, 141). Furthermore, sometimes the physicians have their
own personal interests which may lead to the prescription of expensive treatments or
provision of substandard services that are likely to induce informal payments (i.e., underthe-table or, in Romanian, atentie) (Savedoff and Hussmann 2006).
Third, the large number of actors involved and the complex forms in which they
interact make this sector particularly vulnerable to corruption (Savedoff and Hussmann
2006). When associated with the significant amount of information to be collected and
analyzed and the high levels of uncertainty and information asymmetry, the opportunities
for corruption and inefficiency in the provision of health care services are likely to
increase. Lastly, although equally important, the large sums of public money that are
involved in the health care sector are likely to attract dishonest characters and corrupt
behavior. For example, it is estimated that the European members of the OECD
collectively spend more than USD $1 trillion on health services each year, the United
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States spends USD $1.6 trillion per year, and Latin American countries spend collectively
about USD $136 billion per year for health care (half of which comes from public
finances) (Savedoff and Hussmann 2006, 4). All these large sums of funds constitute
attractive targets for corrupt activities.
These unique features of health care systems pose serious challenges to reformers
from countries undergoing transition to democracy. On the European continent, the
organization and regulation of health care sectors has been considered a national matter
from the very beginning of the European Community. Although over the years health
care issues have been incorporated into European treaties, the national governments
continued to be assigned the main responsibility for health care policy, responsibility that
governments have "guarded jealously" (McKee, Mossiales and Baeten 2002). Hence,
even though EU institutions have made some progress in promoting public health in all
member states, the candidate countries have been under little pressure to reform their
health care sectors. Consequently, there was little external pressure (i.e., EU pressure) on
the Romanian authorities to develop comprehensive reforms and anticorruption strategies
in the health care sector. In the absence of the external pressure, the main impetus for
health care reform had to come from within the country.

2.2. Corruption in the Health Care Sector

The features that make the health care market unique are also the features that
make this sector more vulnerable to corruption. The combination of large sums of public
money and many actors involved in managing those public funds is likely to lead to
corruption, particularly when associated with poor oversight and regulations (Savedoff
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and Hussmann 2006). Corruption in the health care may take various forms such as
mismanagement/embezzlement of public funds (Prevenslik-Takeda 2006); false billing,
paying doctors to refer patients to hospitals, hiding paperwork and accounts from
government auditors (Sparrow 2006); and procurement of medication, equipment, and/or
medical supplies and the construction or rehabilitation of health facilities (Vian 2002,
Vian 2005, Lewis 2006).
Perhaps one of the most visible and, paradoxically, most tolerated forms of
corruption is represented by informal payments. Also referred to as "gratitude payments"
or "under-the-table payments," informal payments are defined as "monetary or in-kind
transactions between patient and a health care professional for services officially free of
charge in state health facilities" (Balabanova and McKee 2002, 246). Informal payments
are often explained as being rooted in the culture of a country and their continuation is
justified as being part of the "gift tradition" specific to that culture and which is cherished
and respected by everyone. The magnitude, manifestations, and implications of informal
payments are examined all over the world from Asia (Chiu, et al. 2007), to Africa
(Akesbi, Benchekroun and El Mesbahi 2006, Maestad and Mwisongo 2008), to Latin
America (Savedoff 2008), and Southern Europe (Liaropoulos, et al. 2008).
In the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in
the former Soviet republics, however, the extent of informal payments is particularly
striking. There, the informal payments are one of the so called traditions inherited from
the previous regime. The fall of communism opened the door for a long and difficult
transition to democracy and market economy which, instead of improving the quality of
health care services and eliminating the use of informal payments, has further
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exacerbated existing problems. A multitude of studies have found that informal payments
are a widespread practice, well understood by the public, and expected by the health care
providers in CEE (Kornai 2000, Balabanova and McKee 2002, Leven 2005, Gaal 2006,
Szende and Culyer 2006, Vian, Grybosk, et al. 2006).
A common finding of these studies is the discrepancy between the patients'
perception of informal payments and that of health professionals. Although some patients
found justification for making such payments - such as wages disproportionately small
relative to the qualifications and responsibility of health professionals or the need to show
their gratitude for the service delivered - most patients see informal payments as
additional costs imposed on them by health providers. On the other hand, health
professionals perceive informal payments as token of patients' gratitude or voluntary
contributions to the cost of their care (Vian, Grybosk, et al. 2006, Gaal 2006, Balabanova
and McKee 2002). Another common finding is that informal payments negatively impact
the quality of care provided to patient, may lead to unnecessary medical interventions,
discontinuity of care, and erosion of the professional image and trust, and may introduce
inequality in access to health care with poorer segments of the population at disadvantage
(Rose 2006, Vian, Grybosk, et al. 2006).
There are, however, some authors who claim that informal payments may in fact
have a positive impact because they persuade health professionals to provide high quality
care; they will deter health professionals from taking a second job or searching for
alternative means of revenues who will, consequently, focus more on providing patients
quality health care services; and they will introduce competition among health
professionals for providing higher quality health care that is likely to be rewarded by

389

patients (Maestad and Mwisongo 2008). Furthermore, the authors argue that health
professionals may distinguish between poor and wealthy patients and "can choose" to
employ price discrimination. However, the authors recognize that there is no guarantee
that health professionals will employ price discrimination and that the chances of being
caught taking a bribe may make them less likely to accept small bribes. Consequently, the
likelihood of health professionals charging some patients more than others for the same
complicated service or the chances of them providing higher quality care to impress
patients and extracts higher payments are difficult to consider as positive effects of
informal payments. Reforming health care systems must, therefore, start with
governments acknowledging the problem of informal payments, its magnitude, and
impact in order to address the underlying factors that sustain the system of informal
payments (Allin, Davaki and Mossialos 2006).

3. The Romanian Health Care Sector

3.1. Brief History

The Romanian health care system has a fairly long tradition dating back to the
beginning of the twentieth century. The first organization of the health care was
influenced by the Bismarckian sick-fund model of social insurance. According to that
model, all the employees and their families as well as the self-employed were insured and
the related premium was paid in equal proportion by employers and employees. Romania
was, however, a mainly agricultural country and only five percent of the population had
health insurance under this model (European Observatory of Health Care Systems 2000).
After the end of the Second World War, the communist regime introduced the Semashko
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health care system founded on the principles of universal coverage and free access to
health care at the point of delivery. Health care professionals (e.g., doctors, nurses) were
trained and employed by the state and their wages were fixed by the state. According to
the socialist ideology, the working class, as the main builder of the socialist state, was
rewarded financially for its role, which translated in equal or higher salaries than those of
doctors or other categories of intellectuals. The latter had to find meaning in serving their
society and not in accumulating wealth (Leven 2005, 449). The discrepancy between the
workers' and doctors' wages combined with the high costs of supporting universal health
care systems led to dissatisfaction among health care professionals and shortages in
medical supplies, technologies, and drugs. The continuous deterioration of health care
systems was further aggravated by the inequality of access to good quality health care
services. For example, members of the nomenklatura had privileged access to high
quality health care; those who had the right connections could also benefit from good
quality services; finally, those who could make the side payments were more likely to get
good treatments (Rose 2006). The result was the creation of system that promoted
favoritism and corruption, and one in which making informal payments for prompt and
effective treatment had become a "perfectly acceptable and expected method" (Leven
2005, 449). The system was reformed in 1983 when out-of-pocket payments were
introduced for some ambulatory services, but the rest of the system was left unchanged.
The Ministry of Public Health was the institution responsible for regulating and ensuring
the proper functioning of the entire health care system (Vladescu, Scintee and Olsavszky
2008).
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The centralized,

state-controlled

health care

system

was underfinanced,

underequipped, and poorly managed. This, in turn, led to an increase in the inequality of
access to good quality health care, the spread of informal payments, and privileges for
members of the nomenklatura. These features specific to the Semashko system persisted
in the new health care system (post-1989), which continued to be characterized by small
proportion of GDP allocated to health care, lack of transparency and accountability, poor
quality services, deficient management capacity, and insufficient medical equipment,
drugs, and other supplies (Vladescu, Scintee and Olsavszky 2008). Additionally, the
status of health professionals remained unchanged for the first five to seven years, with
doctors and nurses continuing to be employees of the state with fixed salaries that were
considered too low.

3.2. The Current Organizational Structure

In the first five years of the transition, the government and the Ministry of Public
Health issued a number of decrees and decisions designed to slowly change and improve
the organization and functioning of the health care system. The changes addressed a
variety of issues from the financing of health care services to training, methods of
payment for health professionals, and the management of major health problems such as
tuberculosis and AIDS (Vladescu, Scintee and Olsavszky 2008). Two pieces of
legislation were of particular importance due to their implications in the long term. The
first was Government Decision no. 370/1990, which introduced a new system for paying
primary health care providers in a pilot project implemented in eight districts and which
led to the introduction of this system in the entire country. The second major legislation
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was the Law no. 74/1995 regarding the organization of the College of Physicians in
Romania, a law that was actually implemented two years later. The main changes,
however, began with 1997 when the Law no. 145 on Social Health Insurance was
adopted and which will be discussed in more detail later.
The legislative changes adopted since 1997 have reformed the organizational
structure of the health care system and changed the roles of the main health institutions.
Thus, the current health care system is organized at two main levels: national (central)
and district (judef) level (see Figure 30). The main institutions at the central level are the
Ministry of Public Health (MPH) and the National Health Insurance House (NHIH). The
MPH is responsible for ensuring the health of the nation through the development of
health policies and strategies, and the planning, coordinating and evaluation of these
health plans. The NHIH is an autonomous public institution responsible for managing
and regulating the social health insurance system, although from 2002 until 2005, it
functioned under the coordination of the MPH. Since 2005, the NHIH regained its
autonomy and is responsible for developing the strategy of the social health insurance
system, the monitoring of the activity of the District Health Insurance Houses (DHIH),
the allocation of resources to the DHIH, and the allocation of resources by type of care
(Vladescu, Scintee and Olsavszky 2008).
At the district level, the health care system is organized and coordinated by the
regional branches of the MPH and NHIH. The former discharges its powers through the
District Public Health Directorates (DPHD) and the latter through the DHIHs. There are
42 of each, one in each of the 41 districts and a separate one for Bucharest. The
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simplified organizational structure chart (Figure 30, above) depicts the different type of
relations between the various health institutions down to the health providers and insured.

Figure 30
Organizational Structure of the Romanian Health Care System
Government

Health Insurance Houses

Medical Profession

National
Level

District
Level

Legend:

control; < > contract relationship; —• premiums and services;
— collaboration.
Source: Vladescu, Scintee and Olsavszky 2008, 24.

4. Institutional Strategies

The survey data presented in Chapter IV showed that health care sector is
perceived to be one of the most corrupt sectors in Romania. Furthermore, the same data
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revealed that 60 percent of respondents believed that "all" or "almost all" officials in
health care sector were corrupt in 2005, more than 10 percent increase since 2000. The
practice of informal payments in the health care sector is also revealed by the studies (i.e.,
Barometers of Health Services (BHS)) conducted by the Center for Health Policies and
Services (CHPS) from 2002 until 2006, 2004 excluded. The percent of respondents
declaring that they made informal payments to get access to health care services ranged
from 35 in 2002 to 18 in 2005. If in 2002, the main reason for making such informal
payments was to receive better care (34 percent), in 2005 informal payments were
perceived to be a customary practice by 55 percent of the respondents although the
percentage of those making such payments to ensure better care remained high (32
percent). The same studies revealed that the informal payments took the form of cash
payments or presents and they varied in value from tens of dollars to several hundred
dollars. The 2005 BHS also showed that most of the informal payments (63 percent) were
made prior to the beginning of consultation or treatment and only 31 percent of them
were made at the end of treatment or medical session. A common theme in all these
surveys was the respondents' attitude towards informal payments with an overwhelming
majority of them disagreeing with informal payments or considering them to be a form of
corruption. Thus, if in 2002 64 percent of them disapproved the practice of informal
payments, in 2006 their number increased to 82.8 percent indicating an increasing decline
in the tolerance of this practice (not necessarily in the practice itself). Moreover, the
practice of informal payments continued to be a heavy burden for many Romanians,
particularly for those with low and very low income. The 2005 and 2006 BHS revealed
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that 18 percent of the poorest segments of the population had to borrow money to make
such payments, further increasing their everyday hardship.
As in neighboring countries, corruption in the health care sector is considered to
be one of the unfortunate features of the communist era that made the transition into the
new system. Nonetheless, one of the goals of the health care reform is not only to
eradicate the problems inherited from the previous regime but to also increase the
effectiveness of the health care system as a whole. In this chapter, the following
institutional strategies designed to reform and combat corruption in the health care sector
are analyzed: 1) the enforcement of legislation, 2) the establishment and effectiveness of
oversight institutions and anticorruption agencies, 3) the increase in transparency, 4) the
adoption and implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5) the adoption
and implementation of ethics codes, and 6) the existence and implementation of meritbased civil service.

4.1. The Legislative Foundation

The process of reform in the health care sector started in the early 1990s and the
main goal was to ensure a smooth transition from a centralized, state-funded, statecontrolled system to a health care system better capable of ensuring high quality medical
services for everyone. Thus, in 1992-1993, the project^ Healthy Romania was developed
in collaboration with foreign experts and financed through a loan from the World Bank.
The project failed to reach its goals and, although it was developed based on the
recommendations from the World Bank, lacked transparency and a clear methodology
(Vladescu, Scintee and Olsavszky 2008). The preparations for the big change that would
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be introduced by the adoption of an insurance based health care system were carried out
in the next three years (1994-1996) when pilot reforms were implemented in eight
districts. However, the evaluations revealed that the pilot programs had no impact on
hospital admissions, the general practitioners (family doctors) failed to play their
designated roles as gatekeepers to the rest of the system, and the programs failed to
introduce competition on the health care market (Vladescu, Scintee and Olsavszky 2008,
144).
Although the initial attempts to reform the system were unsuccessful, they served
as a starting point for the major reform that began in 1997 by providing information
about the existing shortcomings and by suggesting solutions for the problems identified
during the pilot phase. Thus, in July 1997, the Chamber of Deputies approved the Social
Health Insurance Law (henceforth, Insurance Law), Law no. 145, almost three years after
it was approved by the Senate. The law entered into force on January 1998 except for the
provisions regarding the institutions responsible for managing the Social Health
Insurance Fund (SHIF). The 1997 Insurance Law changed the financing of the health
services from a tax-based system to a mandatory health insurance. Under the new law,
employer and employees had each to contribute five percent of the monthly gross salary
income to SHIF, a contribution that shortly afterwards was increased to seven percent for
each contributor

(Government

Emergency

Ordinance no. 30/1998).

The

same

contribution quota was to be paid by retirees or any other categories of self-employed
persons, whereas the contributions of the unemployed were to be covered from the
unemployment funds. Chapter II, Section 1 of the 1997 Insurance Law lists the categories
of individuals exempt from paying the monthly contributions, such as 1) children and
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youth under the age of 26 (if they are pupils or students), 2) the spouses, parents or
grandparents of the insured person if they do not have an income, 3) disabled persons
without an income, and 4) politically persecuted people, war veterans, revolutionaries of
December 1989. The law also specified that failure to make the monthly contributions
would result in financial penalties.
The 1997 Insurance Law stipulated the rules regarding the establishment of the
SHIF and the Social Health Insurance Houses (i.e., the National Health Insurance House
(NHIH) and the District Health Insurance Houses (DHIH)). The SHIF was to be formed
by the contributions made by the insured persons and their employers, subsidies from the
state and local budgets, and other revenues (Article 51). The social health funds were to
be used for the payment of drugs and medical services (83 percent), administrative
expenses (five percent), a redistribution fund (seven percent), and a reserve fund (five
percent) (Article 60).
As with much other legislation in Romania, the 1997 Insurance Law was
amended twice from 1998 until 2002 when it was abrogated by the Government
Emergency Ordinance 150/2002 (henceforth, the 2002 Insurance Law). The new law
maintained most of the legislative provisions of the 1997 version while also introducing
some important changes. Perhaps the most important change was the provision regarding
the NHIH, which was subordinated to the Ministry of Public Health (MPH) (Article 60,
paragraph 1). The President of the NHIH was nominated by the Prime Minister at the
recommendation of the MPH and became a member of the government as Secretary of
State (Vladescu, Scintee and Olsavszky 2008). This provision was highly criticized by
the College of Physicians in Romania (CPR), NHIH, and civil society organizations
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which saw in it an attempt to exercise political control over the NHIH and use the NHIF
for purposes other than those intended by the law (Institute for Public Policy 2003). In
2005, the autonomy of the NHIH was reestablished through a Government Emergency
Ordinance (GEO no. 38) which later became a law (Law no. 327.2005). The most recent
change of the Social Health Insurance Law took place in 2006 when Law no. 95 was
approved. The new law seeks to cover all areas of the health care system.
One of the important provisions of the Insurance Laws refers to those who are
uninsured and are in need of medical attention. If until 2004, being uninsured was not a
major impediment in accessing health care services, the situation changed since then.
Any person must prove that he/she is insured in order to receive medical care - other than
emergency care which is available for everyone for up to three days (Interview Physician
1, July 15, 2007). Thus, according to the NHIH Ordinance no. 122/2005, a person must
pay retroactively for the previous three years or the period not covered during that time to
obtain health insurance. If the person failed to pay the monthly quota although he/she had
a regular income, the retroactive payment would include also interest and financial
penalties for all those payments. The 2006 Insurance Law increased the retroactive
payments to five years prior to the date when the health insurance is requested.
The unintended effect of these provisions may have been an increase in the
number of uninsured people because they cannot afford to make the retroactive
payments. Such potential categories may include farmers who failed to make the regular
payments to the NHIF because their incomes were too low one or more years or the selfemployed whose businesses were producing too little or no profit. It may apply to other
social categories as well. For example, one of the interviewees shared his "adventurous"
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hospital experience (Anticorruption Expert 2, May 20, 2007). Because he studied abroad
for a couple of years, he failed to pay his health insurance in Romania. Unfortunately,
shortly after his return home, his leg was broken in a car accident and it required surgery.
To avoid making the retroactive payments, he decided to bribe his stay in the hospital.
Consequently, he paid the head-nurse to cover the fact that his health insurance was not
covered for the previous two years. Additionally, he made informal payments to the
anesthesiologist and the surgeon to ensure a speedier intervention. However, the lack of
experience in bribing procedures led him to confuse the anesthesiologist with a nurse,
which led him to the embarrassing situation of asking the nurse to return the money so he
can pass it to the "right" person. After three hours of waiting on the operating table, the
money reached the anesthesiologist (who refused to take the payment directly from the
patient), and the surgery began. Hence, the strict formal rules in this case had
inadvertently reduced the incentives for compliance and, in association with a weak
enforcement of Anticorruption Law, led to a decrease in the costs of corruption in the
health care sector. Under these circumstances, compliance with the informal rules proved
to be more beneficial for the interested parties (i.e., patients and health providers).
Perhaps realizing that three or five years or retroactive payments are a very
serious burden on most uninsured people and they unintentionally sustain corruption, the
law was changed in 2007 (NHIH Ordinance no. 617). According to this law, if a person
was uninsured and owned no income for the past five years, he/she will have to pay
retroactively for the past six months only. If the person received income but failed to
make the monthly payments, he/she would have to pay retroactively for all those months,
with penalties, and for the previous six months prior to receiving the health insurance.
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The 2006 health care reform package attempts to address every aspect of the
health care system and amends and introduces 17 laws. According to the Minister of
Public Health, Eugen Nicolaescu, the changes introduced by the new legislation attempt
to ensure the good funding of the services provided and to reduce the heavy financial
burden of financing every single medical service and treatment which led to the overall
underfunding of the health care system (Ionescu, Corruption Targeted in Romania's
Health Reforms 2006). Figure 31 shows the evolution of the total health care expenditure
in Romania in the decade prior to EU accession.

Figure 31
The Evolution of Total Health Care Expenditure

Year
Source: Ministry of Public Health,
http://www.ms.ro/fisiere/pagini_virtuale/130_432_BREVIAR-DE-STATISTICASANITARA-2006.html#Cuprins (accessed November 5, 2008).
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As the data indicate, although the amounts of money allocated to the health care
sector increased every year, the system is still underfunded and in many hospitals patients
are asked to bring their own medicine, bandages, syringes, and even food. The situation
led President Traian Basescu to say that the situation in the health care system can be
explained not only by "bad management but also [by] corruption" (Ionescu, Corruption
Targeted in Romania's Health Reforms 2006). Consequently, the 2006 reform legislation
package promised to correct these problems and ensure that patients receive good quality
health care services without being forced to make informal payments.
The health care reform process attempted to reshape the entire system and,
therefore, also included measures designed to restructure hospitals with regard to their
organization, functioning and financing (Law on Hospital Organization, Law no. 146/199
abrogated by the Law no. 270/2003); to strengthen the role of the family doctors as
gatekeepers to the rest of the health care system; to empower patients by regulating their
rights and obligations (Law on the Patient's Rights, Law no. 46/2003); to privatize the
health insurance system (Law on the Private Health Insurance, Law no. 212/2004); and
to decentralize the health care system (according to the 1992 Law of Local Public
Administration and the subsequent amendments) after the adoption of the 1997 Insurance
Law. These series of legislative measures illustrate the magnitude of the health care
reform process without saying much about their actual provisions, language, or impact.
One of the common themes in all the interviews with public officials, physicians, and
NGO representatives from the health care system was related to reform and legislation in
this sector. All of the interviewees said that the health care reform lacks a clear vision, a
clear philosophy, and a clear direction. The legislation was characterized as being

402

"confusing and difficult to implement: 1) there was never a coherence
among the various legislative acts... and the result is a lack of clarity with
regard to the precise responsibilities of the MPH, NHIS, and the CPR; 2)
there is no secondary legislation [to the 2006 Insurance Law, n.a.] and all
that is left is a law that exists on paper and is never implemented; 3) and a
problem common to all Romanian legislation is the lack of clear sanctions,
as is the case of the Law on Patient's Rights" (Interview Health Care
Expert 1, April 4, 2007).
The frequent changes in legislation as a result of the high turnover of the
Ministers of Public Health (9 Ministers from December 1996 until December 2006) have
also contributed to the confusing and often contradictory provisions. The major problem
was that not only each administration had its own vision of how the health care reform
should take place, but the replacement of every Minister of Public Health was
accompanied by a series of legislative and personnel changes (Interview F. Furtunescu,
Ministry of Public Health, May 24, 2007). Thus, "every new Minister changed the
organizational structure of the institution to get rid of the unwanted staff and to bring in
his/her own people" (Interview Health Care Expert 1, April 4, 2007). Additionally, the
reform changes were "pompous and attempted to solve an immediate problem without a
vision of how the future system should look like" (Interview V. Astarastoae, CPR, May
24, 2007). The working approach in the health care system has always been "because this
is how I want it" or "because this is how I think it should be done!" (Interview Health
Care Expert 2, May 30, 2007). Consequently, there was almost no collaboration with
non-governmental actors, including health care experts or professionals. According to the
representative of the CPR, their input has been sought by political figures only when they
were in the opposition. Once in government positions, the political leaders no longer
sought or wanted to collaborate with the CPR. When their suggestions were considered,
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the legislative decisions were of no political or economic interest for the decision-makers
(Interview V. Astarastoae, CPR, May 22, 2007).
Hence, the massive health care legislation is under continuous transformation and
almost twenty years after the fall of communism, the Shemasko system continues to be
the scapegoat for the slow pace of change. The legislative incoherence makes it difficult
not only for the patients to understand how the system works and what their rights are,
but also for the health care professionals to adjust to the new provisions while ensuring
the best health care possible. The MPH's attitude towards dialogue and collaboration
with actors outside the government has been detrimental to the quality of legislation and
the image of the institution among medical professionals and the general public.

4.2. Oversight Institutions and Anticorruption Agencies

4.2.1. National Health Insurance House

The 1997 Insurance Law stipulated the establishment of the NHIH and its district
divisions (DHIH) as autonomous public institutions with responsibilities in administering
the health insurance system. The law specified the organizational structure of the NHIH
and DHIHs, the formation of the board councils and the procedures for electing the board
members. Despite the provision stipulating that the Council of Administration of the
NHIH should be established through a national election, the government decided to
postpone the election and to nominate an interim Council that would prepare the election
of the next board members. The Interim Council would be composed of 15 members that
would represent the interests of the government, trade unions, and employers'
associations in equal number. The five representatives of the government were nominated
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by the MPH, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, the Ministry of Public Finance,
and two by the Romanian president. The president of the NHIH was directly appointed
by the Prime Minister in consultation with the MPH (European Observatory of Health
Care Systems 2000). Although initially planned to be a temporary solution, the procedure
of appointing members to the Council of Administration became the rule. The 2006
Insurance Law increased the number of the board members to 17 by adding two
representatives of the National Council of the Elderly appointed by the Prime Minister.
The same law introduced another change regarding the number of representatives
appointed by the President, which was reduced to one, and the inclusion of a
representative of the Ministry of Justice (Article 276).
Even though the NHIH was initially established as an autonomous institution,
from 2002 until 2005 it functioned under the coordination of the MPH. The change
introduced by the 2002 Insurance Law followed the 2000 national elections that resulted
in a new government and was in accordance with the practice of every new government
in Romania (i.e., to change the legislation adopted during the previous administration).
Additionally, the change was explained as a result of the power-struggle between the
MPH and the newly created NHIH. The health insurance system meant that the MPH lost
significant influence due to the transfer of responsibility for managing the NHIF to the
NHIH. The situation was described by one of the interviewees as: "Who has the money,
has the power, and the Minister of Public Health felt that it lost its power" (Interview
Health care Expert 1, April 4, 2007). The result was a new legislation and a change
regarding the control of the money allocated to the health care system.
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The changes introduced in 2002 affected also the activity of the DHIHs and the
creation of the health insurance fund. Thus, if prior to 2002, the DHIHs were in charge of
raising the health insurance contributions locally and retained and used 75 percent of the
collected funds, after 2002 that responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Public
Finance. The remaining 25 percent of the funds collected represented the redistribution
fund administered by the NHIH. According to the director of the NHIH, Vasile Cepoi,
the change had both positive and negative consequences for the functioning of the NHIH
and the health insurance system. Under the 1997 Insurance Law, there was no unique
National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) and only 25 percent of the contributions raised
locally were being used to correct for the economic and demographic differences between
various districts. Consequently, the redistribution fund was insufficient to equilibrate the
discrepancies between districts while the 75 percent of revenues raised in the
economically powerful districts (e.g. Bucharest) were more than sufficient to ensure high
quality services. The result was a migration of population from poorer districts to richer
districts to receive better quality medical services and a deterioration of the health status
of the population in the underfinanced districts. Hence, the creation of the NHIF ensured
a better redistribution of funds and an improved level of equity in the provision of health
care, although discrepancies continued to exist. The main disadvantage of the 2002
changes was the manner in which it impacted the personnel working in the health
insurance system. If initially, the NHIH and DHIH staff had a separate autonomous status
and higher salaries compared to other public servants, after 2002 that changed. The result
was a migration of quality public servants from the health insurance system to other areas
of activity and apathy among many of those left behind (Interview V. Cepoi, NHIH,
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April 11, 2007). The impact of the 2002 Insurance Law and the changes regarding the
NHIF is captured in Figure 32.

Figure 32
The Evolution of the National Health Insurance Fund
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The data

show that in 2003, the first year when the health insurance

contributions were collected by the Ministry of Public Finances, the NHIF decreased
slightly only to continue on an ascendant slope in the next three years. However, since
2003, the expenses from the NHIF have consistently been higher than the total revenues,
indicating the existence of a combination of problems, such as inefficiency in collecting
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All values in Figure 32 were adjusted for inflation and discounting and are expressed in real 1997 USD,
the first year of the research study. See Chapter VI for a detailed explanation of the adjusting calculations.
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the health insurance contributions, mismanagement of existing funds, misallocation of
funds, or corruption.
In addition to the responsibility regarding the administration of the NHIF, the
main responsibilities of the NHIH also include: the development of the social health
insurance system; the coordination and supervision of the activity of DHIHs; the
elaboration of the framework contract

and the secondary norms for the implementation

of the framework contract in collaboration with the CPR, other relevant medical
associations, and trade unions; the decision regarding the resource allocation to the
DHIHs; the decision regarding the resource allocation by type of care; and collaboration
with the MPH in the establishment of public health programs. As the central and highest
institution in the health insurance system, the NHIH has the responsibility to monitor the
activity of the territorial divisions and the provision of health care services. The NHIH
has also an Internal Audit Division responsible for carrying out controls at the DHIHs in
accordance to the decisions of the president of the NHIH (Law 95/2006, Article 294).
Although the monitoring and control responsibilities of the NHIH are briefly
stipulated in the Insurance Law, there is almost no data available regarding the number of
controls conducted, the problems identified, and/or the solutions proposed since the
establishment of the institution. The 2008 Activity Report of the NHIH specifies that in
2005 were conducted 980 activities of control and monitoring of the DHIHs, while in
2006 the number of control activities was 746. Pursuant to those controls, there were
issued 1,847 recommendations in 2005 and 1.812 in 2006. The recommendations referred
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The framework contract establishes the norms and rules under which the medical services are provided
in the health insurance system. Under the health insurance system, all providers of medical services,
pharmaceuticals, and medical devices are independent and are contracted by the NHIH. The framework
contract is renewed and updated every year.
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to the closing of framework contracts with medical and pharmaceutical providers, the
reimbursement of medical services and drug prescriptions, the administration of budgets,
and the evaluation of health care providers in the ambulatory clinics (National Health
Insurance House 2008). The paucity of information regarding the activity of monitoring
and auditing makes it, however, difficult to accurately assess the effectiveness of the
NHIH in this area. The available data indicates that the central institution is attempting to
fulfill its responsibility of control and audit, although more detailed data is necessary to
determine how well that responsibility is being carried out.

4.2.2. National Control Authority

The National Control Authority (NCA) was established in 2003 according to the
provisions stipulated in the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 64 and Government
Decision no. 745. One of the responsibilities of the NCA was to monitor the activity of
the NHIH and its territorial structures (DHIS) along with the activity of the health care
providers (family doctors, ambulatories, policlinics, and hospitals) and suppliers of drugs
and medical materials. One of the stated goals of the NCA was "to eliminate the acts of
corruption from this system ... [and] to create a normal environment for the provision of
medical services and for the satisfaction of patients' expectations" (Blanculescu 2004).
To attain the first stated goal, the NCA verified the implementation of the
provisions regarding the conflict of interest and incompatibilities of public servants in the
health care system as established by the 2003 Anticorruption Package. Pursuant to the
verifications made at the MPH, the NCA inspectors found that a series of public servants
holding executive positions were violating the 2003 legal provisions by holding positions
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or shares (directly or through their close family members) at medical or pharmaceutical
companies. For example, Victor Voicu, the President of the Committee for Transparency
at the MPH was at the same time the President of the Scientific Council of the National
Medicines Agency (NMA). The responsibilities of the Committee for Transparency
include the creation of the list of drugs to be prescribed in ambulatory and hospitals, the
criteria for including or excluding certain drugs from the list, and the creation of expert
committees for the analysis of pharmaceutical documents presented by the providers. As
with regard to the Scientific Council of the NMA, its responsibility is to authorize the
marketization of all drugs in Romania. The conflict of interest was between the positions
held by Voicu and those held by his wife. Specifically, she was the administrator and
main shareholder of the SC Labormed Pharma SA, a company whose business was
researching, manufacturing, and distributing drugs. Several similar examples of conflicts
of interest were identified among high level officials in the MPH and in all cases they
were asked to resign from the public office positions (Blanculescu 2004). Furthermore,
cases of incompatibilities with holding public office positions were uncovered during the
controls executed at the NHIH and its territorial divisions (National Control Authority
2004).
In addition to monitoring the implementation of this anticorruption provision, the
NCA verified also the activity of the NHIH and DHIHs and the manner in which the
health insurance funds were being managed. Pursuant the controls executed in 2003, the
NCA concluded that there were serious deficiencies in the activities of all these
institutions. Some of the problems identified were lack of responsibility regarding the
collection of health contributions; deficient management of the NHIH and DHIH budgets
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due to the non-observance of public procurement regulations; and non-observance of the
frame-contract provisions regulating the activity of health providers and medical
suppliers. Following the controls, the NCA took a series of measures that ranged from
sanction recommendations made to the institutions hierarchically responsible for
enforcing them (e.g., the NHIH in the case of a DHIH), to fines, and to notifications sent
to the MPH or to the NAPO, depending on the seriousness of the problems identified
(National Control Authority 2004). In cases where severe deficiencies were uncovered,
those responsible were fired (e.g., Eugeniu Turlea, president of the NHIH) or forced to
resign (e.g., Robert Serban, president of the DHIH Bucharest) (Blanculescu 2004).
Despite the seemingly effective activity, the NCA was dismantled in June 2005
through Government Emergency Ordinance no.49. The staff, budget, and infrastructure
allocated to the NCA was transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister. However, the
responsibility of eliminating corruption in health care sector was not part of the transfer
nor was that related to monitoring the activity of health care institutions.

4.2.3. Court of Accounts

As the ultimate institution of ex post financial control of the management of
public money, the Court of Accounts (CA) regularly monitors the activity of the MPH,
NHIH and their territorial divisions. Hence, the CA exercises the role of an oversight
institution that focuses specifically on how the health insurance fund is managed by the
central and territorial institutions. Since the establishment of the NHIF in 1998, the CA
has made annual controls of how the health contributions are collected and spent by the
MPH, NHIH, and the DHIH. The most common problems identified every year included:
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declarations of higher revenues than the actual contributions collected; failure to update
the records of health care contributors (particularly the list of employers who had to make
the health contributions for their employees); failure to properly monitor the collection of
health contributions from companies; failure to calculate and enforce the financial
penalties to late contributions; reimbursement of medical services not included in the
basic health package (e.g., corrective plastic surgeries, private medical services); and
reimbursement of hospital services to a higher price. An interesting situation identified by
the CA in 1999 referred to the Decision no. 328/70/1999 of the MPH and the NHIH
according to which every person requiring a prescription had to pay a 2,000 ROL as a
fixed fee for the act of issuing the prescription. The CA concluded that the Decision was
illegal and contravened the Law no.72/1996 on Public Finances. A summary of the
financial losses identified by the CA from 1998 until 2004129 expressed as unmet
revenues and prejudices is presented in Table 16.
The category of unmet revenues refers to the failure of the institutions responsible
for collecting the health contributions to do so, while the prejudices include all financial
losses produced as a result of mismanagement or illegal behavior. As the data show, in
most years the main problem was the collection of health contributions. The huge
amounts of money lost every year are illustrative of the significant sums of public money
allocated to the health care system and of the vulnerabilities and temptations for
corruption that accompany them. Although the CA does not have an officially assigned
role in combating corruption, the unveiling of illegalities may potentially deter corrupt
behavior and reduce the financial losses in the health care system.

129

Data for 2005 and 2006 was not available at the time of this analysis.
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Table 16
Problems Identified by the Court of Accounts (in Billion ROL & Million USD)
Year/
Problem
Unmet
Revenues
Prejudice
s
Total
(ROL1)
Total
(USD2)

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

16,477.7

21,223.0

9,201.5

25.546

28.555

3,025.69
7

5,333.0

131,813.0

88.615

446.882

44.396

29.625

153,036.0

9,290.12 25,993.2 72.951

3,055.32

1,313.42 3,450.68 8.79

324.75

1998

1999

1,032.05
43.360

1,075.41 21,810.7
205.48

3,889.26 2,335.42

These values are expressed in real 1997 USD and are, therefore, adjusted for inflation
and devaluation.
Source: Court of Accounts, Activity Reports 1998-2004, http://www.rcc.ro (accessed
May 12, 2006).

4.3. Transparency

Given the asymmetry of information and uncertainty specific to health care
systems along with the significant amounts of money and people involved in
administering them, it is very important to ensure as high a level of transparency as
possible without infringing on patients' privacy. Transparency in health care sector refers
to the provision of information regarding the NHIF; the activity and functioning of the
health care institutions; the health benefits package the insured are entitled to; the
medical services not covered by the NHIF; the rights and obligations of the health care
providers and patients; and the data and evaluation reports regarding the provision of
health care services, the administration of health insurance funds, or any data related to
the functioning of health care sector. To ensure transparency, the main health care
institutions must be able to collect the necessary information from the health care
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providers, to analyze it, and to present the results to those interested including the general
public. Consequently, an increase in transparency and, implicitly, in accountability, is
also contingent upon the existence of a well-established and highly functional health
information system (HIS).
The White Chart of Governance issued by the SDP government in December
2000 identified the information systems as "the main provider of information in support
of decision-making in health policy at both central and local levels as well as for result
evaluation" (Csicki, Marcu and Ungureanu 2003, 7). One effect of the implementation of
the 1997 health insurance reform was the increase in the number of health care
institutions, each with its own information systems and with exclusive rights over that
information. Thus, in addition to the MPH and its subordinated institutions, hospitals,
institutes of public health, institutes of medical research and education, was also created
the NHIH and its subordinated divisions. The result was double reporting, and
incoherence in both the reporting of data and the coding of information (Csicki, Marcu
and Ungureanu 2003).
The current structure of the HIS consists of three parallel sub-systems: 1) the
formal statistical system led by the MPH and the National Institute of Statistics; 2) the
monitoring of expenditures for the delivery of health services system led by the NHIH;
and 3) the system composed of smaller information channels related to the national health
programs and which are independent of each other. The three sub-systems operate almost
completely independent of each other and with minimal or non-existence communication
among the institutions responsible for gathering the data. Furthermore, each sub-system
employs its own software, formats, definitions, standards and support for reporting data.
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Sometimes, there are differences in coding the data within the same sub-system which
makes it almost impossible to make an accurate comparison at that level, not to mention a
comparison at the national level. The data providers (i.e., family physicians, hospitals,
ambulatories, polyclinics, and territorial divisions of the MPH) are required to produce
"double or triple reporting in formats and software which are not compatible" (Csicki,
Marcu and Ungureanu 2003, 3). Additionally, the 2003 evaluation of the HIS identified a
series of problems in analyzing and processing of data. For example, the report concluded
that only data on diseases is analyzed and processed into information although data on
health status and other health related issues is being collected. Moreover, data is
aggregated at the district level which makes it difficult to get access to disaggregated data
and nearly impossible to obtain individual level data. Finally, there is no monitoring
system or quality assurance mechanism which results in inappropriate and insufficiently
processed information and, even in breaching of confidentiality regulations (Csicki,
Marcu and Ungureanu 2003).
To address some of the problems, the NHIH initiated in 2003 the Integrated
Unique Information System (IUIS), a project estimated at €120 million (Mihalas, et al.
2009). The IUIS, the largest project developed by the software companies SIVECO and
HP Romania, was built in a hierarchical structure consisting of three levels: NHIH—the
highest level; DHIHs—the second level; and the providers of medical and pharmaceutical
services—the lowest level. The overall objective of the IUIS is to provide the ITmanagement of economic and medical data required for an efficient functioning of the
health insurance system (SIVECO Romania SA 2009).
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Although SIVECO Romania claims that the project was a success, critics point to
the problems in the implementation and utilization of the IUIS. For example, the IUIS
failed to integrate the previous systems, particularly the Diagnosis Related Groups
reporting system which has become mandatory since 2005, and, thus, IUIS is duplicating
the reporting of most data. Additionally, the system has an unfriendly interface which has
increased the time for filling in all forms up to four hours per day; the transfer of patient
databases from previous systems was deficient and hundreds of patients were lost in each
district with significant financial consequences for health providers; and the system does
not cover all particular (i.e., medical) cases. Furthermore, although most Romanian
family doctors do not have computer-based training, the implementation of the IUIS was
not accompanied by a training of personnel (Mihalas, et al. 2009). The director of the
NHIH, V. Cepoi, also expressed moderate optimism regarding the success of the IUIS
stating that "only when the system will function properly, we will be able to know how
many patients are being treated, how many should be treated, how many died and why.
Then, the responsibility of everyone will be much higher" (Interview, April 11, 2007).
Consequently, the increase in transparency in the health care sector depends on the
complete implementation of the IUIS, its acceptance by health care providers, and the
proper employment of the IUIS.
A deficient HIS has implications that range from poorly drafted legislation, to
deficient public health programs, to mismanagement of NHIF, and a provision of
incomplete information to the public. The 2003 evaluation report of the HIS in Romania
concluded that "decisions in health policy are often taken on the basis of criteria other
than data" (Csicki, Marcu and Ungureanu 2003, 4). Four years later, a similar opinion
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was expressed by the director of the NHIH and one of the health care experts
interviewed. The latter stated that "[T]he decisions are made based on unknown
information. That is, no one can say exactly what data or information was used to reach a
specific decision" (Interview Health Care Expert 2, May 30, 2007).
Nonetheless, some measures to increase transparency were more successful. For
example, all main health institutions have created their own websites where they post
information regarding the organizational structure, current legislation, legislative
proposals, budgetary information, activity reports, and information relevant to insured
and health providers. Although in theory the websites are great portals of information, in
practice, they provide less information than advertised. For example, the NHIH posts
only the 2008 activity report although the website was established in 2001, which implies
that there should be electronic copies of all relevant documents of public interest since
that year. Perhaps the least user friendly website is that of the MPH, which although very
busy suggesting that it provides a lot of information, makes it very difficult to find any
specific information (e.g., the statistical data provided). Additionally, the MHP does not
make public its activity reports despite the fact that "transparency is one of the
fundamental principles in the health care system and the MPH relies on transparency and
cooperation with main stakeholders" (Interview F. Furtunescu, May 24, 2007).
Also in the spirit of increased transparency, the adoption of the Law on the
Patient's Rights (Law no. 46/2003) and the secondary legislation (NHIH Decision no.
386/2004) gave the patients the legal right to receive medical information relevant to
his/her case, the right to privacy regarding the medical information, and the right to
medical services and treatments. Article 38 of the law stipulates that health authorities
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have the duty to make public the annual reports regarding the implementation of the Law
on the Patient's Rights. However, there is no information regarding the annual evaluation
reports on the implementation of this law and the lack of sanctions for failure to
implement it made it "a beautiful law and that's it!" (Interview Health Care Expert 1,
April 4, 2007).
Nonetheless, since 2005 information regarding the costs of services that must be
covered directly by patients has been posted in clinics (Interview Physician 1, July 15,
2007). The measure is part of the government's attempt to combat informal payments in
the health care sector by providing the public with the information regarding the cost of
medical services not included in the basic benefits package. However, the 2006
Barometers of Health Services (BHS) conducted by the CHPS revealed that almost 70
percent of the respondents do not know the services they are entitled to receive and
almost 65 percent of them get information regarding the health care system from
television. While the responsibility of being informed lies also with the public, the
frequent changes in the health care legislation and policies make it difficult even for
health providers to keep abreast. Consequently, the asymmetry of information is
reinforced along with the doctors' position as "guru for the patients" (Interview Health
Care Expert 1, April 4, 2007), which further strengthens the practice of informal
payments.
An interesting aspect of the patient's rights legislation is Article 34, which
stipulates that patients can make additional payments or donations to the health care
providers or the medical institution where it received the service, in accordance with the
law. This provision, which is not uncommon in other countries, is particularly important

418

for the discussion of informal payments in the Romanian health care system. The practice
of "atenfie " (informal payments) made to health providers is considered acceptable and
within the limits of the law, as long as it is made after the conclusion of the medical
service or treatment. Only when the health provider conditions the medical service on the
informal payment, can one talk about corruption (Interview V. Astarastoae, CPR, May
22, 2007). Thus, according to this interpretation, the practice of informal payments is
legal and non-problematic as long as the health provider does not ask directly for such a
payment. However, the BHS indicated that health providers rarely ask directly for
informal payments and that most of the time they suggest through their behavior that such
a payment is necessary. For example, in 2006 more than 31 percent of respondents said
that a payment was suggested to them. Moreover, at its highest, the percent of those
claiming that the informal payment was made as a sign of gratitude was 29 percent in
2005. Hence, although showing gratitude may be considered acceptable and customary, it
is definitely not the predominant reason for making informal payments and it is not the
patients' primary choice. While showing gratitude is acceptable behavior, the direct or
indirect requests for demonstrations of gratitude fall outside the scope of any law.
Moreover, imposing the practice of gratitude on patients adds to the already stressful
situation caused by the health problems that led them to seek medical care in the first
place or it may deter patients from seeking medical help until it is too late.

4.4. Freedom of Information

The consistent implementation of FOIA is considered to generate more
transparency by providing public access to information regarding the organization,
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functioning, and activity of formal institutions as well as to the management of public
funds allocated to those institutions. Although the effective implementation of FOIA
started in 2002, the record of health institutions in responding to FOIA requests has not
been publicized by those institutions. To date, there is only one report of the Agency for
Governmental Strategies that disaggregates the data by ministries in 2003. All later
reports issued by this Agency present the aggregated data for all central institutions
without distinguishing among them. Based on the 2003 report, the MPH had a very good
record in responding to FOIA requests. Thus, from a total of 6,149 FOIA requests
received that year, it favorably answered 6073. The remaining 76 requests were rejected
for various reasons, such as the information requested was part of the category of
information excepted from public access, the information was nonexistent, or other nonspecified reasons. The same year, there were 13 administrative complaints and three court
complaints filed against the decisions made by the MPH in answering FOIA requests
(Agency for Governmental Strategies 2003).
This very responsive beginning of the MPH is confirmed also by the study
conducted by two Romanian NGOs, Pro-Democracy and TI Romania, in 2007. The study
compared the response of public institutions to FOIA requests in 2003 and 2007 to
determine the evolution in the implementation of this legislation. Thus, if in 2003 the
MPH had a 100 percent rate of response to FOIA request, in 2007 the rate of response
dropped to 25 percent (Asociatia Pro-Democratia & TI-Ro 2007). The increasing lack of
responsiveness was also confirmed by the four FOIA requests I filed in the past two years
and to which I received a single incomplete response on July 13, 2009. The response was
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received several weeks after Dr. Jim Butterfield130 filed an identical FOIA request and the
response was addressed to both of us, although it was sent only to me. Thus, no answer
and no explanations were given to my demand for the number of FOIA requests received
by the MPH from 2002 until 2006, the number answered favorably and rejected, and the
reasons for declining to answer favorably the requests.
Compared to the MPH, the NHIH has a better record in answering FOIA requests,
although no information regarding the actual number of requests received and answered
every year is made public by the institution. Nonetheless, compared to 2003 when the
NHIH also had a perfect rate of response to FOIA requests, in 2007 that rate decreased to
87.5 percent (Asociatia Pro-Democratia & TI-Ro 2007). The better rate of responsiveness
of the NHIH compared to MPH may be explained by the difference in the longevity of
the two institutions, the youngest institution (NHIH) being more inclined to promote
transparency. The MPH has a well-established tradition of opacity and lack of dialogue
with outsiders, even when they are health care experts or professionals. The adoption of
FOIA and inclusion of transparency as a major part of health care reform has failed yet to
produce a real change in the attitude of the MPH. The result seems to be the opposite, the
MPH becoming "increasingly unreceptive to any outside input and less inclined to
dialogue with main stakeholders" (Interview Health Care Expert 2, May 30, 2007).

4.5. Ethics Codes

The roots of the ethics codes in health care practices can be traced back to
Ancient Greece, the Hippocratic Oath being an influential document on the ethics of
130

Due to the lack of response to my FOIA requests, I assumed that my nationality and credentials are not
impressive enough to elicit an answer from the Romanian authorities. Dr. Butterfield agreed to file a
similar FOIA request to test this hypothesis and also obtain some data.
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medical practice. The College of Physicians in Romania (CPR) was assigned the
responsibility for developing the Ethics Code for Medical Profession (ECMP),
monitoring its implementation and observance of the rules, as well as for sanctioning
those who violate the rules of ethics. According to the Law no. 74/1995 (which entered
into force in 1997) on the Establishment of the CPR, the responsibilities of the institution
include all areas of concern for physicians, including their accreditation and training.
Additionally, the law also specifies that all physicians must become members of the CPR,
failure to pay the membership dues resulting in the loss of accreditation.
The Ethics Code specifies the physicians' responsibilities in exercising their
profession; the importance of observing professional secrecy and of ensuring the patient's
right to privacy; the obligation of providing medical services; the responsibility of
continuing their professional training; the importance of maintaining the image and
integrity of the medical profession; the obligation to refuse any decisions that might
produce illegal or unfair profit to the patient; and the appropriate conduct in special cases
(e.g., the patient is a child, research on human subjects, etc.). Moreover, the Ethics Code
specifies the physicians' obligation to support the CPR in all aspects and to fully
cooperate with the CPR when they are under investigation for allegations of misconduct.
The mere existence of the Ethics Code is insufficient to impact the physicians'
conduct and their relations with the patients. While the observance of the ethics rules is
dependent upon being aware of the existence of such a code and its provisions, the impact
is also contingent upon monitoring the implementation and enforcement of sanctions.
According to the representative of the CPR, V. Astarastoae, in 2003 the institution had
successfully persuaded the Ministry of Education to include the Ethics Code in the
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curricula of medical schools. In 2007, the CPR convinced the MPH to include ethics as a
special part in the training of resident doctors (Interview May 22, 2007). Despite these
accomplishments, V. Astarastoe admitted that there was still little emphasis put on ethics
in medical schools, a fact confirmed also by other interviewees in this sector. Moreover,
the ethics of future doctors are endangered also by the practice of corruption in medical
schools. "It is a major mistake to accept bribe for a medical student to pass an exam. This
is unacceptable for any student, but more so for medical ones who will become doctors
and make life and death decisions" (NGO Interviewee 5, April 30, 2007). Consequently,
the importance of the Code of Ethics must begin in the medical schools, with professors
teaching it to students and, most importantly, with professor acting as examples of honest
behavior.
With regard to sanctions and their enforcement, the situation presents itself as
follows. Pursuant to a FOIA request filed on March 13, 2009, the CPR provided only the
2006 activity report of the Disciplinary Committee from the ten reports requested.
According to the data, the CPR investigated a total of 112 cases and made the following
decisions: 83 cases were rejected; the sanctions were annulled in 10 cases;131 and
sanctions were applied in 19 cases. The sanctions ranged from warnings to votes of
censure (vot de blarri) to fines. The reduced number of cases sanctioned may be due to the
fact that the allegations were baseless or to the protective attitude of physicians towards
their colleagues. The medical profession was described as being "very united, which
makes it difficult to expose cases of corruption unless they are extremely serious"
(Interview Health Expert 1, April 4, 2007). However, the reluctance to sanction violations

131

As the central institution, the CPR has the authority to maintain or reverse a decision reached by one of
its territorial divisions.
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of ethics "sends a negative message to future doctors. Moreover, the CPR must
understand that it is not a syndicate and that it needs to stop acting primarily as a
defender of physicians" (Interview Health Care Expert 2, May 30, 2007).
However, bribes in the health care sector are also exchanged among physicians
and not only in medical schools. To get a job in a better hospital or in a bigger city, one
can choose to pay if he/she has enough money. For example, a physician had money put
aside for an apartment but she decided to make a different investment when she heard
that a position was opened at a big university hospital in Cluj. She got the position and
postponed buying an apartment for several years. In a different case, a physician said:
"My husband has a stable position now and he decided that this year is my turn to get a
good position, no matter how much we will have to pay!" That year, she got the clinical
position she wanted (Interview Physician 1, July 15, 2007).
The lack of more information regarding the basis of the decisions reached by the
CPR associated with the small number of cases investigated and a negative image of
health care providers among the general public only reinforces the perception that there is
a lack of commitment to combat corruption in the health care sector. Furthermore, the
perception that physicians always cover their own and that they are almost never found
responsible for their mistakes can potentially increase the lack of trust between public
and health care providers. Although one wants to trust that the physician has his/her best
interests in mind, one also wants to know that breaches of ethics rules or medical
mistakes are being sanctioned. The absence of the latter contributes to the perpetuation of
a negative image of the health care providers in the public eye.
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4.6. Merit-Based Civil Service

4.6.1. The Rules of Promotion and Remuneration in the Health Care
Sector

The structural changes produced by the introduction of the health insurance
system affected also the employee status of health care providers. If under the Semashko
system, all health care providers were state employees, under the health insurance system
most health care providers are contracted by the NHIH and are no longer considered
public servants. Consequently, the majority of health care providers are paid through
different contractual arrangements by the NHIH and its district divisions. Thus, the
payment for family doctors is calculated as a combination of age-weighted capitation (set
at 85 percent for 2005-2007) and fee for service (set at 15 percent) for certain curative,
preventive, and health-promotion services such as immunization, monitoring specific
chronic diseases, and mother and child supervisions. The number of patients and services
provided are calculated in points and, to prevent fraud and ensure the quality of services
provided, thresholds were established for the number of points and registered patients per
physician. Thus, the threshold is set at 2,000 registered patients and 23,000 services
provided. All points above this threshold are calculated at a 25 percent of their value. The
threshold is set higher in rural areas (35, 000 points) due to the smaller number of family
doctors compared to the total population (Vladescu, Scintee and Olsavszky 2008).
Since 1999, the specialists in ambulatory services, physicians trained in nonclinical specialties, and dentists are paid on a fee-for-service basis. In the case of
ambulatory specialists, the fee-for-service is determined by a points system, while the
fee-for-services of specialists in non-clinical ambulatories is expressed in prices. The
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monetary value of points is calculated by taking into consideration the health insurance
budget available and the total number of points for the services delivered by all health
care providers in any three-month period. Less services delivered means higher point
values and higher reimbursement per service. However, the point values are different for
family doctors and specialists because the budgets for different types of services are
separate and their sizes are determined in advance (Vladescu, Scintee and Olsavszky
2008).
The health providers in hospitals continue to be paid through salaries determined
by the MPH. According to the Government Emergency Ordinance (GEO) no. 115/2004,
which became Law 125/2005, the remuneration of medical personnel takes into
consideration the position, responsibility, social value, complexity of services, education,
professional aptitude, and performance (Article 3). The calculation of salaries would
include the fixed gross income, the various bonuses (e.g., executive position, seniority (525 percent), night shift (25 percent), risk (15-100 percent)), and awards. Article 25 of the
GEO no. 115/2004 also stipulates the rules for hiring and promoting medical staff. Thus,
to be hired as a health care provider, one must pass an entrance exam, while the
promotions are made through the transformation of the existing positions into new ones
corresponding to the degree or level of advancement proposed.
A common complaint among health care providers is the low payment they
receive for the services provided. Thus, the 2002 BHS found that 90 percent of
physicians interviewed considered their salaries to be insufficient. Furthermore, 43
percent of them declared that their monthly revenues range between $50 and $150 and
only 12 percent declared monthly revenues ranging between $251 and $350. When asked
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what would constitute appropriate revenue, 27 percent of them responded "higher than
$850 per month" and 22 percent said "between $451 and $550." According to the
Romanian National Institute of Statistics, the national average net income in 2002 was
3,790,000 ROL or $114.66, whereas the average net income in health care sector was
3,190,000 ROL or $96.5. In 2006, the national average net income was 8,660,000 ROL
($308.3) whereas that in health care was 8,230,000 ROL ($293). The salaries are even
lower when compared to those who work in the defense or justice sectors and whose
average net incomes are almost double than those of health care providers. The salary
increases that occurred over the years have maintained the gap between these two
professional categories and added to the dissatisfaction of physicians regarding their
remuneration.
The low salaries are also used as the main justification for the perpetuation of the
informal payments.
"If the salary of a doctor after six years of medical school is lower than
that of a custodian in private sector, the result is a desire to migrate to
other countries (specifically the U.S.) or to start accepting informal
payments...And this happens because everything costs money: a surgeon
cannot take the tram to work, he needs a car! Additionally, the books cost
hundreds of Euros. So, it is a shame to see patients who mark "BRIBE" on
the money they give to physicians, and the latter are being sent to jail. This
for me is not corruption!" (Interview Health Care Expert 1, April 4, 2009).
A similar explanation was given by another interviewee, who said that the
"informal payments help me to survive... A physician needs money to
participate in conferences and attending a major conference costs about
€1,000; then there are the books which are very expensive, the continuous
educations seminars that must be paid and the salary is insufficient."
(Interview Physician 1, July 15, 2009)
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The increase in salaries of health care providers is supported also by the general
public with a little more than 60 percent of them favoring such a decision. The public's
support for higher salaries in the health care sector remained constant over time, the
difference between 2003 and 2006 being of only 0.2 percent among those in favor. It
should be noted that the public's motivation for this decision is rooted in the hope that
informal payments would be less necessary if health care providers are satisfied with
their income. The latter would also welcome such a decision and claim that corruption in
the form of informal payments has a negative impact on their relationship with the
patients. For example, "if the doctor begins looking at the patient as a possible
whistleblower and the patient sees in doctor a potential criminal offender, the relation
physician-patient deteriorates to the latter's detriment" (Interview V. Astarastoae, CPR,
May 22, 2007). Additionally, "informal payments reduce the level of satisfaction of
health providers" (interview F. Furtunescu, MPH, May 24, 2007) and perpetuate the
misconceptions regarding the relationship between physician and patient (Interview
Physician 1, July 15, 2007).
The low remuneration of health care providers is, therefore, considered to be the
major cause of dissatisfaction among health professionals and of the perpetuation of
informal payments. In 2005, the Minister of Health, E. Nicolaescu, said that "we need a
revolution when it comes to medical staff wages. As of 2006, we are considering paying
them a fixed salary and then a further variable payment, probably unlimited, depending
on their performance" (Ionescu 2005, 1515). However, the translation of that promise
into practice was delayed due to the complexity of the 2006 legislation reform package
and the drafting of the secondary legislation which was still being drafted a year later. On
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the other hand, Allin and his collaborators (2006) found that the substantial salary
increases of hospital physicians in early 1980s had no impact on the incidence of
informal payments in Greece. Moreover, several studies conducted in Venezuela and
Argentina showed that although low salaries may induce corruption, higher wages in the
absence of close auditing^ monitoring, and sanctioning does not reduce corruption
(Savedoff 2008). There is also the issue of "how high is high enough" to deter corruption.
If physicians do not perceive informal payments as corruption but merely as a token of
their gratitude, the likelihood that higher wages will reduce corruption is limited.
Furthermore, as long as central health care institutions do not publicly acknowledge that
corruption in the form of informal payments is a serious problem in this sector, there is
little incentive for the practice to decrease, less to disappear.

4.6.2. Continuous Medical Education

One of the responsibilities of health care providers, especially physicians, is to
stay abreast with the latest developments in medical science and research. According to
the Decision no. 67/2005132 Regarding the Establishment

of a Credit System for

Continuous Medical Education (CME), each physician must accumulate a minimum of
200 credits over a period of five years. Failure to acquire the minimum required number
of credits results in loss of professional accreditation. The CPR decision specifies the
activities that qualify for CME credits as well as the minimum number of credits a
specialist must accumulate in his/her own field of expertise.
The list of professional activities that are part of the CME includes graduate
studies, conferences, seminars, round tables, publications, and medical courses. The
132

This decision was replaced in 2009 by the updated Decision no. 2.
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number of credits per activity varies from five credits per annual subscription to a
medical journal, to 200 credits per publication of a book manuscript, and to 300 credits
for receiving a doctoral degree. The Committee for Professional and Scientific Education
within the CPR is in charge of monitoring the CME and developing standards and
programs for the accreditation of physicians (Colegiul Medicilor din Romania 2008).
Medical courses (traditional and online) for CME are offered also by the College of
Physicians in Bucharest as well as by the major universities of medicine and pharmacy in
the country and which have received the CPR approval.
The changes introduced by the health insurance system required that hospitals
have managers with expertise in the management of medical practice. Consequently, a
line of training refers to the preparation of hospital managers. However, there is a long
tradition of hospitals being managed by physicians and, therefore, the continuation of that
practice was made contingent upon the physician in charge of the hospital accumulating
knowledge in medical management. Thus, "a two-week crash course in the management
of medical practice is considered sufficient for the preparation of hospital managers"
(Interview Health Care Expert 2, May 30, 2007). Nonetheless, the 2006 legislation
reform attempts to correct the situation and to no longer allow medical doctors to be
hospital managers at the same time. Additionally, the Minister of Health would have the
power to dismiss any hospital manager who has a poor performance. While an important
measure in delineating the medical performance from the management performance, in
practice "one needs to have the appropriate political color to occupy a hospital manager
position at big hospitals" (Interview Health Care Expert 2, May 30, 2007). Hence,
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although attempts to improve the management of hospitals have been taken, the status
quo is difficult to change.

5. The Impact of Anticorruption Strategies

The analysis of the institutional strategies designed to reform and combat
corruption in the health care sector has shown that efforts have been made to modify the
organizational structure of the health care system. Furthermore, the analysis has shown
that the major change began in 1997 with the introduction of the health insurance system,
a moment that marked the departure from the Semashko health care system inherited
from the previous regime. As hypothesized, the lack of a unified EU health care policy
resulted in low external pressure to reform this sector. Consequently, reforming and
combating corruption in the health care was not the main priority of the Romanian
government despite the fact that health care reform has significant implication for the
well being of the population. The analysis has demonstrated that the results in reforming
health care system were mixed, with some major changes being implemented and many
problems remaining to be solved. Moreover, corruption in the form of informal payments
was publicly acknowledged by some public figures as a problem in 2005 although actual
measures to address it are yet to be seen.
The introduction of the health insurance system was the most important and
profound change since 1990. The structure of the system was changed by the creation of
the NHIF and the NHIH with its territorial divisions. Furthermore, the financing of the
system was modified by the introduction of health care contributions that all insured
persons must pay and by the payment of health care providers on a contractual basis. A
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combination of capitation and fee-for-service payments was introduced for family
doctors, while the ambulatory and non-clinical physicians are paid on a fee-for-service
basis. These changes attempted to stimulate their performance in the provision of health
care services
Also part of the health insurance system, patients were given the right to choose
their own family doctors, the latter being assigned as gatekeepers to the rest of the
system. Moreover, the rights of patients to medical information and to ensure the
confidentiality of that information were enshrined in the Law on the Patient's Rights.
Another positive change regarded the establishment of the IUIS in 2003 in an attempt to
improve the management of information regarding the insured and medical providers and
to ensure the quality of the health care services. The creation of an informatics system for
the collection of medical data has positive implications for the transparency of the health
care system by providing information regarding the management of the NHIF. To ensure
the quality of health care services, measures were also taken to guarantee the continuous
training of health care providers and the observance of ethics rules. The CPR was
assigned a major role in monitoring the continuous training of physicians and in
investigating and sanctioning violations of the Code of Ethics.
Despite the many and frequent changes that took place in the health care system
from 1997 until 2006, important problems continue to affect the functioning of the health
care system and the quality of health care services. A major problem that was recognized
by all the interviewees regards the under-financing of the health care system. Despite the
fact that every year more money was allocated to the health care system, the total budgets
are considered to be insufficient, a fact revealed by the increasing expenses from the
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NHIF compared to the revenues raised since 2003. The tendency to finance every public
health program and to cover every medical service from the NHIF further exacerbated the
problem by creating a general under-financing of the entire health care system. The
reluctance of the MPH to collaborate with non-governmental actors and to have an open
dialogue with health care experts had serious implications for the quality of legislation
adopted and the policies implemented. Not surprisingly, the legislation was difficult to
implement and required frequent changes to resolve the contradictions existing between
chapters of the same law or to adapt them to the reality on the ground.
A major problem that is yet to be solved in the health care system is the absence
of a unique system for collecting and processing data. The existence of parallel systems
with different coding and definitions and which collect data on different formats makes it
almost impossible to gather comparable data. Furthermore, within the same information
system there are problems with the collection and processing of data with serious
implications for the basis on which health care decisions are being made. Related to
transparency and provision of information is the response of health care institutions to
FOIA requests. Instead of observing more openness and transparency, the MPH has
become increasingly reluctant to respond to FOIA request or to collaborate with nongovernmental actors, for that matter. A different problem but with important implications
for the delivery of health care services and the image of health care providers is the
observance of ethics rules and, importantly for the public, the sanctioning of violations of
these rules. The protective attitude of the CPR towards its own members and the
reluctance to sanction unless there is a very serious case of ethics violations or
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malpractice further reinforces the negative image of health care providers in the eyes of
the public.
Perhaps the most interesting finding regards the attitude of health care providers
and health care authorities towards informal payments. Among health care providers and
public officials there appears to be consensus that corruption in health care sector is
limited to public procurement and pharmaceutical contracts, while informal payments are
merely a means of patients expressing their gratitude for the services provided. While the
interviewees did not deny the practice of informal payments, for the most part it was
downplayed as being less serious and in some cases was directly catalogued as not being
corruption. According to one interviewee, "there is a manipulation of the population to
emphasize corruption at the provider end...that way, no one will focus on what is going
on at the higher levels when the big decisions are being made" (Interview Physician 2,
May 24, 2007). Corruption in health care is considered to be "an image created by mass
media" (Interview V. Astarastoae, CPR, May 22, 2007) or a "subjective perception
induced by mass media" (Interview V. Cepoi, NHIH, April 11, 2007). Another common
point among health care providers and authorities is with regard to the low wages of
health professionals. The latter are used to justify the acceptance of informal payments
and/or the demand of such payments. A second justification is the practice of gratitude,
although a small percentage of the general public considers informal payments a token of
their gratitude.
However, a study financed by the World Bank found that in 2004 alone Romanian
patients paid around $360 million in informal payments, amounting to almost $1 million
per day in bribes to health care providers. The main reason expressed for bribing the
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medical personnel was the need to ensure a basic, standard quality health care service.
Furthermore, one in ten respondents said that nurses asked them directly for payment and
one in twenty respondents said the same thing about doctors. Although informal
payments are a matter of general knowledge among Romanians, the authorities were very
reluctant to hear the negative results. According to the coordinator of the study, Mihai
Vintoiu, it required two months of persuasion for the Ministry of Public Health to accept
the idea of making public the results of the study (Ionescu 2005). Pursuant to the study,
the authorities declared the need for addressing corruption in the form of informal
payments in the health care sector.
Nevertheless, a comparison of the data on the perception and experiences of
corruption in the health care sector shows a statistically significant increase in the
experiences with corruption in the health care sector in 2005 (see Figure 33). As in the
case of the judiciary, comparable data from the Barometers of Public Opinion was
available for only three data points (fall 2003, spring 2004, and spring 2005).
Nonetheless, the comparison is still significant because it provides information regarding
the differences between experiences and perceptions of corruption. The question about
the level of perception of corruption was measured on a frequency scale133 and in order to
make it comparable to the question assessing the actual experiences with corruption, only
the percent of those who answered that "very many" and "almost all" health care
professionals are corrupt were added and graphed. Ninety five percent confidence

133

The answers to the question "How widespread do you think corruption is among health care
professionals?" was measured on a five point scale: 1= "Almost None", 2="Very few", 3="Very many",
4="Almost all", and 5="I do not know". The questions assessing the experiences with corruption, "In order
to be treated fairly in hospitals did you have to offer additional money, gifts, favors..?", was measured on a
binary scale: l="No" and 2="Yes".
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intervals were calculated around the data points in order to determine if there are
significant differences over time.

Figure 33
Comparison of Perceptions vs. Experiences of Corruption in the Health Care Sector
(2003-2005)
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Source: Barometer of Public Opinion 2003-2005, Open Society Foundation Romania

The analysis indicates that there is a discrepancy between perception and
experiences with corruption, the former being consistently higher. However, the
discrepancy is smaller than in the case of the judiciary (see Chapter V), indicating that in
the health care sector people experience more direct corruption. Moreover, due to the
illegal nature of corruption, people may be reluctant to admit that they engaged in corrupt
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activities and, consequently, the actual experiences with corruption in health care may be
higher.
A very interesting finding of this analysis is that both perceptions and experiences
with corruption increased beginning with spring 2004. This indicates that the institutional
strategies adopted and implemented in the health care sector have little impact on the
perceived and experienced delivery and quality of health care services. Although much
legislation and measures have been developed and implemented, their results are yet to
have an impact. A significant change would require the demonstrated commitment of
MPH to combat corruption and the health care providers' support, difficult to realize as
long as there is a resistance to accept that informal payments are a form of corruption
and, therefore, they are legally and ethically condemnable.
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CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The underlying argument of this study is that corruption is an informal institution
that threatens democratic consolidation by creating incentives incompatible with the
formal rules, altering the effectiveness of formal institutions, and undermining the rule of
law. Hence, the goal of the study has been to examine the capacity of formal institutions
to counteract the informal institution of corruption in four sectors: the judiciary, customs,
health care, and public procurement, in the decade prior to Romania's accession to the
EU. This chapter summarizes the main findings of the study and it is divided into four
sections. First, I revisit the theoretical model and original hypotheses and discuss whether
they were confirmed. Second, I outline the differences in the impact of institutional
strategies in the four sectors and discuss the factors that explain them. Third, I discuss the
advantages of employing an institutional approach to the study of corruption. Fourth, I
present the implications of this study and the future areas of research. Throughout this
chapter I also address some of the limitations of the study.

1. Theoretical Model and Hypotheses Reexamined

To analyze the interaction between formal institutions and the informal institution
of corruption, this study employed a unique theoretical model (see Figure 1, Chapter I).
While the model was developed based on the literature on corruption and institutions, it
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went a step further by incorporating their recommendations into a single model which
examines corruption as an informal institution interacting with formal institutions. Hence,
the model took into consideration the role played by internal and external actors in
stimulating political will, the institutional anticorruption strategies adopted and
implemented, and their impact on formal and informal institutions. Eight types of
institutional strategies were included: 1) enforcement of legislation and sanctions; 2)
oversight institutions; 3) anticorruption agencies; 4) increase in transparency; 5) freedom
of information; 6) whistleblower and witness protection; 7) ethics codes; and 8) meritbased civil service. The model examined the proposed correlation between formal and
informal institutions according to which an increase in the effectiveness of formal
institutions should relate to a decrease of corruption. Furthermore, political will, an
essential element in fighting corruption, was disaggregated into two components,
demonstrated and rhetorical, to better capture its presence and to test the first two
hypotheses.
Hypothesis # 1. The more corruption became a salient issue for the EU, the higher
was the political will to fight corruption.
This hypothesis was confirmed. Corruption was not a major concern for the EU
when the EC issued its opinion regarding Romania's application for EU membership in
1997. At the time, regional stability and the consolidation of democracies in former
communist countries in CEE were major concerns. Hence, the EU decided to employ a
comprehensive and inclusive approach to enlargement and to include each country based
on its progress towards achieving the EU membership requirements. However, as
corruption gained significance by the early 2000s, EU pressure on Romanian authorities
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increased, particularly in two sectors of special interest for the EU: the judiciary and
customs. The increase of EU pressure and, particularly, the change in EU pressure in
2004 has been qualitatively and statistically demonstrated. The impact of EU pressure
resulted in an increase in the instances of demonstrated and rhetorical political will.
Furthermore, the analysis has demonstrated that EU pressure was unevenly
distributed among the four sectors investigated. The judiciary was the major priority for
the EU, a fact supported also by decisions to send a team of EU experts to collaborate
with Romanian authorities and ensure the adoption of the judicial reform package in
2004. The unprecedented decision indicated the seriousness with which the EU was
approaching corruption and the establishment of the rule of law in Romania. The second
sector of major concern for the EU and in which the pressure exercised by the external
actor was confirmed was customs. A corrupt customs sector would have multiple and farreaching consequences for the safety, health, and economy of all EU member states.
Therefore, EU pressure to clean up and reform this sector was not unexpected. However,
in the public procurement sector and health care the situation was different. In the former,
EU pressure started increasing in 2005 and its impact led to several demonstrations of
political will to combat corruption in public procurement. In the health care sector, EU
pressure was almost completely absent since the organization and regulation of health
care systems has always been considered a national matter. Overall, the analysis has
confirmed that EU pressure increased as the accession date approached, although it
differed from sector to sector.
Hypothesis # 2. The more corruption became a salient issue for the public, the
higher was the political will to fight corruption.
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This hypothesis was only partially confirmed. Although corruption was shown to
be a major concern for the public, a concern that undermined the trust in formal
institutions, the available data failed to definitely demonstrate that public opinion
pressure moderated political will. The existence of a statistically significant relationship
between the number of articles presenting cases of corruption and the rhetorical
component of political will has been confirmed. However, the number of corruption cases
publicized by mass media was poorly correlated with the opinion surveys data showing
high levels of perception of corruption. The absence of a statistically significant
relationship between public opinion and political will may be explained by several
factors. First, data collected from newspapers may not have accurately captured public
opinion pressure. Second, except for the judiciary, corruption in the other three sectors
represented a small proportion of the total number of cases of corruption publicized.
Hence, a statistically significant correlation between the number of cases of corruption in
each of the four sectors and political will was unattainable, except for the judiciary.
Third, given mass media's inclination towards sensationalism, small cases of corruption
that plague the health care sector may be less attractive from an editorial perspective than
cases involving bribes of thousands or millions of dollars. Fourth, it may be the case that
the role of the public in fighting corruption is overestimated by anticorruption advocates.
Corruption in the Romanian health care sector is widespread and well-known by
everyone. However, there was little evidence found to support the claim that the public
has exercised pressure on the successive governments to address the problem. The
Romanian survey data indicated an increasing lack of acceptance of corruption in the
health care sector and, at the same time, a continuation of the practice of informal
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payments in this sector. Hence, at least in this case, the public's disapproval of corruption
had little impact on the political will to fight corruption.
Hypothesis # 3. The more anticorruption strategies were adopted, the greater the
decrease of corruption.
Hypothesis # 4. The more anticorruption strategies were employed simultaneously
(multi-dimensional approach), the greater the decrease of corruption.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 were both only partially confirmed. Increased demonstrated
political will, whose presence was confirmed by Hypothesis # 1, manifested itself by a
higher number of institutional strategies adopted. However, the mere adoption of more
anticorruption strategies or their simultaneous employment has not automatically resulted
in a decrease of corruption or an increase in the effectiveness of formal institutions. The
analysis of institutional strategies adopted in the four sectors has confirmed the relative
impact on reducing corruption and the existence of discrepancies among the effects of
institutional strategies adopted within and across sectors. The differences within each
sector were determined by factors such as the language of legislation, funding and
personnel allocation, monitoring of implementation and enforcement of institutional
strategies. All of these factors were underlined by the presence or lack of political will to
combat corruption in that particular sector. Hence, the institutional strategies adopted in
the judiciary have resulted in a greater decrease of corruption and a corresponding
increase of the effectiveness of judicial institutions than the institutional strategies
adopted in the health care sector. A major reason for that difference was the recognition
of corruption as a major problem in the judiciary versus the denial attitude adopted by
authorities in the health care sector. If corruption was not considered to be a problem in
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the health care sector, there was no perceived need to adopt and implemented strategies
that would address it.
The differences among sectors, discussed in more detail in the next section, were
due in part to the specific features of each sector that led to the adoption of anticorruption
strategies tailored for each sector, and to the significance the Romanian government
assigned to fighting corruption in each sector. Some strategies, however, were more
general in their applicability. For example, NAPO has jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute medium and high cases of corruption in all sectors; FOIA and the legislation
regarding the protection of whistleblowers and witnesses in cases of corruption also have
general applicability across sectors. Some institutional strategies contained measures that
were sector specific. For example, the SCM is the oversight institution responsible for
guaranteeing judicial independence and it is solely responsible for magistrates' careers,
whereas in the customs sector the counterpart institution is the IVD. Furthermore, in the
public procurement sector, the two institutions with oversight responsibilities specific to
this sector are NARMPP and UCVPP, whereas in the health care sector the CPR plays a
similar, although more limited, role specific to the training and monitoring of the ethical
conduct of physicians.
The varying longevity of the institutional strategies (i.e., older versus newer, such
as SCM or IVD compared to NARMPP or UCVPP) also explains the discrepancies
regarding the impact of anticorruption strategies. Where the institutional strategies were
adopted a year or two prior to accession, their impact was difficult to observe since they
did not have time to produce results (e.g., NARMPP and UCVPP). The adoption of some
anticorruption strategies just months prior to EU accession was indicative of the pressure
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felt by the Romanian government to show the EU that it was committed to combating
corruption, even though some of these measures would not have time to show whether
they worked or not. As long as the EU was willing to accept the adoption of
anticorruption strategies as clear indicators of demonstrated political will, the Romanian
authorities had only to gain by complying with the EU request to adopt more
anticorruption strategies.
The study has also shown that Romania has opted for a multi-pronged approach to
fight corruption and that it utilized multiple institutional strategies in all sectors. Hence,
corruption has been addressed on multiple fronts in all sectors, although with mixed
results. Thus, the employment of multiple anticorruption strategies produced more visible
results in the judiciary and customs, where the strategies were adopted earlier than in the
other two sectors and where the external pressure was higher. Moreover, the manner in
which the anticorruption strategies common to all sectors (such as FOIA) were employed
made a difference in the reduction of corruption across sectors.

2. Differences in the Impact of Institutional Strategies across Sectors

The impact of institutional strategies designed to reform formal institutions and
combat corruption differed across sectors. The national or sectoral characteristics of the
strategies adopted, the priority attached to their implementation, the external and
domestic pressure to produce results, the time lag from their adoption to the assessment
of their effects on the ground were all factors that influence the changes observed on the
two dependent variables, the informal institution of corruption and the formal institutions
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in the four sectors. Hence, some strategies had a greater impact on one sector than in the
others, whereas some have failed to make a difference in any sector.
The enforcement of anticorruption legislation and sanctions is one of the main
responsibilities of the judicial system, although the observance of legislation and
regulations falls under the jurisdiction of all formal institutions. The data indicated that
the number of convictions in cases of corruption has fluctuated little since the
Anticorruption Law was adopted in 2000. The establishment of the NAPO as a special
institution responsible for investigating and prosecuting medium and high cases of
corruption contributed positively to the fight against corruption, although NAPO fell
short of its intended purpose. That is, until 2006, no high official was investigated for
corruption due to NAPO jurisdictional restrictions. The investigation of the former Prime
Minister Nastase, which proved to be an important demonstration of political will for the
EU, was initiated in the last year prior to accession. However, three years later, the
investigation was blocked by Parliament and Nastase continues to enjoy his privileges as
a senator. Consequently, the absence of sanctions for high cases of corruption reinforced
the general perception that some segments of the population are above the law.
Furthermore, the application of sanctions for medium and small cases of corruption failed
to have an impact on the general public, who wants to see some "big fish" legally
sanctioned for their corrupt activities. Consequently, the continuous high levels of
perception of corruption among the general public are not difficult to explain.
There were noted discrepancies among sectors with regard to the public officials'
attitude toward corruption and their responsibility to fight it. The most aggressive
approach to combat corruption was in the judiciary, where EU pressure and concomitant
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political will of the Romanian leadership was also the highest, followed by customs, and
in the last two years prior to accession, also in the public procurement sector. However,
health care stands out as a sector where corruption was denied as a problem for almost
the entire decade under study and, when finally acknowledged, was not followed by
concrete measures to address it. As far as public officials in the health care sector were
concerned, corruption was a problem for NAPO and other judicial institutions. For
example, the director of the NHIH, V. Cepoi, said that corruption "does not constitute the
object of their activity....but of specialized institutions" (Interview, April 11, 2007).
Additionally, when the existence of corruption was recognized, it was catalogued as
being the result of the public procurement activities in the health care sector or of the
illegal activities of pharmaceutical companies. However, "solving cases of public
procurement corruption or transactions of pharmaceutical companies does not solve the
problem of informal payments in the health care, which is a reality and a problem"
(Interview C. Galea, Chief Prosecutor NAPO, February 23, 2007).
The differences across sectors were also noticeable with regard to the impact of
the activity of oversight institutions. The formal authority of institutions, their longevity,
and the funding and personnel allocated have directly influenced the scope and
effectiveness of their activity. For example, the 1991 Constitution recognized the role of
the SCM as sole guarantor of judicial independence but the actual transfer of power from
the Ministry of Justice took place in 2004 after the judicial reform package was adopted
under EU pressure. The IVD oversight institution established in the customs sector was
given the formal authority to develop activities that would prevent corruption in customs
and to monitor the implementation of anticorruption strategies in this sector only in 2005,
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although it was created in 2001. A similar situation was found in the public procurement
and health care sector where oversight institutions were either created on the wake of
accession deadline (e.g., NARMPP, UCVPP in the public procurement sector) or were
not given formal authority to address corruption issues (e.g., NHIH in the health care
sector).
The activity of oversight and anticorruption institutions was also influenced by
the budgets and staff allocated. Insufficient funding was a common problem across all
four sectors, although differences were identified across sectors. Thus, the SCM in the
judiciary, the NARMPP in the public procurement sector, and the NHIH in the health
care sector were all allocated larger budgets in the last few years prior to accession. By
contrast, the budget of NAPO, the only specialized anticorruption institution, saw a
reduction in its funding in 2006. A similar trend was noted also in the customs sector,
where the budget not only for the IVD but for all customs institutions began decreasing
after 2001. Budgets tell only part of the story, of course; how money was being managed
directly impacted the effectiveness of the institution, a fact revealed by the customs
institutions which managed to fulfill the EU requirements with regard not only to the
transposition and implementation of the acquis in this area, but also the reduction of
corruption as indicated by the 2005 BEEPS and 2006 CAID surveys of firms.
The problem of qualified and sufficient personnel to allow a proper functioning of
the institutions led to other discrepancies across sectors. Once again, the judiciary was
given priority manifested by a higher increase of personnel allocated, although the
magistrates' case load continued to remain high throughout the decade under study. In
customs, the discrepancy between the number of customs officers and the volume of
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work per person was a major concern, whereas in public procurement sector the paucity
of specialists had consequences that ranged

from accurate

interpretation

and

implementation of procurement legislation and regulations to the activity of institutions
responsible for monitoring public procurement activities. In the health care sector, the
legislative changes that resulted in pay cuts for the NHIH personnel affected the
effectiveness of the institution due to the migration of highly qualified people from the
NHIH to the private sector or other public institutions and the attraction of less qualified
personnel. Hence, the mere creation of oversight and anticorruption institutions has not
always led to an improved fight against corruption, and funds and qualified staff were
two of the factors affecting their activities.
All sectors made progress in increasing the transparency of their activities by
establishing websites that gave the public direct access to a range of information
classified under FOIA as being of public interest. Hence, information regarding the
legislation in force, the proposed legislative drafts, the activity reports of each institution,
and the management of public funds have all become available to the public. Since the
adoption of the Anticorruption Package in 2003, the declarations of income and interests
of public officials have also become part of the public information category. However,
discrepancies in the enforcement of these formal rules were found across the four sectors.
The highest level of transparency and the most information provided to the public was
found in the judiciary, whereas the health care institutions were found again to be the
least transparent. The discrepancy between the health care sector and the other sectors is
particularly visible with regard to how the Ministry of Health responded to FOIA
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requests over the year. The data showed a decrease in openness and transparency of this
institution compared to that of institutions in other sectors.
The differences among sectors were determined also by the sectoral specific
measures designed to increase transparency. Thus, the media were given more access to
judicial procedures, and new mechanisms for recording judicial decisions were
introduced. The customs procedures were computerized by the introduction of TARIR,
NCTS, and ASYCUDA, which all reduced the direct contact between clients and customs
officers and achieved two goals, specifically an increase in transparency and a reduction
of the opportunities for corruption. The transparency of public procurement procedures
was increased in 2006 through the inclusion of the public procurement dossier in the
category of information of public interest. The introduction of e-Licitatie in 2002 and its
upgrading in 2006 to completely align the regulations in this sector with the EU acquis
had, however, a limited impact on increasing transparency due in part to the low levels of
internet connectivity in Romania, high fees for online procurement transactions, and a
resistance to change. Once again, the health care sector lagged behind the other three
sectors due primarily to the lack of a well-organized and unified system for collecting and
processing health information. The reform of the health care system resulted in the
creation of parallel systems of collecting similar data, with each system utilizing different
software, definitions, and coding schemes. Moreover, the data were poorly analyzed and,
perhaps

most

importantly,

often ignored

when

policy

decisions

were

made.

Consequently, a noticeable increase in transparency was difficult to achieve in the
absence of relevant information about how the system worked and what impact the
strategies had in practice.
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One institutional strategy that had no visible impact in any of the four sectors was
the protection of whistleblowers and witnesses. The activity of the National Office for
Witness Protection is considered classified information and, therefore, no data was
available to the public. The data regarding the implementation of the legislation regarding
the protection of whistleblowers can be catalogued as "unknown" information. That is,
except for one report done by an NGO in 2006, two years after the law was adopted,
regarding the inclusion of legislative provision in the internal rules of the formal
institutions, no data could be found on the actual implementation and enforcement of
those provisions. Additionally, no interviewee was able to offer any information in that
regard and the general agreement among them was that the law was not being enforced.
One interviewee related the story of an employee whose decision to blow the
whistle on an important case of corruption led to the creation of a coalition against her;
that is, almost 40 of her colleagues signed a petition claiming that she was mentally
unstable

and,

therefore, her

actions

should

be

completely

disregarded.

The

whistleblower's reputation and expertise, along with the evidence provided to her direct
superior ensured that she was not fired, although she had to change jobs shortly after that
(Interview Journalist 2, June 6, 2007). This example is indicative of the power of
informal rules and the sanctions for violating them. It may also explain the reluctance of
people to come forward with information about cases of corruption, regardless of their
magnitude. If the case is very big, the risks associated with whistle-blowing are also
higher and an honest act may not warrant the costs; if the case is small, the risk of being
exposed as a whistleblower and the sanctions attached to that (marginalization, ostracism)
from the colleagues at work may also not warrant the effort. In the absence of a
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consistent enforcement of legislative provisions, it is very unlikely that this strategy will
work.
A strategy whose implementation had different impacts in the four sectors was the
implementation of ethics codes. In the public procurement sector, no ethics code was
adopted. The proposal drafted in 2003 as part of a PHARE program was never finalized
and all future discussions regarding such a code were successfully avoided by the
authorities. In the other three sectors, however, codes of ethics were adopted and
specialized disciplinary committees were established. Formally, the institutions in all
three sectors made their employees aware of their code of ethics by posting copies in
public places. In practice, however, not much emphasis was placed on informing them of
their rights and obligations as public servants and there was even less emphasis on
preparing the new generations of magistrates, customs officers, or health care providers
with regard to the rules of an ethical conduct in their professions.
The largest difference in the implementation of this strategy across the three
sectors, however, regarded the activities of the disciplinary committees in each sector.
The customs sector had the highest number of disciplinary sanctions applied per year,
followed by the judiciary and health care. In the judiciary, the number of magistrates
disciplinarily sanctioned increased in the last two years prior to accession, indicating a
decrease in tolerance towards corruption among magistrates. Although the magistrates
were often accused as protecting each other, that phenomenon was nowhere as apparent
as in the medical profession. The spirit of unity and the image of physicians as a special
social category were used as justification for the low number of health professionals
sanctioned for violations of ethics code and/or for corruption. The consequence is the
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perpetuation of an image of impunity and a crystallization of distrust in public institutions
and their employees among the general public.
The establishment of a merit-based civil service where the employees are selected
based on their qualifications, rewarded and promoted due to their professional expertise
and efficiency was another institutional strategy that yielded different results across the
sectors. Thus, in the judiciary and customs new rules for promotion and career
advancement to ensure a faster vertical mobility of employees and, thus, to reward them
for their excellence in activity were adopted in 2005. New rules regarding the selection of
new employees through exams were also adopted in both sectors. However, the
implementation in practice of those rules was a different matter. For example, in the
judiciary, a significant number of magistrates continued to be directly accepted in the
magistracy and promoted to higher positions despite the direct appointment procedure
being considered an exceptional procedure. In customs, promotions continued to be
difficult even after the legislative change due to the limited financial resources (i.e.,
promotions involved higher salaries). The issue of establishing a merit-based civil service
in the public procurement sector was limited to the preparation of experts in this area.
Since there were no schools that specialize in public procurement, the only avenue for
producing specialists was through training seminars. The number of such seminars
increased in the last two years prior to accession, along with the number of public and
private institutions offering them. However, the quality of the seminars did not follow the
same ascending trend, most seminars being snapshots of the legislation and often offering
contradictory interpretations of procurement regulations. Consequently, the effective
training of public procurement experts was not achieved.
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The health profession is, perhaps, the most regulated with regard to the
preparation of health care providers. The major problem in this sector, as it was
consistently expressed by all interviewees, was the low salaries of health professionals.
Low wages were considered responsible for the widespread practice of informal
payments and the decrease in quality of health services. Therefore, no decrease in
corruption was noted in the health care sector. Furthermore, any change would require
the recognition of informal payments as a major, unethical, and illegal problem by health
care providers and health authorities. As long as corruption is portrayed as a token of
patients' gratitude, little change is likely to occur.
Hence, this study has demonstrated that, particularly after 2000, there were clear
indications of political will manifested through comprehensive diagnoses of corruption,
the intermittent inclusion of the main stakeholders in the policy-making process, the
adoption of anticorruption reforms, and the creation of more transparent monitoring
systems at the national and sectoral level. Similarly demonstrated has been the
importance of identifying demonstrated political will and differentiating it from
anticorruption rhetoric which, although frequently employed by policy-makers to create
an image of anticorruption fighters, often failed to materialize in concrete measures.
The analysis has also shown that one factor stood out in explaining the presence
or absence of political will, namely the external pressure exercised by the EU. The EU
pressure was a constant factor in explaining the instances of political will and in
supporting the anti-corruption leaders if and when they appeared (e.g., Minister of Justice
Macovei in 2005 and 2006). The consistent and increasing EU pressure was especially
noticeable beginning with 2004, the year when EU pressure was the highest. Although
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institutional strategies were adopted prior to 2004, most of them were done at the EU
request and, in the absence of demands to implement the adopted strategies and to
carefully monitor their enforcement, the results produced were modest. The significant
increase in external pressure to combat corruption and reform the three sectors of
particular importance for the EU (i.e., judiciary, customs, and public procurement—in
order of their salience for the EU) materialized in the adoption of comprehensive reforms
in all three sectors. However, most of those measures were adopted just prior to
accession, as it was the case in the public procurement sector where the EU began
exercising more pressure at the last minute (i.e., in 2005), and, consequently, their actual
impact could not be assessed prior to accession.
The EU decision to grant Romania membership was, at least in part, made on
faith; that is, the EU hoped that the pace of reforms would continue after the accession
and that the implementation of those adopted reforms would produce the desired changes.
To ensure that progress in combating corruption and increasing the effectiveness of
formal institutions would continue, the EU adopted safeguard clauses that would allow it
to continue monitoring Romania and to sanction it for failure to carry on its pre-accession
promises. In July 2007, the EC issued its first report assessing Romania's progress in
combating corruption and continuing the reforms initiated prior to accession. The EC
concluded

that the

Romanian

authorities

have

demonstrated

"good

will

and

determination" to continue judicial reform and fight against corruption and that it has
achieved "some progress in the reform of its judicial system" (European Commission
2007, 2). However, the report noted that the progress made in addressing high-level
corruption remained insufficient despite the changes in NAPO jurisdiction introduced in

454

2006. A problem emphasized by the EC was the absence of dissuasive sentences in such
cases and of a "very high number of suspensions of these penalties in cases of high-level
corruption" (European Commission 2007, 3). The failure to follow up rigorous
prosecutions with appropriate judicial decisions has significant implications for the
public's trust in formal institutions and in their political leaders.
The success in consolidating the rule of law and curbing corruption was
dependent also on the climate of political stability in the country. The year 2007 was full
of political turmoil and corruption was at the centre of the political crisis. Only three
months after the accession, the PM Calin Popescu Tariceanu requested the dismissal of
three ministers, including the independent Minister of Justice Macovei, who had
launched an aggressive campaign against high-level corruption and was threatening
political figures from all political parties. In response, President Basescu withdrew his
political party, DP, from the governing coalition. The PM retaliated by calling up on his
party, NLP, and the opposition to demote the President and on April 19, 2007 the
Parliament approved by 322 to 108 votes the suspension of the President on allegations of
abuse of power and constitutional violations. A month later, the President won almost 75
percent of the referendum votes and was reinstated as the head of state. What followed
was a political situation marked by tension, conflict, and inefficiency due to the lack of
cooperation between the President and the government led by Tariceanu, who refused to
resign. The government coalition created after the 2008 national elections between
President Basescu's party and the SDP broke down ten months later and from October
13, 2009 until January 2010, when the new post-presidential election government was
formed, Romania was without a functioning government. Throughout all this turmoil,
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corruption was a major bone of contention with accusation of corruption flowing from all
parties, but with no high-profile case of corruption being finalized.
The second factor of pressure, public opinion, was shown to be insufficient by
itself to stimulate political will and to lead to the adoption of anticorruption reforms,
particularly outside the election years. Although since 1996, every election resulted in a
turnover of power, which suggested that the electorate sanctioned political leaders for
their failure to translate in practice their campaign promises, no other clear indications of
public pressure were found. As mentioned earlier, in the Romanian case the public failed
to play an important role in encouraging the political will necessary to combat corruption
even when corruption had a direct impact on their quality of life as was the case of health
care. In this sector more than in the other three, the balance between incentives and costs
for compliance with the formal or informal rules was tilted in favor of the informal rules
of corruption.
Overall, the largest progress in combating corruption and increasing the
effectiveness of formal institutions was registered in the judiciary, the sector of highest
salience for the EU and with serious consequences for the rule of law and democratic
stability of the country. Customs came second with regard to the increase in the
effectiveness of its formal institutions and decrease of corruption, whereas in public
procurement sector some positive changes were registered in the last couple of years
prior to accession. The least progress in addressing corruption was made in the health
care sector where corruption in the form of informal payments continues to be denied as
being a serious problem by both health care authorities and health care providers.
Additionally, three years after the comprehensive health care reform designed to tackle
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informal payments was initiated, corruption in health care not only has not decreased, but
it captured the attention of international mass media such as the New York Times and
National Public Radio.
Another interesting finding of this study was the discrepancy between perceptions
and experiences of corruption reported by the Romanian public over time. The
comparative analysis of the survey data for the judiciary and health care sectors134
revealed, as expected, a higher perception of corruption than the actual experiences with
corruption reported in both sectors. Moreover, the comparison showed that the two
longitudinal trends (i.e., perceptions and experiences) followed similar patterns over the
years while maintaining the gap between perceptions and experiences. That is, when
perceptions of corruption decreased, the reported experiences of corruption decreased and
vice versa. The analysis also revealed that while in the health care sector the differences
between perceptions and experiences with corruption are relatively small (about 20
percent), in the judiciary the differences was much higher (about 40 percent). Moreover,
in 2005, the experiences of corruption trend slightly decreased while the perceptions of
corruption trend slightly increased indicating that other factors other than actual
corruption were influencing the public's perception of corruption in the judiciary. The
focus of the mass media on covering cases of corruption in the judicial sector along with
the consistent and high pressure exercised by the EU have placed the judiciary at the
center of anticorruption rhetoric and, implicitly, influenced the public's perception of
corruption in this sector.
This finding suggests that caution should be employed when using solely
perceptions of corruption to assess the level of corruption and/or changes over time
134

See Chapters V and VIII for a detailed discussion of the comparative analysis.
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because they may be artificially inflated. On the other hand, perceptions of corruption
may be illustrative of a failure of the anticorruption strategies to produce results or a lack
of publicizing the results in combating corruption, whenever they are present. If higher
exposure to the problem of corruption influences the public's perception of corruption, an
increase publicity of the results in curbing corruption may also affect the public's
perception of corruption and anticorruption efforts. Therefore, perceptions of corruption
data should be interpreted carefully by comparing it with data regarding the actual
experiences of corruption and by taking into consideration contextual factors (e.g.,
anticorruption campaigns, high mass media coverage of corruption, or anticorruption
rhetoric).

3. The Advantages of Employing an Institutional Approach to the Study of
Corruption

To analyze corruption as an informal institution, this study relied on two
institutional

approaches—Historical

Institutionalism

(HI)

and

Rational

Choice

Institutionalism (RCI). It has shown that the informal institution of corruption developed
under the communist regime when they were tolerated because they served as alternatives
to an increasingly deficient state command economy and as substitutes for formal
institutional reform. The expansion of corruption after the fall of communism has
demonstrated the resilience of informal institutions. Hence, the path dependence
explanation, whose significance for understanding and analyzing institutions was
emphasized by HI, was useful in explaining the endurance of the informal institution of
corruption in post-communist Romania. Moreover, the functional mechanism proposed
by HI to explain the survival of institutions provided the necessary framework for

understanding the incentive structure underlying the informal institution of corruption.
That is, effective informal institutions are supported by an incentive structure that induces
actors to engage in corrupt behavior because either the benefits are higher than the costs
or it is too costly to violate the informal rules even if the benefits are unsatisfactory. In
the case of the informal institution of corruption, the endurance of systemic corruption
was explained by an incentive structure in which the costs for violating the informal rules
were too high for people to ignore.
The collapse of the communist regime meant the creation of new institutions or a
remodeling of the institutions that survived the regime change. However, that was a
costly and long-term process that led to the creation of a fluid environment where the
new rules needed time to be fully developed, implemented, and legitimized by the
general public. That environment of uncertainty has been shown to be conducive to the
growth of the already established informal institution of corruption. Existing informal
institutions meant that the actors' expectations were stabilized and the probabilities of
their actions established (Knight 1992, 147). In other words, the informal institution of
corruption inherited from the communist regime created a common set of shared
expectations about the informal rules, which, in turn, influenced the actors' behavior.
Under such circumstances, the probability of an individual to violate the informal rules
was determined by the power of incentive structure underlying the informal institutions.
RCI was useful in explaining the actors' behavior and the probability of choosing to
comply or not with the informal rules. Thus, when informal institutions are effective, an
individual's best strategy would be to comply with the informal rules. Non-compliance,
when sanctions are high, is unattractive and unlikely to occur, even though the actors may
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prefer different institutional arrangements. That explains the high percentage of
Romanians complying with the informal rules of corruption in the health care sector
although they would have preferred non-compliance.
Moreover, changes in observance of informal rules at the individual level are
unlikely to produce systemic changes unless a sufficient number of individuals make the
same choice (Knight 1992). In the absence of certainty that an actor's behavior is not
unique and that others will violate the informal rules, the individual actor's action will
have no impact at the systemic level. Hence, the incentive structure underlying the
informal institution of corruption and the calculus approach emphasized by RCI were
useful in explaining the resilience of the informal institution of corruption. Additionally,
RCI provided the framework for understanding the mechanism through which
institutional change, formal and informal, takes place. A change in the balance of cost
and benefits affected the effectiveness of the institution. For example, the adoption of
anticorruption strategies that led to an increase in transparency, accountability, and an
increase in the effectiveness of judicial institutions influenced the incentive structure of
the formal institutions in the judiciary. However, the increase in the costs for noncompliance with the formal rules has not yet surpassed those for complying with the
informal institution of corruption. Nonetheless, the study has demonstrated that by
altering the balance between costs and benefits for complying with the formal and
informal rules, one can change the effectiveness of formal and informal institutions.
An institutional approach to analyze corruption offers an analytical framework for
understanding the "rules of the game" that regulate human interaction (North 1990, 4).
Intrinsic to any institution are not only the rules but also the sanctions associated with the
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violation of those rules. The institutional approach provides the framework for
investigating the informal rules of corruption and the sanctions associated with their noncompliance. Information regarding the balance between the risks for violating the
informal rules of corruption and the benefits for complying with formal rules becomes
particularly important in the development of effective anticorruption

strategies.

Anticorruption strategies that are likely to result in a small reduction of the costs for
violating the informal rules may be unlikely to succeed, especially if the sanctions for
non-compliance with the informal rules are high.
An institutional approach helps us differentiate the "rules from the players"
(North 1990, 4). That is, it helps us differentiate the informal institution of corruption
from informal organizations, such as mafia or clans. Hence, an institutional approach
offers an understanding of the underlying rules of corruption, of their evolution, and their
consequences and it helps us discerning it from the strategies employed by actors in
informal organizations. Additionally, analyzing corruption from an institutionalist
perspective helps us distinguish it from culture. More too often culture has been used to
justify the persistence of corruption. Although culture influences informal institutions and
the two are sometimes difficult to discern, for analytical purposes it is important to
maintain them separately. I agree with Helmke and Levitsky (2006, 7) that a definition of
informal institutions as shared expectations or beliefs is useful in delineating it from
culture, understood as shared values.
Hence, an institutional approach to analyze corruption offers an analytical
framework for examining the underlying rules of the game, for identifying the incentive
structure supporting the "informal institutions, and for examining the mechanism to
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generate informal institutional change. The analysis of corruption as an informal
institution has the advantage of analytically differentiating it from informal organizations
and culture and, thus, allowing one to focus on informal rules and to investigate the
relations between informal institutions, on the one hand, and informal organizations and
culture, on the other hand. Moreover, an institutional approach allows one to investigate
corruption in interaction with formal institutions and to determine the degree and
mechanisms through which they impact each other. Such an analysis is especially
important in developing the strategies to increase the effectiveness of formal institutions
and decrease the effectiveness of informal institutions (i.e., institutional strategies).

4. Implications and Future Research Agenda

This study has demonstrated that combating corruption and increasing the
effectiveness of formal institutions are complementary actions. Thus, the institutional
strategies designed to strengthen formal institutions implicitly reduce the effectiveness of
the competing informal institution of corruption by increasing transparency and
accountability and limiting the discretionary powers of public officials. However, the
study has also shown that not all strategies are equal and that some are more likely to
produce the intended results than others either due to the existence of demonstrated
political will to combat corruption or because they are less likely to produce significant
disruptions in the status

quo.

The important variation across sectors in the

implementation and enforcement of similar institutional strategies (e.g., FOIA) indicated
the salient role played by non-governmental actors (particularly the EU) in supporting the
fight against corruption.
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Although the EU is unique in the world, other international institutions and/or
organizations can and should play an important role in promoting the rule of law and
fighting corruption. While conditioning or denying financial support may not always be
effective, especially if the country is rich in natural resources, other tools of pressure
should be identified and employed, such as building partnerships with national actors
willing to curb corruption, supporting them in the challenging endeavor to create
anticorruption agencies or institutions with both financial and technical support. The tools
and strategies available would differ according to the type of international institution and
the country with which it deals. International institutions such as the World Bank have
demonstrated their commitment to combat corruption by developing anticorruption
strategies and allocating financial and human resources to countries that expressed
combating corruption as their goal or agreed to fight corruption in order to receive
financial support. One of the pitfalls of the Western approach to fighting corruption in
developing countries is to impose an anticorruption strategy that ignores the specific
problems the country encounters (e.g., poor developed bureaucratic apparatus); the
informal rules that govern the interaction between the public servants and the general
public; and the domestic actors committed to combat corruption. Fighting corruption is a
difficult and long term endeavor that requires the support of political actors, civil society,
and even the general public. A failure to take into consideration the domestic actors and
to adapt anticorruption strategies to the specific conditions of each country is likely to
limit the chances of successfully combating corruption.
An additional important lesson that can be drawn is that sustained external
pressure is more effective than one-time or intermittent pressure. Without external
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pressure, the countervailing pressures on leadership to adhere to the status quo may be
otherwise insurmountable. Hence, careful monitoring of how the external funding
allocated to combating corruption was managed, of how the anticorruption strategies
were implemented, of the results in curbing corruption are all important elements in
assessing the political will over time and the success in combating corruption.
Nonetheless, an interesting research question is how the role of the EU in
combating corruption in candidate countries has changed post-accession when the
leverage of the EU has diminished. As mentioned earlier, the safeguard clauses and the
threat of activating them if insufficient progress was made failed to deter the Romanian
political class from attempting to halt the fight against high-level corruption. Moreover,
the post-accession analysis of the institutional strategies adopted just prior to accession
will reveal if the EU decision to grant Romania membership based on the promise of
change was warranted or rushed. For example, the progress made in the public
procurement sector was applauded by the EU months prior to accession. However, the
2009 Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity Survey (BEEPS) found that 52.3
percent of the surveyed firms identified corruption as a major concern for their
businesses, a 22.5 percent increase since 2005. The same survey found that the number of
firms expected to make gifts to secure government contracts also increased 23 percent
since 2005, indicating that the impact of institutional strategies was limited or that
perhaps some strategies were not even implemented.
Another important area of research regards the role of the public in supporting the
fight against corruption. The literature on corruption advocates for the inclusion of the
public if success in curbing corruption is to be reached. It stands to reason that once
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people understand the consequences of corruption and are aware of the means to fight it,
they would become more involved. However, the findings of this study suggest that a
closer look at the role of the public in fighting corruption is necessary. This research has
shown that as long as the incentives to violate the informal rules are low and the costs are
high, it is very unlikely to gather the public support for combating corruption, even if
there is awareness about corruption and its effects.
Additionally, the theoretical model used in this study may be applied to other
types of competing informal institutions in other democratizing settings, such as in Latin
America where clientelism and patrimonialism are considered to be competing informal
institutions. More recent studies have shown that competing informal institutions can take
other forms. For example, Daniel Brinks (2006) studied an informal institution that
allows the killing of perceived violent criminals in Brazil and Argentina. He claimed that
there was a competing informal institution which "short-circuits due process and shows
no regard for the physical integrity of those who come in contact with the police" (Brinks
2006, 226). Hence, the application of this theoretical model (replacing, of course, EU
pressure with a different actor) may yield important results and offer additional answers
regarding the interaction of formal and informal institutions.
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Appendix A

The Acquis Chapters
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Chapter 1: Free Movement of Goods
Chapter 2: Free Movement for Persons
Chapter 3: Freedom to Provide Services
Chapter 4: Free Movement of Capital
Chapter 5: Company Law
Chapter 6: Competition Policy
Chapter 7: Agriculture
Chapter 8: Fisheries
Chapter 9: Transport Policy
Chapter 10: Taxation
Chapter 11: Economic and Monetary Union
Chapter 12: Statistics
Chapter 13: Social
Chapter 14: Energy
Chapter 15: Industrial Policy
Chapter 16: Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
Chapter 17: Science and Research
Chapter 18: Education and Training
Chapter 19: Telecommunications and Info
Chapter 20: Culture and Audiovisual Policy
Chapter 21: Regional Policy and Co-ordination
Chapter 22: Environment
Chapter 23: Consumers and Health Protection
Chapter 24: Justice and Home Affairs
Chapter 25: Customs Union
Chapter 26: External Relations
Chapter 27: Common Foreign and Security Policy
Chapter 28: Financial Control
Chapter 29: Finance and Budgetary Provisions
Chapter 30: Institutions
Chapter 31: Other Matters
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Scheme Used for Coding Newspaper Articles Regarding Corruption Cases
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CODE
CUSTOMS

EDUCATION

FINANCIAL

FIRMS

GOVERNMENT

HEALTH CARE

JUDICIAL

MEDIA
MILITARY

PARLIAMENT
POLICE
PRIVATIZATION

PUBLIC OFFICIALS

PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT
TRANSPORTATION
OTHER

DEFINITION USED FOR CLASSIFYING THE ARTICLES
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption in the customs sector involving customs
personnel.
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption in the education sector (involving teachers,
professors, or any other personnel working in this sector).
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption in the banks sector (e.g., corrupt financial
transactions, bank frauds).
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption involving businesses, enterprises, and/or
factories.
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption involving ministers, secretary o f state, or any
other national government official.
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption in the health care sector (involving doctors,
nurses, or any other personnel working in this sector).
This category includes articles that present cases o f
corruption in the judiciary involving magistrates (judges,
prosecutors), lawyers, and court clerks.
This category includes articles that present cases o f
corruption in mass media (television and written media).
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption in the military (i.e., involving military
personnel).
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption involving members o f Parliament (MPs).
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption in the police sector.
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption regarding the privatization o f state-owned
assets (e.g., firms, factories, enterprises).
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption involving public officials (in public
administration at all levels such as mayors, prefects, local
councilors, and inspectors of the Financial Guard) except
Government officials.
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption in the awarding and administration of public
procurement contracts.
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption involving train and bus tickets controllers.
This category includes articles that present cases of
corruption that do not fit into the other categories.
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PERCENT
4.32

4.32

4.25

15.95

10.31

3.14

13.63

0.54
3.50

1.86
12.74
2.21

16.88

4.57

0.75
1.00

Appendix C

List of the Barometers of Public Opinion with Dates When They Were Administered

470

B O P CODE

DEFINITION

S97

SPRING 1 9 9 7

MONTH ADMINISTERED
JUNE

F97

FALL 1 9 9 7

DECEMBER

S98

SPRING 1 9 9 8

JUNE

F98

FALL 1 9 9 8

NOVEMBER

S99

SPRING 1 9 9 9

MAY

F99

FALL 1 9 9 9

OCTOBER

SOO

SPRING

F00

FALL

SOI

SPRING 2 0 0 1

MAY

F01

FALL 2 0 0 1

NOVEMBER

S02

SPRING

F02

FALL

S03

SPRING

F03

FALL

S04

SPRING

F04

FALL

S05

SPRING

F05

FALL

S06

SPRING

F06

FALL

2000

MAY

2000

NOVEMBER

2002

JUNE

2002

OCTOBER

2003

MAY

2003

OCTOBER

2004

MAY

2004

OCTOBER

2005

MAY

2005

OCTOBER

2006

MAY

2006

OCTOBER

Source: Open Society Foundation Romania,
http://www.osf.ro/ro/program_articol.php?articol=107 (last accessed November 5,
2009)
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Appendix D

Discount Rates
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DISCOUNT RATES* (PERCENT)
MONTH
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

JANUARY

-

19.6

21.25

17.31

7.5

FEBRUARY

34.6

19.2

21.25

15.69

7.5

MARCH

34.2

18.4

21.25

10.75

8.47

APRIL

34.1

17.4

21.25

8.45

8.5

MAY

32.2

17.9

21.25

7.96

8.5

JUNE

30.6

18.2

21.25

8

8.5

JULY

28.3

18.2

20.75

8

8.5

AUGUST

27.2

18.2

20.29

8

8.75

SEPTEMBER

25.6

19.11

19.24

8.25

8.75

OCTOBER

23.8

19.25

18.75

7.72

8.75

NOVEMBER

22.2

20.19

18.75

7.5

8.75

DECEMBER

20.4

20.41

17.96

7.5

8.75

Source: National Bank of Romania, http://www.bnro.ro/ (accessed June 15, 2009).
*The mean value of the discount rates is 16.93 percent; the lower bound confidence
interval is 14.93 percent; and the upper bound confidence interval is 18.93 percent.
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Appendix E

Budgetary Funds for the National Customs Authority (1997-2006)
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1,717,228,830,000

1,369,471,600,000

1,286,194,594,000

1,208,613,572,000

973,629,137,000

757,217,751,000

272,347,104,000

175,175,050,000

150,243,452,000

63,347,958,000

Budgetary Fund

—

319,528,875,000

473,825,132,000

481,838,853,000

375,488,000,000

350,091,737,000

400,000,000,000

175,892,000,000

Special Fund for
Modernization

—

—

528,120,100,000

351,000,100,000

270,337,830,000

100,000,000,000

47,000,000,000

—

Extra-Budgetary
Funds

—

108,265,000,000

212,430,000,000

External
Credits

Source: Romanian National Customs Authority, Response to FOIA request (March 9, 2009)
Note: The Values are expressed in million ROL.

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

Year

1,717,228,830,000

1,369,471,600,000

1,713,988,469,000

1,682,438,704,000

1,501,749,237,000

1,802,486,704,000

918,172,934,000

625,266,787,000

597,243,452,000

239,239,958,000

Total
(Nominal Value)

Appendix F

Budgetary Funds for the Customs Sector Adjusted for Inflation and Discounting
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10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

TIME

106.6

109

111.9

115.3

122.5

134.5

145.7

145.8

159.1

254.8

CPI

3,201,296,914,495

3,902,808,417,348

3,717,999,841,971

3,123,638,412,960

3,414,673,696,500

1,605,699,818,690

1,092,715,893,879

956,490,456,126

239,239,958,000

R E A L 1997
ROL*

1,717,228,830,000 4,104,595,740,000

1,369,471,600,000

1,713,988,469,000

1,682,438,704,000

1,501,749,237,000

1,802,486,704,000

918,172,934,000

625,266,787,000

597,243,452,000

239,239,958,000

NOMINAL ROL

*Adjusted for in lation.
**The real 1997 value reported in Figure 23.

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

YEAR

1,004,495,913,370

916,069,514,866

1,305,883,391,421

1,454,659,083,052

1,429,016,691,914

1,826,629,413,193

1,004,362,031,337

799,204,423,087

818,004,985,054

239,239,958,000

DISCOUNTED
1997 R O L

140,137,322

127,800,946

182,183,918

202,939,629

199,362,256

254,833,245

140,118,644

111,497,086

114,119,954

33,376,390

DISCOUNTED
1997 U S D * *

163,680,660

146,718,168

205,573,029

225,076,022

217,325,948

273,042,969

147,562,876

115,412,002

116,106,175

33,376,390

CI
L O W E R 95
(USD)

120,296,857

111,583,801

161,787,042

183,301,987

183,151,242

238,116,575

133,166,836

107,778,042

112,200,547

33,376,390

CI
U P P E R 95
(USD)
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The HSIRB Approval
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Date: June 8,2006
To:

Jim Butterfield, Principal Investigator
Mihaiela Ristei, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Amy Naugle, Ph.D.,
Re:

HSIRB Project Number: 06-03-13

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "An Institutional
Analysis of Corruption in Romania: A Comparison of the Judiciary, Customs, Health
Care and Public Procurement" has been approved under the expedited category of
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